Frantic intrigue of King Abdullah's last hours

AN IMPORTANT PIECE

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David Hearst

King Abdullah's death was triggered by massive internal bleeding and not by pneumonia, informed Saudi sources have told me. The collapse in his health, which happened on December 31 last year, prevented the King from carrying out a plan to remove his half brother Salman from the position of crown prince and replace him with Prince Muqrin bin Abdel Aziz. Abdullah's own son Prince Meteb would have become next in line to the throne, the sources said.

On December 31, the palace issued a statement which said the king had been admitted to hospital, but which disguised the severity of his condition. According to the state SPA news agency the king " entered today, Wednesday ... the King Abdulaziz Medical City of the National Guard in Riyadh to undergo some medical tests".

The King was rushed to hospital from the Rawdat Khraim resort near Riyadh, where he had been preparing to convene a meeting between the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and the Egyptian president Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. The meeting, which would have sealed the reconciliation between the two sparring states, never took place.

Had it done so, the late King would then have announced a series of decisions which he had taken and which Meteb and the head of his royal court Khalid Al-Tuwaijri had been urging him to take for some time. The decisions would have secured the transfer of power to his own son, when the crown was handed over to the grandchildren of the founding King.

Abdullah's sudden collapse triggered panic in the Tuwaijri camp which foresaw the consequences to them, and their partners who staged the military coup in Egypt of Salman coming to power. Abdullah was being ventilated and under general anesthesia, so he was unconscious.

Meteb and Tuwaijri fought to keep his condition under wraps. They tried to prevent Salman from entering the king's room. They searched for ways to keep the original plan in play, so that the king's decision could be announced under his name.

To get the plan out into the open, they passed instructions to the Egyptians to float the idea in their media. The Egytian TV anchor Yousef Al-Husseini revealed in his show that a decision would be announced, relieving Prince Salman from his position as Crown prince. Al-Husseini said that would be better for Egypt and went on to attack Salman's son Mohammed for " meddling in the business of others."

Salman fought back. His camp successfully pushed for an official statement which admitted that the King had been intubated, and thus was unconscious. On Jan 2, the royal court issued a second statement which said that Abdullah was suffering from pneumonia and " temporarily needed help to breathe through a tube". This extra detail puzzled observers at the time, but it was an official admission that the king was in no state to announce any decisions.

Tuwaijri and Meteb then tried another tack. They proposed to Salman the idea of an announcement that the king had abdicated due to illness. Salman would become king in exchange for his guarantee that Meteb would become his deputy crown prince. Salman refused to enter any discussion while the King was still alive in hospital.

This attempt continued after the death of the king and that explains why it took so long for the official news of his death to come out and the conflicting media accounts of that night. It also explains the speed with which Salman acted when he inherited the crown, announcing the removal of Tuwaijri before his half-brother had even been buried.

During that period, Tuwaijri and his ally Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, used the Egyptian media as their personal press office, and as a way to advance their intrigues. The day before the death of the king, the Egyptian Al-Nahar TV Channel broadcast as breaking news, a report item saying that "King Abdullah will abdicate within hours, Salman will be King, Muqrin will be Crown Prince and Metev will be deputy Crown Prince." This was the proposal Tuwaijri and Meteb were trying to get Salman to accept.

We know from leaked recordings of conversations that Abbas Kamil the manager of Sisi's office instructed journalists directly and that he was in contact with Tuwaijri's office. Saudi sources now point to a second man in the chain of command. He was the UAE Minister of State Sultan Al-Jabir. His job was to communicate with Abbas and TV channels and asked them to broadcast information about Egypt as desired by the UAE and Tuwaijri.

Since Salman came to power, the Tuwaijri camp has lost out. The new crown prince Mohammed bin Nayef has gone out of his way to show that the kingdom's friends are changing. Yesterday he met the Turkish interior minister. Last week he chose Doha for his first official visit.

There have also been a number of indicators that the Kingdom's policy on the Muslim Brotherhood , which Abdullah declared a terrorist organization, is about to change.

Four days ago a Saudi journalist quoted Foreign minister Saud al-Faisal as saying he had "no problem" with the Brotherhood. "We do not have a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood; our problem is with a small group affiliated to this organisation," he said.

He is the world's longest serving foreign minister, so his statement last week could not have been a slip of the tongue. Then, two days ago a confidant of Salman gave an interview in which he said it was "unreasonable" to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

Ahmed al-Tuwaijri (no relation) a former member of the consultative assembly said: "He denied the Interior Ministry had designated the whole Brotherhood as terrorists and explained the "context" around the group's designation as an outlawed organization.

"There is something called linguistic context," Tuwaijri told Rotana, a television channel owned by Saudi billionaire al-Waleed bin Talal.

"The kingdom couldn't say in one statement that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization. It (the designation) came as part of a list of terrorist organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood's name was added to that. It (the designation) is a group of organizations that follow the path of violence, intent on spreading terror [the designation condemns] all those to whom this applies.To take this concept and have it generalized over this huge organization that stretches from Indonesia to Morocco and to say that it is all terrorist is unacceptable to someone of reason."

The story of the court intrigues in Abdullah's last days, and the leaked recordings which have come out since then, show something that was not immediately apparent in June 2013, when Egypt's first elected president Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by his army, after mass demonstrations against his rule.

The story shows how close the connections were between one faction in the Saudi royal court, the Egyptian military and UAE. Sisi was doing their bidding and expected to be paid handsomely for it. The tone of his remarks in the leaked recordings is one of a man who is contemptuous of his paymasters. At one point in the private discussions of his kitchen cabinet, the Gulf states are referred to as "half-states".

The long arm of the Saudi royal court holds applies today to the shake-up that is currently under way. Salman's new personnel will forge new alliances, lifting the cover that Egypt's rulers have thus far enjoyed. This could be another factor behind the release of taped recordings of deeply incriminating conversations in Sisi's private office.

This article was first published by The Huffington Post

معركة إيران في جنوب سوريا ودلالاتها

رأي القدس

FEBRUARY 15, 2015

شهد الموضوع السوري حدثاً عسكريا وسياسياً بارزا تمثّل في الهجوم الكبير الذي تقوم به قوات من «حزب الله» اللبناني والحرس الثوري الإيراني على جنوب سوريا، كما يشارك فيه مقاتلون عراقيون وأفغان.
وبحسب «المرصد السوري لحقوق الإنسان»، فإن قائد الحزب في معارك سوريا الجنوبية هو مصطفى بدر الدين، أحد المتهمين المطلوبين من المحكمة الدولية المختصة بمتابعة قضية قتل رئيس الوزراء اللبناني الأسبق رفيق الحريري، فيما يقود القوات الإيرانية الجنرال الشهير قاسم سليماني، وهو ما يحمّل هذه المعركة دلالات سياسية ورمزية مهمة.
أول نتائج هذا الحدث إن تبعية عتاد وجنود وقيادة هذه المعركة للتحالف الإيراني ـ اللبناني، يقارب تسليم النظام في دمشق لسيادته الافتراضية على البلد، ويعزّز هذه النتيجة ما رشح من أخبار عن إعدام الإيرانيين لـ13 ضابطاً من الجيش العربي السوري، وهو ما يعني كفّاً نظرياً ليد النظام عن جهاز العسكري نفسه.
يمكن للنظام السوري أن يعزّي نفسه بأنه يستخدم ورقة «حزب الله» وإيران لحسم معاركه الداخلية، كما فعل في حمص والقلمون من قبل، ولكنّ الواقع يقول إن من يتحكّم في معارك الأرض هو من يقرّر أين تبدأ خارطة السيادة السياسية لسوريا وأين تنتهي.
الدلالة السياسية الرمزية الأولى تتمثّل في تركّز المعارك حول درعا، المدينة التي انطلقت منها الثورة السورية، غير أن تنكّب الإيرانيين وحزب الله لمهمة إنهاء الثورة في مهدها الذي انطلقت منه يحوّل الثورة من حرب على النظام إلى حرب ضد قوى أجنبية، ولا يخفّف البتة من وقع فكرة «الاحتلال الأجنبيّ» هذه أن القوى المشاركة من طبيعة مذهبية شيعيّة، فالصراع السنّي ـ الشيعيّ كان يمكن صرفه بـ»العملات المحلّية»، لولا أن التدخّل الفارسي المعلن، يقوّض كافة الأركان السياسية والدينية في بلد يحتل بشار الأسد فيه منصب الأمين العام لحزب «البعث العربي الإشتراكي» ذي الرسالة الخالدة للأمة العربية الواحدة.
الدلالة السياسية الثانية تقصّد «حزب الله» تكليف مصطفى بدر الدين، المتهم بقتل رفيق الحريري، يحمل دلالة سياسية مهمة ثانية، فبعد ظهور بدر الدين المذكور في حفل عزاء جهاد نجل القائد العسكري السابق لحزب الله عماد مغنية يأتي إعلان مشاركته السورية أثناء الاحتفال بذكرى اغتيال الحريري ليصبح الموضوع تعريضاً مباشراً بتيّار «المستقبل» وبسنّة لبنان، وهي رسالة تعني أن اغتيال القادة السياسيين والإعلاميين في لبنان، ودعم نظام الأسد في سوريا، وإعلاء راية إيران على المنطقة العربية، مشروع شامل لا تنفصم عراه عن بعضها البعض.
الدلالة السياسية الثالثة هي استخدام «حزب الله» عنوان معركة «شهداء القنيطرة»، وهي المدينة التي في أذهان السوريين رمز للصراع مع العدو الإسرائيلي في حرب تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 1973، وبذلك لا يحتلّ «حزب الله» أراضي سورية، ويقاتل سوريين فحسب، بل يسرق من الشعب السوري أيضاً منظومة العداء لإسرائيل، كما فعل مع أحزاب المقاومة اللبنانية التي تم اغتيال قادتها وطردها بالقوة من معركة القتال مع إسرائيل وإلحاقها بـ»حزب الله» وحده.
إضافة إلى ذلك كله يستهدف الهجوم الثقل الأساسي للمعارضة العسكرية السورية «المعتدلة»، والمدعومة عربيّاً، كما فعل «حزب الله» في معارك القصير والقلمون، وهو ما يخلي الأرض عملياً وسياسيا للتنظيمات السلفية المسلحة، متمثلة بـ»جبهة النصرة» و»الدولة الإسلامية»، وهو الهدف الذي اشتغل عليه النظام السوري منذ بدايات الأزمة، ليفرض نفسه ضمن تقاطع مصالح موضوعي مع الدول العربية والغربية، التي ستضطر للتعامل مع الأسد وحلفائه للقضاء على تلك التنظيمات.
مشاركة الإيرانيين المباشرة تقول إن الهدف الأوسع للمعارك يتجاوز كسر المعارضة السورية المسلحة إلى السيطرة على حدود سوريا مع لبنان وإسرائيل والأردن، وهو ما سيؤمّن أوراقاً هائلة للعب في يد طهران قبل بدء مفاوضاتها مجدداً مع الدول الغربية، لكنّ الطموح الإيراني، سيصطدم بعقبة كأداء تتمثّل في السوريين أنفسهم الذين سيتفانون في قتالهم احتلالا أجنبياً، كما أنه قد يفعّل الجبهة العربية والغربية ضد إيران، فتصبح إيران و»حزب الله» الضحيّة الأخيرة لهدف مستحيل التحقيق.

رأي القدس

Life and death in America

The troubling aspects of the murder of three young American Muslims in Chapel Hill.

By Marwan Bishara

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I know little about Craig Hicks but know enough about the state of US-Muslim relations to understand why millions (at least 2 million tweeted) believe his murder of three American Muslim students to be a hate crime.

Otherwise, as we are told, a dispute over parking space is in all likelihood the main reason for the senseless murder. A parking space - really?

Really. It seems that parking, like hate, are two of the many motives for violent acts in the US. Police records show a long list of parking violence; at times with children, spouses or parents watching.  

And it's the reason why North Carolina's local prosecutor assumes there's a probable cause to accuse Hicks of triple murder for no more than a damn parking spot.

So which is it - hate or parking? Well, it depends on the motive of the killer - his main motive. And until the investigation is over, it's actually hard to say for sure; at least officially.

Hate crime?

All of which leads me to ask a troubling question; a provocative question. Why is it so important for Deah, Yusor and Razan's loved ones to plead with US President Barack Obama and others to treat the Chapel Hill murder as a hate crime?

But before that, a quick look at the banality of crime and hate in America. The land of liberty is also a land of violence.

US authorities investigate motive in students' killings

Over a million violent acts were carried out in the US last year, including over 14,000 murders. That marks a drop of a few percentage points form the previous years. North Carolina ranks eighth out of 51 American states in terms of homicide. 

These acts were committed by, among others, seven million Americans; over two million of whom are in prison and over four million are on parole or probation. Indeed, the US has the second highest prison population in the world per 100,000 inhabitants - behind Seychelles.

Guns are the murderers' preferred means, and yet the right to purchase, carry and use arms by the likes of Hicks and countless others, is sacrosanct. It's enshrined in the second amendment to the US constitution - "the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed".

Alas, most Americans continue to support the right to bear arms or oppose laws that infringe on that right despite the proliferation of arms.

The National Rifle Association is the self-proclaimed protector of the second amendment and the small arms industry. It's a ridiculous motto: Guns don't kill people, people kill people.

And so do cars, alas. From pollution to accidents, and from car theft to car parking, too. All certain to continue unabated considering that Americans hold dearly onto their guns and cars.

Racism and discrimination

If the second amendment guarantees the right to bear arms, the first amendment to the US constitution guarantees the right of religious freedom.

Obama, who finally denounced the Chapel Hill murders as 'brutal and outrageous', refrained from invoking religious hate as a cause.

But Obama, who finally denounced the Chapel Hill murders as "brutal and outrageous", refrained from invoking religious hate as a cause. Instead, he underlined the importance of the oneness of the "American family". Violent as it may be.

Only a few weeks ago, Obama boasted that America's Muslims feel themselves to be Americans, unlike their counterparts in certain parts of Europe.

This might be partially true, but it doesn't dispel the fact that hate speech, hate crime and discrimination against Arabs and Muslims continue unabated in America and has even been growing since before 9/11. 

It's all part of a greater racism and xenophobia that continues to taint the much-celebrated "American way" of life as we've recently seen in Ferguson, Missouri and New York; just as it taints the "American Dream" for so many immigrants and their descendants.

So while the law forbids any form of discrimination based on race, religion or nationality; discrimination is omnipresent in America. The same wonderfully complicated US that elects a black president. Twice.

All of which leads back to the opening question: Is the Chapel Hill triple murder of Muslim Americans, a hate crime or another senseless crime?

Provocation

Either way, I doubt the prosecutor's final conclusion will change the minds of the many who have already made up their minds.

But would those who have already made up their minds about Hicks' crime prefer to be proven right about his hateful motives, or prove wrong, meaning Hicks is a randomly and idiotically criminal person? That Hicks killed the three young Muslims because he's a fanatic atheist and they're proudly Muslims; or that he would have done the same against, say, religious Jews?

That he shot his victims because they're Muslim Arabs per se, or because they're non-whites; and would've done the same to, say Japanese or Mexican Americans?

Is the predetermined claim of hate crime meant - perhaps subconsciously - to portray Muslims as equal victims of the West; to neutralise the hate speech against Muslims and Islam in the West; and to balance out the terrible crimes committed by certain Muslims?

I hope not.

It doesn't require the terrible murder of three innocent souls to prove that Muslims are indeed the foremost victims of terrorism.

Unconscionable banality

Because the facts speak louder than Fox News.

The largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia accounts for one-fifth of the murder rate of the largest Christian nation, the US. And countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela account for many fold the rate of killings than Turkey, Egypt, and Iran.

So, if it's a hate crime, then all must be done to prevent more of the same. If it's not, everything should still be done to prevent hate crimes and the killing of Muslims here and there.  

All of which leaves me with the most disturbing of all questions: Why are the victims' loved ones so adamant about making the case that Deah, Yusor and Razan's killing is a hate crime and are so keen that Obama treats it as such?

They either know it to be true, or it's unbearable that three young, charitable and industrious students died because of a senseless parking dispute. It's unconscionable in its banality.

Either way, as Deah, Yusor and Razan's immediate, and larger family, struggle with their deaths, it should be clear that there's no good and bad reason for murder. It's just reprehensible.

Either way, Obama and the "American family" have lots to answer for.

Marwan Bishara is the senior political analyst at Al Jazeera

ما وراء الخبر- دلالات عنف الحوثيين تجاه شباب الثورة

اليمن: القوى الاقليمية أوكلت لجماعة الحوثي مهمة الاطاحة بالإسلاميين من قوى الثورة

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تعز – «القدس العربي»: يستغرب الكثيرون من الصعود المفاجئ والقوي لجماعة الحوثي المسلحة التي التهمت الدولة في اليمن في غضون أشهر قليلة بشكل متسارع غير مسبوق. بيد أن التعمّق في متابعة خلفيات الجماعة والمهمة الموكلة إليها وعوامل القوة والدعم المادي والمعنوي الذي تحصل عليه من أطراف محلية واقليمية ودولية، يزيل هذا الاستغراب ويكشف أوراق اللعبة المرسومة لها برعاية دولية.
باختصار شديد لم تكن جماعة الحوثي المسلحة، بذلك القدر من القوة لتقضي على الدولة وعلى كل مقدراتها العسكرية، ولتطيح بالرئيس عبدربه منصور هادي وسلطاته وبحكومة خالد بحاح، بل كانت (واجهة متمردة) لتنفيذ مخطط محلي وإقليمي وبرعاية دولية للقضاء على الإسلام السياسي السني الذي صعد عبر ثورة 2011، ممثلا في اليمن بحزب التجمع اليمني للاصلاح، ضمن خطط القضاء على ثورات الربيع العربي.
وعلمت «القدس العربي» من مصادر دبلوماسية وسياسية أن دولا خليجية ممن تزعمت عملية الاطاحة بنتائج ثورات الربيع العربي تبنّت المبادرة الخليحية بشأن اليمن لضمان تنفيذ خطة نقل السلطة في اليمن بشكل سلس والحفاظ عليها في (مكان آمن)، وهي ما كشف عنها الرئيس السابق علي عبدالله صالح، بمقولته الشهيرة «أيدي أمينة»، في إشارة إلى الشخص الذي سيتم نقل السلطة إليه بعد رحيله. 
كانت جماعة الحوثي (الواجهة) أو (الأداة المتمردة) على النظام والقانون وعلى الأعراف والتقاليد، تم اختيارها للقيام بمهمة الانقضاض على قوى الثورة، وبالذات الإسلاميين، وانحصر دور الرئيس هادي بدور (المحلّل) الذي تم عبره امتصاص غضب الشارع ضد نظام صالح والايحاء للثوار بأن حلمهم بالتغيير قد تحقق، بينما لم يكن الواقع سوى مسرحية هزلية، أبطالها مقاتلو جماعة الحوثي المغمورون المدعومون محليا وإقليميا ودوليا بدرجات متفاوتة.
ولم يكن دور الرئيس هادي في عملية التغيير السياسي في اليمن سوى لعب دور ثانوي في اللعبة، أو بمعنى أدق القيام بدور الـ(كومبارس)، وهو ما انكشفت أوراق لعبته مع مرور الوقت حين كان الشارع اليمني شديد الاستغراب من تصرفاته وقراراته المصيرية التي لا توحي أبدا بأنها تصدر عن رئيس دولة يحظى بتأييد محلي وخارجي غير مسبوق. وانكشفت لعبته عندما كرّس أغلب جهوده للخروج بأكبر قدر ممكن من الأموال والثروة من فترة رئاسته القصيرة التي لم تتعد ثلاث سنوات، حيث أطاح به الحوثيون عشية الذكرى الثالثة لانتخابه رئيسا للبلاد، ليقولوا له «اللعبة انتهت».
ووفقا للعديد من المصادر والتقارير الدقيقة، كانت المسرحية الحوثية تتمحور حول الاطاحة بمكامن القوة العسكرية والقبلية للإسلاميين في اليمن وقص الأجنحة التي يطير بها حزب الاصلاح، كواجهة لإسلاميي اليمن، فكانت الخطة المرسومة للمسلحين الحوثيين القضاء على القوة العسكرية والقبلية في محافظة عمران، المحاذية للعاصمة صنعاء والتي تعتبر آخر بوابة منيعة أمام العاصمة من جهة صعدة، معقل المسحلين الحوثيين.
وبعد سقوط عاصمة محافظة عمران في تموز/يوليو الماضي في أيدي المسلحين الحوثيين، عبر اقتحام معسكر اللواء 310 مدرع ومقتل قائده حميد القشيبي، بعد تدمير معاقل آل الأحمر القبلية فيها، انتقلت المطامع الدولية إلى الانقضاض على ما تبقى من مكامن القوى لدى الاسلاميين، فأشاروا للحوثيين تدمير المحضن العلمي لهم المتمثل في جامعة الايمان بالعاصمة صنعاء واقتحام معسكر الفرقة الأولى مدرع (سابقا) المجاور لها، بذريعة أن قائده السابق اللواء علي محسن الأحمر، محسوب على الإسلاميين أيضا.
الخطة الدولية والخليجية عبر الحوثيين كانت تقف عند هذا الحد، في محاول لجر الإسلاميين إلى مربع العنف والزجّ بهم إلى مواجهة المسلحين الحوثيين بمبرر الدفاع عن المنشآت المحسوبة عليهم بشكل خاص والدفاع عن العاصمة صنعاء بشكل عام وتحقيق هدف عام هو إضعاف الجماعتين، حيث سيخرج الطرفان منهكين من هذه المعركة، المهزوم منكسر بالهزيمة فيما المنتصر سيخرج خائر القوى لضخامة المعركة التي خاضها ضد الآخر.
المسلحون الحوثيون (خرجوا عن النص) على ما يبدو، إثر رفض الإسلاميين قتالهم عند اقتحام الحوثيين للعاصمة صنعاء في أيلول/سبتمبر، عندما اكتشفوا اللعبة المرسومة للزج بهم في هذه الحرب التي لا هدف لها سوى الاطاحة بهم، فتمدد الحوثيون في كل أرجاء العاصمة صنعاء خلال ساعات محدودة بدون قتال أو مقاومة، وبتسهيلات واضحة من وزير الدفاع حينها محمد ناصر أحمد، الذي لعب دور المنسّق لعملية تسليم معسكرات الدولة للحوثيين.
وعلمت «القدس العربي»من مصدر سياسي وثيق الاطلاع أن «مصالح العديد من الأطراف المحلية والاقليمية والدولية اجتمعت في دعم وتمويل مسرحية اللعبة الحوثية، وفي مقدمة الداعمين لها إيران، المملكة العربية السعودية، الإمارات، الولايات المتحدة ولعبت الأمم المتحدة دور الراعي الرسمي لتنفيذ الخطة بسلاسة وعلى نار هادئة».
وأوضح «أن الخطة المرسومة للحوثيين كانت القضــــاء على شوكة الإسلاميين، التي تحقق مصالح للعـــديد من الأطـــراف المحلية والدولية، غير أن المسلحين الحـــوثيين خرجوا عن النص وانقضّوا على الـــدولة برمتها، لتحقيق مصالحهم الذاتية التي كانوا يطمحون لها منذ وقت مبكر ووجدوا أن الفرصة جاءت إليهم على طبق من ذهب».
مشيرا إلى أن الحوثيين وجدوا في هذه الفرصة قربانا للتقرب بها إلى طهران، التي تدعمهم ماديا ومعنويا منذ وقت مبكر والتي وجدت من المكتسبات الحوثية العسكرية والسياسية في الأراضي اليمنية أيضا فرصة لتحقيق أطماعها في السيطرة على منطقة شبه الجزيرة العربية من كل الجوانب، عبر السيطرة على مضيق باب جنوبي البحر الأحمر، الذي يتحكم بحركة الملاحة البحرية الدولية بين الشرق والغرب والتي وجدت في الحوثيين خير من يحقق أطماعها الاستراتيجية.
وتشير المصادر إلى أن نظام الرئيس السابق علي صالح كان لاعبا رئيسيا في الدعم العسكري لجماعة الحوثي وقيادة معاركه العديدة في محافظة عمران وفي عملية اقتحام العاصمة صنعاء والعديد من المدن والمحافظات الأخرى، وكشفت الأيام عمق العلاقة الوطيدة بين الطرفين، اللذين جمعتهما مصلحة واحدة وهي ضرب الإسلاميين، بغرض الانتقام منهم لتزعمهم ثورة الربيع اليمني في العام 2011. 
اجتماع هذه القوى المحلية والاقليمية والدولية لدعم جماعة الحوثي خلق منها جماعة مسلحة تجاوزت مسألة التمرد على الدولة إلى مستوى (المارد) الذي خرج من القمقم وأزاح كل الكائنات من طريقه، ليتربع على أعلى سلطات الدولة ويهيمن عليها بدون تجرد من الفوضى او مراعات لمشاعر الآخرين.
وللأسف الشديد قبلت الأمم المتحدة على نفسها أن تلعب دور المشرعن لكل هذه العملية التدميرية لليمن، الذي بدأت معالم الانقلاب الحوثي على الدولة تتشكل بشكل واضح مؤخرا وبدأت مخاطره تلتهم الجميع بعد أن تأكد لهم أنهم فقدوا السيطرة على الوضع، وهو ما أجبر أغلب البعثات الدبلوماسية الغربية والخليجية على مغادرة اليمن، وإغلاق أغلب السفارات بصنعاء وفي مقدمتها السفارة الأمريكية والبريطانية والفرنسية والألمانية والايطالية والسعودية والاماراتية وسفارة بعثة الاتحاد الأوروبي.
وفي تعبير عن افتضاح لعبة الأمم في الوضع اليمني الراهن قال القيادي الناصري البارز عبدالملك المخلافي عن دور الأمم المتحدة في اليمن، Game over أو «اللعبة انتهت»،
وهي عبارة أطلقها المخلافي عن الدور المفضوح لمبعوث الأمم المتحدة لليمن جمال بنعمر، التي كشفت الأيام أن جهوده لم تكن سوى وسيلة لشرعنة عمليات الحوثيين المسلحة التي اسفرت عن اسقاط الدولة والسيطرة عليها.

خالد الحمادي

هذة قصتي - فؤاد الهمداني، اختطفه الحوثيون وعذبوه ثم ألقوه على الرصيف

جماعة الحوثي تستهدف النشطاء السياسيين

Iraq: Militias Escalate Abuses, Possibly War Crimes

Killings, Kidnappings, Forced Evictions

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(New York) – Abuses by militias allied with Iraqi security forces in Sunni areas have escalated in recent months. Residents have been forced from their homes, kidnapped, and in some cases summarily executed. At least 3,000 people have fled their homes in the Muqdadiyya area of Diyala province since June 2014 and, since October, been prevented from returning. In addition to the events documented here, Human Rights Watch is conducting an investigation into more recent allegations that militia and SWAT forces killed 72 civilians in the town of Barwana, also in Muqdadiyya.

Residents told Human Rights Watch that security forces and allied militias began to harass residents in the vicinity of Muqdadiyya, an area 80 kilometres northeast of Baghdad in June, shortly after the extremist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) took over Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. The abuses escalated around October, witnesses said, the month after Hayder al-Abadi took over as prime minister, pledging to rein in abusive militias and to end the sectarianism that fed the cycle of violence under his predecessor.

“Iraqi civilians are being hammered by ISIS and then by pro-government militias in areas they seize from ISIS,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “With the government responding to those they deem terrorists with arbitrary arrests and executions, residents have nowhere to turn for protection.”

Human Rights Watch spoke to six displaced residents of villages near Muqdadiyya – a largely rural region in central Diyala with a diverse population of about 300,000, including Sunni and Shia Arabs, Kurds, and Turkoman. Five residents told Human Rights Watch that they initially left their villages in June and July, when Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq militiamen, volunteer fighters, and Iraqi SWAT forces attacked.

In mid-October, hearing that militias had left the area, residents began to return home, only to find that militias had torched many homes. Soon after, militia members who now control the area began kidnapping the returned residents and firing randomly in the street, at homes, and in the air with automatic weapons. The residents interviewed described the kidnappings and killings of three men by militias.

The attacks in northern Muqdadiyya appear to be part of a militia campaign to displace residents from Sunni and mixed-sect areas after the militias and security forces routed ISIS in these areas. On December 29, Hadi al-Ameri, the Badr Brigades commander and transport minister under the previous administration of Nuri al-Maliki, threatened Muqdadiyya residents, saying, “The day of judgment is coming” and “We will attack the area until nothing is left. Is my message clear?”

In October, Human Rights Watch researchers observed militias occupying and setting fire to homes in the proximity of Amerli in Salah al-Din province, following the retreat of ISIS fighters. On December 17, the Wall Street Journal and other media reported that militias were carrying out evictions, disappearances, and killingsin the Baghdad Belt after conducting military operations against ISIS. In January 2015, media reported that militias had arrested thousands of men in Samarra without warrants and were preventing them from returning home. On January 26, militias, volunteer fighters, and security forces reportedly escorted 72 civilians from their homes in Barwana, Diyala province, and summarily executed them. Human Rights Watch is currently investigating these allegations.

On December 18, 2014, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by Prime Minister al-Abadi in which he pledged to “bring … all armed groups under state control. No armed groups or militias will work outside or parallel to the Iraqi Security Forces.” In addition to ordering a public investigation into the killings in Barwana, al-Abadi ordered an investigation into allegations that security forces extrajudicially killed two Sunni civilians in Anbar and has strongly condemned unlawful conduct by militias and security forces.

The evidence that militias are leading security operations in Salah al-Din, Diyala, Baghdad, and Babel provinces belie this pledge, Human Rights Watch said. On January 1, 2015, Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, the long-time leader of the Kita’ib Hezbollah militia who now heads the Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Front), a quasi-governmental organization, gave a news conference in which he described himself as a military commander and the president of the “militia Hashd al-Shaabi,” and attacked Saudi Arabia and the US, which he described as sponsors and supporters of ISIS. This suggests that despite the prime minister’s promises, militias continue to act with free rein.

“The Iraqi government and its international allies need to take account of the militia scourge that is devastating places like Muqdadiyya,” Stork said. “Any effective response to ISIS should start with protecting civilian lives and holding those who abuse them to account, especially in areas where people have already suffered from ISIS occupation and attacks.”

Accounts by Victims, Witnesses
A 70-year-old resident of al-Bulour village in Muqdadiyya, who identified herself as Um Mariam, told Human Rights Watch that on December 8, 2014, Muqdadiyya police took her sons, Karim, 33, and Seif, 38, from their home without an arrest warrant. “They burst into the house and grabbed them,” she said. They released the men, who Um Mariam said were civilians, two days later.

But at about 3:30 p.m. on December 12, as their mother watched them approach the al-Bulour checkpoint on their return home, six armed men wearing black or camouflage with their faces covered grabbed the two men. The armed men pushed Um Mariam and threatened to shoot her if she screamed: “I was kissing their hands to make them stop, and they just kicked me off of them,” she said. Immediately afterward, Um Mariam went to file a complaint with the police station commander, who told her the police “couldn’t do anything” about the abduction, she said.

Another brother, Abu Yousif, told Human Rights Watch that unknown men called him shortly afterward and told him his brothers were dead: “Come take your dogs,” they said. “We shot each of them ten times in the chest and threw their bodies.”

Um Mariam and Abu Yousif then fled to Khanaqin, an area in northern Diyala under both Kurdish peshmerga and militia control.

A farmer in his 50s from al-Bulour who identified himself as Abu Seif told Human Rights Watch that beginning on June 20, militiamen and volunteers fighting with the quasi-governmental Popular Front began attacking the villages of al-Bulour, Matar, Aruba, Hurriyya, and al-Sudur al-Harouniyya, together home to approximately 1,000 Sunni families. Abu Seif said he identified the militiamen by the writing on the sides of their vehicles as members of “the Islamic Resistance Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq.” He said he saw militiamen and volunteers burn at least 50 houses in the villages and fire mortars and rockets on homes in June. It is not known whether any ISIS fighters were present in the villages at the time. He said that widespread kidnapping of fighting-age males over the course of the months that followed prompted most residents to flee.

Like many residents of the rural areas in northern Muqdadiyya, Abu Seif returned after three months when he heard that militias had left the area. “But when Muharram came,” he said, referring to the first month of the Muslim calendar, around October, “the militias came back in full strength.” In al-Bulour, a village of approximately 200 families, militiamen called residents sectarian names and forced the residents to fly Shia flags from their homes and businesses, he said. “They made us feel like prisoners in our own town,” he said.

He said conditions worsened in December. In mid-December, he said, he saw militias kidnap a local fruit and vegetable dealer. They later demanded US$70,000 for his release, which Abu Seif said the man’s family paid. A day later, the family found the man’s body on the side of the road.

Abu Ahmed, a 32-year-old farmer from the village of Dur al-Dhubat, also left with his wife and 3-year-old child in June. He returned in October after hearing that the area was safe again. “When I returned, I found exactly the opposite,” he told Human Rights Watch:

Militias were firing randomly in the air and launching rockets inside Dur al-Dhubat, terrorizing people. Families began to leave the area again [in mid-December] and 90 percent of the families have left. Militias distributed flyers warning residents that they would kill them if they did not leave. The flyers said, “You people must leave, you have been warned. If you don’t, you will dig your graves in your backyards with your own hands.”

Abu Ahmed said that residents of Hay al-Matar and al-Dur told him militias were carrying out kidnappings in those areas. Militiamen, whom he said he identified by their black or camouflage clothes and insignias, drove daily through his neighborhood on motorcycles and in cars “just to terrorize us,” he said. “I’m not afraid of ISIS shooting us,” he said. “I’m afraid of the militias kidnapping and killing us.”

A man from the village of al-Azy who identified himself as Abu Yehia told Human Rights Watch in an interview that he left the area in late 2013 due to increasing militia and security forces attacks and mass arrests. He said that residents told him they saw militiamen, SWAT and federal police from the 5th division burned down his house on July 20, along with 30 other civilians’ homes in his village. He said the civilian homes were not being used by ISIS when they were attacked.

He returned to Muqdadiyya during Muharram, in October, and was living in al-Bulour. But at 9:30 p.m. on December 18, he said militia members kidnapped a 70-year-old relative, Ali Mohsen, as Abu Yehia, his mother, and his sister watched. The militia members warned the women not to scream or they would kill them, he said. The next day, Abu Yehia said, the family found Ali Mohsen’s body along the side of the highway leading from Baghdad to Khanaqin.

Abu Qandil, a 58-year-old resident of the village of Shok al-Rim, where 300 families live, said that militias began attacking Sunni areas in Muqdadiyya district in June, beating civilian villagers and burning or blowing up their homes, particularly in the villages of Imam Taleb and al-Farouq. When residents returned in November, they found that militias still occupied the village, Abu Harith said. Militias accused the residents of supporting ISIS and “said that they would kill us because we are Sunni,” he said, “People in the area are terrified of being shot by militias.” He said that militia members were still setting fire to homes in another village, al-Wizan.

Human Rights Watch spoke to victims and witnesses from Muqdadiyya, most of whom have fled their homes, by telephone between January 8 and January 15, 2015. Human Rights Watch explained to potential interviewees how their stories would be used, and all consented after requesting anonymity for security reasons. All the names used are pseudonyms.

Arab revolutions: On non-violence and disappointment

By: Tawakkol Karman 

Date of publication 15 February, 2015

Link

Tags

Arab Spring revolution, Yemen, Houthis, peace, violence

Comment: Despite the many setbacks to the Arab Spring, people must pursue a peaceful path to change if they want to secure a better future for the region.

The Arab Spring revolutions erupted four years ago to usher in a new dawn of freedom in a region that had been reeling under oppressive regimes for decades.

The world remembers the masses that filled public squares and streets in Arab Spring countries with great admiration and respect. It remembers the crowds that peacefully demanded change and swelled with happiness and hope.

Non-violence and civil resistance leads to democracy and the rule of law.

The rhetoric of violence decreased at the time. Groups that adopted violence or terrorism as part of their charters looked increasingly unable to defend their position. It could be argued that the Arab Spring revolutions brought about a resurgence of peaceful civil resistance in the region.

In Yemen, the revolt against then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime was as important for the means deployed as its occurrence. The decision to remain peaceful despite the regime's attempts to drag it into violence was crucial. It would have been easy for Saleh not to step down if the country had been buffetted by violence and counter-violence.

The peaceful nature of the February revolution also exposed the lies and fabrications of Saleh's regime. These had painted a distorted picture of Yemeni society to the world to justify avoiding political reform. Yemenis were the only citizens in the world whose government had all but accused them collectively of being terrorists.
Yemenis actively took part in the project for peaceful change and all the attempts to militarise the revolution and turn it into a tribal or regional conflict failed. Everyone took part in trying to build a new country based on equal rights, the rule of law and political participation. It was in this context, and for this purpose, that a conference of national dialogue that included all the political and regional forces was held.

The moment didn't last however. The peaceful revolution ended up hijacked by militias that adopted violence to pursue their narrow interests. Today, we have armed groups fighting amongst themselves to control the fate of all Yemenis, taking advantage of a deterioration in state institutions to impose their beliefs.

The Houthi movement is adamant about portraying its armed invasion of Sanaa as a revolution. But it is just an attempt to impose its will through force. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda, which has no support in Yemeni society at large, will work hard to use the Houthi military expansion to its own benefit, challenging Houthi dominance in order to gain popularity.

The irony is the Houthis could be an immensely popular political force. However, they declared war on state and society and it has caused a national moral backlash. Additionally, their use of force has pushed Yemenis to abandon the political process and respond to various calls for violence. This is a situation that Yemenis who aspire to a normal and stable life do not deserve.

When violence reigns, there are no longer any citizens - only killers and the dead.

Many have criticised the Arab Spring for adopting peaceful and reconciliatory means. Some suggest these are signs of weakness. Other contend such measures simply won't work; they will only allow the old order to return to power or extremist forces to seize it.

These critics ignore the fact that adopting peaceful means and seeking reconciliation was the only way to break with a past that was based ona philosophy of vengeance, nepotism and violence, to build a future that opposes these principles. Non-violence and civil resistance leads to democracy and the rule of law. Violence usually only leads to more violence.

Where peaceful resistance succeeds, it increases people's confidence to build and develop. When violence reigns, whether for government or opposition forces, there are no longer any citizens - only killers and the dead.

We must not give in to despair and abandon peaceful resistance no matter the sacrifice. The price we will pay for non-violence will be much less than the price we will have to pay if we decide to travel the road of violence.

Let us always remember that there are many more choices to make and tools to use if we decide to pursue non-violence rather than violence. A message on social media can strike fear into governments and regimes that until only recently thought the virtual world could never affect the material one.

Arab and Yemeni youth, who are the true heroes of the moment, should continue on the path of peaceful change. They should remember the revolutionary spirit runs strong and no one can accept the monopolisation of power, especially now: people are more aware, have better and more constructive visions of the future, and are more able to use technology to communicate with the outside world.

There are many obstacles. But a peaceful struggle is more faithful to the martyrs that have already fallen. It offers a more assured vision of the future.

This article is an edited translation from our Arabic edition.

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