Saturday, April 23, 2016

ما وراء الخبر-جدوى التنسيق الأمني الفلسطيني مع إسرائيل



We can learn from Italy and Israel

By Faisal Qassem


We Arabs may be the people in the world who write the most poetry and romantic odes about human virtues such as brotherhood, justice, equality and the need to protect humanity, its soul and its right to inheritance. Our emotions, though, are nothing more in today’s reality.
The fact that we are in this position comes as no surprise. I say this as we are see Italy’s media campaign centred on politics, humanitarianism and civil liberties; as we witness its dedication to these virtues in its reaction to the death of student Giulio Regeni who was killed in Egypt a few months ago. Italy did not let the death of its citizen pass without comment just so that it could maintain its “economic” relationship with Egypt. It has pursued this case so that Regeni’s death has become a pan-European if not global issue. The Egyptian government now finds itself in an unenviable position because the Italian media in particular, and the world in general, has turned Egypt and its credibility into dust.
There is no doubt that the regime in Cairo is facing a crisis because of the unbelievable conditions that are experienced by the majority of Egyptians. This is not due to price increases, nor to the political authoritarianism in the country, but is because the regime is in the middle of an international scandal due to the death of an Italian university student in Egypt at the hands of the intelligence services or some other agency. It does not matter who killed Regeni, according to the Italians, but what is important is that an Italian citizen was killed in Egypt under mysterious circumstances. From an Italian perspective, therefore, it is important to shake the ground under the feet of the Egyptian authorities.
Not a day goes by without members of the Italian parliament mentioning Regeni’s name. Not a day goes by without the Italian newspapers covering every detail of the case and its progress. Not a day goes by that Egypt is not criticised. Not a day goes by that demonstrations do not take place on Italian streets and they are happening because of Regeni’s death. Not a day goes by that the Egyptian government does not find itself in a predicament because it has yet to provide the Italian government with any reasonable explanation about what happened to the student.
It was sad to see Egyptian representatives at a televised press conference answering questions as if they were in the dock in a court. They struggled to answer embarrassing questions. Both the Egyptian government and media have expressed their regret with regards to Regeni’s death, and there is now no other option but to find a way to free them from the consequences of this issue. Regeni’s ghost has become a nightmare for the regime that finds itself preoccupied with the death of a European citizen and Italy’s recall of its ambassador from Cairo.
Notice how the Italian government and people responded to the death of one university student in Egypt, and compare that to the tens of thousands of Arabs dying every day without anyone ever hearing of their story or knowing their name. Who is seeking justice on their behalf? A country which views the death of one citizen as the death of an entire nation is one which will work to protect human rights and force anyone who seeks to violate them to think twice about it. This is how self-respecting governments protect themselves and their people. Nobody can take governments seriously if they swat their own people like flies.
Regini’s case reminds me of the Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit, the soldier who was held captive by Hamas for more than 5 years. Not a single day went by that Israel did not try to rescue him. Shalit’s case became a cause célèbre across the globe. As it took centre stage, an article appeared under the following title “Shalit the Israeli and Shalout the Arab”. Shalout is an Arabic vernacular term meaning to “to be kicked aside”. The article painted a clear picture of the differences between an Israeli or Western citizen on one hand and an Arab citizen on the other by making the distinction that the former is treated like a citizen while the other is thrown aside like an old shoe. When we Arabs call for the release of 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for one Israeli hostage, we are admitting to the discrepancies in the value of human beings, and that one Israeli, or westerner, is worth thousands of Arabs.
Now look to how the Israeli government is trying everything within its power to retrieve the remains of the famed Israeli spy Eli Cohen who was captured by the Syrian regime years ago and killed. Did you know that the Israelis have been speaking with the Russians in an effort to convince the Syrian regime to release Cohen’s remains so that he can be reburied in Israel? Do not be surprised if Bashar Al-Assad releases them via the Russians so that he can gain more Israeli support.
Notice the difference between Israel and the Syrian regime; while the Israeli government has been asking Putin for his help to retrieve the remains of one person, Assad has been asking him for his help to slaughter Syrians. His regime has been using all of Russia’s new weaponry to kill Syrians and destroy Syria. Putin himself admitted recently that Syria is the best place to try out new weapons and munitions.
A leader who makes little of his people gives the green light to outsiders to disrespect and hate him and them. Respect your citizens so that others can respect you.
Translated from, 17 April, 2016

Mohammad Afifa's Cartoon: Israeli Military Helmet

خوذة حرب اسرائيلية

Friday, April 22, 2016

حديث الثورة- هل بلغ مسار التفاوض السوري طريقه المسدود؟

DNA 22 04 2016 تيران وصنافير أرض سورية

Egypt: Children Reported Tortured, ‘Disappeared’

Alexandria Arrests Emblematic of Security Abuses


Beirut – Egyptian security forces allegedly tortured a group of 20 people, eight of them children, in February 2016, after an arrest sweep in Alexandria, Human Rights Watch said today. Relatives and lawyers said the authorities refused to acknowledge holding them or to tell their families their whereabouts for more than a week and tortured them to make them confess to crimes or provide the names of other suspects.
Human Rights Watch spoke to family members and lawyers of three boys, ages 16 and 17, and three young men, ages 18 to 21, detained during the sweep for demonstrating without permission, committing vandalism and arson, and joining a banned organization. Although relatives said that all the arrests occurred on February 4 and 5, the Interior Ministry’s National Security Agency claimed in reports submitted to the prosecutor that the arrests were on February 12, the day before the detainees first appeared before a prosecutor. Egyptian law requires warrants for arrests and for prosecutors to see any detainee within 24 hours of arrest.
Some Egyptian officials have disappeared children and apparently tortured them, then faked arrest records to cover it up. The authorities have turned a blind eye to the reports of abuse and refused to investigate. 

Zama Coursen-Neff

children’s rights director
Some Egyptian officials have disappeared children and apparently tortured them, then faked arrest records to cover it up,” saidZama Coursen-Neff, children’s rights director at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities have turned a blind eye to the reports of abuse and refused to investigate.”
Six of the detainees described to relatives how they were tortured and subjected to other ill-treatment at the Security Directorate, according to their relatives. The mistreatment included being punched and given electric shocks in the genitals, having their arms tied and being suspended from their arms, being handcuffed in painful positions for long periods, having water thrown on them, and being forced to sleep on the floor in the cold. The arrests occurred after a reported arson attack on a garage and a traffic police vehicle in the early morning of February 4, in Alexandria’s al-Asafra neighborhood, for which some of the detainees were charged. Other crimes allegedly committed by detainees occurred at various other times.
The arrests fit a wider pattern of abuse and violations by officers of the Interior Ministry’s National Security Agency. Since 2014, Human Rights Watch has documented National Security officers’ frequent use of enforced disappearance and torture, as well as a failure by prosecutors and judges to investigate these violations when defense lawyers raise them. Between December 1, 2015, and March 31, 2016, the independent Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms documented 204 cases of enforced disappearance by Egyptian security services.
Family members told Human Rights Watch that they went each day to the prosecutor’s office in Alexandria but first learned of the detainees’ whereabouts on February 13, when they spotted them being taken to the office in cars. Before then, National Security officers held the detainees on the fourth floor of the Alexandria Security Directorate, an administrative building that is not an official detention site, and tortured them, the detainees told their families.
In one case, men in plain clothes who identified themselves as National Security forces arrested N., 16, on February 4, while he was sleeping in his bed at home and did not allow him to put on his shoes before taking him away barefoot, a relative told Human Rights Watch. When the family finally saw him, a week later, a relative said, “I tried to hug him, he couldn’t stand my hand on his back, it was so sore.”
Human Rights Watch obtained the names of the 20 detainees.
“They were electrocuted,” said a lawyer representing several of those arrested, including two children. “They were suspended from their wrists, not allowed to sleep, and stripped of their clothes.”
The lawyer said the children told the prosecutor what happened, but that the prosecutor did not order any investigations, because by the time they appeared, there were no substantial marks left on the victims’ bodies.
Security forces arrested three more people in the same case in the days following the initial arrest sweep. Of these 23 detainees, officials released five detainees, including two children, without charge after they appeared on February 13. Judges released another nine in separate hearings on bail of 5,000 Egyptian pounds (US$560) each in March, and another five people, including one child, on bail on April 19. A lawyer said that four people remain in detention.
In addition to the arrests and disappearances on February 4 and 5, local mediaactivists, and rights groups reported the enforced disappearances of more than 25 other people, including children, in Alexandria in March and April, and allegations that some of the detainees were taken to the Security Directorate and a National Security building in Alexandria and tortured. The family of a detainee who was arrested in another case, and a former defense lawyer from Alexandria, separately told Human Rights Watch that detainees had been held and tortured on the fourth floor of the Alexandria Security Directorate.
Egypt’s 2014 constitution prohibits torture and coercion, as well as arrest without a judicial order, and provides that all detainees “shall be immediately enabled to contact [their] relatives and lawyer, and shall be brought before the investigation authority within 24 hours” of arrest. The constitution and Egypt’s Child Law of 1996, as revised in 2008, define a child as anyone under 18 and require providing any detained child with legal assistance and detention “in appropriate locations separate from […] adults.”
Egypt has also pledged to uphold international laws that protect children’s rights and prohibit, without exception, torture and enforced disappearances, defined as a state’s refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of a person’s liberty by state agents or concealment of the person’s fate or whereabouts. Torture is defined as state agents deliberately inflicting severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, on a person for a specific purpose such as extracting information or a confession. Egypt is required to investigate credible allegations of torture and other crimes and prosecute those responsible.
Human Rights Watch, Egyptian human rights groups, and the National Council for Human Rights have all documented enforced disappearances and torture of detainees, including children, and virtual impunity for the security services responsible.
“Egypt’s security services are disappearing and torturing children on flimsy suspicion of property crimes or even just taking part in protests,” Coursen-Neff said. “Egyptian families deserve safety for their children and accountability for the security officials who’ve cruelly abused them.”
Disappearances and Torture of Children
Human Rights Watch interviewed relatives of six of the detainees who said the detainees told them how security officers tortured and ill-treated them at the Security Directorate. They said the ill-treatment included being punched and given electric shocks in the genitals, having their arms tied and being suspended from them, being handcuffed in painful positions for long periods, having water thrown on them, and being forced to sleep on the floor in the cold. The average temperature in Alexandria in February is around 13 degrees Celsius (55 degrees Fahrenheit).
A relative of two brothers, 16 and 18, told Human Rights Watch that they “were in the same clothes for the whole ten days of their disappearance, so when I got to see them [on February 13] they were in miserable shape.”
The lawyers and relatives said that officials from the National Security agency told the prosecutor that one group of the detainees was accused of vandalizing an ATM and committing acts of arson, and another was accused of participating in illegal protests and “joining a banned organization,” an apparent reference to the Muslim Brotherhood.
N., a 16-year-old who was in the third year of preparatory school – the equivalent of grade 9 – was in bed sleeping when more than a dozen men in plain clothes arrested him at 8 a.m. on February 4, a relative said.
Human Rights Watch spoke with two of his relatives on February 10, when N.’s whereabouts were still unknown, and on February 13, when he first appeared in court. The authorities did not present a search warrant or state the reason for the arrest, but identified themselves as National Security officers “on their way out the door, after they took him and searched his room and took his mobile [phone], two USB drives, and a scarf that had ‘Palestine’ written on it,” a relative said.
“They took some empty bottles, a tube, and a container with some benzene that we used for household cleaning that we kept outside in the stairway,” possibly as evidence that N. had thrown Molotov cocktails, an issue about which he was subsequently interrogated. “They didn’t even let him put his shoes on, they took him away barefoot.”
N.’s relative said the family searched for him, filed complaints, and requested help from state officials, without result, similar to the process described by the families of other missing detainees:
We started asking in all the police stations where he was. We sent a telegraph to the prosecutor general in Alexandria, and filled out a complaint at the police station. It was almost twenty people who’d been arrested the same day, and all the families filled out separate complaints plus one joint complaint. [N.’s] father went to Muntazah Second Police Station, but they denied they had him, and they even kept his father there for two hours before they let him go.
We asked for [N.] in other police stations, but they said the same. Then a few families went to the head of the public prosecution section in Alexandria, but he denied that he knew anything about the arrests. He promised to visit some detention places to see if he could find them.
Each day, relatives of the missing detainees went to the court complex in the Manshiyya neighborhood in hopes that they would be able to see the detainees if they were transported to the prosecutor’s office there. On February 13, “we saw a lot of police and soldiers were there, and the kids were brought in different cars to be sent to the prosecutor,” N.’s relative said.
The family asked three lawyers to take N.’s case but they refused “because they thought it was too risky.” A fourth lawyer agreed, his relative said. The lawyer declined to speak with Human Rights Watch out of concern for his security.
The prosecutor allowed the lawyer to attend N.’s questioning, and the lawyer told the family that the police report claimed that N. was arrested on the street on February 12, the relative said. Human Rights Watch was unable to obtain a copy of N.’s police report, but relatives and lawyers for other children and adults charged in the same case, interviewed separately, all said that police had submitted reports with the same false arrest date. His lawyer told the family that N. was accused of vandalizing an ATM and taking part in a group that tried to set a police vehicle on fire.
N.’s relative said he was eventually able to speak to his family for about five minutes, and said that security officials had tortured him on the fourth floor of the Alexandria Security Directorate:
There were bruises around his neck. When I tried to hug him, he couldn’t stand my hand on his back, it was so sore. He was always rubbing his eyes. I asked why, he said they were blindfolded all the time in detention. He lost a lot of weight.
The relative said that after being questioned by the prosecutor, N. was transferred to the Muntazah police station, where he was detained in a cell with adults for three days before the prosecutor ordered his continued pretrial detention for another 15 days and he was moved to a cell for children in the same police station.
N. described the cell as 2 meters by 1.5 meters with 15 people in it, his relative said: “They can’t sleep properly or even sit down. I wanted to give him a bottle of water but he said he doesn’t want food because there’s no bathroom [in the cell].” He was released on bail on March 10.
I. and M.
Two brothers, I. and M., ages 16 and 18, were arrested in the same case and subjected to enforced disappearance, torture, and other ill-treatment, a relative said in a phone call with Human Rights Watch on March 30. At the Alexandria Security Directorate, the brothers told their family:
They were hung from their wrists, electrocuted, hit in sensitive places, had water poured on them, and were stripped down to their boxers. They were sleeping on the floor, and were in the same clothes for the whole period of ten days’ disappearance, so when I got to see them, they were in miserable shape. They were tortured to obtain confessions or at least to name other people.
The younger brother, I., said he was detained for two days at the Muntazah police station, then transferred to a National Security office in the Smouha neighborhood, and then taken to the fourth floor of the Security Directorate, his relative said. “He didn’t know what to tell them, or what he was being charged with,” the relative said. “They were threatening that they would bring his mother and sister and arrest them and beat them.”
The brothers were both arrested in the early morning of February 5, at the younger brother’s workplace, where he was working the night shift, 6 p.m. to 4 a.m. The family last heard from I. in a 1 a.m. phone call, when I. said he would return home at the end of his shift. When he did not return, a relative went to visit his workplace at 7 a.m. I.’s employer told the relative that men in civilian clothes had arrested him, his older brother M., and another friend who were both visiting him at work and put them a police car waiting outside. Police at the Montazah station denied having the brothers in custody, as did other police stations and Interior Ministry offices, the relative said.
That night, a group of 30 police officers, men in plain clothes, some wearing balaclavas, and a man who identified himself as a National Security officer searched the brothers’ home without showing a warrant, the relative said. “They broke the metal door downstairs,” the relative said. “The only reason they didn’t break the house door was because I woke up and was waiting for them to come up. When I asked about [I. and M.] they said they didn’t know about them.”
I. was released without charge on February 13; M. remains in Borg al-Arab Prison, near Alexandria.
The relative said that I., but not M., had previously been arrested three times, the first when he was 14, in each case on similar charges of protesting without permission, blocking roads, and joining a banned organization. After being detained for 20 days in February 2014, I. was released with a disciplinary action as a minor. In May 2014, police arrested him and a judge sentenced him to several years in jail for charges similar to those in the current case, a relative said, but he was acquitted upon appeal and released after 10 months in jail, in January 2015. He was arrested again in November 2015, detained for 45 days, and then released shortly before plainclothes officers forcibly disappeared him on February 4. “The day he was disappeared was the final court hearing of the [November] case,” his relative said. Judges acquitted him in that case at a hearing on February 24, even though he was not in court.
A. and E.
Security forces including green-uniformed soldiers, black-uniformed Central Security Forces, police, and men in civilian clothes arrested A., 17, and his brother E., 20, at their home in Alexandria’s al-Asafra neighborhood on February 4, a relative told Human Rights Watch. “They destroyed things in the house, went to the kids’ room and shut the door, then came out with the boys tied up with a rope and took them without saying where they were going,” the relative said. “But the police report claims they were arrested in a tuk-tuk [a three-wheeled taxi] and had Molotovs on them.” They were subsequently charged with acts of vandalism and arson, the relative said.
The relative said that the brothers disappeared after their arrest and that no authorities would acknowledge that they were in detention or their whereabouts until the two appeared at the prosecutor’s office on February 13, when E. had bruises on his face. The brothers were then detained together at the Montazah police station for several days.
On the night of February 13, the relative said, “The boys managed to get a cell phone at the police station and called us, crying, saying they had been accused in a serious case.” They said they had been on the fourth floor of the Alexandria Security Directorate, where their arms had been handcuffed painfully behind their backs and their legs chained. E. was transferred to Borg al-Arab Prison, and A. remained at the police station in a cell with other children. They were both released on bail on April 19.
Both had been enrolled in secondary school, “but the school dismissed them for long absences,” the relative said on March 18. “It took three days for us to get a permission from the prosecution to deliver school books and materials to them in prison, and [a family member] spent the last 10 days trying to get the proper papers to have them registered in school again.”
The relative and the family’s lawyer, interviewed separately, said that a judge, without explanation, rejected their appeal to release the youths. “The kids told the prosecutor they were subject to enforced disappearance and torture but the prosecutor didn’t order an investigation into that,” the lawyer said.
M., a 21-year-old business student, was arrested at his home at 7 a.m. on February 4, by men who refused to identify themselves and who did not present a warrant, said a relative who spoke to Human Rights Watch on February 18 and again on March 18. M. also told his family he had been detained and tortured on the fourth floor of the Alexandria Security Directorate. M.’s relative said his family also complained to the prosecutor that he had been disappeared, and that the prosecutor responded by promising to search for him, but that they heard nothing until he appeared at the prosecutor’s office on February 13. His relative was later able to speak briefly with M., who described what happened to detainees at the Security Directorate building, the relative said:
When I first saw him I was shocked by his condition. He had to be supported to stand up. They had kept him on the bare floor, and they threw water on him. He said he had been electrocuted, and that they blindfolded and whipped the detainees and said they were recording their confessions.
M. is accused of vandalizing the same ATM machine as in the other cases, setting a garage on fire in the al-Asafra neighborhood, and setting a bus station on fire in the Montazah neighborhood, a lawyer familiar with his case said. “There is another police report on the ATM machine that accused different people of doing it, but the prosecutor just relied on the state security investigations file.”
After the hearing at the prosecutor’s office, M. was detained for five days at the Montazah police station, then transferred to Borg al-Arab Prison. A judge ordered him released on bail of 5,000 Egyptian pounds (US$560) on March 7, and the Interior Ministry transferred him from the prison to a National Security agency building in Ibees, an area in Alexandria, where officials “beat and kicked him” before releasing him on March 10, his relative said. 

Ashkenazi Jews descended from ancient Turkey: New research

New research suggests Yiddish language has its origins in north-east Turkey 


Most of the world's modern Jewish population, as well as the Yiddish language, come from Turkey and not other parts of the Middle East, according to a new study.
Dr Eran Elhaik of the University of Sheffield used a computer modelling system to convert Ashkenazi Jewish DNA - the Jewish communities historically located in Europe - data into geographical information, which revealed that 90 percent of Ashkenazi Jews descend from the Greeks, Iranians and others who colonised northern Anatolia (now northern Turkey) more than 2,000 years ago before converting to Judaism.
Dr Elhaik said he believed that that three still-surviving Turkish villages – Iskenaz, Eskenaz and Ashanaz – located in north-eastern Turkey made up part of the original Ashkenazi homeland and formed the nucleus that developed the modern Jewish language of Yiddish.
"We identified 367 people who claim they have two parents who are Ashkenazic Jews and we divided them into people whose parents only speak Yiddish and then everyone else," Eran Elhaik, the leader of the research, told Wired.
The three villages all derive from the word "Ashkenaz", which is the root of the word "Ashkenazi". Elhaik told Wired that north-east Turkey is the only place where the four place names exist.
Scholars had previously identified Yiddish as originally a Germanic or Slavic language, but Elhaik and others believe it was more likely developed in the 8th and 9th centuries CE, by Jewish merchants trading along the Silk Roads linking China and Europe.
Elhaik noted that the results were "surprising" as the area does not have a "rich history of Jews".
"We conclude that AJs [Ashkenazic Jews] probably originated during the first millennium when Iranian Jews judaised Greco-Roman, Turk, Iranian, southern Caucasus, and Slavic populations inhabiting the lands of Ashkenaz in Turkey," said the latest research, which has been published in the journal Genome Biology.
"Our findings imply that Yiddish was created by Slavo-Iranian Jewish merchants plying the Silk Roads between Germany, North Africa and China."
The debate over the ethnic origins of the Ashkenazi Jews has been fiercely fought by Jewish nationalists, Palestinians and anti-Semites all of whom argue that the resolution of the issue would impact on the claims of Jews to the modern land of Israel.
The theory that modern Ashkenazi Jews were originally converts from the ancient kingdom of Khazaria in Central Asia - and thus have no ancestral genetic links to the Biblical kingdom of Judea and the original Twelves Tribes of Israel - has been touted by some anti-Zionists as a means of denying the Zionist claims to historic Palestine.
Other research, however, has revealed common genetic ancestry between Ashkenazi Jews and other Middle Eastern ethnicities, including the Palestinians.
“The closest genetic neighbours to most Jewish groups were the Palestinians, Israeli Bedouins, and Druze in addition to the Southern Europeans, including Cypriots,” wrote Harry Ostrer, professor of pediatrics and pathology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine in the Bronx, New York, and Karl Skorecki, director of medical and research development at the Rambam Health Care Campus in Haifa in the journal Human Genetics in October 2012.

Yemen's "Peace Talks" ?

Thursday, April 21, 2016

DNA 21/04/2016 أوباما يدفع ممانع لتكسير التلفزيون

It's open season on the Muslim Brotherhood

Jordan – prompted by the UAE – along with Egypt, the Islamic State, as well as some EU states are all moving against the Muslim Brotherhood 

By David Hearst


Last week the Islamic State (IS) devoted 25 pages of its propaganda magazine Dabiq to a “feature” denouncing the Muslim Brotherhood as apostate. “Over the last few decades, a devastating cancer has emerged, mutated, and spread, attempting to drown the entire Ummah [Muslim community] in apostasy,” IS said, describing the Brotherhood’s religion as a combination of various tenets and rites of democracy, liberalism, pacifism and socialism “borrowed from the pagans of West and East”.
IS’s attack on the “Murtadd Brotherhood” rested on two counts: Meeting “tyrants” such as the Iranian supreme leader and maintaining a relationship with Shia nations through Hamas is one. The second one was more interesting. It was that the Brotherhood was guilty of the sin of democracy. This, it defines, as a “religion that gives supreme authority to people rather than Allah”.
“In it, the right to legislate is distributed amongst mankind so that they thereby determine what laws are fit to be ruled by in the lands,” declares Dabiq, alluding to democracy. “If the majority decide sodomy is legal, it is legalised even though it contradicts Allah’s Sharīah.”
On the same day as Dabiq appeared, Jordan announced it was closing down the Brotherhood headquarters in Amman and six other offices and banning it from holding internal elections. 
Open season has been declared on the Brotherhood. Whether the hunters are Salafi jihadists, the King of Jordan or the president of Egypt, or indeed David Cameron, the British prime minister, the effect of their labours is the same. About one third of the Arab electorate would vote for political Islamist candidates in free elections so this is about disenfranchising the biggest political movement in the region. 
The pretext for the crackdown in Jordan is the existence of a licensed offshoot called the Muslim Brotherhood Society, although the bulk of its members still lies with the old party.
Rather than do anything as messy as shoot 3,000 protesters dead in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria or fill up the country’s jails with over 40,000 political prisoners, Jordan is squeezing the life out of the Brotherhood by fragmenting it.
This is a bold move as the Brotherhood is the largest political movement in Jordan. It is also as old as the modern state is. The government is nullifying a legal status dating back to a cabinet decision made in 1946.
The satellite TV station Al-Yarmouk, which is close to the Brotherhood, expects to stop transmitting from Amman and will move abroad. The extinction of the Brotherhood in Jordan is performed by seals of red wax poured into keyholes, rather than bullets, but the effect for now is still just as real. 
Jordan’s moves against the rump of the movement have divided observers. Some see splits within the Brotherhood as an internal issue and say that government moves have the sole purpose of persuading the Brotherhood to participate in legislative elections to be held early next year. 
Others note the cumulative effect of Jordan’s rigged elections on the Brotherhood. It won only six seats in 2007 parliamentary elections out of a total of 110, which at the time was seen at blatant political fraud. Candidates who knew they had won seats by observing the count woke up the next day to find they had not. 
Muhammad Abu Rumman wrote before the November 2010 elections: “The push to boycott this year ironically came from those who are called the doves or moderate reformists, who had pushed for participation in 2007 (despite fraud in municipal elections the same year) and felt burned by the results. In addition, Brotherhood leaders were disappointed with the new electoral law passed earlier this year, which they saw as unbalanced and favouring tribal allegiances rather than political parties.”
The same pattern is being repeated now. Each time the Brotherhood plays along with the elections game in Jordan it ends up as window dressing. This is not to say that the movement isn’t being torn apart by rifts between hawks and doves about the boycott issue. 
Hassan Abu Haniyeh, an authority on Islamists in Jordan wrote: “Engaging in political action within a semi authoritarian political environment immersed the Muslim Brotherhood group in a state of anxiety, internal tension, division and strife. The regime’s policies demand more political participation from it and no boycott. However, it does not guarantee the observance of fair measures in attaining democratic results. Hence the dispute among the radicals and the moderates over the viability of the political process and the limits of moderation and radicalism.”
There may be another motive. Jordan has often acted as His Master’s Voice - only the master this time might have changed. Jordan’s moves against its Brotherhood are closely tied to its security relationship with the United Arab Emirates. It jailed a senior Brotherhood official Zaki Bani Irsheid for a Facebook post in which he criticised the UAE classifying the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. The crime he had committed was to “disturb Jordan’s relations with a foreign country”. The moves against the Brotherhood follows a meeting in Abu Dhabi between King Abdullah and Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan the crown prince.  
Admittedly, motives differ. Pressured by bin Zayed, who threatened to pull the plug on a $6bn contract for BAE Typhoon fighter jets and a BP oil contract if Britain did not proscribe the Muslim Brotherhood, David Cameron obediently launched an inquiry which caused him over two years of headache and legal challenge. 
Unable to prove a connection between the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain and the actions of Islamic militants in Egypt - it was ruled out by MI6 early on -  the inquiry ended with a written statement in the Commons, claiming that membership of, or association with, or influence by the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered as a “ possible indicator of extremism”. The prime minister’s statement ended by claiming that ‘“aspects of Muslim Brotherhood ... are contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security”.
Republican members of the US Congress, under pressure from much the same Gulf lobby, are treading the same well-worn path. The Republican-led House Judiciary Committee approved legislation last month calling on the State Department to label the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organisation.
IS and the Arab dictators and their Western backers have created their own version of a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Alienation, unemployment, rule by corrupt royal families and self-serving military elites, are all factors driving recruits to the IS. The unfulfilled promise of the revolution and jobs is in Tunisia’s case as much a driver as the old regime was. IS terrorism in turn feeds autocrats with a reason for their continued autocracy, which in turn levers aid and arms from their Western backers. Each year they declare the Middle East less fit for democracy than it was in the last. 
Each of the hunters have something specific to fear from political Islam, which is not the only force, but is certainly the numerically strongest force, that could stop this merry dance of political repression and terrorism in its tracks. Faced with a new generation of political activist - Islamist and secular, emerging from the streets of Egypt - pragmatists in the Egyptian army ought to have realised that they cannot rule the country as a long-term option, and a way out of the nightmare could be found.
Victimhood does not bestow political wisdom and the Brotherhood, like all of the opposition in Egypt, is profoundly divided. If a change of ruler came, it too would be deeply unprepared. The issue here is not the fate of one Islamist movement, but the battle going on between ballots and bullets. 
At the moment Egypt, the nerve centre of the Arab world, is being driven into the dust by one man, who tolerates no dissent. He implores each citizen to listen only to him. But they are not citizens in his eyes. They are subjects who are not yet ready for this thing called democracy.
At a press conference with the French president Francois Hollande, who had Amnesty International’s words of condemnation ringing in his ears the Egyptian host decided to lecture his guest on the subject of democracy. 
Sisi dismissed allegations of abuses under his presidency - the latest being the torture and murder of an Italian PHD student - as a plot by “an evil force”. Sisi continued with his lecture on democracy: "The region we live in, President Hollande, is very turbulent," Sisi said. “European criteria” of human rights should not be applied to struggling countries - such as his own.
This is not a model that can endure. There is no politics in Egypt only the disjointed speeches and actions of one man, and one institution - the Egyptian Army. No other institutions appear to exist. 
Each has different motives to crush representative democracy. IS fears it as an enemy, more lethal than any precision-guided bomb. And they are right to do so. The Arab autocrats fear the Brotherhood because it challenges their legitimacy. Western powers have little desire to deal with a movement which is intellectually and politically independent of it, and which challenges a Middle East order founded on the maintenance and protection of Israel at the cost of regional peace.
Each, too, has a reason and motive for expanding the field of battle. IS is as much an aggregator of regional conflict as it is a creator of it. It sucks in causes and fighters as different from each other as Dagestani militants from the North Caucasus and angry youths in search of a cause from a suburb of Brussels. The two could not be more different.
IS has shown remarkable resilience to both the air strikes and ground forces fighting it. Omar Ashour, senior lecturer in security studies at the University of Exeter, reports in his paper “Why Does the Islamic State Endure and Expand?” that IS prevails despite being heavily outgunned and outnumbered. The Iraqi Army enjoys a numerical eight to one advantage over IS, and that is without counting the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, the Shia militias and a 60 nation coalition and over 44,000 air sorties since September 2014.
There are many reasons for its endurance. Some have nothing to do with force of arms, but with its supply of subsidised bread. The chief reason for IS’s endurance, and its continuing ability to attract recruits from 120 countries, may indeed be political, rather than religious or social. 
As Ashour put it: “IS can certainly endure and expand in a regional context where bullets keep proving that they are much more effective than ballots, where extreme forms of political violence are committed by state and non-state actors and then legitimated by religious institutions, and where the eradication of the 'other' is perceived as a more legitimate political strategy than compromise and reconciliation.”
Well into the second decade of the war against  Salafi jihadists, the West still lacks an elementary understanding of its enemy. Governments in Europe blur the target and increase the list of suspects under the assumption that all Islamists are terrorist. Why stop there? Manuel Valls, the French prime minister, challenged the wearing of hijab in French universities. France's state of emergency is becoming a moveable feast.
We feed the monster that we are fighting. It has been going on for 15 years now and, at this rate, it is set to continue for longer still. 
- David Hearst is editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He was chief foreign leader writer of The Guardian, former Associate Foreign Editor, European Editor, Moscow Bureau Chief, European Correspondent, and Ireland Correspondent. He joined The Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.

Obama and the Arabs

Jordan linked to killing of Syrian rebel commander

Jordanian-Saudi relations have been recently strained by Amman's stance on the Syrian conflict 
Jordan linked to killing of Syrian rebel commander

Jordan has been accused of having a hand in the killing of Jaish al-Islam's former leader Zahran Alloush, angering the rebel group's staunch ally Saudi Arabia according to diplomats.
Jordan has been linked to the killing of Syrian rebel leader Zahran Alloush in December, leading to friction between the kingdom and Jaish al-Islam's alleged backers Saudi Arabia.

Alloush - leader of Damascus-based rebel group Jaish al-Islam - was killed in a Russian air raid in December.

The group is playing a leading role in the Saudi-backed High Negotiations Committee, which pulled out of potential peace talks in Geneva on Monday.

Supporters of Alloush have always maintained that an insider provided the intelligence Russia needed to hit the rebel commander.

"Jordanian security services believe Alloush used his relationship with Saudi Arabia to repeatedly violate Jordan's sovereignty by crossing the borders into Saudi Arabia without consent," an unnamed diplomat told local media.

He said that Riyadh has received information of a Jordanian link to the killing of the commander in Jaish al-Islam - an Islamist rebel group fighting both the Islamic State group and the Syrian regime.

"Circles inside Saudi Arabia have serious doubts about the nature of Jordan's role in Syria after it signed a secret agreement of understanding with Russia last November and the recent improvement of the security relations between Jordan and the Syrian regime," the source said.

Last year, Syrian regime intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk reportedly visited Jordan - in secret - to discuss joint security issues with top officials.

The source added that Jordanian-Saudi relations have been further strained by Amman's quiet support for Russian air raids in Syria.

Jordan has also criticised Riyadh's foreign policy by saying that regional powers should prioritise on fighting IS rather than concentrating military resources on battling Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Alloush - born in the Damascus suburbs in 1970 and raised in Saudi Arabia - founded Jaish al-Islam in late 2013, two years after the Syrian revolution began.

He was criticised after the abduction of Syrian activists in areas controlled by Jaish al-Islam.

He was also condemned for using Alawite civilians as human shields by locking women and children in cages placed on Eastern Ghouta's streets, following days of heavy regime bombing.

The United States and Saudi Arabia both criticised the killing of Alloush.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said that attempts to assassinate leaders fighting IS "do not serve the peace process and efforts to achieve a political solution in Syria".

دوافع التقارب السعودي - التركي ومستقبله

المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات

دوافع التقارب السعودي - التركي ومستقبله

مثّلت الزيارة التي قام بها العاهل السعودي الملك سلمان بن عبد العزيز، أخيراً، إلى تركيا محطةً مهمة في مسيرة التقارب التي بدأت بين البلدين قبل نحو عام. وكانت العلاقات التركية السعودية شهدت قبل ذلك تدهوراً زادت في حدته الخلافات في مصر، وتجلّى هذا التدهور أيضاً في عدم التنسيق والتنافس في سورية؛ وذلك قبل أن يتمكن البلدَان من إعادة تعريف مصالحهما القومية وبدء مسيرة تقارب دفعت إليها جملةٌ من المخاطر، أخذت تفرض نفسها عليهما بقوة في ظل حالة انهيار إقليمي، مثّل التنافس التركي - السعودي أحد معالمها.

التوتر التركي - السعودي وثورات "الربيع العربي"
مثّلت ثورات الربيع العربي نقطة خلاف رئيسة بين السعودية وتركيا؛ ففي حين رأت أنقرة في الثورات العربية، بخاصة في سورية ومصر، فرصةً لتعزيز حجم حضورها في العالم العربي، والقيام بدور قيادي على المستوى الإقليمي، رأت فيها السعودية تهديدًا كبيرًا، ليس بوصفها دولة محافظة، تعارض الفعل الثوري في المبدأ، وتخشى من ارتداداته عليها فقط، بل لأنّ السعودية اعتقدت، أيضاً، بوجود تفاهم أميركي - تركي يسمح، أو أقلّه، لا يعارض وصول تيارات إسلامية إلى السلطة، في دول "الربيع العربي"، ومنحها فرصة للخروج من ثقافة المعارضة، وتشكّل تركيا نموذجاً لها في الحكم والإدارة.
بلغت الخلافات السعودية - التركية ذروتها في مصر؛ إذ أيّدت السعودية بقوة الانقلاب العسكري الذي أطاح حكم الرئيس محمد مرسي في شهر يوليو/ تموز 2013، وقدّمت له كلّ أشكال الدعم السياسي والاقتصادي الكفيلة بإنجاحه، أمّا تركيا فقد عارضت الانقلاب، ليس من باب أنّه أطاح نظامًا حليفًا لها جاء إلى السلطة عبر صناديق الاقتراع فقط، وإنّما أيضاً لأنّه حرّك مخاوف النخبة الحاكمة في تركيا، والتي طالما عانت انقلاب الجيش عليها وتدخلاته ضدّها، ولم يكن آخرها بعيدًا (قضية أرغنكون عام 2007).
وفي سورية أيضاً، اختلفت دوافع كلٍ منهما في دعم الثورة؛ فالسعودية المعارضة للثورات عموماً دعمت الثورة في سورية ضد تمدد النفوذ الإيراني، في حين أنّ تركيا بعد أن يئست من حثّ النظام على الإصلاح دعمت قوى تعدّها قريبة منها في دولةٍ جارة ذات أهمية إستراتيجية بالنسبة إليها. وأدّى التنافس التركي – السعودي، ودعم كلٍ منهما فصائل معارضة متنافسة تسعى إلى إسقاط نظام حكم بشار الأسد، إلى تفتيت ساحة المعارضة السورية، وتبديد جهودها في معارك جانبية، أطالت أمد المواجهة، وأسهمت في تحويل الثورة عن مسارها الأصلي، بوصفها مشروع تحرّر من الاستبداد والطغيان إلى صراع أهلي مكلف ومرير.

أسباب التقارب
مع سقوط العاصمة اليمنية صنعاء بيد الحوثيين في سبتمبر/ أيلول 2014، بدأ يتضح للرياض 

التكاليف المترتبة على الدخول في مواجهة ثنائية متزامنة مع إيران وحلفائها (في سورية، والعراق، ولبنان، واليمن، وغيرها) من جهة، ومع تركيا والتيارات الإسلامية القريبة منها، لمنعها من الاستفادة من أوضاع الربيع العربي، من جهة أخرى. وأدّى وصول قيادة جديدة إلى الحكم في السعودية مطلع عام 2015 إلى إعادة ترتيب أولويات السياسة الخارجية واعتبارات الأمن القومي السعودي، وتمثَّل التغيير الرئيس في إعطاء الأولوية لمواجهة التمدّد الإيراني في المنطقة على ما عداها؛ إذ كادت إيران تحكم الخناق على السعودية، من خلال اقترابها من السيطرة على اليمن عبر حلفائها الحوثيين، بعد أن غدت صاحبة النفوذ الأكبر في سورية والعراق ولبنان.
وفي ظل اهتزاز الثقة بالسياسات الأميركية، بدا من الصعب حدّ الاستحالة مواجهة إيران واحتواء نفوذها المتصاعد إقليمياً من دون مساعدة قطبٍ إقليمي في حجم تركيا، يضاف إلى ذلك تصدّع النظام الإقليمي العربي، واتضاح عجز مصر عن أداء دورٍ يبرز ثقلها العربي والإقليمي في ظل أزمة داخلية مركّبة، يمثّل العداء للإسلاميين حجر الزاوية فيها. 
ويمكن بذلك إجمال أهمّ الأسباب التي ساعدت على إنهاء حالة التنافس، وانطلاق مسيرة التقارب بين السعودية وتركيا، كما يلي:
1. العامل الأميركي 
مثّلت السياسة الأميركية في المنطقة أحد أهم أسباب التقارب السعودي - التركي؛ فالولايات المتحدة التي بدت مستنزفةً مع الأزمة المالية التي ضربتها عام 2008، واتجاهها نحو مقاربة تعتمد حدًا أدنى من التدخّل في المنطقة، انطلاقًا من فشل سياساتها في العراق وأفغانستان، بدأت تعيد تعريف مصالحها في المنطقة، مع ظهور ملامح اكتفائها نفطياً، نتيجة ثورة الغاز والنفط الصخريين. جعلت هذه التحولات واشنطن أقلّ ميلاً لمراعاة حساسيات حليفها السعودي الذي مثّلت معادلة الأمن مقابل النفط حجر الزاوية في العلاقة معه منذ نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية. وبينما مثّل تخلّي واشنطن عن الرئيس المصري السابق، حسني مبارك، إبّان ثورة 25 يناير، مؤشراً سلبياً على مدى التزام واشنطن بحلفائها، مثَّل إصرار إدارة أوباما على التوصّل إلى اتفاق مع إيران حول برنامجها النووي، من دون أخذ اعتراضات السعودية على دور إيران الإقليمي في الحسبان، نقطة خلاف جوهرية أخرى بين الطرفين.

ومع ظهور تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية (داعش)، وسيطرته على مناطق شاسعة من سورية والعراق صيف عام 2014، بدت واشنطن مهتمة بمواجهة هذا التنظيم الذي مثّل صعوده تجسيدًا لفشل السياسات الأميركية في العراق في عهد أوباما، أكثر من اهتمامها بمواجهة دور إيران الإقليمي في المنطقة. بل على العكس، بدأ بعض دوائر واشنطن ينظر إلى الحرب على تنظيم الدولة، بوصفها نقطة التقاء في المصالح مع إيران، وأخذ من ثم ينظر إلى حلفاء إيران بوصفهم حلفاء محتملين في الحرب على داعش، الأمر الذي أثار قلق السعودية.
وعلى نحو مشابه، مثّلت السياسة الأميركية مبعث قلق كبير لتركيا، خصوصاً في سورية؛ إذ ظلت إدارة الرئيس أوباما ترفض دعم الموقف التركي المطالب بإنشاء منطقة "آمنة" في شمال سورية، وتزويد المعارضة السورية بأسلحةٍ نوعيةٍ، تساعد في حسم المعركة ضد نظام الرئيس بشار الأسد، وما زاد الأمر سوءًا بالنسبة إلى تركيا اتجاه واشنطن إلى دعم حزب الاتحاد الديمقراطي الكردي الذي يعدّ الفرع السوري لحزب العمال الكردستاني، ذي الميول الانفصالية والمصنف إرهابياً في تركيا والولايات المتحدة، وذلك لمواجهة تنظيم الدولة. وتنامى القلق التركي، بعد أن تمكّن هذا الحزب بدعم أميركي من السيطرة على معظم حدود سورية الشمالية مع تركيا في المنطقة الواقعة شرق نهر الفرات، قبل أن يذهب باتجاه الإعلان عن قيام اتحاد فيدرالي في مناطق شمال سورية وشمالها الشرقي. وهكذا، أصبح اختلاف الرؤى مع الولايات المتحدة، من أسباب التقارب السعودي التركي. 

2. الرد على التحالف الروسي - الإيراني
بقدر ما مثّل القلق من السياسات الأميركية في المنطقة عموماً، وسورية خصوصاً، أحد أهمّ الأسباب وراء التقارب التركي - السعودي، مثّل التحالف الروسي – الإيراني في سورية الدافع الآخر الرئيس وراء علاقات أكثر قرباً بين أنقرة والرياض.
مثّلت طموحات إيران الإقليمية مبعثَ قلق مشترك لكلٍ من السعودية وتركيا على السواء، 

خصوصاً بعد أن تركت واشنطن العراق يسقط في دائرة النفوذ الإيراني، إثر قرارها الانسحاب منه عام 2011. ومع اندلاع الثورة السورية، وعلى الرغم من اختلاف رؤية الطرفين لها، بدت الرياض وأنقرة مصممتين على منع تكرار خطئهما في العراق، وترك سورية تسقط كلياً في دائرة النفوذ الإيراني، ما يعني عملياً قطع تركيا والعالم العربي عن بعضهما قطعاً كاملاً.
وخلال السنوات الأربع الأولى من عمر الثورة السورية، تمكّنت السعودية وتركيا وقطر من منع النظام السوري المدعوم إيرانيًا من سحق الثورة، بل تمكّنت، أيضاً، من توجيه ضربات قوية له جعلت حدود سيطرته على الأراضي السورية تتقلص إلى نحو الخمس تقريبًا. لكن التدخّل العسكري الروسي الذي جاء على خلفية فشل إيران في تمكين النظام السوري من الصمود في وجه تقدّم المعارضة في شمال غرب سورية، خصوصًا خلال النصف الأول من عام 2015، مثّل تحديًا كبيرًا لكلٍ من السياسات السعودية والتركية؛ فقد حال التدخّل الروسي دون تنفيذ الاتفاق الذي جرى التوصّل إليه بين أنقرة وواشنطن في شهر يوليو/ تموز 2015، بغية إقامة منطقة "آمنة" أو منطقة "خالية من داعش" في شمال سورية، لتوطين جزء من اللاجئين السوريين واستخدامها مقرًا للمعارضة السورية. وبالمثل، أدّى التدخّل الروسي إلى إنهاء إمكانية إسقاط النظام السوري عسكرياً، ومن ثم القضاء على النفوذ الإيراني في سورية، وهو الهدف الرئيس للسياسة السعودية في سورية.
لم يؤدِّ التحالف الروسي – الإيراني في سورية إلى منع انهيار نظام الرئيس بشار الأسد فحسب، بل مثّل تحدياً كبيراً للأمن القومي التركي والسعودي أيضاً، إذ أخذت روسيا تدعم بقوة القوى والأحزاب الكردية الساعية وراء الفيدرالية (وأحلام الانفصال). وتبلور هذا التوجه الروسي، خصوصاً بعد التوتر الشديد الذي خيّم على العلاقات الروسية التركية، إثر إسقاط أنقرة طائرة حربية روسية، قالت تركيا إنّها انتهكت مجالها الجوي، في نوفمبر/ تشرين ثاني 2015. ونتيجة القلق التركي - السعودي المشترك من استخدام كلٍ من روسيا وإيران الحرب ضد تنظيم الدولة، لإعادة تأهيل النظام ومساعدته في استعادة السيطرة على الحدود الشمالية مع تركيا، وميل الولايات المتحدة إلى اعتماد القوى الكردية حليفاً في الحرب ضد تنظيم الدولة، للسيطرة على المنطقة الحدودية نفسها، عرضت كلٌ من أنقرة والرياض القيام بالتدخّل عسكرياً لاستعادة الشريط الحدودي الواقع بين جرابلس وأعزاز من تنظيم الدولة، وتفويت الفرصة على كلٍ من الأكراد المدعومين أميركياً وروسياً وإيرانياً والنظام المدعوم روسياً وإيرانياً، للسيطرة على هذه المنطقة. وللغاية نفسها أيضاً، أعلنت السعودية تشكيل "التحالف الإسلامي لمواجهة الإرهاب" الذي جرى استبعاد إيران منه؛ وذلك للردّ على محاولات إلصاق تهمة دعم الإرهاب بها وبتركيا، وتفويت الفرصة على روسيا وإيران في الاستفادة من الحرب الأميركية على تنظيم الدولة، لعزل السعودية وتركيا وتعويم حلفائهما في المنطقة.

3. انهيار النظام الإقليمي العربي
أدّى انهيار العراق بفعل الغزو الأميركي، وسقوط سورية في أتون صراعٍ مدمر، بعد أن 

تحوّلت إلى ساحة للتنافس الإقليمي والدولي، وانكفاء مصر وعجزها عن اجتراح دور قيادي في العالم العربي والمنطقة عموماً، إلى انهيارٍ كامل لبنية النظام الإقليمي العربي الذي ساد بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية. وبقدر ما مثّل غياب قوة عربية فاعلة حافزاً للتمدد الإيراني في المنطقة، فقد مثّل حافزًا لتقارب سعودي – تركي، لمواجهة التحديات التي سبقت الإشارة إليها؛ إذ لم يعد في وسع السعودية الاعتماد على المثلث العربي (العراق، وسورية، ومصر) الذي أدّى، في مرحلة سابقة، دورًا مانعاً لمحاولات التمدد الإيراني، ولم يعد بإمكان كلٍ من تركيا والسعودية أيضاً الاتكال على تحالفهما مع واشنطن لمواجهة التحالف الروسي – الإيراني، خصوصاً بعد أن أبدت واشنطن وحلف الناتو عدم استعدادهما لمساعدة تركيا، إلّا في حال الدفاع عن النفس، إذا وقعت مواجهة مع روسيا، سواء في سورية أو حتى في الممرات المائية في البحر الأسود.

لأسبابٍ جيوسياسية بحتة، ولوجود جملة من المخاطر الكبرى التي تهدّد أمنهما القومي (التهديد الإيراني بخاصة بالنسبة إلى السعودية، والتهديد الكردي المدعوم روسيًا بالنسبة إلى تركيا)، قرّرت الرياض وتركيا تحييد خلافاتهما، والبحث عن مشتركاتٍ تساعدهما في مواجهة هذه التهديدات. وبقدر ما تحتاج السعودية إلى قوة عسكرية إقليمية كبرى لموازنة إيران (تملك تركيا ثاني أكبر جيش في الناتو)، تحتاج تركيا إلى دعم قوة اقتصادية ومعنوية كبرى بحجم السعودية، لمواجهة محاولات روسيا العبث بأمنها القومي، خصوصاً إذا أخذنا في الحسبان أنّ تركيا تعتمد بأكثر من 80 في المئة من احتياجاتها من الطاقة على كلٍ من روسيا وإيران، ما يمثّل معضلة أمنية حقيقية، يمكن للسعودية أن تساعد في التخفيف منها، إذا اقتضى الأمر ذلك. وفي كلّ الأحوال، يمكن القول إنّه ليس أمام السعودية وتركيا من خيار إلّا التعاون، لضبط الفوضى الإقليمية التي تمثّل جزءًا من إستراتيجية التمدد الإيراني والعودة الروسية إلى المنطقة والانكفاء الأميركي عنها. 

قامت السعودية (بالتحالف مع دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة) بدور أساسي ومعلن في إفشال عملية التحول الديمقراطي في المنطقة العربية بعد الثورات. وهي لم تتخلَّ عن هذا الدور، وعن تحالفها مع نظام السيسي، لكنّها لم تعد تُخضع تحالفاتها الخارجية للعلاقة مع النظام المصري، فقد أصبحت أكثر ديناميكيةً في تحركاتها الخارجية في محاولةٍ للحفاظ على علاقات مع قوى متخاصمة، فهي تدعم النظام في مصر، وتوثّق العلاقة مع تركيا في الوقت نفسه، أخذاً بالاعتبار احتياجات أمنها القومي ومصالحها الإستراتيجية.