U.S.-Arab strains hand Russia chance to regain some Mideast clout

"(Reuters) - Unfamiliar strains between Washington and its Arab allies have given Russia an opportunity to regain some lost influence in the Middle East, capture arms sales from U.S. competitors and enjoy the unusual spectacle of its old rival looking puny.

No one expects Moscow to challenge the United States as the dominant security guarantor in the Gulf. Nor will Washington cede its place as the main outside player in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Iran's nuclear dispute or other regional issues.

But a perception that America is an increasingly reluctant regional policeman, perhaps because it is less concerned about Arab oil shocks thanks to its own growing output, stirs fears among some Arab rulers that it is no longer a reliable ally.

Arabs feel the balance of world power is changing, and perceptions of U.S. weakness as it withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan mean Gulf Arabs in particular are hedging their bets.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's resolute support for the Syrian leadership has won grudging respect, even among Gulf Arabs who strongly disagree with the Kremlin's policy.

That means that Russia has a chance to restore some of the clout it has lost since the high water mark of Soviet influence in the 1950s and 1960s, when many newly independent Arab states turned to socialism and Moscow for foreign support.

That decline in the Kremlin's sway accelerated after the end of the Cold War two decades ago, a development President Vladimir Putin is expected to do his utmost to reverse.

WEAPONS DEALS

How far Putin succeeds depends partly on his ability to persuade his ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, to embark on peace talks with rebels and to keep his promise to give up his chemical weapons.

It also hinges on U.S. President Barack Obama's ability to restore Gulf Arab trust in his policies on Syria, Iran and Egypt, countries where Saudi Arabia feels he displays weakness.

"Countries are discussing weapons deals with the Russians to send a message to Washington to get its policy straight," Saber Sweidan, a former commander of the Kuwait air force, told Reuters.

"Putin thinks he can bring back the old Soviet empire, and if Obama continues with these policies, maybe Putin will."

Not everyone is so downbeat about U.S. strategy, but attempts by Arab states to cozy up to Moscow are seen a way of signaling displeasure with Washington.

Shadi Hamid, of the Doha Brookings think tank, said Russia probably would become more influential in the region.

"But there are real limits about how far it can go, not least how capable it is," he said. "No one can fill the (security) role played by the United States."

In a development closely watched in the West, Egypt's military-backed authorities hailed a new era of defense cooperation with Moscow last week during a visit by Russian defense and foreign ministers billed by both sides as historic.

Egypt and the Soviet Union were close allies until the 1970s, when Cairo moved closer to the United States, which brokered its 1979 peace deal with Israel.

A source close to the Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that the minister, Sergei Shoigu, and his team spoke with Egyptian counterparts about the sale of fighter jets and air-defense systems, although no deals had been finally agreed.

Despite a better diplomatic climate, Russia has a way to go to match the West's arms supplies to the region.

Russia delivered arms worth $8.4 billion to the Middle East and North Africa in 2008-11, up from to $3.4 billion in 2004-07, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. That is well behind U.S. deliveries of $21.8 billion in 2008-11 and $19.6 billion in 2004-07.

Nevertheless, the region is already exploring a more diverse set of weapons suppliers.

Guy Anderson, Senior Principal Analyst at the IHS Jane's Defense Industry news service, said that while he would not expect a big change in Gulf arms markets medium term, the region's countries were using defense spending to diversify economies though investment partnerships with suppliers.

"They realize that the established relationships with Western powers will probably only get them so far - emerging defense equipment suppliers tend to be more flexible," he said.

Sami al-Faraj, who advises the Gulf Cooperation Council on security matters, said Gulf Arabs wanted "the United States to understand that this is a two way relationship".

"The twists and changes of President Obama have made us suspicious of his intentions," he said, adding Gulf Arabs should expand their list of allies - "not necessarily negating or expelling the whole of the U.S. military role, but adding to it".

India and China had an "affinity of interest" to secure the Gulf, and so did Turkey and Israel, he said.

ARAB DISMAY

The most recent signs of Arab dismay have come from Egypt.

Relations between Cairo and the United States deteriorated after the army overthrew Islamist President Mohamed Mursi on July 3. Washington later said it would withhold deliveries of some military and economic aid pending progress on democracy.

An Egyptian diplomat said Cairo was trying to diversify its arms suppliers and be the region's top military power, and was not abandoning the United States. "It wants options," he said.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states, strong opponents of Mursi, were dismayed by the curb on aid to Egypt. The development added to Gulf Arab anger at Washington's refusal to take action over Syria, where Saudi Arabia and its arch foe Iran are engaged in a proxy war.

Gulf Arabs are equally uneasy over Iran, suspecting Obama is pursuing rapprochement with the Islamic Republic, a power they say meddles in their internal affairs, at the expense of their own security concerns. Iran denies any interference.

A U.N. deal backed jointly by the United States and Russia to dismantle Syrian chemical weapons appeared to Obama's critics in the region to have been a weakling's way of avoiding a retaliatory U.S. military strike on Damascus following a chemical weapons attack on August 21.

"The Americans did not do what they said they were going to do. A man is held by his tongue, as we say in Arabic. Once you say something, follow through," said a Gulf Arab source familiar with the regional defense industry.

Gulf officials and analysts say the problem the Arabs have with Washington centers on Obama and his close aides in the White House, who appear to take them for granted and to value more highly the prospect of a deal with Tehran.

The perception that individuals at the pinnacle of U.S. power do not empathize with Gulf Arab governments erodes Gulf Arab trust in Washington. As small, wealthy states surrounded by sometimes hostile, bigger ones, the ruling dynasties want to feel their ally will defend them in an emergency."

Current Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Online Poll

Do you see sectarian fitna as the objective behind the double bombing in Beirut?

The vote is almost evenly split with 52% saying yes.

Al-Jazeera Video: الحملات الأمنية في سيناء

Yemen's not-so-temporary president

Presidential extension? Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi	Presidential contender? Ahmad Saleh

Election delay likely as ex-dictator's son waits in the wings

By Brian Whitaker

  

           

 
"Following the uprising that led to the fall of President Saleh in Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was "elected" to replace him.

Hadi's victory was scarcely surprising, since his name was the only one on the ballot papers. This was actually illegal, because Yemen's constitution states clearly (Article 107) that there must be at least two candidates, but at the time it was seen as a way of moving forward from the brink of civil war.

In any case, Hadi was supposed to be only a temporary president, steering the country through a two-year "transitional period".

Now, though, it appears that the transitional period – and Hadi's "temporary" presidency – will be extended. 

The transition agreement hammered out in 2011, mainly through the Gulf Cooperation Council, appears to set a two-year time limit on Hadi's presidency starting from the date of his inauguration on 27 February 2012. But the agreement also states that Hadi's presidential term will end with the inauguration of a new president "elected under the new constitution".

The problem here is that with the expiry of the two-year period little more than three months away, Yemen still does not have a new constitution and may not do so in time for elections next February.

Yesterday Jamal Benomar, the UN's special envoy to Yemen, told AFP that Hadi may stay in power for longer because the transition period does not officially end until "all its milestones are completed". 

AFP adds:

"Last month, Hadi said national dialogue talks aimed at drawing up a new constitution and preparing for elections would be resolved within days.

"The talks had been due to end on September 18, but they have been delayed by disagreements about the number of regions that will make up the future state.

"Benomar confirmed one of the main obstacles to the dialogue is 'the structure of the state (with) participants agreeing on the principle of a federal state but not on the number of provinces'.

"Once-independent southern Yemenis are demanding two entities in a federal state – one in the north and one in the south – while northerners want several regions."

Considering the extremely difficult circumstances in Yemen, Hadi has not been a bad president but the longer he stays in office beyond February, the more his legitimacy will be undermined – especially in the light of his dubious election in 2012.

Meanwhile, there's another spectre on the horizon: Ahmad Ali Saleh – eldest son of the ousted president. According to the National Yemen website, a petition is being organised, urging him to contest the next presidential election. 

This is a classic Saleh family tactic. During his 34 years in power, Ahmad's father often insisted that he did not really want to be president and whenever he offered to step down his supporters always demanded that he stay. But when the public began demanding that he go, Saleh proved extremely reluctant to do so.

Now we have the prospect of his son playing the same game – trying not to look hungry for power.

Before the uprising, of course, Saleh the father was generally believed to be grooming his son to succeed him. That fell apart when Saleh was ousted though his son – who had his own military forces in the shape of the Republican Guard – continued to cause trouble for a while.

Eventually, Hadi bundled him off to the United Arab Emirates as Yemen's ambassador there."

Do You Trust This Always Grinning Hyena?

Do You Trust This Always Grinning Hyena?

I Certainly Don't.

Six Other Iranian Embassy Staff Confirmed Dead in Beirut Suicide-Blasts

"Head of the Iranian Embassy’s security team and five of his men have also been among more than two dozen people killed in the twin blasts which struck an area near the embassy compound in Beirut Tuesday morning.

"Rezwan Fares, a Lebanese national who was in charge of the security of the Iranian embassy in Beirut and was also known as Hajj Reza, and the Ambassador's personal bodyguard stopped the suicide-bomber from entering the embassy compound and opened fire on him, when the suicide-bomber exploded his jacket," local officials told FNA's bureau in Beirut Tuesday afternoon.

_{^{Head of the Iranian Embassy’s security team "Rezwan Fares"}}

"Five of the embassy guards were also killed in the blasts today," the report added.

A Lebanese government source said Iran's Cultural Attache Ebrahim Ansari was entering the embassy as the blasts took place, adding that the Iranian official died of his wounds at a Beirut hospital.

_{^{Iran's Cultural Attache in Lebanon Ebrahim Ansari}}

The two bomb blasts killed 23 people and injured 146 others. The attack targeted just 10 meters away from Iranian embassy in Beirut’s Southern neighborhood of Jinah, inflicting much damage to the compound.

The main gate of the Iranian Embassy was blown out by the first explosion, and the second blast happened just meters away from the embassy.

Meanwhile, Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati described the bombings as "a cowardly terrorist act".

Mikati was quoted by Lebanese NNA news agency as saying that the aim of the attacks was to "stir-up the situation in Lebanon".

"We have asked the security apparatuses to speed up the investigations to uncover and arrest the perpetrators."

Also, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Marziyeh Afkham strongly condemned the attack as "an inhuman action", and said, "The Islamic Republic of Iran takes the Zionists and their mercenaries responsible for this action."...."

Al-Jazeera Video: ثلاثة وعشرون قتيلا بتفجيرين في بيروت

مقتل الملحق الثقافي الإيراني في بيروت وآخرين

Israeli Weapon of Mass Colonization, by Emad Hajjaj

Lebanon: Iran's embassy in Beirut hit by two explosions

More than 20 people including diplomat die after twin blasts near Iranian mission in Lebanese capital

• Martin Chulov in Beirut
• theguardian.com, Tuesday 19 November 2013

COMMENT:

This is a major blow to Iran and to Hizbullah. It illustrates that Hizbullah is now incapable of protecting the embassy of its boss in Tehran located in a Hizbullah neighborhood.

The fact that Hizbullah is now pinned down in Syria is an explanation for this vacuum in Lebanon. If Israel attacks in South Lebanon, Hizbullah will not have the resources to repel the Israelis. Is this part of the Israeli strategy?

"Two explosions near the Iranian embassy in Beirut have killed at least 23 people, wounded more than 150, including an Iranian diplomat, and caused extensive damage to one of Lebanon's most heavily guarded buildings.

The attack shattered more than two months of relative calm in Lebanon and was cast by some officials as another spillover from the devastating war in neighbouring Syria, in which Iran, along with other regional powers, has taken a prominent stake.

One of the explosions is thought to have targeted a convoy arriving at the embassy, which contained cultural attaché Sheikh Ibrahim al-Ansari. Ghazanfar Rokanabadi, Iran's ambassador to Lebanon, confirmed Ansari's death, Iranian semi-official news agency Fars said. Lebanese officials also said he had been killed.

Among those killed were embassy guards, who eyewitnesses said had tried to stop a suicide bomber riding a motorbike near the building's gates, which were destroyed in the attack. The first bombing is thought to have been a prelude to a more substantial explosion about a minute later. A large crater near the embassy gate revealed the destructive force of the bomb, which is thought to have been hidden in a car.

Gunfire was heard in the minutes after the blasts as security forces tried to hold back bystanders and allow a cavalcade of rescue vehicles to enter the Bir Hassan area on the western edge of Hezbollah's Beirut stronghold.

The Lebanese militia has been on high alert in its heartland since August when the second of two explosions within weeks ravaged a nearby civilian area, killing scores.

The Shia Islamic leadership of Iran and its Hezbollah ally are strongly supportive of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, while those fighting against it are almost all Sunni Muslims – many of them homegrown Syrians, but also including jihadists who have travelled to Syria to fight the regime and its backers.

As state power has crumbled in Syria, sectarian faultlines have been stretched in Lebanon, where, despite their 1,500-year-old schism, the two main sects of Islam have more or less co-existed since both countries were formed from the ruins of the Ottoman empire.

But such an accommodation is increasingly being tested here, and elsewhere in the region, where the two sects live in proximity. Iraq has witnessed almost daily bombings for the past six months, nearly all of them carried out by extremist Sunni groups who openly state they are trying to reignite the sectarian war that raged there from 2006-07.

Both Iran and Hezbollah have played lead roles in recent advances by Syrian forces around Aleppo in the north and in rebel-held land south of Damascus. Hezbollah is also believed to be at the vanguard of a regime offensive in the Qalamoun mountains just to the east of the Syrian border, which looms as a significant battleground in the overall fight for control of the country.

With the war raging and regional tensions continuing to reverberate, Syrian opposition political leaders have yet to commit to a summit that aims to bring the crisis to a negotiated end. Opposition leaders say they remain opposed to Iran taking part and to Assad playing any future role in Syria.

Iran's ambassador blamed Israel for the attack. The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, remains vehemently opposed to negotiations between Iran, the US and Europe over the fate of Tehran's nuclear programme, which Iran insists is for civilian purposes but Tel Aviv counters is a cover to make nuclear weapons that will be used to "

Guardian Video: Iranian embassy in Beirut left devastated by two explosions

"Rescue teams are seen outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut on Tuesday after at least 20 people were killed and nearly 100 wounded by two explosions nearby. Security forces attend the scene of the blasts in Janah, south Beirut, a neighbourhood hit by several explosions in the past few weeks that have killed and wounded scores of people."

Israel Seeks to Tap Arab Markets With Made-in-Jordan Label

Al-Akhbar

"Cross-border projects are materializing, but not between Arab countries – as Arabs would have hoped – but between Israel and Jordan. A joint industrial park is to be established along the Israeli-Jordanian border, giving Israeli companies the ability to tap into Arab markets, as their products will bear the misleading label “Made in Jordan.”

The Israeli press reports that the industrial zone – the brainchild of Israeli Minister of Regional Cooperation Silvan Shalom – will be submitted to the Israeli government for approval next week. The industrial park will consist of a section near Kibbutz Tirat Zvi on the Israeli side, which will be linked via bridge over the Jordan River to the Jordanian section.

On the Jordanian side, industrial facilities will be built by Israeli and Jordanian firms, and are expected to employ up to 2,000 Jordanian workers, while administration, logistics, and marketing facilities will operate on the Israeli side.

The estimated cost of the project, dubbed Sha’ar Hayarden, meaning Jordan Gate, will be around 180 million shekels (about $50 million).

The estimated cost of the project, dubbed Sha’ar Hayarden, meaning Jordan Gate, will be around 180 million shekels (about $50 million).

According to Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, Jordan will benefit from the increased job opportunities while Israel will stand to benefit from huge savings in labor costs by paying workers relatively low wages (no more than $500 per month on the Jordanian side).

In addition, the factories will be “close to home,” helping Israeli companies save on logistical costs and have more effective control over the production process. But more importantly, the products manufactured in this zone will be stamped with the label “Made in Jordan,” allowing Israeli companies to market their products in Arab countries.

Yedioth Ahronoth also noted that the project, which is considered a historic move between Israel and Jordan, will be overseen by a government agency attached to the Ministry of Regional Cooperation, which will collaborate with the ministries of economy, foreign affairs, defense and transportation.

The newspaper quoted Silvan Shalom as saying, “Sha’ar Hayarden represents a real breakthrough. The project will help strengthen relations between Israel and Jordan, and boost economic growth in the region through the establishment of new factories and joint ventures and job creation. We will continue to take the initiative and press forward with such projects.”"

‘خلطة’ حسن نصر الله

صبحي حديدي

NOVEMBER 17, 2013

محمود أحمدي نجاد، الرئيس الإيراني السابق، غادر المنصب السياسي، وتوجّب أن تغادر معه (لا أن يصطحبها هو، بالضرورة!) تلك التخاريف الطريفة التي اقترنت بخطابه السياسي والعقائدي؛ حول ‘الإمام المهدي الذي يدير العالم ونرى يده المدبّرة في شؤون البلاد كافة’، بما في ذلك نصر إيران على العراق، وتقدّم البرنامج النووي الإيراني؛ أو ‘هالة النور’، التي زعم أنها تحيط به كلما خطب؛ أو تهديد الاحتلال الأمريكي في العراق بـ’يد الله’، التي سوف ‘ترفع جذور الظلم عن العالم’. والإنصاف يقتضي القول إنّ تلك الهلوسات أثارت حفيظة بعض ممثّلي التيّار المحافظ أنفسهم، كما في تعليق حجة الإسلام غلام رضا مصباحي، على سبيل المثال فقط: ”مؤكد أنّ المهدي المنتظر لا يقرّ التضخم الذي بلغ 20 في المئة، وغلاء المعيشة، والكثير غيرهما من الأخطاء’.
توجّب أيضاً أن يصمت، وإنْ إلى حين، أولئك الذين كانوا يغرّدون في السرب ذاته، ضمن الصفّ المحافظ الملتفّ حول نجاد، أمثال غلام علي حداد عادل، الرئيس الأسبق للبرلمان الإيراني، والأوّل غير المعمم، عضو مجلس تشخيص مصلحة النظام ومجلس الشورى والمجلس الأعلى للثورة الثقافية، حامل الدكتوراه في الفيزياء والفلسفة، والمرشح للانتخابات الرئاسية الأخيرة… ولعلّ أشهر هلوسات صاحبنا هذا، ذلك التصريح الذي أطلقه سنة 2006، حين كان يتسيّد البرلمان، وكانت إسرائيل لا تُبقي حجراً على حجر في لبنان: ‘الحرب بدأت لتوّها’، ومعها ‘بدأ يوم القيامة’، ‘وجاء يوم عودة الفلسطينيين إلى ديارهم ووطنهم وكذلك عودة الإسرائيليين إلى البلاد التي جاءوا منها أصلاً’! وإذْ أوضح أننا ‘سنؤدي صلاة الشكر في القدس قريباً إن شاء الله’، بشّرنا لا فُضّ فوه بأنّ ‘دماء آية الله الخميني تجري في عروق نصر الله’، ولهذا ‘لن تكون هناك بقعة في الأراضي المحتلة بمأمن من هجمات حزب الله’…
بيد أنّ هذا الطراز من خطاب الاستيهام غاب عن الواجهة الأولى في إيران، لكي يتواصل، أو تظهر تنويعات شتى عليه، في أماكن أخرى مترامية، لعلّ لبنان أبرزها وأشدّها سخونة، أو سعاراً بالأحرى؛ ولعلّ الإطلالات الجماهيرية التي دأب عليها حسن نصر الله، الأمين العام لـ’حزب الله’، أعلاها تمثيلاً لروحيّة ذلك الخطاب، وأكثرها إدراكاً لوظائفه، وإحياءً لمفرداته. والمرء يتذكّر ذلك الإفراط الشديد في تلميع صورة نجاد، أثناء زيارته إلى لبنان قبل ثلاث سنوات، وكيف أنّ تضخيم سجاياه القيادية، ورفع خصاله الشخصية إلى سوية رفيعة (السند العظيم للمقاومين والمجاهدين والمظلومين) بدا وكأنه باغت الرئيس الإيراني السابق نفسه. حصّة نصر الله، في ذلك التلميع، كانت مشهودة حقاً: ‘نشمّ بك يا سيادة الرئيس رائحة الإمام الخميني المقدّس، ونتلمس فيك أنفاس قائدنا الخامنئي الحكيم، ونرى في وجهك وجوه كلّ الإيرانيين الشرفاء من أبناء شعبك العظيم الذين صدقوا ما عاهدوا الله عليه، فمنهم من قضى نحبه في كلّ الساحات، ومنهم من ينتظر وما بدّلوا تبديلا’.
الأرجح، اتكاءً على منطق حسابي وأخلاقي بسيط، أنّ الإيرانيين الذين لم يصوّتوا لأحمدي نجاد في ترشّحه الثاني للانتخابات الرئاسية (وهم في عداد ‘الإيرانيين الشرفاء’ الذين تحدّث عنهم نصر الله، في المنطق الحسابي والأخلاقي البسيط هنا أيضاً)، لم يذهبوا مذهب الأمين العام لـ’حزب الله’ في ذلك التفخيم للرجل؛ تماماً كما كان العديد من السوريين قد نظروا بمرارة، وباستنكار، إلى عبارات مثل ‘سورية حافظ الأسد’ و’سورية بشار الأسد’ كان نصر الله قد اعتاد النطق بها في خطب سابقة. هذا بمعزل عن احتمالات مواقف عكسية تصدر عن مرجعيات دينية عليا في إيران، على غرار حجة الإسلام مصباحي، قد تأبى على نصر الله شمّ رائحة الخميني، أو تلمّس أنفاس خامنئي، في شخص نجاد!
‘نريد أن نقول لكلّ عدو ولكلّ صديق، نحن شيعة علي بن أبي طالب في العالم’؛ ‘ونحن حزب الله. الحزب الإسلامي الشيعي الإمامي الإثنا عشري، لن نتخلى عن فلسطين’؛ وأيضاً: ”قولوا رافضة. قولوا إرهابيين. قولوا مجرمين. اقتلونا تحت كل حجر ومدر، وفي كل جبهة، وعلى باب كلّ حسينية ومسجد، نحن شيعة علي بن أبي طالب!’، هكذا ردّد نصر الله، في آب (أغسطس) الماضي، احتفاءً بيوم القدس. وبالأمس، في يوم عاشوراء، تكررت النغمة ذاتها: ‘يجب أن نذكّر أمّتنا الإسلامية جمعاء بالقضية المركزية، قضية فلسطينوشعب فلسطين ومقدسات الأمة في فلسطين’؛ ليس دون ربط القتال إلى جانب نظام الاستبداد والفساد ضدّ الشعب السوري، بفلسطين… أيضاً وأيضاً: ‘إنّ وجود مقاتلينا ومجاهدينا على الأرض السورية، هو بهدف الدفاع عن لبنان والدفاع عن فلسطين وعن القضية الفلسطينية’…
هذه ‘الخلطة’، بين الإمامية الإثنا عشرية، وإشعال جذوة الحمية المذهبية على النحو الأشدّ استدراراً للشعور العصبوي الجَمْعي الرخيص؛ وادعاء الجهاد (نعم، وليس ‘المقاومة’ هذه المرّة!) على أرض سورية، ضدّ ‘الإرهابيين’ و’التكفيريين’، وليس ضدّ إسرائيل بأية حال من الأحوال؛ ثمّ الدفاع عن لبنان وفلسطين معاً، ولكن من القصير وحلب وسبينة وبيت سحم والسيدة زينب… هي خلطة ضيزى، شائهة زائفة مضلِّلة، لا ينقصها إلا استلهام هستيريا نجاد حول المهدي المنتظَر، أو التماس هالة النور… على جبين البشار الأسد!

Egypt: There is Something Deeply Unhealthy About the Sisi Worship

He has won the hearts and minds of the people but all that may change if the security situation worsens or the economy dips

By Robert Fisk 
November 17, 2013 "Information Clearing House - "The Independent" -- Could we ever have imagined, two and a half years ago, that we would witness the idolisation of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi?

Perhaps Egypt does something to generals. We were always reminded by former President Hosni Mubarak's cronies that he was an air force hero in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; you'd think that his bombing raid was the only one staged by the Egyptian air force. Sadat loved uniforms when he was president - blue, with far too many ribbons - and of course there was Colonel Nasser and his millions of admirers.

But the mass worship of Sisi has surely gone too far. Journalists adore him, people eat sweets made in his portrait. And now, Egyptians are passing around hundred dollar bills with his coloured portrait Photoshopped over the engraving of Benjamin Franklin. Sisi is in full colour and dress uniform, staring unsmiling at the holder of this weird currency. On the reverse side, over the White House, there he is again, this time seated on a kind of throne, in camouflage fatigues, baseball cap on his head, arm raised to his chin, thinking, no doubt, of Egypt's glorious future.

Egyptians may be grateful to their army commander - and minister of defence, and deputy prime minister, for Sisi is all of these things - for deposing the country's first elected president, Mohamed Morsi, and putting him on trial this month for the deaths of anti-Brotherhood demonstrators last December. But there have to be limits. When an Egyptian journalist walked up to me in the court in which Morsi was being tried, I knew the question she would ask. "Was it a coup or a revolution?" It's the only question a stranger gets asked in Cairo these days. Say it was a coup which overthrew Morsi in July, and you are a Muslim Brotherhood supporter. Say it was a revolution - in other words, a continuation of the 2011 revolution which overthrew Mubarak - and you are with Sisi.

The trial itself was political. Why wasn't the current Egyptian minister of interior also in the dock - he held the same ministry in Morsi's government - for the same crime of killing demonstrators outside the presidential palace. And, for that matter, why wasn't he on trial for the deaths of more than 600 pro-Brotherhood protestors after the coup. For it was indeed a coup; Sisi wasn't elected. Besides, does anyone believe that Morsi will be declared innocent? Yet strangely, the outside world is going along with this nonsense. John Kerry, the US Secretary of State who must be the only man alive to believe he can bring peace to 'Palestine', turned up in Cairo - on the day before Morsi's trial, no less - with soft words for Sisi. Progress towards a civilian government - there are supposed to be parliamentary elections early next year - would "function according to the norms of a global democracy, irrespective of the fact that we may have some cultural variations here and there in terms of our traditions."

What this gobbledegook meant was anyone's guess. Did he mean that Egyptians like armies to overthrow elected presidents, whereas Americans generally don't? But it's true that the military coup is now scarcely criticized, even on foreign satellite TV channels. I noticed at the time that broadcasts abroad of Egyptian state television footage of the violence usually carried the original Egyptian logo, 'War on Terror' - in English - at the top of the screen, without explaining to international viewers that this was not exactly what the coup was about.

Yet millions of Egyptians have now also accepted this interpretation of events. True, there are the makings of a Salafist uprising in Sinai with some vicious mass murders of policemen - perhaps involving Palestinians from across the Gaza frontier - but this has now been conflated with the overthrow of Morsi's legitimate if deeply flawed government. Much publicity has been given to the closing of the tunnels that run beneath the Egyptian border into Gaza and the destruction of eight underground tanks holding 334,000 litres of diesel that was to be smuggled by hose into the Hamas-controlled slums of that pitiful place. But there is also evidence that the Egyptian authorities are simply closing and then re-closing the same tunnels. Certainly, the Palestinian refugees of Gaza are now paying the price of Morsi's alliance with Hamas.

Politically, it is as if many Egyptians have relapsed into the infantilism of the Mubarak era. He always called his people his "children" - he did so, twice, in his final broadcast - until the people grew up, only to discover that it was the government who were children, one of whom was 83 years-old. But do they want to be children all over again? Few are the voices of sanity to speak out against the new and fearful spirit infecting Egypt. Egyptian commentator Nervana Mahmoud is one of them, writing this month that Sisi had clearly managed to win the hearts and minds of Egyptians because of what the people see as good leadership, the very skill which Morsi lacked.

"Should this popularity shield Sisi from criticism?" she then asked. "The answer lies in what Egyptians really wanted when they poured into the streets on 30 June. If they truly wanted to overthrow Islamist fascism, then they should repudiate the equally oppressive national fascism and resist the temptation to elevate al-Sisi to a special, sacrosanct level."

But the new regime's powers creep on. When Brotherhood students began shouting "Al-Sisi is a traitor" at Cairo University, they found the army and police turning up at the gates. University staff claim there has been violence on campus, but would prefer private security guards. The authorities now want to check the identities of all students as they enter and leave universities.

There are reports that the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to participate in elections next year through its political party, and this may be true. The Brotherhood has always been prepared to slide behind the backs of their own supporters and parley with the bad guys. After all, they didn't want to participate in the revolution against Mubarak. While young revolutionaries were being shot down in Tahrir Square in 2011, the Brotherhood's men were negotiating with the late Omar Sulieman, Mubarak's creepy intelligence boss. One of the Brotherhood negotiators was Morsi himself.

Sisi is an interesting man. His uncle was a member of the Brotherhood many years ago - is this why Morsi accepted him as his own defence minister? - but he has never seen combat, unless his forgotten defence of virginity tests on Tahrir demonstrators counts. He graduated from military academy only after the 1973 war and the army leadership today contains no great military heroes. True, the old boys of the '73 war probably support Sisi. One retired general, Sayed Wagdy who is still being treated for his wounds at the Maadi military hospital, publicly declared that in July the army "did what had to be done at the right time to avoid a civil war."

But this year's 40th anniversary celebration of the crossing of the Suez Canal was curiously muted, as if the army did not want to draw attention to itself - or to Sisi's lack of a combat record. One Egyptian government official - a senior man in a position of responsibility within his ministry - told me that Sisi must be careful. "At the moment, it's going OK for him," he said. "But wait until something goes wrong. The economy gets worse, say, or there is even less security - more car-bombings - and then he will get blamed. Sisi won't have a good time forever." And what if Israel decides to abandon any connection with Gaza and tells the Egyptians to take it over? Will the Egyptian army then have to take on Hamas?

And there is something deeply unhealthy about the Sisi worship. The army is always beyond reproach. But Sisi's name is actually uttered in hushed and reverential terms, not so much a father-figure but a mother-protector to rival Egypt's greatest mother, the Nile. Indeed, the voice you hear most was best summed up by a journalist two weeks ago. "Give me a strong army that will shoot down armed men crossing over my border," she wrote. "Give me a national leader who will show no mercy in facing down car bombings, assassinations, sabotage. Give me a statesman who will respect your religion but blow you into your 'janna' (heaven) if you try to snuff out mine."

The journalist was Sharmine Narwani and the headline of her article read: "Forget Democracy, Give Me Safe Borders." But she was writing in support of the Syrian regime. No wonder Bashar al-Assad congratulated the Egyptian military on their overthrow of Morsi."
 

Too Soon

David Fitzsimmons, Cagle Cartoons, The Arizona Star

Sunday Times: Israel, Saudi Arabia cooperating to plan possible Iran attack

Saudis would allow Israel use of air space and provide drones, rescue helicopters and tanker planes, report says.

HAARETZ

Netanyahu and King Abdullah have a common interest in a possible air attack on Iran (NIR BEN-YOSEF/AFP/AVI OHAYON)

"Israel and Saudi Arabia are secretly working together on plans for a possible attack against Iran in case the Geneva talks fail to roll back its nuclear program, British paper The Sunday Times reported.

The two countries' shared concern has put them at odds with the United States as the latter continues to seek an agreement with Iran to ease economic sanctions in return for pulling back nuclear development.

According to the diplomatic source quoted by the Times, Saudia Arabia has agreed to let Israel use its air space, and assist an Israeli attack by cooperating on the use of drones, rescue helicopters and tanker planes.

Israel's Mossad intelligence agency is reportedly working with Saudi officials to make arrangements following the signing of a nuclear deal in Geneva.

“Once the Geneva agreement is signed, the military option will be back on the table. The Saudis are furious and are willing to give Israel all the help it needs,” the Times quoted the source as saying....."

التحالف الإيراني في غرور استثنائي

ياسر الزعاترة

لا يحتاج المراقب إلى كثير من التنقيب في ثنايا الأخبار والمعلومات كي يرى بأم عينيه حجم غرور القوة ومشاعر الغطرسة التي تتلبس أركان التحالف الإيراني في المنطقة، والتي بدت أكثر وضوحا خلال الأسابيع الأخيرة على خلفية الشعور بفشل الثورة السورية في الإطاحة بنظام بشار الأسد الذي يمثل الركن الإستراتيجي في ذلك التحالف، وبالطبع بسبب تأثيرات سقوطه على الوضع في العراق ولبنان، ومجمل مشروع التمدد الإيراني. واللافت بالطبع في هذه القضية هو تراجع حكاية المواجهة مع المشروع الأميركي الصهيوني في المنطقة في خطاب التحالف، بخاصة ذلك القادم من إيران التي تعيش مرحلة غزل مع "الشيطان الأكبر"، بل ومع اليهود أيضا والكيان الصهيوني الذي لم يعد يُذكر إلا في سياق لا يختلف عن الخطاب العربي (خطيب جمعة طهران 8 نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني الجاري، حيث قال بالنص "يجب تشخيص العدو.. الأعداء الرئيسيون لنا هم أميركا وبريطانيا وحلفاؤهما"، من دون أن يذكر الكيان الصهيوني بالاسم). وقد لفت انتباه رئيس الموساد السابق (إفرايم هاليفي، كيف غاب البعد الفلسطيني من خطاب مشاركين إيرانيين في مؤتمر حضره معهم ومع آخرين في تركيا مؤخرا (يديعوت 11/11). بشار أيضا لم يعد يذكر المشروع الصهيوني في مقابلاته، بقدر ما يتحدث عن تركيا وعدد من الدول العربية، وبدا ذلك أكثر وضوحا بعد صفقة السلاح الكيميائي الذي باعه من أجل الحفاظ على وجوده، فضلا عن الدور الذي بات يعرضه على الغربيين، ممثلا في مواجهة الإرهاب الذي يمكن أن يضرب بعد ذلك المدن الأميركية والأوروبية، كما يردد دائما. "أول معالم الغرور تلك القادمة من دمشق والتي يعكسها خطاب بشار وعدد من مساعديه بعد أن شعروا بالاسترخاء إثر انتهاء كابوس الضربة العسكرية، فضلا عن الشرعية التي حصل عليها عبر الاتفاق معه، والحاجة إليه لأكثر من عام حتى يتم التخلص من الكيميائي " وحده حسن نصر الله ومساعدوه هم الذين لا يزالون يرددون ذلك الخطاب، ليس قناعة باستمرار المواجهة مع المشروع الصهيوني، بل لأنه المبرر الوحيد المتاح للاحتفاظ بالسلاح في لبنان، في وقت يعلم الجميع أن حزب الله قد انتهى كحركة مقاومة بعد الاتفاق الذي أنهى حرب يوليو/تموز 2006. في سياق الحديث عن معالم الغرور والغطرسة التي تتلبس التحالف الإيراني منذ أسابيع يمكن رصد الكثير من المعالم، لعل أولها تلك القادمة من دمشق والتي يعكسها خطاب بشار وعدد من مساعديه بعد أن شعروا بالاسترخاء إثر انتهاء كابوس الضربة العسكرية، فضلا عن الشرعية التي حصل عليها عبر الاتفاق معه، ومن ثم الحاجة إليه لأكثر من عام حتى يتم التخلص من الأسلحة الكيميائية، فضلا عن الحاجة إليه كي لا يقع البلد في أتون الفوضى، ولكي يواجه الجماعات الإرهابية كما يسمونها. لاسيما أيضا أن بشارا لا يجد أدنى مشكلة في قيام الكيان الصهيوني باستهداف ما تبقى من الأسلحة التي يمكن أن تشكل خطرا عليه، كما حدث مؤخرا لمخازن الصواريخ المضادة للطيران في اللاذقية، مع ضرورة التذكير بالغضب الإسرائيلي على الأميركيين الذي سرّبوا خبر الهجوم، والذي يعني إمكانية أن تكون هناك هجمات أخرى حدثت أو ستحدث من دون أن يجري تسريب أخبارها. الجانب الأهم من الخطاب الذي يعكس غرور القوة يأتي من طرف حزب الله على وجه الخصوص، كما عكس ذلك نصر الله وبعض مساعديه مؤخرا (عنونت صحيفة الأخبار المقربة من الحزب تغطيتها لخطابه الأخير بالقول "نصرالله: هذا زمننا"). ففي مجلس عاشورائي تحدث (محمد رعد) مسؤول كتلة نواب حزب الله في البرلمان قائلا "نحن تدخلنا في سوريا لنمنع تدخلهم وتواطؤهم وتآمرهم على المقاومة وشعبها ورجالها وإنجازاتها، من أجل أن نحمي لبنان من ارتكاباتهم وجرائمهم والصور الإجرامية التي نشاهدها منهم على شاشات التلفزة". وأضاف "قلبنا الطاولة على رؤوسكم، وإياكم أن تفكروا بمثلها، نحن دافعنا عن أنفسنا وعن لبناننا بما يتطلبه الدفاع، لكن حذار أن تجبرونا على أن نتصرف بغير الدفاع". ولم يكتف بذلك، بل سخر من سياسة النأي بالنفس قائلا "لا توجد وسطية اسمها النأي بالنفس، هذه الوسطية الحيادية هي انحياز لمعسكر الباطل، عن قصد أو عن غير قصد". أما نائب زعيم حزب الله (الشيخ نعيم قاسم) فقال إن "مشروع إسقاط سوريا أخفق، والمراهنين عليه خسروا وسيزدادون خسارة يوما بعد يوم"، لكن نصر الله نفسه لم يكن أقل وضوحا في عكس مشاعر الانتصار وغرور القوة، فقد قال ما نصه "ما كان مخططا لسوريا أكبر مما كان مخططا لحزب الله في يوليو/تموز 2006، والأمر يتجاوز موضوع الإصلاح والتغيير، هناك مؤامرة لإسقاط النظام بخياراته السياسية التي جعلته يقف إلى جانب المقاومة في العراق وفلسطين ولبنان". وأكد أن ذهاب حزب الله إلى سوريا "كان أكثر من ضرورة وواجب"، مضيفا "لو لم نذهب إلى سوريا، لتحول لبنان عراقا ثانيا". "لا حاجة للرد هنا على مبررات نصر الله ومساعديه، فالجميع يعلم أن الثورة السورية لم تكن مؤامرة ولا ثورة عنف ولا إرهاب، بل ثورة ضد نظام دكتاتوري فاسد من قبل شعب داعبته أشواق الحرية التي انتشرت في المنطقة بسبب ربيع العرب " لا حاجة بالطبع للرد هنا على مبررات نصر الله ومساعديه، فقد تحدثنا مرارا عنها، فيما يعلم الجميع أن الثورة السورية لم تكن مؤامرة، ولا ثورة عنف ولا إرهاب، بل ثورة ضد نظام دكتاتوري فاسد من قبل شعب داعبته أشواق الحرية التي انتشرت في المنطقة بسبب ربيع العرب.   ولا ننسى الإشارة هنا إلى أن نصر الله وأيا من مساعديه لم يذكر اتفاق الكيميائي، ولا غزل إيران مع "الشيطان الأكبر"، بل تحدثوا بذات اللهجة القديمة وكأن شيئا لم يتغير أو يحدث طوال شهور. على أن الأسوأ من الخطاب، هو السلوك العملي، ففي حين كانت دوائر حزب الله تبعث برسائل هنا وهناك تتحدث عن بداية انسحاب لمقاتلي الحزب من سوريا، إذ بنا نفاجأ بتصعيد وجوده ودوره وعملياته، ومعه الكتائب الشيعية القادمة من العراق، ومن دول أخرى، وصار حضور الحزب وتلك الكتائب بإشراف من الحرس الثوري أكثر وضوحا وتحديا وقوة من ذي قبل. ففي حين تحدث نائب إيراني عن وجود عشرات الكتائب من الحرس الثوري في سوريا، عاد المسؤول الإعلامي للحرس إلى القول إن وجوده لا يتعدى الإشراف والتدريب، لكن الحزب كان له رأي آخر في طريقة عرض نفسه، إضافة لما نقلناه آنفا. فقد رافق مراسل مجلة "تايم" الأميركية استعدادات عناصر الحزب لمعركة القلمون، ونقل بعض الشهادات من هناك، والتي تعكس حجم الغطرسة التي يشعر بها القوم، بخاصة بعد التقدم الذي أحرزوه في بعض مناطق ريف دمشق وحلب. أحد مقاتلي حزب الله، واسمه علي (27 عاما) قال لمراسل تايم "إذا لم ندافع عن النظام السوري فإنه سيسقط في غضون ساعات". أما أبو جهاد (قيادي من الحزب)، فقال إن الجيش السوري سيساعد (في القلمون)، لكن "كل شيء سيكون تحت قيادتنا، وسيعمل الجيش بناء على خططنا".  وزاد أحد القادة الميدانيين مشاعر الغطرسة وضوحا حين قال "اتخذنا قرارا بعدم السماح لأي منهم (ثوار القلمون) بالخروج حيا"!! وما لا يقل وضوحا هو ذلك الخطاب الذي يأتي من الفرع الإيراني الآخر في العراق، لاسيما بعد أن خطت تركيا خطوات نحو التقارب مع الحكومة العراقية، فقد سمعنا أحد أركان تحالف المالكي يتحدث إلى إذاعة "بي بي سي" بعد وصول أحمد داوود أوغلو إلى بغداد يقول إن تركيا ستكون "تحت الاختبار" للتأكد من صدق نواياها، وتحدث عن دعمها لمكون عراقي معين (يقصد العرب السنّة)، متجاهلا ما تفعله إيران. مما يعكس غرور القوة ومشاعر الغطرسة بالنسبة للتحالف الإيراني، ودائما بسبب القناعة بأن نظام بشار قد نجا من السقوط، هو تلك الإشارات التي تأتي من مناطق أبعد، كما هو حال الاشتباكات التي جرت في دماج (اليمن) بين الحوثيين والسلفيين، والتي تعد رسالة للسعودية التي تقف بحسب التحالف الإيراني ضد النظام السوري، وضد التمدد الإيراني. "ما ينبغي أن يكون واضحا هو أن الحراك السياسي بالمنطقة لم يستقر على حال بعد، فسوريا ورغم ما تعيشه ثورتها من إشكالات، فإنها تشكل استنزافا لإيران، ولا يبدو أن فرصة الحسم العسكري لصالح النظام واردة، وأقصى ما يمكن أن تحلم به طهران هو اتفاق "لا غالب ولا مغلوب" " يدخلنا هذا البعد الأخير مباشرة إلى ملف المواجهة مع هذه الحالة التي نحن بصددها، ذلك أن مشكلة الوضع العربي إنما تتمثل في تحالف الثورة المضادة عربيا، والذي يوحي بأنه يتصدى للتمدد الإيراني (يريد ذلك فعلا)، فيما الحقيقة أن أولويته هي مطاردة ربيع العرب والإسلام السياسي السني، وهو بانقضاضه على الثورة المصرية منح إيران فرصة أكبر للتمدد في المنطقة، لاسيما أن مرسي كان قد اتخذ موقفا جديدا حاسما حيال ثورة سوريا، ولا يتوقف الأمر عند ذلك، فتخريب ربيع العرب سيشمل بالضرورة سوريا، كما أن أجواء الإحباط في المنطقة بعد إجهاض ثورة مصر لا شك ستطال سوريا. على أن ما ينبغي أن يكون واضحا هنا هو أن الحراك السياسي في المنطقة لم يستقر على حال بعد، فسوريا ورغم ما تعيشه ثورتها من إشكالات، إلا أنها تشكل استنزافا كبيرا لإيران، ولا يبدو أن فرصة الحسم العسكري لصالح النظام واردة، وأقصى ما يمكن أن تحلم به طهران هو اتفاق "لا غالب ولا مغلوب". أما الذي لا يقل أهمية فهو أن خسارتها وحلفاءها باتت كبيرة بدخولهم في مزاج عداء حاد مع الأغلبية السنية في المنطقة، ما سيؤثر بالضرورة على لبنان والعراق حتى لو لم تنته ثورة سوريا بانتصار واضح. ستكتشف إيران، وإن في وقت متأخر، أن ما فعلته في سوريا كان أشد ضررا بها وبحلفائها من سقوط النظام، إذ لم يسبق أن دخل أحد في مزاج عداء شامل مع غالبية الأمة، إلا وكانت الخسارة من نصيبه، إن لم يكن في المدى القريب، ففي المدى المتوسط. هل ثمة فرصة لتصحيح الموقف؟ لا إجابة حاسمة، لكن المعارك الدائرة في المنطقة تستنزف الجميع، وليس مستبعدا أن يعود المغرورون إلى رشدهم ويعيدوا حساباتهم على نحو يجعل إمكانية التعايش وحسن الجوار بديلا عن الغطرسة والعدوان

What future for the Palestinian movement? Two debates

Submitted by Ali Abunimah on Sat, 11/16/2013 - 20:11

I participated in the Palestine Center’s annual conference in Washington, DC on 15 November, with the theme “The Politics of Identity in the Middle East.”

Two panels, the first with me and Bill Quandt, and the second featuring Osamah Khalil and Manal Jamal, focused specifically on the question of Palestine.

Instead of giving presentations, we answered questions posed by the moderator, engaging in lively debate with audience participation – the “Palestinian version of Crossfire,” as one moderator called it.

Here are the videos and my comments.

The “peace process” and its alternatives

In the first encounter, moderated by Dr. Eid Mustafa, William Quandt, professor of politics at the University of Virginia, and I discussed the “peace process” and alternatives to it, including the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement and the growing attention to the “one-state solution.”

Quandt served as a staff member on the National Security Council (1972-1974, 1977-1979) and was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

With regard to the current US-sponsored peace talks, we were asked to address whether the US would and could successfully propose a peace plan of its own.

“I can’t imagine that Secretary [of State John] Kerry has invested as much time and energy as he has unless he has in the back of his mind that at some point in the near future, the United States will put forward some kind of bridging proposals,” Quandt said.

Such proposals would most likely resemble the “Clinton parameters” for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, territories Israel occupied in 1967.

Such proposals usually include an extremely limited right of return for refugees and Israeli annexation of large settlement blocs.

Quandt stressed that despite well-justified doubts and past experience, there was no other party that could do this other than the United States.

I argued that this approach was far past working, regardless of one’s views on the two-state solution.

While the Palestinian Authority would “eagerly grab at a few shreds of the West Bank and call it a state if the Israelis would offer it to them,” there was no prospect of this, I said.

“The Israelis are not looking for a deal along the 1967 lines or anything close to the 1967 lines,” I added. “Israel isn’t interested in borders. Israel is interested in expansion.”

Paraphrasing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s dictum on Iran-US negotiations that “no deal is better than a bad deal,” I affirmed that:

for the Palestinians, no deal with Israel is better than a bad deal, because a bad deal would irrevocably cancel Palestinian rights. And now, the only thing protecting Palestinians from a bad deal is Israel’s intransigence.

I also noted – in a point Khalil elaborated on later drawing on his deep knowledge of US diplomatic history – that tensions between the United States and Israel over Iran would not necessarily translate into gains for Palestinians.

Rather, the US would most likely seek to appease Israeli anger with further indulgence as Israel colonizes more of the West Bank.

Quandt warned that the alternative to a diplomatic solution would be continued stagnation as Israel builds settlements. The question of Palestine could be relegated to a category which includes the Cyprus and Kashmir conflicts – intractable issues that attract few serious efforts aimed at resolving them.

Future of the Palestinian movement

In a rich discussion, moderated by journalist George Hishmeh, Osamah Khalil and Manal Jamal discussed the past and present role of Arab states in the question of Palestine, the situation of Palestinians in Syria, and the future of the Palestinian national movement.

“Let’s be clear. The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] was dismantled after the Oslo accords,” Khalil declared early in the discussion.

“Mahmoud Abbas’ title as chairman of the PLO is an empty title. That organization does not exist. What exists of the PLO – liberation has been pulled out of the Palestine Liberation Organization. What we have instead is a Palestinian Negotiating Authority.”

Khalil is assistant professor of history at Syracuse University and co-founder of Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network (http://al-shabaka.org).

Given such stark analyses, a major topic was how Palestinians could move forward given the multiple immediate crises Palestinians including internal divisions and the dire situations of Palestinians from Gaza to Lebanon to Syria.

In so many places Palestinians are struggling for mere “survival,” said Jamal, assistant professor of political science at James Madison University.

“We have all these crises going on and when people want to organize the next step, how do we look at the overall picture?”

Should we be discussing such issues as “one state or two states” or emphasizing the immediate crises, Jamal asked.

Jamal also affirmed that in light of the latest revelations regarding polonium poisoning, there should be an international investigation into the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s “assassination.”

While Khalil supported this, he suggested that investigations into the corrupt practices of living Palestinian Authority leaders might be more pressing.

No one will be surprised that we could not definitively resolve these issues, but these are thought-provoking discussions that touch on many questions that Palestinians everywhere are asking.