Thursday, December 25, 2014
جبهة النصرة أيضاً
سلامة كيلة
كان يبدو أن الجبهة السورية الجنوبية تحقق انتصارات لامست حدود ريف دمشق، وكان المؤمل أن تفك الحصار عن الريفين، الغربي والشرقي. لكن، بدا، منذ أسابيع، أن التقدم توقف، وأن غموضاً يلف ما يجري. في الأيام الأخيرة، شنت جبهة النصرة هجوماً على لواء شهداء اليرموك، وقبلها حاولت فرض "خلافتها" على مدينة نوى، حيث حصلت احتكاكات مع مقاتلين من الجيش الحر من المدينة. وبالتالي، ظهر أن الجبهة أخذت تمارس ما مارسته في الشمال، حيث باتت تريد فرض سلطتها وفرض "قوانينها" (أو شريعتها)، ثم بدأت عملية قضم للكتائب المسلحة الأخرى.
منذ وجود جبهة النصرة في منطقة حوران، افتعلت صراعاً مع مناطق درزية، وخطفت دروزاً عديدين. وحين تقدمت الكتائب المسلحة للسيطرة على القنيطرة، احتجزت الجبهة القوات الدولية. في تلك وفي هذه، لم يجرِ تحليل الهدف من مثل هذه الخطوات، وظل التعامل مع جبهة النصرة قائماً، وعلى الرغم من أنها كذلك، اعتقلت وقتلت من قيادات الكتائب المسلحة. ربما استطاعت الكتائب المسلحة "لجم" النصرة، حيث كانت تريد افتعال صراع طائفي مع الدروز، وتريد أن تدفع القوى الدولية إلى دعم السلطة، بعد خطف عناصر القوات الدولية، عبر قرار من مجلس الأمن. ربما لم يتحقق لا ذاك ولا هذا. لكن، كان يجب أن يكون واضحاً أن للنصرة "أهدافها"، وأنها ستغدر كما فعلت في الشمال (قبل داعش).
ما لا يبدو مفهوماً لدى الكتائب المسلحة هو طبيعة النصرة (وكذلك داعش، وحتى جيش الإسلام). ولهذا، تجري معاملتها كتنظيم "من الثورة" يخطئ. لكن، الأمر أكبر من ذلك، أو ليس كذلك أبداً، لأن هذه التنظيمات لا تعرف السياسة، بل تتبع الفقه (وفق مدرسة الوهابية). ولهذا، لا تخوض الصراع السياسي ضد السلطة، بل تعتبر أن مهمتها "إقامة دولة الخلافة"، وهنا النصرة كداعش وقبلها (أقامت الخلافة في حلب قبل داعش). بالتالي، ليست معركتها ضد الاستبداد، أو من أجل التحرر من سلطة ناهبة، فذلك كله لا يرد في القاموس الفقهي الذي تتبعه، وهو مرحلة تتجاوز الفقه أصلاً. إنها تريد فرض "شريعتها" التي تلقتها من الوهابية، والتي تعتمد التفسير الحرفي الشكلي جداً للدين، وتعتقد أن مهمتها "التاريخية" فرض تلك الشريعة عبر المطاوعة، أو المدربين لدى المطاوعة.
وإذا كنت أعتقد أنها مخترقة مثل داعش من أجهزة أمنية، ومن السلطة تحديداً (أطلقت سراح كثيرين من كادرها بعد الثورة بأشهر، وربما بعام)، فالأمر، في كل الأحوال، يقود إلى ما نلمس كل يوم من ميل لفرض "الإمارة"، نتيجة التكوين الأيديولوجي الذي حُقن به هؤلاء "البسطاء"، وينطلق من فرض الشعائر والقيم الدينية المؤسسة على مفاهيم محمد بن عبد الوهاب، والبدائية في بنيتها، على كل فرد. هذه أولوية لدى هؤلاء، تسبق الصراع ضد السلطة بالضرورة (وكما كانت أولوية ضد الشيعة في العراق بدل الاحتلال). بالتالي، يجعلنا الانطلاق من "طيب نية" نرى هذا الجانب الخطر في بنية هذه التنظيمات. إنهم "رسل" بناء "الدولة الإسلامية"، وليس الصراع من أجل "سفاسف الحياة".
ماذا يعني ذلك؟ إنه يعني أنهم قنبلة في كل مكان يوجدون فيه، لأنهم سينقلبون، بالضرورة، ضد القوى التي تقاتل السلطة، ويسعون إلى فرض خلافتهم. فالجنة تقتضي ذلك. ولهذا، يسهل قيادهم من الأجهزة الأمنية، وتوجيههم بما يخدم السلطة (والإمبريالية).
مأساة المعارضة أنها "جاهلة"، ومشكلة الشباب الذي يقاتل أنه لم يستفد من تجارب سابقة، بدأت في أفغانستان، ثم في العراق، وتكررت في الشمال السوري. لهذا، لا إمكانية لقتال حقيقي ضد السلطة في منطقة توجد فيها النصرة، أو داعش طبعاً، أو حتى كل الفصائل التي تريد "تطبيق الشريعة". فهؤلاء يقاتلون من أجل "الجنة"، وليس من أجل الحرية والديمقراطية.
كان يبدو أن الجبهة السورية الجنوبية تحقق انتصارات لامست حدود ريف دمشق، وكان المؤمل أن تفك الحصار عن الريفين، الغربي والشرقي. لكن، بدا، منذ أسابيع، أن التقدم توقف، وأن غموضاً يلف ما يجري. في الأيام الأخيرة، شنت جبهة النصرة هجوماً على لواء شهداء اليرموك، وقبلها حاولت فرض "خلافتها" على مدينة نوى، حيث حصلت احتكاكات مع مقاتلين من الجيش الحر من المدينة. وبالتالي، ظهر أن الجبهة أخذت تمارس ما مارسته في الشمال، حيث باتت تريد فرض سلطتها وفرض "قوانينها" (أو شريعتها)، ثم بدأت عملية قضم للكتائب المسلحة الأخرى.
منذ وجود جبهة النصرة في منطقة حوران، افتعلت صراعاً مع مناطق درزية، وخطفت دروزاً عديدين. وحين تقدمت الكتائب المسلحة للسيطرة على القنيطرة، احتجزت الجبهة القوات الدولية. في تلك وفي هذه، لم يجرِ تحليل الهدف من مثل هذه الخطوات، وظل التعامل مع جبهة النصرة قائماً، وعلى الرغم من أنها كذلك، اعتقلت وقتلت من قيادات الكتائب المسلحة. ربما استطاعت الكتائب المسلحة "لجم" النصرة، حيث كانت تريد افتعال صراع طائفي مع الدروز، وتريد أن تدفع القوى الدولية إلى دعم السلطة، بعد خطف عناصر القوات الدولية، عبر قرار من مجلس الأمن. ربما لم يتحقق لا ذاك ولا هذا. لكن، كان يجب أن يكون واضحاً أن للنصرة "أهدافها"، وأنها ستغدر كما فعلت في الشمال (قبل داعش).
ما لا يبدو مفهوماً لدى الكتائب المسلحة هو طبيعة النصرة (وكذلك داعش، وحتى جيش الإسلام). ولهذا، تجري معاملتها كتنظيم "من الثورة" يخطئ. لكن، الأمر أكبر من ذلك، أو ليس كذلك أبداً، لأن هذه التنظيمات لا تعرف السياسة، بل تتبع الفقه (وفق مدرسة الوهابية). ولهذا، لا تخوض الصراع السياسي ضد السلطة، بل تعتبر أن مهمتها "إقامة دولة الخلافة"، وهنا النصرة كداعش وقبلها (أقامت الخلافة في حلب قبل داعش). بالتالي، ليست معركتها ضد الاستبداد، أو من أجل التحرر من سلطة ناهبة، فذلك كله لا يرد في القاموس الفقهي الذي تتبعه، وهو مرحلة تتجاوز الفقه أصلاً. إنها تريد فرض "شريعتها" التي تلقتها من الوهابية، والتي تعتمد التفسير الحرفي الشكلي جداً للدين، وتعتقد أن مهمتها "التاريخية" فرض تلك الشريعة عبر المطاوعة، أو المدربين لدى المطاوعة.
وإذا كنت أعتقد أنها مخترقة مثل داعش من أجهزة أمنية، ومن السلطة تحديداً (أطلقت سراح كثيرين من كادرها بعد الثورة بأشهر، وربما بعام)، فالأمر، في كل الأحوال، يقود إلى ما نلمس كل يوم من ميل لفرض "الإمارة"، نتيجة التكوين الأيديولوجي الذي حُقن به هؤلاء "البسطاء"، وينطلق من فرض الشعائر والقيم الدينية المؤسسة على مفاهيم محمد بن عبد الوهاب، والبدائية في بنيتها، على كل فرد. هذه أولوية لدى هؤلاء، تسبق الصراع ضد السلطة بالضرورة (وكما كانت أولوية ضد الشيعة في العراق بدل الاحتلال). بالتالي، يجعلنا الانطلاق من "طيب نية" نرى هذا الجانب الخطر في بنية هذه التنظيمات. إنهم "رسل" بناء "الدولة الإسلامية"، وليس الصراع من أجل "سفاسف الحياة".
ماذا يعني ذلك؟ إنه يعني أنهم قنبلة في كل مكان يوجدون فيه، لأنهم سينقلبون، بالضرورة، ضد القوى التي تقاتل السلطة، ويسعون إلى فرض خلافتهم. فالجنة تقتضي ذلك. ولهذا، يسهل قيادهم من الأجهزة الأمنية، وتوجيههم بما يخدم السلطة (والإمبريالية).
مأساة المعارضة أنها "جاهلة"، ومشكلة الشباب الذي يقاتل أنه لم يستفد من تجارب سابقة، بدأت في أفغانستان، ثم في العراق، وتكررت في الشمال السوري. لهذا، لا إمكانية لقتال حقيقي ضد السلطة في منطقة توجد فيها النصرة، أو داعش طبعاً، أو حتى كل الفصائل التي تريد "تطبيق الشريعة". فهؤلاء يقاتلون من أجل "الجنة"، وليس من أجل الحرية والديمقراطية.
Wednesday, December 24, 2014
بلا حدود- مستقبل الجيوش في دول الربيع العربي
EXCELLENT!!
ناقشت الحلقة في جزئها الثاني مع الخبير المتخصص بشؤون الدفاع والجيوش العربية بمعهد كارنيغي للسلام يزيد صايغ، مستقبل الجيوش في دول الربيع العربي وتحديدا في مصر وسوريا والعراق وليبيا واليمن.
تقديم: أحمد منصور
ناقشت الحلقة في جزئها الثاني مع الخبير المتخصص بشؤون الدفاع والجيوش العربية بمعهد كارنيغي للسلام يزيد صايغ، مستقبل الجيوش في دول الربيع العربي وتحديدا في مصر وسوريا والعراق وليبيا واليمن.
تقديم: أحمد منصور
The Palestinian presidency must withdraw its project
Lamis Andoni
(The Arabic original was posted earlier)
(The Arabic original was posted earlier)
If the aim behind promoting a draft resolution for the recognition of a Palestinian state is to recognise the Palestinian-ness of the land and undermine the legitimacy of settlement expansion, then the clauses [of this resolution], especially as they have been amended under US pressure, seek to reinforce the Israeli occupation and prevent any Palestinian political, cultural or armed resistance.
The original draft of the resolution was already problematic to begin with without any amendments. The reason for this is that it demands the recognition of a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders and this ignores the very core of Palestinian rights, most notably the right of return for Palestinian refugees among other historical and legitimate demands.
While the original draft makes no reference to compromising on Palestinian rights, it also does not make any explicit reference to the Palestinian right of return except to say that the plight of the refugees should be solved as it was outlined in UN Resolution 194. This claim does not adhere to the full implementation of the resolution but simply refers to it as a non-negotiable reference, which quite frankly is the problem in itself.
The vague wording of UN Resolution 194 is so ambiguous that it presents a sort of loophole that gives officials the opportunity to fully ignore the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. And yet, as if the ambiguity of this resolution was not enough for the United States, they also insisted on adding amendments that would force the Palestinian people to give up their original demands for the return of the original Palestinian state thereby giving up their claim to all of historic Palestine and the right of return.
It is also wrong to assume that the extent of the injustices would stop at forcing the Palestinians to give up their right to historic Palestine in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state on less than 20 per cent of the original land with East Jerusalem as the sovereign and independent capital of Palestine. The new amendments outline that Jerusalem will be the joint capital among both sides, a suggestion that ultimately declares that the Israelis have the right to all of Jerusalem, which goes back to the Israeli suggestion that the Palestinian Authority can extend its mandate over Abu Dis and the surrounding neighbourhoods located just outside of Jerusalem.
Thus, it is also not enough to prevent the Palestinians from establishing a Palestinian state or to allow them to establish some semblance of a semi-sovereign and geographically fragmented entity composed of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as the new amendments now propose the idea of land swaps and completely ignore the illegitimate nature of Israeli settlements. These amendments not only wholly ignore the UN's patchy attempts to salvage the remnants of the Palestinian state, but it also carves out large blocs of land as they are constituted by Israeli settlements and the annexation of the Jordan Valley among other pockets of land desired by Israel.
In order to prevent the Palestinian people from practicing their right to determine their fate, two new amendments have been introduced and one of them prohibits both sides from making any unilateral decisions including land confiscations and the displacement of land owners, Israeli bombardments, preventing Palestinians from ascending to and accessing diplomatic channels and international forums, undermining all attempts at Palestinian resistance (to the occupation). All of these measures ultimately undermine all former international resolutions including the fourth Geneva Convention and the UN charter.
Moreover, the Palestinian administration is, as always; keen to close all the outstanding gaps and build an impenetrable wall that confirms Israel's conditions and outlook on the conflict, which could be as complex as preventing attempts at Palestinian resistance or as simple as preventing any information on the history of the Palestinian revolution from being broadcast on Israeli media because it confirms the historical claim and presence that the Palestinians have to the land.
Finally, the emphasis that has been placed on ensuring Israeli security serves as a pre-requisite to any step forward with our without the US veto. What this ultimately does is hinder all progress and more importantly, renders the veto completely irrelevant as the amendments mentioned above secure Israeli interests. The Palestinian presidential administration must withdraw this resolution immediately.
Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 23 December, 2014
China’s Second ‘Cultural Revolution’
By James Petras
Introduction: China is in the midst of its second ‘cultural revolution’ in a half century. While the first (under Chairman Mao Tse Tung) was intended to ‘revitalize socialism’; the current is directed to ‘moralizing’ capitalism.
The first CR was a frontal attack on the hierarchy of power and privilege inside and outside of the Communist Party, launched from above by Mao Tse Tung, but taken up from below by Red Guards in order to bring about a more egalitarian society.
The current ‘cultural revolution’, launched by President Xi Jinping, is directed at ending widespread corruption, theft and pillage of the Chinese economy and society by high and low officials in government and the capitalist sector.
The two cultural revolutions are linked by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader who officially put closure on the first and set in motion the policies and slogans (“Getting Rich is Good!”), necessitating a second cultural revolution three decades later.
The Socio-Economic Roots of the Cultural Revolution Today
Deng’s call to ‘get rich’ was directed at the Communist Party elite, their family, friends and overseas backers; it was an open invitation to the multi-nationals of the world to freely exploitChina’s resources, infrastructure and labor – educated, nurtured and organized through the collective efforts of the preceding Communist regime. Deng ‘liberated’- or privatized - the means of production and rapidly turned public control and appropriation of earnings over to emerging private capitalists. The corollary was the elimination of all social rights, benefits and protections of labor. The dual incentives were designed to maximize private profits in order to attract long-term, large-scale investments and to achieve high growth in the shortest time possible. Deng telescoped a century of growth and exploitation into a few decades.
His strategy succeeded.
Profits soared. By the late 1980’s and early 1990’s millionaires multiplied like mushrooms after a downpour. Then came the billionaires. Aided and abetted by the wholesale privatization of lucrative industries and public lands, a new class of real estate speculators and so-called ‘developers’ emerged , closely linked to corrupt local municipal, regional and national state officials. Millions of peasants were dispossessed and barely (if ever) compensated; hundreds of millions of workers were employed at starvation wages without the free housing, medical care, education, recreational benefits and lifetime employment of the past, socialist system.
China’s GNP exploded at a double-digit rate for three decades - an unprecedented performance. Most of the profits circulated among a narrow elite of party – state officials and capitalists, while a smaller share ‘trickled down’ to middle and low level functionaries. The seizure of public wealth, followed by three decades of intense exploitation of labor and the private land grabbing of farmland and homesteads, spurred the boom in real estate profits and laid the basis for all pervasive and large-scale corruption .The pillage of the public treasury led to large-scale conspicuous consumption – of imported luxury goods, multi-tiered mansions in gated communities, multiple purchases of luxury condos for offspring, mistresses and bribe-takers and givers.
By the mid 2000’s the concentration of wealth, property and privilege had reached astronomical heights: hundreds of billions accrued to the top 2%, millions to the top 10%, and hundreds of thousands to the top 15% - the self-styled ‘middle class’ who thrived on lesser but equally pervasive corruption and theft and who aped the elite and imitated their life style of luxury consumerism.
Beginning in the mid-2000s, hundreds of strikes by exploited factory workers demanded and secured higher wages; millions of households, farmers and peasants fought against municipal party officials, linked to real estate capitalists, who were attempting to ‘grab’ their land, homes and neighborhoods. Hundreds of millions of Chinese in the countryside protested exorbitant medical and educational costs, induced by the privatized health and educational system, which had bankrupted millions of households. They quickly became aware of the luxurious private medical facilities and specialized clinics for the rich -capitalists and corrupt officials. The internal migrant workers, who built the hyper-luxury condos and mansions, lived in paper shacks, far from the twelve-course banquets celebrating the ‘grand openings’ by business swindlers and ‘bought officials’. As wealth grew among the elite, so did the people’s hostility and rejection of the Party and the State, which they personified.
The ever-cautious klepto-capitalists and public pillagers, fearing for their illicit fortunes, smuggled out enormous wealth. Big swindlers, with big fortunes engaged in massive money laundering while publicly demanding the ‘de-regulation” of the financial sector (i.e. to make it easier to launder and hide their fortunes in overseas accounts). Between 2005-2011 China hemorrhaged over $2.83 trillion in illegal overseas financial outflows.
Part II: The Consequences of Corruption, Pillage and Exploitation
The illicit flow of Chinese wealth overseas resulted from the elite’s savage and illegal exploitation of labor (failure to meet minimum official standards concerning pay, work safety, child labor, excessive hours) .Wealth from bribes, kickbacks on government contracts, speculation on illicit seizures of land, and making false invoices overpricing imports and underpricing exports, flowed upward and outward. While China was profiting from double-digit growth the regime could ‘tolerate’ corruption and illicit outflows. However, by the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, when China’s economy de-accelerated to about 7 – 7.5%, the regime became less tolerant of wholesale corruption accompanied by capital flight.
Moreover, the new billionaires, millionaires and affluent middle class indulged in what Thorsten Veblen described as “conspicuous consumption”, the purchase and ostentatious display of superfluous luxury products as status symbols of “success”. According to a Special Report on “Luxury” in the Economist (12/13/14, p.8 -10) “nearly one-third of all personal luxury goods sold worldwide are bought by Chinese consumers.” Since the global crises of 2009, 70 – 80% of global growth in the (luxury) sector has come from China.
China’s emerging private-public ruling class has advanced from concentrating wealth, to consolidating political power to seeking prestige and social status – recognition from their domestic and foreign peers. Ideologically, they are decidedly neo-liberal and pro-Western – as evidenced by the billions they spend in the top-end real estate markets of North America, Europe and Australia as well as the millions they spend on their pampered offspring for ‘elite’ private education. Theirchildren live in half-million dollar condos in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Oxford and Cambridge (England), Toronto and Vancouver (Canada), Sydney and Melbourne Australia. The Chinese oligarchs “make the market” for six-figure Swiss watches, five figure handbags and four digit French cognac.
Corruption, conspicuous consumption and class polarization has delegitimized the ruling Communist Party elite in the eyes of the great mass of the Chinese working class, as well as the professionals and salaried employees who make-up the lower middle class.
The ‘political rot’- the privileged social networks derived from kinship ties-is leading to a relativeclosed ruling class – excluding the mass of urban workers and rural peasants, with potentiallyexplosive social consequences.
Already thousands of local protests, strikes and other forms of direct action occur every year, even as they are repressed or resolved.
In addition to the social and political dangers resulting from the massive illegal, ‘squandering and theft of wealth’, the illicit outflow of wealth is undermining domestic investment andproductive overseas investments, and corruption is preparing the way for stagnation and financial crisis.
The stars are lining up for a ‘perfect political storm’ – which has unfolded in the form of President Xi Jingping’s launch of China’s second cultural revolution (CR).
Xi Jingping’s Cultural Revolution
From the start of the 2nd CR in 2012 to mid-2014, the Chinese Communist Party’s internal corruption body has prosecuted and punished 270,000 cadres. That figure includes both the “tigers” (high officials) and the “flies” (low level functionaries). “Over three dozen officials with ranks of ministers or above, including former security Tsar and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang”, have been arrested and jailed (Financial Times 12/4/14, p. 4). Earlier, the former Railways Minister was arrested and sentenced to death for rigging contracts worth about $26 billion dollars over his seven-year tenure. Hundreds of thousands of private business people, paying bribes, have been arrested and sentenced.
President Xi’s campaign has attacked bribes, ‘gift giving’, frequent ostentatious banquets serving expensive delicacies, and high Party officials’ lodging in five star hotels for weeks on end, ostensibly “tending to business”, but more frequently ‘cavorting with their mistresses’.
To be precise, President Xi is attacking the triple evils of corruption, conspicuous consumption, and pillage of public wealth. The new austerity agenda and the public revelations of ill-gained wealth are focused on exposing public officials and private business people in order to regain public legitimacy. And it is succeeding,…. as far as it goes. Public indignation at the revelations is matched by high approval for the Xi leadership’s anti –corruption campaign.
What makes this far more than just a “power struggle among privileged elites” as the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times have routinely claimed, are: 1. the duration of the campaign of over 2 years, 2. the scope of the campaign, covering top officials and Chinese business equivalents of Wall Street moguls, 3. The nature of the punishment including long prison terms and even death sentences (rather than the mere ‘slap on the wrists and paltry fines’ that US regulators have given to Wall Street’s billion-dollar swindlers), and 4. the ongoing nature of the process. The sweep and magnitude of Xi’s campaign has all the makings of a ‘cultural revolution’ – not the episodic ‘blowing off steam’ or ‘scapegoating of rivals’ described in the Western press.
The Nature of Xi’s Cultural Revolution
Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ is directed and driven from above – established legal authorities are in charge – the masses are excluded, and preemptory justice is eschewed: regular court proceedings decide guilt and sentencing.
Secondly, Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ does not, in any way or place, call into question capitalist property relations, foreign investors, or large-scale inflows and outflows of investment or legallyregistered speculative capital. Nor has Xi called into question existing capital-labor relations.
Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ is an attempt to sanitize existing capitalist relations, and to infuse anew capitalist ethic. He wants to ‘revise’ Deng’s famous precept “Getting Rich is Good” to read “Get Rich Lawfully . . . or Face Jail”. China is rated number 100 out of 175, on a corruption scale published by Transparency in 2014 (Financial Times 12/4/14, p. 4). Xi’s war on corruption is based on the premise that corruption undermines China’s status as a global power – it ranks with Algeria and Surinam. Secondly, Xi hopes that he can ‘reform’ the public sector in order to privatize it and he wants the sale to go to the highest bidder, not the biggest bribe giver.
His campaign attacks privileged elites, who accumulate and dispose of wealth illegally but he has never sought to diminish the class system, the hierarchy and inequalities which concentrate political power and forms the basis of corrupt bribe giving and taking.
Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’ is continuing and corruption may lessen. Ostentatious public spending is declining. But this layer of ‘new morality’ is spread thinly over a system of power that can easily revert to the ‘old system’ once the ‘revolution’ ends.
Xi’s noteworthy ‘cultural revolution’, the moralization of public administration and private capitalism, can only succeed if it is accompanied by a social transformation: ethics at the service of social justice and equality and by a democratization of the economic decision-making process. The problem is that Xi, by family, social ties and political allegiances is deeply embedded in a milieu which absolutely rejects any such ‘deepening’ of Xi’s ‘cultural revolution’.
His cultural revolution is strictly guided by a singular objective: to force ‘morality’ on the ‘captains of capital’ in order to facilitate the smooth transition to fully liberalizing China’s economy. President Xi, along with his anti-corruption campaign, is steadily loosening state control over foreign financial investments in Chinese stocks and financial sector; he is moving strongly to expand China’s overseas investments; he is accelerating the privatization of public enterprises and increasingly opening financial services to Wall Street and the City of London. He is also internationalizing the use of the yuan-the Chinese currency- in global transactions, displacing the dollar.
In other words, his cultural revolution is a bridge to a new stage of Chinese capitalist expansion; it will lessen the crude open plunder of the public treasury, but it will not lessen the exploitation of labor nor slow the increasing concentration of wealth and privilege. That will require a different kind of ‘cultural’ revolution- one led from below by workers, peasants and salaried employees. A real ‘cultural revolution’ that realizes the ethical ideals of ‘good government’ through a transformation of class relations.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign confirms what many workers already knew – but it also unmasks the systemic decay and forges an elementary class consciousness: counter-posing honest, hardworking workers to corrupt privileged oligarchs. Xi is aware of the danger that his campaign could ignite a popular fire: That is why he has kept a tight hold on the process. He is trying to navigate the liberal capitalist transition around the shoals of existing capitalist rot without arousing mass unrest.
مقترحات مشبوهة لتسويق الأسد ومواصلة الصراع
AN IMPORTANT REPORT
وقد ظهرت أفكار هارلاند- روزن، أول مرة، في الرابع من نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2014، في عمود رأي كتبه ديفيد أغناتيوس في صحيفة واشنطن بوست، وبسبب الضجة التي أثارها العمود، أرسل روزن خطاباً مفصلاً عن الموضوع، نشره جيمس تراوب في مجلة فورين بوليسي، في الرابع عشر من الشهر نفسه، بعنوان" بشار الأسد ومساومات الشياطين". وقد عادت تفاعلاتها مجدداً إلى الظهور، في تقرير أخير في "فورين بوليسي"، كتبها محرر شؤون الشرق الأوسط ديفيد كينر.
فيما يبدو وكأنه مسعى جديد إلى إعادة تعويم نظام الرئيس السوري، بشار الأسد، والدفع باتجاه إعادة تأهيله، ظهرت، أخيراً، أفكار سياسية ترتكز عليها بعض المبادرات، وتشترك جميعها بفكرة أساسية، هي أن المعارضة المعتدلة السورية لم تعد طرفاً فاعلاً في هذه الأزمة، وأنها ما فتئت تفقد تأثيرها لصالح جماعات جهادية متطرفة تبدأ بداعش والنصرة، ولا تنتهي بجماعة خراسان التي كشف الأميركيون عن وجودها، أول مرة، عندما استهدفوا ما قالوا إنها مواقع لها، وذلك مع انطلاق الغارات الأميركية ضد تنظيم الدولة في سورية في 23 سبتمبر/ أيلول الماضي. انطلاقاً من ذلك، تحاول هذه المبادرات، بعضها تصريحاً والأخرى تلميحاً، القول إن البديل لنظام بشار الأسد لم يعد، في ظل ضعف المعارضة المسلحة المعتدلة على الأرض، وتشتتها في الخارج، إلا التنظيمات الإسلامية المتطرفة، ما يعني أن إضعاف نظام الأسد والسعي إلى إطاحته يخدم، في نهاية المطاف، هذه التنظيميات، ويمهد لها سبل الوصول إلى السلطة.
مبادرات عديدة وهدف واحد
ظهرت، أخيراً، مبادرتان أساسيتان، تُنَظِّر بهذا الاتجاه: الأولى، مبادرة المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى سورية، ستيفان دي ميستورا، وتهدف إلى تجميد الصراع ابتداءً من مدينة حلب. وترتكز على ثلاث نقاط رئيسة، أهمها التركيز على محاربة الإرهاب، وكأن الإرهاب في سورية يمارس من طرف واحد، وأنه سبب الأزمة، وليس العنف الذي استخدمه النظام لقمع الحركة الاحتجاجية وردعها وإرهابها عن السعي إلى تحقيق تطلعاتها في الإصلاح ثم التغيير. وثاني النقاط تخفيض مستوى العنف، وثالثها تخفيف المعاناة الإنسانية، والدفع باتجاه مصالحات محلية، يمكن أن تشكل منطلقاً لحل سياسي للأزمة.
مبادرات عديدة وهدف واحد
ظهرت، أخيراً، مبادرتان أساسيتان، تُنَظِّر بهذا الاتجاه: الأولى، مبادرة المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى سورية، ستيفان دي ميستورا، وتهدف إلى تجميد الصراع ابتداءً من مدينة حلب. وترتكز على ثلاث نقاط رئيسة، أهمها التركيز على محاربة الإرهاب، وكأن الإرهاب في سورية يمارس من طرف واحد، وأنه سبب الأزمة، وليس العنف الذي استخدمه النظام لقمع الحركة الاحتجاجية وردعها وإرهابها عن السعي إلى تحقيق تطلعاتها في الإصلاح ثم التغيير. وثاني النقاط تخفيض مستوى العنف، وثالثها تخفيف المعاناة الإنسانية، والدفع باتجاه مصالحات محلية، يمكن أن تشكل منطلقاً لحل سياسي للأزمة.
المبادرة الثانية التي تدفع بالاتجاه نفسه تقريباً، هي المبادرة الروسية المدعومة إيرانياً، والتي كشف عن بعض تفاصيلها المستشرق الروسي، فيتالي نعومكن، في مقال نشره موقع المونيتور، والذي يملكه ويديره جمال دانيال، رجل الأعمال الاميركي السوري الأصل، والمقرب من نظام بشار الأسد، وذلك مطلع شهر ديسمبر/كانون الأول الجاري. وهناك دلالة لاختيار نعومكن موقع المونيتور لنشر مقالته، ومن المفيد الإشارة إلى أن دانيال يمتلك، أيضاً، حصة كبيرة في صحيفة السفير اللبنانية، القريبة من النظام السوري، وله مكتب رسمي ومراسلون إسرائيليون في تل أبيب، وكان قد أدار حملة العلاقات العامة لصالح حكومة بشار الأسد في الولايات المتحدة في مايو/ أيار2005، عندما وقعت دمشق عبر سفيرها في واشنطن، حينئذ، اتفاقية مع شركة (نيوبريدج ستراتيجيز)، لتحسين صورة النظام في الولايات المتحدة. وعبر علاقاته الوثيقة بدوائر اللوبي الإسرائيلي في واشنطن، وصداقته مع عائلة بوش، خصوصاً أنه شريك شقيق الرئيس السابق، نيل بوش، في عدة أعمال تجارية، قدم دانيال خدمات كبيرة للنظام السوري في الولايات المتحدة.
وجاء في مقال نعومكن إنه مع تلاشي المعارضة المسلحة المعتدلة على الأرض في سورية، فإن طرفي الصراع الرئيسيين اليوم هما الجماعات الإسلامية المتشددة والنظام السوري، "وإن بقاء نظام الأسد من ثم قد يكون السبيل الوحيد للحفاظ على الدولة السورية ومنعها من الانهيار"، أو سيطرة المتشددين الإسلاميين عليها. ولتحقيق هذا الهدف، تسعى المبادرة الروسية، كما يقول نعومكن، إلى عقد مؤتمر سوري، يجمع أطراف الأزمة في موسكو، أولاً، ثم ينتقل الاجتماع إلى دمشق، ويشارك فيه ممثلون عن نظام بشار الأسد، وأطراف من المعارضة السورية، مثل الرئيس السابق لائتلاف قوى الثورة والمعارضة السورية، معاذ الخطيب، وعباس حبيب ممثلاً عن مجلس العشائر السورية، وقدري جميل المعارض القريب من نظام الأسد، والذي يقيم في موسكو منذ إقالته من منصبه، نائباً لرئيس مجلس الوزراء في سورية عام 2013، وأعضاء من هيئة
| دي ميستورا |
التنسيق التي غالباً ما يشار إليها بالمعارضة الداخلية، وقد أعرب هؤلاء جميعاً، بحسب نعومكن، عن استعدادهم للحضور من دون اشتراط تنحي الرئيس بشار الأسد، وعن دعمهم للحرب على تنظيم الدولة، وإجراء مصالحات بين أطراف الصراع من السوريين.
ولكن، ثمة أفكار أخرى، سعى أصحابها إلى ترويجها في الإعلام، وإكسابها أهمية في الغرب. وهي الأكثر مباشرة في طرحها، لضرورة الحفاظ على بقاء الأسد. وهي لا تستحق تسمية مبادرات. منها التي يقودها ديفيد هارلاند، المدير التنفيذي لمركز الحوار الإنساني، والذي يتخذ من جنيف مقراً، وشريكه في الطرح الصحافي الأميركي، نير روزن، الذي وضع تقريراً في 55 صفحة عن خطة، يطرحها المركز لإبرام هدن محلية في سورية، تشكل منطلقاً لإنهاء الصراع الدائر منذ 4 سنوات. والمعروف أن مركز الحوار الإنساني هو الذي توسط لإبرام وقف إطلاق النار في حمص بين النظام وقوات المعارضة.
هدن محلية أم إعادة تأهيل للنظام؟
كاتب التقرير نير روزن صحافي أميركي، قريب من دوائر اللوبي الصهيوني في واشنطن، وهو من أكثر الصحافيين الغربيين إثارة للجدل، وقد أثار تقرير ظهر في صحيفة تلغراف البريطانية مطلع عام 2012 عن مراسلات سرية بين روزن ومسؤولين في النظام السوري ضجة كبيرة في أوساط الاعلام الغربي، إذ تبين، في وثائق حصلت عليها "تلغراف" بعد اختراق البريد الإلكتروني الشخصي لبشار الأسد، أن روزن كان يزود النظام السوري بمعلومات عن تحركات زملائه من الصحافيين الغربيين في مدينة حمص، في أثناء تغطيتهم المعارك التي اشتعلت في أحياء حمص القديمة بين النظام والكتائب التي شكلها أهالي حمص، للدفاع عن أنفسهم، وذلك في ربيع عام 2012. وفي إحدى الرسائل الإلكترونية التي كان يحاول فيها ترتيب مقابلة مع الأسد، ذَكَّرَ روزن بتغطيته الإيجابية سياسات النظام السوري وممارساته، عبر مقالات نشرها في قناة الجزيرة الانجليزية. وفي رسالة جرى توجيهها إلى بشار الأسد، لإقناعه بإجراء مقابلة معه، يقول روزن "تَمَكنتُ من دفع قناة الجزيرة الانجليزية إلى عرض المسيرات المؤيدة للنظام، كما نجحت في دفعها إلى توضيح أن بشار الاسد وحكومته يحظيان بدعم وتأييد كبيرين في سورية، وأن هناك بالتأكيد جماعات مسلحة تطلق النار على قوات الأمن السورية التي تجد نفسها مضطرة للدفاع عن نفسها".
وقد ظهرت أفكار هارلاند- روزن، أول مرة، في الرابع من نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2014، في عمود رأي كتبه ديفيد أغناتيوس في صحيفة واشنطن بوست، وبسبب الضجة التي أثارها العمود، أرسل روزن خطاباً مفصلاً عن الموضوع، نشره جيمس تراوب في مجلة فورين بوليسي، في الرابع عشر من الشهر نفسه، بعنوان" بشار الأسد ومساومات الشياطين". وقد عادت تفاعلاتها مجدداً إلى الظهور، في تقرير أخير في "فورين بوليسي"، كتبها محرر شؤون الشرق الأوسط ديفيد كينر.
والحقيقة أن الحديث، هنا، عن فردين"تطوعا" لاختراق جبهات الثوار، وللتواصل مع أجهزة النظام، ولتقديم أفكار لم يطلبها منهما أحد، ولا أحد يعلم من تخدم، ولماذا قدمت؟ ولولا أنهما من "العرق" الأبيض المتفوق، ولولا أن موضوع الحديث هو العرب، وعن كيفية مكافحة الإسلاميين، لما أعارهما أحد اهتماما. ولنتخيل، مثلاً، لو ظهر صحفيان عربيان بدون صفة أخرى في مناطق الصراع في إيرلندا، في سبعينيات القرن الماضي، وطرحا حلولاً لمشكلة إيرلندا الشمالية، هل كان سيعيرهما أحد انتباهه؟ وهل كانت "فورين بوليسي" ستفرد لهما مقالاً؟
وعلى الرغم من أن التقرير صدر عن مركز الحوار الانساني الذي يرأسه هارلاند، فإن المركز رفض المسؤولية عنه، وطلب الإشارة إليه باعتباره من تأليف روزن. النص، إذن، لا يستحق أن
| الصحفي الأميركي نير روزن |
يسمى تقريراً، بل هو ورقة قدمها صحفي مغامر في أفضل الحالات، وشخص يعمل عن وعي لصالح أطراف معادية للشعب السوري في أسوئها. يحاول روزن تسويق فكرة أن المعارضة السورية سلكت طريق التطرف الذي لا عودة عنه، وأن نظام بشار الأسد يبقى، في المقابل، غير طائفي بطبيعته وتكوينه، وأن حل الصراع يمكن أن يتم بعد أن فشلت كل المساعي الدولية لإنهائه، عبر هدن محلية، يجري التوصل إليها عبر الأمم المتحدة بين المجتمعات المحلية والنظام، وبما يسمح بعزل المتطرفين وتشكيل قوة مشتركة لمواجهتهم، لكن ذلك سوف يتطلب، بالطبع، التخلي عن شرط رحيل الرئيس السوري، بشار الأسد، عن السلطة.
يقوم تقرير روزن، في جزء كبير منه، على مقابلات أجراها المؤلف مع مسؤولين سياسيين وأمنيين في نظام بشار الأسد، وقد جرى تقديم التقرير إلى مسؤولين في إدارة الرئيس الأميركي، باراك أوباما، في محاولة للحصول على دعمهم للمبادرة، ومستغلاً غياب أي سياسة واضحة لواشنطن تجاه المسألة السورية.
وفيما يحاول إعادة تسويق نظام بشار الأسد باعتباره نظاماً "علمانياً وحداثياً وغير طائفي"، بحسب زعمه، فإن روزن يحاول، في المقابل، أن يتجاوز عن كل الجرائم التي ارتكبها بحق السوريين، بما فيها المسؤولية عن قتل مئات الألوف منهم وتهجير الملايين وتدمير أكثر من نصف البلاد. أما المعارضة فيصفها بالمتطرفة والمعادية للمرأة والحداثة والعلمانية والديموقراطية، و"لكل ما هو غير سني"، وكأن هذه المواقف بافتراض صحتها تصلح مادة للمقارنة بالجرائم التي ارتكبها النظام. بغض النظر، وسواء نجح روزن (وأمثاله من "المتطوعين" الذين يظهرون فجأة في مناطق الصراع) في تسويق مبادرته في الغرب، الذي لم يقدم لثورة الشعب السوري، منذ البداية، إلا دعماً كلامياً، ساهم ربما في زيادة الوضع سوءاً، أو فشل، فالأكيد أنه لن ينجح في تسويقها بين أصحاب الشأن من السوريين الذين قطعوا مع النظام، وقرروا أن لا عودة عن الطريق الذي سلكوه.
يدرك الناس في سورية خطورة نشوء الميليشيات المسلحة المتطرفة التي لا تتبنى شعارات الثورة وبرنامجها، بل تحمل نقيضها. ولكن، ثمة حقيقة باتت بديهية لسوريين كثيرين، هي أنهم يحملون النظام المسؤولية ليس فقط عن الاستبداد، بل عن حقيقة أن هذا الاستبداد هو الذي دفع إلى نشوء الثنائية بينه وبين والإرهاب، نبوءة تحقق ذاتها، تماماً مثل ثنائية "الأسد أو نحرق البلد". وقد يعتقد بعضهم في الغرب أن الأسد أفضل من داعش، ولكن في الشرق لا يجري أحد مثل هذه المفاضلة الوهمية، فهذه ثنائية الاستبداد ومفاضلاته التي تهدف إلى تبرير وجوده. الناس في الشرق لا يريدون هذا ولا ذاك. ويحملون الاستبداد وعقليته وسلوكه وجرائمه المسؤولية بالدرجة الأولى.
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
Syria: Escalating Assault on Rebel-Held District
Indiscriminate Attacks, Increased Restrictions in Homs
While attention has moved on from Homs, tens of thousands of civilians are suffering and others dying in al-Waer. The Syrian government should not be allowed to use its unlawful siege tactics at such a high price for the civilian population.
(New York) – The Syrian government is indiscriminately attacking the al-Waer neighborhood in Homs, the last neighborhood of the city still in the hands of rebels, with devastating consequences for the civilian population.
Government shelling on the area has intensified since the breakdown of talks between the warring parties in early October 2014. Since October 2013, the government has restricted the ability of al-Waer residents to leave the area and has limited, and at times completely blocked, deliveries of humanitarian assistance to the estimated 70,000-100,000 civilians still there. Most recently, on December 16, 2014, an attack left a reported 36 dead including at least 33 civilians.
“While attention has moved on from Homs, tens of thousands of civilians are suffering and others dying in al-Waer,” said Nadim Houry, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “The Syrian government should not be allowed to use its unlawful siege tactics at such a high price for the civilian population.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed six residents of al-Waer, five of them currently in the neighborhood. Residents said that government attacks on the neighborhood intensified starting October 4, after negotiations broke down. The interviewees described the persistent shelling of residential areas, which they said had had no apparent military targets in the vicinity, from nearby government held territory.
On October 1, two bombs exploded outside an elementary school in Akrama, a predominately Alawite neighborhood in Homs, killing dozens, mostly children, media reports said. Akrama, identified by numerous rebel groups as a loyalist, pro-government neighborhood, has been subject to repeated car bombings. The army and pro-government forces have intensified their attacks on al-Waer since then.
The Violations Documentation Center, a local monitoring group, has identified 91 civilians and one combatant killed in al-Waer since October 2014. According to a member of the al-Waer Media Center, which is collecting information on fatalities in the neighborhood, the number of civilians killed in government attacks is much higher, with at least 150 civilians killed in al-Waer in October alone.
The UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, visited Homs on November 10, and met with representatives from al-Waer.
Human Rights Watch repeated its call to the UN Security Council to take further action, since the Syrian government and rebel groups have not complied with Security Council Resolution 2139 of February 22, 2014, demanding that the parties to the conflict cease indiscriminate attacks and unlawful restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Security Council action could include referring Syria to the International Criminal Court and imposing an arms embargo on groups, including the government, committing systematic and widespread human rights violations, Human Rights Watch said.
Governments allied with the Syrian government – including Russia and Iran, which media reports indicate played a key role in negotiating a local cease fire on May 2 for Old Homs – should use their influence with the Syrian government to cease the unlawful attacks and restrictions on al-Waer.
Al-Waer, a densely populated neighborhood on the outskirts of Homs, became the last rebel-controlled area in the city when rebels in Old Homs withdrew in May following a UN-brokered agreement there. Since 2011, the neighborhood had served as a refuge for many Homs families fleeing the fighting in other parts of Homs and more recently had received families and fighters that left Old Homs after the local deal there. Negotiations between the government and armed groups in al-Waer have been ongoing but broke down in early October 2014.
The government and pro-government militias have used improvised weapons including airdropped barrel bombs in the December 16 strikes and crudely manufactured rockets containing cylinders of explosives as warheads, called istuwanat in Arabic.
Describing the terror induced by these rockets, one resident, Maha (all names have been changed to protect witnesses), a Syrian from Homs who lived in al-Waer from June 2012 until July 2014, said: “Once a cylinder full of explosive is fired, if you see it you have 30 seconds to run away. It has a distinct, terrible sound... They can destroy a complete building.”
A video published on YouTube shows the remnants of one such improvised rocket that stuck al-Waer. Like factory-produced unguided artillery rockets, these weapons cannot be accurately or predictably targeted and are prone to being indiscriminate when used in populated areas. The improvised nature of these rockets degrades the performance and reliability of the weapons and exacerbates the potential of indiscriminate impact.
In describing the December 16 attacks, a member of the Media Center told Human Rights Watch that the neighborhood was shelled from around 10 a.m. until 5 p.m., during which the 36 people were killed in an estimated 18 aerial attacks using aircraft and helicopters. He said that barrel bombs were used in the neighborhood for the first time along with mortars, shilka – a four-barrel antiaircraft cannon mounted on an armored vehicle – and sniper fire targeting most areas of the neighborhood including main thoroughfares such as Fardous Street. In addition to those killed, many civilians were wounded.
Talal, a 27-year-old former school teacher who is running a field hospital in al-Waer, told Human Rights Watch that one of the first aerial attacks on December 16 hit a school that was in session, in the late morning, as children were getting ready to leave. He said the situation in al-Waer was calm before the strikes began.
Several videos published on YouTube showed the aftermath of the attack, including a completely destroyedbuilding, the wounded, and some of those killed, including children. An image was also published of a mass grave where the dead were purportedly buried.
In addition to striking al-Waer indiscriminately, witnesses also told Human Rights Watch that government forces have been regularly restricting their access to food, oil and diesel for heating, and life saving assistance and have limited the ability of many residents to flee the neighborhood, with only students and government employees allowed out. In some cases, those attempting to leave have been harassed, beaten, arbitrarily detained, and disappeared. Since October 2013 only two humanitarian aid deliveries were brought into al-Waer, once on June 28 and again on November 11, 2014.
Under international humanitarian law, all parties to an armed conflict are obligated to facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need. Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited. All sides also need to take all feasible steps to evacuate the civilian population from the vicinity of military objects.
“As attacks on al-Waer intensify and restrictions tighten, what was once a refuge for residents, particularly Sunnis fleeing violence in other parts of Homs, has become a prison,” Houry said. “The people of al-Waer need more than the words of a UN resolution, they need to see the UN put it into action.”
The Al-Waer Occupation
Al-Waer consists of two areas – new Waer, with nine districts, called “Islands,” and old Waer, which includes Waer al-Qudat and the area around the Homs al-Kabeer Hospital. With the exception of the 9th Island, all Islands are under rebel control. According to the residents, rebel fighters in al-Waer are from at least 30 factions, including the Free Syrian Army, al-Ansar, Atba’ al-Rasul, Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Manara Battalion, Ahrar al-Sham, Ibn al-Malek Brigade, al-Hoda Battalion, Jabhat al-Asliya wa al-Tanmiya’, and al-Hur Brigade.
Despite the concentration of rebel fighters on active fronts and in the 7th Island, the residents who spoke to Human Rights Watch said that government attacks stretched across al-Waer, into areas with no rebel fighters or other military targets in the vicinity. The areas attacked included those with high concentrations of civilians.
Ghassan, a 21-year-old former student from Khalidya living in al-Waer since 2012, told Human Rights Watch that the government is targeting al-Waer from all directions: from the orchards to the north, from the forest to the south, from the bakery checkpoint just behind Homs al-Kabeer Hospital to the east, and from Mazraa and the 9th Island to the west, which is under government control. A member of the Media Center in al-Waer confirmed the multi-directional assault, including daily shelling with istuwanat that appear to be launched from the military academy grounds to the northeast.
In addition to shelling attacks, residents also told Human Rights Watch that government or pro-government snipers, including those positioned in the Homs al-Kabeer Hospital area and the al-Gardenia Tower in the Old Homs neighborhood, have also targeted civilians including women and children.
All six residents told Human Rights Watch that rebel fighters in al-Waer are concentrated in the 7th Island, where the most intense clashes have taken place between government and rebel forces. They said there are also active fronts in the orchards to the north, the forest to the south, and near the Homs al-Kabeer Hospital to the east, with rebel fighters present. Residents said that rebel groups also had offices across al-Waer and that fighters did not sleep on the active fronts, but rather in other parts of the neighborhood.
Residents said that Islands 1 through 6 are populated by civilians. According to the residents, areas in these Islands without any rebel offices or presence are also subjected to daily artillery attacks. In addition to strikes on these areas, the 4th and 6th Islands have also been subject to aerial attacks.
Indiscriminate Attacks
Residents told Human Rights Watch that the shelling of al-Waer began in October 2013, when rebel fighters entered al-Waer from Bab Amr. At the same time, the government began to restrict movement in and out of the neighborhood.
Ghassan said that, after negotiations between the government and rebel groups broke down on Eid al-Adha, October 4, 2014, “the government’s bombing of al-Waer increased, including in Islands 5, 6, and 8... After Eid al-Adha, there were three days of daily intensive shelling.” He told Human Rights Watch that his father was injured by shrapnel after a mortar strike around this time: “The mortar was fired from the 9th Island, or Mazraa [where the government forces are]. Luckily it was a superficial injury on his face, and we did not have to take him to the hospital.” Several videos published on YouTube purport to show the aftermath of a strike on an apartment building in al-Waer on October 4 after morning prayers, allegedly from a warplane.
Talal, a 27-year-old former school teacher from al-Waer, also told Human Rights Watch that during Eid al-Adha, just after the morning prayer, civilians going to the cemetery in Island 1 were also struck by surface-to-surface rockets.
Sleiman, a paramedic, told Human Rights Watch that a rocket hit an apartment tower in the 4th Island in early November. Sleiman, who went to the scene of the attack to evacuate wounded, said 11 people were killed, mostly women and children, but also some fighters. The impact threw one child, Soha, 8, out of the building.
Shelling in al-Waer ceased during a temporary ceasefire between government and rebel forces that began on November 11, but resumed days later, albeit with less intensity.
On December 16, however, the member of the Media Center in al-Waer who spoke to Human Rights Watch said the intensity of the shelling on the neighborhood increased drastically. These attacks resulted in 36 fatalities, including at least 33 civilians. He said the fighters killed on December 16 were working as first responders to evacuate the wounded.
Aid Restrictions
Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that government forces have been regularly restricting their access to life-saving assistance and have limited the ability of many residents to flee the neighborhood.
Three residents told Human Rights Watch that the government began significantly restricting access points to and from the neighborhood in October 2013 after rebel fighters entered the neighborhood and fighting began in the 7th Island.
The main access road that remained opened was the bakery checkpoint, but government forces severely restricted movement even out of this checkpoint. All of the witnesses said that movement for Waer residents in and out of the neighborhood became limited to state employees and students.
Three witnesses described how even these residents were subject to harassment, physical abuse, and arbitrary detention when trying to enter or leave the neighborhood.
Talal, who used to leave and enter al-Waer daily to teach outside of the neighborhood, said he was arbitrarily detained in May 2014 when returning to al-Waer from work.
Government shelling on the area has intensified since the breakdown of talks between the warring parties in early October 2014. Since October 2013, the government has restricted the ability of al-Waer residents to leave the area and has limited, and at times completely blocked, deliveries of humanitarian assistance to the estimated 70,000-100,000 civilians still there. Most recently, on December 16, 2014, an attack left a reported 36 dead including at least 33 civilians.
“While attention has moved on from Homs, tens of thousands of civilians are suffering and others dying in al-Waer,” said Nadim Houry, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “The Syrian government should not be allowed to use its unlawful siege tactics at such a high price for the civilian population.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed six residents of al-Waer, five of them currently in the neighborhood. Residents said that government attacks on the neighborhood intensified starting October 4, after negotiations broke down. The interviewees described the persistent shelling of residential areas, which they said had had no apparent military targets in the vicinity, from nearby government held territory.
On October 1, two bombs exploded outside an elementary school in Akrama, a predominately Alawite neighborhood in Homs, killing dozens, mostly children, media reports said. Akrama, identified by numerous rebel groups as a loyalist, pro-government neighborhood, has been subject to repeated car bombings. The army and pro-government forces have intensified their attacks on al-Waer since then.
The Violations Documentation Center, a local monitoring group, has identified 91 civilians and one combatant killed in al-Waer since October 2014. According to a member of the al-Waer Media Center, which is collecting information on fatalities in the neighborhood, the number of civilians killed in government attacks is much higher, with at least 150 civilians killed in al-Waer in October alone.
The UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, visited Homs on November 10, and met with representatives from al-Waer.
Human Rights Watch repeated its call to the UN Security Council to take further action, since the Syrian government and rebel groups have not complied with Security Council Resolution 2139 of February 22, 2014, demanding that the parties to the conflict cease indiscriminate attacks and unlawful restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Security Council action could include referring Syria to the International Criminal Court and imposing an arms embargo on groups, including the government, committing systematic and widespread human rights violations, Human Rights Watch said.
Governments allied with the Syrian government – including Russia and Iran, which media reports indicate played a key role in negotiating a local cease fire on May 2 for Old Homs – should use their influence with the Syrian government to cease the unlawful attacks and restrictions on al-Waer.
Al-Waer, a densely populated neighborhood on the outskirts of Homs, became the last rebel-controlled area in the city when rebels in Old Homs withdrew in May following a UN-brokered agreement there. Since 2011, the neighborhood had served as a refuge for many Homs families fleeing the fighting in other parts of Homs and more recently had received families and fighters that left Old Homs after the local deal there. Negotiations between the government and armed groups in al-Waer have been ongoing but broke down in early October 2014.
The government and pro-government militias have used improvised weapons including airdropped barrel bombs in the December 16 strikes and crudely manufactured rockets containing cylinders of explosives as warheads, called istuwanat in Arabic.
Describing the terror induced by these rockets, one resident, Maha (all names have been changed to protect witnesses), a Syrian from Homs who lived in al-Waer from June 2012 until July 2014, said: “Once a cylinder full of explosive is fired, if you see it you have 30 seconds to run away. It has a distinct, terrible sound... They can destroy a complete building.”
A video published on YouTube shows the remnants of one such improvised rocket that stuck al-Waer. Like factory-produced unguided artillery rockets, these weapons cannot be accurately or predictably targeted and are prone to being indiscriminate when used in populated areas. The improvised nature of these rockets degrades the performance and reliability of the weapons and exacerbates the potential of indiscriminate impact.
In describing the December 16 attacks, a member of the Media Center told Human Rights Watch that the neighborhood was shelled from around 10 a.m. until 5 p.m., during which the 36 people were killed in an estimated 18 aerial attacks using aircraft and helicopters. He said that barrel bombs were used in the neighborhood for the first time along with mortars, shilka – a four-barrel antiaircraft cannon mounted on an armored vehicle – and sniper fire targeting most areas of the neighborhood including main thoroughfares such as Fardous Street. In addition to those killed, many civilians were wounded.
Talal, a 27-year-old former school teacher who is running a field hospital in al-Waer, told Human Rights Watch that one of the first aerial attacks on December 16 hit a school that was in session, in the late morning, as children were getting ready to leave. He said the situation in al-Waer was calm before the strikes began.
Several videos published on YouTube showed the aftermath of the attack, including a completely destroyedbuilding, the wounded, and some of those killed, including children. An image was also published of a mass grave where the dead were purportedly buried.
In addition to striking al-Waer indiscriminately, witnesses also told Human Rights Watch that government forces have been regularly restricting their access to food, oil and diesel for heating, and life saving assistance and have limited the ability of many residents to flee the neighborhood, with only students and government employees allowed out. In some cases, those attempting to leave have been harassed, beaten, arbitrarily detained, and disappeared. Since October 2013 only two humanitarian aid deliveries were brought into al-Waer, once on June 28 and again on November 11, 2014.
Under international humanitarian law, all parties to an armed conflict are obligated to facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need. Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited. All sides also need to take all feasible steps to evacuate the civilian population from the vicinity of military objects.
“As attacks on al-Waer intensify and restrictions tighten, what was once a refuge for residents, particularly Sunnis fleeing violence in other parts of Homs, has become a prison,” Houry said. “The people of al-Waer need more than the words of a UN resolution, they need to see the UN put it into action.”
The Al-Waer Occupation
Al-Waer consists of two areas – new Waer, with nine districts, called “Islands,” and old Waer, which includes Waer al-Qudat and the area around the Homs al-Kabeer Hospital. With the exception of the 9th Island, all Islands are under rebel control. According to the residents, rebel fighters in al-Waer are from at least 30 factions, including the Free Syrian Army, al-Ansar, Atba’ al-Rasul, Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Manara Battalion, Ahrar al-Sham, Ibn al-Malek Brigade, al-Hoda Battalion, Jabhat al-Asliya wa al-Tanmiya’, and al-Hur Brigade.
Despite the concentration of rebel fighters on active fronts and in the 7th Island, the residents who spoke to Human Rights Watch said that government attacks stretched across al-Waer, into areas with no rebel fighters or other military targets in the vicinity. The areas attacked included those with high concentrations of civilians.
Ghassan, a 21-year-old former student from Khalidya living in al-Waer since 2012, told Human Rights Watch that the government is targeting al-Waer from all directions: from the orchards to the north, from the forest to the south, from the bakery checkpoint just behind Homs al-Kabeer Hospital to the east, and from Mazraa and the 9th Island to the west, which is under government control. A member of the Media Center in al-Waer confirmed the multi-directional assault, including daily shelling with istuwanat that appear to be launched from the military academy grounds to the northeast.
In addition to shelling attacks, residents also told Human Rights Watch that government or pro-government snipers, including those positioned in the Homs al-Kabeer Hospital area and the al-Gardenia Tower in the Old Homs neighborhood, have also targeted civilians including women and children.
All six residents told Human Rights Watch that rebel fighters in al-Waer are concentrated in the 7th Island, where the most intense clashes have taken place between government and rebel forces. They said there are also active fronts in the orchards to the north, the forest to the south, and near the Homs al-Kabeer Hospital to the east, with rebel fighters present. Residents said that rebel groups also had offices across al-Waer and that fighters did not sleep on the active fronts, but rather in other parts of the neighborhood.
Residents said that Islands 1 through 6 are populated by civilians. According to the residents, areas in these Islands without any rebel offices or presence are also subjected to daily artillery attacks. In addition to strikes on these areas, the 4th and 6th Islands have also been subject to aerial attacks.
Indiscriminate Attacks
Residents told Human Rights Watch that the shelling of al-Waer began in October 2013, when rebel fighters entered al-Waer from Bab Amr. At the same time, the government began to restrict movement in and out of the neighborhood.
Ghassan said that, after negotiations between the government and rebel groups broke down on Eid al-Adha, October 4, 2014, “the government’s bombing of al-Waer increased, including in Islands 5, 6, and 8... After Eid al-Adha, there were three days of daily intensive shelling.” He told Human Rights Watch that his father was injured by shrapnel after a mortar strike around this time: “The mortar was fired from the 9th Island, or Mazraa [where the government forces are]. Luckily it was a superficial injury on his face, and we did not have to take him to the hospital.” Several videos published on YouTube purport to show the aftermath of a strike on an apartment building in al-Waer on October 4 after morning prayers, allegedly from a warplane.
Talal, a 27-year-old former school teacher from al-Waer, also told Human Rights Watch that during Eid al-Adha, just after the morning prayer, civilians going to the cemetery in Island 1 were also struck by surface-to-surface rockets.
Sleiman, a paramedic, told Human Rights Watch that a rocket hit an apartment tower in the 4th Island in early November. Sleiman, who went to the scene of the attack to evacuate wounded, said 11 people were killed, mostly women and children, but also some fighters. The impact threw one child, Soha, 8, out of the building.
Shelling in al-Waer ceased during a temporary ceasefire between government and rebel forces that began on November 11, but resumed days later, albeit with less intensity.
On December 16, however, the member of the Media Center in al-Waer who spoke to Human Rights Watch said the intensity of the shelling on the neighborhood increased drastically. These attacks resulted in 36 fatalities, including at least 33 civilians. He said the fighters killed on December 16 were working as first responders to evacuate the wounded.
Aid Restrictions
Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that government forces have been regularly restricting their access to life-saving assistance and have limited the ability of many residents to flee the neighborhood.
Three residents told Human Rights Watch that the government began significantly restricting access points to and from the neighborhood in October 2013 after rebel fighters entered the neighborhood and fighting began in the 7th Island.
The main access road that remained opened was the bakery checkpoint, but government forces severely restricted movement even out of this checkpoint. All of the witnesses said that movement for Waer residents in and out of the neighborhood became limited to state employees and students.
Three witnesses described how even these residents were subject to harassment, physical abuse, and arbitrary detention when trying to enter or leave the neighborhood.
Talal, who used to leave and enter al-Waer daily to teach outside of the neighborhood, said he was arbitrarily detained in May 2014 when returning to al-Waer from work.
Every working day I was taking the bus. I am younger than the other employees so this made them suspicious of me, and every day they used to check my ID [to see if I was wanted]. Sometimes this process would take three hours. In May, when we were coming back to al-Waer, Abou Haidar from Military Intelligence entered the bus and asked me to go with him. He then told the bus to continue to al-Waer... I was taken to his office at the checkpoint... I got really scared. Abou Haidar took all my stuff, my wallet, and phone. My mother was calling me because she got scared when I did not come back with the others. Abou Haidar threw my phone on the floor. He handcuffed me, blindfolded me, and hit me with a stick. He put me on my knees, and kept me there for three to four hours.
Talal told Human Rights Watch that he was then taken to a Military Intelligence facility where he was insulted, stripped, beaten, and held in an overcrowded cell for two days, then taken to be interrogated. During his interrogation he was tortured, including with electricity. He was released, but he later learned that it was only after his father had paid a bribe of 1.5 million Syrian pounds (approximately $8,500 USD).
Talal also told Human Rights Watch about a man he saw detained at a checkpoint during one of his trips in and out of al-Waer. The man was stopped because he had a picture of Bashar al-Assad in his pocket with his ID, which Talal thought the man carried in an effort to reduce his chances of arrest at the checkpoint:
Talal also told Human Rights Watch about a man he saw detained at a checkpoint during one of his trips in and out of al-Waer. The man was stopped because he had a picture of Bashar al-Assad in his pocket with his ID, which Talal thought the man carried in an effort to reduce his chances of arrest at the checkpoint:
When the Military Intelligence member saw the picture, he started laughing and told him: “Liar, you think because you have a picture of Assad, it will protect you.” They covered his head with his shirt to blindfold him, handcuffed him, and took him. Since then he has disappeared.
Three residents also said that employees and students were physically and verbally abused at the checkpoints, including if they tried to bring in banned goods or more quantities of goods than were allowed. One resident, Sleiman, said that he was still a student when he moved to al-Waer from Bab Amr in 2012, but that he stopped going to school because of the verbal harassment he was subjected to at the checkpoints.
In addition to restrictions on residents trying to leave al-Waer, the Syrian government is heavily restricting goods that can be brought into the neighborhood. All of the residents who spoke to Human Rights Watch described restrictions on the type and amount of food they could bring into the neighborhood.
Several residents told Human Rights Watch that people with government IDs, students and government employees, were allowed to bring in small quantities of food, but that there were restrictions, which varied from time to time. One of these residents, Maha, said:
In addition to restrictions on residents trying to leave al-Waer, the Syrian government is heavily restricting goods that can be brought into the neighborhood. All of the residents who spoke to Human Rights Watch described restrictions on the type and amount of food they could bring into the neighborhood.
Several residents told Human Rights Watch that people with government IDs, students and government employees, were allowed to bring in small quantities of food, but that there were restrictions, which varied from time to time. One of these residents, Maha, said:
[The checkpoints] allowed [each family] to bring in one kilo of each kind of food. You have to choose it is either meat or chicken. On some days, there would be random restrictions, and they would just say ‘today no sugar’, or ‘today no tomatoes’...
She and other residents also described blanket bans on other goods, including cigarettes, chlorine, salt, and sugar. Four residents also told Human Rights Watch that there were restrictions on preserved food and dry goods since June 2014, including rice, bulgur, lentils, canned food, and milk for children. Gas and diesel are also forbidden, the residents said, raising concerns about heating oil for the winter. Talal said that other items, like diapers, were also restricted:
Three days ago one of my friends in al-Waer asked from me to help him get diapers for his baby. I asked one of my friends who is still working at a University. At the checkpoint they asked him for a family booklet, since he did not have a baby they threw out the diapers.
The residents also described intermittent electricity and water supply and restricted access to medication and medical assistance. Four residents said the only hospital accessible to al-Waer residents in the neighborhood is the Al-Waleed hospital, which is underequipped. This hospital was struck by a government attack on November 18, 2013. The Violations Documentation Center investigated the strike on the hospital and identified 12 people killed in the strike, including eight nurses, a woman, and her child.
The al-Burr hospital, which is under government control, in the Kudat neighbourhood in Old Waer, can receive patients but the injured have to pass through government checkpoints and receive authorization from the checkpoint before being sent for treatment. Sleiman, the paramedic, and Ghassan explained that some medications are allowed in via the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for chronic diseases, but medical supplies for treating wounds or operating are not allowed.
The member of the Homs Media Center who spoke to Human Rights Watch explained that after October 2013 only two humanitarian aid deliveries were brought into al-Waer, once on June 28 and again on November 11, 2014. Ghassan said that the November 11 delivery included hygiene kits and food, but no medical supplies.
The al-Burr hospital, which is under government control, in the Kudat neighbourhood in Old Waer, can receive patients but the injured have to pass through government checkpoints and receive authorization from the checkpoint before being sent for treatment. Sleiman, the paramedic, and Ghassan explained that some medications are allowed in via the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for chronic diseases, but medical supplies for treating wounds or operating are not allowed.
The member of the Homs Media Center who spoke to Human Rights Watch explained that after October 2013 only two humanitarian aid deliveries were brought into al-Waer, once on June 28 and again on November 11, 2014. Ghassan said that the November 11 delivery included hygiene kits and food, but no medical supplies.
الأسئلة المعلقة
خليل العناني
مرت، الآن، أربع سنوات على الموجة الأولى "للربيع العربي"، ولا تزال أسئلة كثيرة معلقة بلا أجوبة يقينية واضحة. أسئلة كثيرة برسم الماضي القريب تحاصر المستقبل، وتطارده، كل يوم، مع كل نقطة دم تسقط هنا أو هناك، ومع كل روح تُزهق على أيدي مجرم هنا، أو مستبد هناك. لم يعد شريط الأخبار "العاجلة" يحمل أخباراً سارة، وإنما يقذف أخباراً مؤلمة وقصصاً موجعة، لم يكن لأحد أن يتخيلها قبل أربع سنوات. حكايات متكررة لعائلات ثكلى، وأطفال يتامى، ونساء تتشح بالسواد، بعد أن فقدت عزيزاً، أو ودّعت قريباً، ونفوس حائرة وضعت همومها فى حقيبة سفرها، وحملتها على ظهرها، مودعة الأهل والوطن والأحباب.
هل ثرنا حقاً، أم كانت ثوراتنا بلا أنياب، فلم تقوَ على اقتلاع جذور الاستبداد؟ وهل سقطت ثوراتنا بسبب قلة خبرتنا ووعينا ورعونة قياداتنا، أم كانت ضحية انقساماتنا وخلافاتنا وخياراتنا السيئة؟ هل كانت الثورة المضادة قدراً محتوماً، أم جاءت نتيجة أخطائنا وفشلنا وضعف خياراتنا؟ وهل تتحمل أحزابنا ونشطاؤنا وجماعاتنا السياسية والثورية المسؤولية، أم تتحملها الشعوب التي لم تصبر على دفع فاتورة التغيير؟ هل نحن شعوب صالحة للثورة ابتداء، أم أننا شعوب تعشق الاستبداد والاستعباد؟ وهل انحازت أغلبيتنا إلى الحرية والعدالة والكرامة، أم مالت باتجاه الصمت، من أجل الاستقرار؟
مضت الأعوام الأربعة، ولا تزال أسئلة كثيرة عالقة، فماذا كسب الإسلاميون من الهرولة إلى السلطة، وماذا خسروا؟ وماذا حقق العلمانيون بتواطئهم وتآمرهم، وإلى ماذا وصلوا؟ وماذا حدث لشباب الثورة، ولماذا انتكسوا؟ وماذا حلّ بملايين الحالمين بالتغيير، وأين ذهبوا؟ وماذا حدث لشعوبنا، ولماذا استمرأوا البطش والقتل، ولماذا صمتوا؟ وأين ذهب رموز "الربيع العربي"، وكيف سقطوا؟ وأين ذهبت صيحات "الحرية والكرامة والعدالة"، ولماذا اختنقت؟
سنوات أربع مرت، لم نقرأ فيها، أو نسمع، عن مراجعة للأخطاء، أو وقفة جادة مع الذات، أو مراجعة لفكر أو محاسبة لقيادة، أو تغيير لاستراتيجية أو تعديل لخطة، أو نرى خطوة إلى الخلف، من أجل تصحيح المسارات. فتكررت الكوارث، وتكاثرت المحن والنوازل، وتكالب الخصوم، وتضاعفت الهموم، ولم يعد في الصدر متسعٌ لمزيد من الألم والشجون.
بعد أربع سنوات، لم يعد أمام بعضنا سوى أن يصرخ: "جبنا آخرنا" من شدة القهر والظلم، بينما يئن بعض آخر تحت سياط السلطوية، وتفحش "إعلامها" وانحطاط إعلامييها وتواطؤ نخبتها ومثقفيها. وبعد أربع سنوات، لم تعد الثورة حلماً، بل باتت كابوساً، ولم يعد التغيير مطلباً، وإنما أصبح مرادفاً للعنف والفوضى. بعد أربع سنوات، سقط الثوار، وانقلب الجنرالات، وانقسمت الآراء، وتفتت الرؤى، وانزوى التوافق والإجماع.
سنوات أربع مضت، تمكنت فيها الأصولية السلطوية من استعادة زمام المبادرة، بمساعدة ورعاية حلف إقليمي فاسد، احتضن الثورة المضادة، فموّل رجالها، وجهّز إعلامها، فانطلقوا جميعاً ينهشون فى جسد الثورة الأصيلة. اشتروا النفوس، وأفسدوا الأخلاق، وزوّروا الأقلام، واغتصبوا الأحلام، واستحلوا الدماء، وتآمروا على الشباب، وأتلفوا الألباب. فعلوا ذلك تحت غطاء دولي سافر، وتواطؤ أممي مُشين، وصمت عالمي مفضوح، سوف يظل نقطة سوداء في سجّل التحرر من الاستبداد. لا يخجل تحالف الثورات المضادة من أقواله وأفعاله، بينما يصمت أصحاب الحقوق وطالبو التغيير، هروباً أو خوفاً.
نجحت الثورة المضادة، ولو مؤقتاً، بعد أن استفاق السلطويون، وانقسم الثوريون، وتفرّق المتحمسون للتغيير، بعد أن فترت عزيمتهم، وضعُفت شوكتهم، وانزوى معظمهم خوفاً أو إحباطاً أو فشلاً. وسقطت الثورة الأصيلة تحت ضربات قضاءٍ لا يُنصف، ونخبٍ لا تُنصت، وجمهور لا يكترث، ومؤسسات قاصرة، تعتاش على الفساد، وتمالئ السلطان، وتحمي عرين الاستبداد.
سنوات أربع مرت، سقط فيها عشرات الأبرياء من كل الفرق والتيارات والجماعات، وارتقت فيها أرواح عزيزة، وكُسرَت فيها نفوس سليمة، واحترقت فيها وجوه كانت يوماً شريفة، ولم يعد على السطح سوى نفايات عقلية وبقايا بشر. هذا كله بينما لا يزال رفقاء الميادين منقسمين، حائرين، تائهين، متنابذين، ومتعاتبين، كأن شيئاً لم يحدث، وكأن الثمن لم يكن فادحاً. ماذا تنتظرون، بعد أن خُنقت الثورات، ووقعت الانقلابات، وانتفض المستبدون، وتوحش المرتزقة والمنتفعون؟ ماذا تنتظرون بعد أن بُرّئ القتلة، وتعالت ضحكات الفجرة، وسُجن الأبرياء، وضاعت حقوق الشهداء؟ وماذا تنتطرون، بعد أن وصل البطش والقمع إلى أعتاب بيوتكم، بينما أنتم تتناحرون وتتشاجرون وتتلاومون؟
أما السؤال الكبير فهو: هل كانت "الثورات" العربية من تونس إلى اليمن ثورات حقيقية، أم كانت انتفاضة ما قبل "الموت" والسكون؟
Hamas: between resistance and government (part 2)
Asa Winstanley
Just who is Mohammad Dahlan, the deposed and disgraced Gaza warlord, who "lost" Gaza for Fatah back in 2007? And how true are recent media reports that he may be about to make a big come back on the Palestinian scene, possibly even aided by his arch-enemy, the Hamas movement?
Just who is Mohammad Dahlan, the deposed and disgraced Gaza warlord, who "lost" Gaza for Fatah back in 2007? And how true are recent media reports that he may be about to make a big come back on the Palestinian scene, possibly even aided by his arch-enemy, the Hamas movement?
Born in Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, Dahlan was once head of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) highly militarised "Preventative Security" force. During the post-Oslo era, when Hamas first engaged in a campaign of retaliatory bombings against Israel, Dahlan's forces were responsible for brutal arrests and torture of Hamas activists and sympathisers. Some accounts date Dahlan's links with Israeli military and spy agencies as far back as 1994, when the PA was first being formed.
As I recounted in part one, Dahlan was at the vanguard of the Fatah-Israel-US-European conspiracy to overthrow the elected Palestinian government in 2006 after Hamas came to power in free and fair elections.
Dahlan has long been Western imperial powers' preferred interlocutor in the Palestinian scene. He is seen as a reliable potential dictator, much as Saddam Hussein was once seen by the West, and much as former Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak was seen. And certainly he is regarded in the much the same light as current Egyptian military dictator Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in the halls of Western imperial power.
Indeed, Dahlan is very much a wannabe Sisi, having formed very warm ties with him since the former's coup against the elected president of Egypt (who was kidnapped and "disappeared" by the military regime). He has also developed close ties with the regime of the United Arab Emirates (which, like all other Gulf regimes, is a tyranny run by absolute monarchs). The oil and gas money flowing to Dahlan from there keeps him in business.
As I recounted in a column in March, although once important allies, and despite essentially agreeing on the need to capitulate to American power by serving the interests of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, Dahlan and Abbas are now bitter enemies.
Dahlan, kicked out of Gaza by Hamas in 2007, was later extradited from the West Bank on fraud charges in 2010. He now reportedly lives between UAE and Egypt – but clearly travels a lot.
While the fraud charges against Dahlan were likely of substance, they were political in nature: a way for Abbas to get rid of a key rival to his throne – one with powerful Western and Gulf allies (to say nothing of the Israelis). After all, who is more corrupt than Abbas: the man whose son was mocked on Arab social media recently for carrying a passport marked "president's son" under the "occupation" field?
Last week marked a new milestone in the Dahlan-Abbas cold war. Posters of Dahlan were openly hoisted in Gaza for the first time in years. While the participants in this "demonstration" last Thursday were almost certainly for the most part paid loyalists, the very fact that Hamas allowed it to go ahead is significant.
Amid reports that Abbas's dictatorial behaviour had led to him losing ally after ally, it seems Hamas may be feeling out the possibility of thawing relations with Dahlan. A long report in the pro-armed-resistance Lebanese leftist newspaper Al-Akhbar earlier this month quotes several Hamas leaders making ambiguous but unmistakably conciliatory statements in that direction.
Is Hamas genuine in this alarming initiative? Do they really want to "reconcile" with Dahlan the torturer; Dahlan the American and Israeli agent? Or is this some sort of political game, designed to confuse and infuriate their political rivals in Ramallah? Only time will tell.
But one thing is for sure. An alliance between a project of resistance to Israeli occupation and a project of acting as a proxy for that same occupation is doomed to failure.
An associate editor for The Electronic Intifada, Asa Winstanley is an investigative journalist who lives in London.
2014 a game-changer in Palestine
By Ramzy Baroud
In terms of losses in human lives, 2014 has been a horrific year for Palestinians, surpassing the horrors of both 2008 and 2009, when an Israeli war against the Gaza Strip killed and wounded thousands.
While some aspects of the conflict are stagnating between a corrupt, ineffectual Palestinian Authority and the criminality of Israeli wars and occupation, it would also be fair to argue that 2014 was also a game-changer to some degree - and it is not all bad news.
To an extent, 2014 has been a year of clarity for those keen to understand the reality of the "Palestinian-Israeli conflict" but were sincerely confused by the contrasting narratives. Here are five reasons that support the argument that things are changing.
1. A different kind of Palestinian unity
Although the two leading Palestinian parties, Hamas and Fatah, agreed to a unity government in April, little has changed on the ground. Yes, a government was officially established in June, and held its first meeting in October. But Gaza is effectively still managed by Hamas, which has been largely left alone managing the affairs of the Strip after the Israeli war in July-August. Perhaps Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority is hoping that the massive destruction will weaken Hamas into political submission, especially as Egypt continues to seal shut the Rafah border.
But while the factions are failing to unite, the Israeli war on Gaza has inspired a new impetus of struggle in the West Bank. Israeli plans of targeting holy sites in Jerusalem, particularly the al-Aqsa Mosque, coupled with the deep anguish felt by most Palestinians over the massacres carried out by Israel in Gaza, are slowly reverberating into a wave of mini-uprisings. Some speculate the situation will eventually lead to a massive conflict that will engulf all of the territories. Whether a Third Intifada takes place in 2015 or not, is a different question. What matters is that the long-orchestrated plot to divide Palestinians is breaking apart and a new collective narrative of a common struggle against occupation is finally forming.
2. A new resistance paradigm
The debate regarding what form of resistance Palestinians should or should not adopt is being sidelined and settled, not by international do-gooders, but by Palestinians themselves. They are opting to use whatever effective form of resistance they can that could deter Israeli military advances, as resistance groups have actively done in Gaza.
Although Israel's latest war killed nearly 2,200 and wounded over 11,000 Palestinians that were mostly civilians, nevertheless, it has still failed to achieve any of its declared or implied objectives. It was another reminder that sheer military strength is no longer the only overriding factor in Israel's conduct towards Palestinians.
While Israel brutalized civilians, the resistance killed 70 Israelis, more than 60 of whom were soldiers; this was also an important step testifying to the maturity of Palestinian resistance, which had previously targeted civilians during the Second Intifada and reflected more desperation rather than a winning strategy.
The legitimization of the resistance was to a degree, reflected in the recent decision by the European court to remove Hamas from its list of terrorist organizations.
Resistance in the West Bank is taking on other forms. Although it is yet to mature into a steady campaign of anti-occupation activities, it seems to be forming an identity of its own that takes into account what is possible and what is practical. The fact is that the "one size fits all" modes of resistance debate is becoming less relevant, giving way to an organic approach to resistance devised by Palestinians themselves.
3. Boycott normalizes debate on Israeli crimes
Another form of resistance is crystalizing in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS) which continues to grow, gathering steam, supporters and constant achievements. Not only was 2014 a year in which BDS managed to win the support of numerous civil society organizations, academicians, scientists, celebrities and to reach out to people from all walks of life, it did something else that is equally important: It normalized the debate on Israel in many circles around the world. While any criticism of Israel was considered a taboo in yesteryears, it has been forever broken.
Questioning the morality and practicality of boycotting Israel is no longer a frightening subject, but is open for debate in numerous media outlets, universities and other platforms.
2014 has been a year that made the discussion of boycotting Israel more mainstream than ever before. While a critical mass is yet to be achieved in the US, the momentum is constantly building up being led by students, clergy men and women, celebrities and ordinary people. In Europe, the movement has been hugely successful.
4. Parliaments are feeling the heat
While, traditionally, much of the southern hemisphere offered unconditional support for Palestinians, the West conceitedly stood with Israel. Following the Oslo accords, a bewildering European position evolved, where they flirted with finding the "balance" between an occupied nation and the occupier. At times, the European Union (EU) timidly criticized the Israeli occupation, while continuing to be one of Israel's largest trade partner, providing weapons to the Israeli army, who then use them to carry out war crimes in Gaza and sustain its military occupation in the West Bank.
This debauched policy is being challenged by citizens of various European countries. The Israeli summer war on Gaza exposed Israel's human rights violations and war crimes like never before, revealing along the way EU hypocrisy. To relieve some of the pressure, some EU countries appear to be taking stronger stances against Israel, reviewing their military cooperation, and more boldly questioning the right-wing policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
A spate of parliamentary votes followed, overwhelmingly voting to recognize Palestine as a state. While these decisions remain largely symbolic, they represent an unmistakable shift in EU attitude towards Israel. Netanyahu continues to rail against European "hypocrisy", assured, perhaps, by Washington's unconditional support. But with the US losing control over the tumultuous Middle East, the Israeli prime minister might soon be forced to rethink his obstinate attitude.
5. Israel's democracy exposed
For decades, Israel defined itself as both a democratic and Jewish state. The objective was clear: to maintain Jewish superiority over Palestinian Arabs, while continuing to present itself as a modern "Western" democracy - in fact, "the only democracy in the Middle East". While Palestinians and many others were never sold on the democracy charade, many accepted the dichotomy with little questioning.
While Israel doesn't have a constitution, it has a "code", called the Basic Law. Since there is no Israeli equivalent to a "constitutional amendment" - the Netanyahu government is pushing for a new law at the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. This will basically put forth new principals under which Israel will define itself. One of these principals will define Israel as "the nation-state of the Jewish people", thus casting all non-Jewish citizens of Israel as lesser citizens.
While, for all intents and purposes, Palestinian citizens of Israel have been treated as an outcast, and discriminating against in many ways, the new Basic Law will be a constitutional confirmation of their state-enforced inferiority. The Jewish and democratic paradigm is dying for good, exposing Israel's reality the way it is.
The year ahead
Certainly 2015 will bring much of the same: The Palestinian Authority will fight for its own existence, and try to maintain its privileges, bestowed by Israel, the US and others by using every tool available; Israel will also remain emboldened by American funds and unconditional support and military backing.
Yes, the next year will also prove frustratingly familiar in that regard. But the new, real and opposing momentum will unlikely cease, challenging and exposing the Israeli occupation, on one hand, and sidestepping the ineffectual, self-serving Palestinian Authority on the other.
2014 was a very painful year for Palestine, but also a year in which the collective resistance of the Palestinian people, and their supporters, proved too strong to bend or break. And in that, there can be much solace.
Ramzy Baroud is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press, London).
In terms of losses in human lives, 2014 has been a horrific year for Palestinians, surpassing the horrors of both 2008 and 2009, when an Israeli war against the Gaza Strip killed and wounded thousands.
While some aspects of the conflict are stagnating between a corrupt, ineffectual Palestinian Authority and the criminality of Israeli wars and occupation, it would also be fair to argue that 2014 was also a game-changer to some degree - and it is not all bad news.
To an extent, 2014 has been a year of clarity for those keen to understand the reality of the "Palestinian-Israeli conflict" but were sincerely confused by the contrasting narratives. Here are five reasons that support the argument that things are changing.
1. A different kind of Palestinian unity
Although the two leading Palestinian parties, Hamas and Fatah, agreed to a unity government in April, little has changed on the ground. Yes, a government was officially established in June, and held its first meeting in October. But Gaza is effectively still managed by Hamas, which has been largely left alone managing the affairs of the Strip after the Israeli war in July-August. Perhaps Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority is hoping that the massive destruction will weaken Hamas into political submission, especially as Egypt continues to seal shut the Rafah border.
But while the factions are failing to unite, the Israeli war on Gaza has inspired a new impetus of struggle in the West Bank. Israeli plans of targeting holy sites in Jerusalem, particularly the al-Aqsa Mosque, coupled with the deep anguish felt by most Palestinians over the massacres carried out by Israel in Gaza, are slowly reverberating into a wave of mini-uprisings. Some speculate the situation will eventually lead to a massive conflict that will engulf all of the territories. Whether a Third Intifada takes place in 2015 or not, is a different question. What matters is that the long-orchestrated plot to divide Palestinians is breaking apart and a new collective narrative of a common struggle against occupation is finally forming.
2. A new resistance paradigm
The debate regarding what form of resistance Palestinians should or should not adopt is being sidelined and settled, not by international do-gooders, but by Palestinians themselves. They are opting to use whatever effective form of resistance they can that could deter Israeli military advances, as resistance groups have actively done in Gaza.
Although Israel's latest war killed nearly 2,200 and wounded over 11,000 Palestinians that were mostly civilians, nevertheless, it has still failed to achieve any of its declared or implied objectives. It was another reminder that sheer military strength is no longer the only overriding factor in Israel's conduct towards Palestinians.
While Israel brutalized civilians, the resistance killed 70 Israelis, more than 60 of whom were soldiers; this was also an important step testifying to the maturity of Palestinian resistance, which had previously targeted civilians during the Second Intifada and reflected more desperation rather than a winning strategy.
The legitimization of the resistance was to a degree, reflected in the recent decision by the European court to remove Hamas from its list of terrorist organizations.
Resistance in the West Bank is taking on other forms. Although it is yet to mature into a steady campaign of anti-occupation activities, it seems to be forming an identity of its own that takes into account what is possible and what is practical. The fact is that the "one size fits all" modes of resistance debate is becoming less relevant, giving way to an organic approach to resistance devised by Palestinians themselves.
3. Boycott normalizes debate on Israeli crimes
Another form of resistance is crystalizing in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS) which continues to grow, gathering steam, supporters and constant achievements. Not only was 2014 a year in which BDS managed to win the support of numerous civil society organizations, academicians, scientists, celebrities and to reach out to people from all walks of life, it did something else that is equally important: It normalized the debate on Israel in many circles around the world. While any criticism of Israel was considered a taboo in yesteryears, it has been forever broken.
Questioning the morality and practicality of boycotting Israel is no longer a frightening subject, but is open for debate in numerous media outlets, universities and other platforms.
2014 has been a year that made the discussion of boycotting Israel more mainstream than ever before. While a critical mass is yet to be achieved in the US, the momentum is constantly building up being led by students, clergy men and women, celebrities and ordinary people. In Europe, the movement has been hugely successful.
4. Parliaments are feeling the heat
While, traditionally, much of the southern hemisphere offered unconditional support for Palestinians, the West conceitedly stood with Israel. Following the Oslo accords, a bewildering European position evolved, where they flirted with finding the "balance" between an occupied nation and the occupier. At times, the European Union (EU) timidly criticized the Israeli occupation, while continuing to be one of Israel's largest trade partner, providing weapons to the Israeli army, who then use them to carry out war crimes in Gaza and sustain its military occupation in the West Bank.
This debauched policy is being challenged by citizens of various European countries. The Israeli summer war on Gaza exposed Israel's human rights violations and war crimes like never before, revealing along the way EU hypocrisy. To relieve some of the pressure, some EU countries appear to be taking stronger stances against Israel, reviewing their military cooperation, and more boldly questioning the right-wing policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
A spate of parliamentary votes followed, overwhelmingly voting to recognize Palestine as a state. While these decisions remain largely symbolic, they represent an unmistakable shift in EU attitude towards Israel. Netanyahu continues to rail against European "hypocrisy", assured, perhaps, by Washington's unconditional support. But with the US losing control over the tumultuous Middle East, the Israeli prime minister might soon be forced to rethink his obstinate attitude.
5. Israel's democracy exposed
For decades, Israel defined itself as both a democratic and Jewish state. The objective was clear: to maintain Jewish superiority over Palestinian Arabs, while continuing to present itself as a modern "Western" democracy - in fact, "the only democracy in the Middle East". While Palestinians and many others were never sold on the democracy charade, many accepted the dichotomy with little questioning.
While Israel doesn't have a constitution, it has a "code", called the Basic Law. Since there is no Israeli equivalent to a "constitutional amendment" - the Netanyahu government is pushing for a new law at the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. This will basically put forth new principals under which Israel will define itself. One of these principals will define Israel as "the nation-state of the Jewish people", thus casting all non-Jewish citizens of Israel as lesser citizens.
While, for all intents and purposes, Palestinian citizens of Israel have been treated as an outcast, and discriminating against in many ways, the new Basic Law will be a constitutional confirmation of their state-enforced inferiority. The Jewish and democratic paradigm is dying for good, exposing Israel's reality the way it is.
The year ahead
Certainly 2015 will bring much of the same: The Palestinian Authority will fight for its own existence, and try to maintain its privileges, bestowed by Israel, the US and others by using every tool available; Israel will also remain emboldened by American funds and unconditional support and military backing.
Yes, the next year will also prove frustratingly familiar in that regard. But the new, real and opposing momentum will unlikely cease, challenging and exposing the Israeli occupation, on one hand, and sidestepping the ineffectual, self-serving Palestinian Authority on the other.
2014 was a very painful year for Palestine, but also a year in which the collective resistance of the Palestinian people, and their supporters, proved too strong to bend or break. And in that, there can be much solace.
Ramzy Baroud is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press, London).
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