Monday, June 29, 2015
Opinion: Europe’s war on Greek democracy
The euro crisis is all about power and nothing about money, Stiglitz says
JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ
Link
NEW YORK (Project Syndicate) — The rising crescendo of bickering and acrimony within Europe might seem to outsiders to be the inevitable result of the bitter endgame playing out between Greece and its creditors.
In fact, European leaders are finally beginning to reveal the true nature of the ongoing debt dispute, and the answer is not pleasant: it is about power and democracy much more than money and economics.
Of course, the economics behind the program that the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) foisted on Greece five years ago has been abysmal, resulting in a 25% decline in the country’s gross domestic product.
I can think of no depression, ever, that has been so deliberate and had such catastrophic consequences: Greece’s rate of youth unemployment, for example, now exceeds 60%.
A “yes” vote would mean depression almost without end.
It is startling that the troika has refused to accept responsibility for any of this or admit how bad its forecasts and models have been. But what is even more surprising is that Europe’s leaders have not even learned. The troika is still demanding that Greece achieve a primary budget surplus (excluding interest payments) of 3.5% of GDP by 2018.
Economists around the world have condemned that target as punitive, because aiming for it will inevitably result in a deeper downturn. Indeed, even if Greece’s debt is restructured beyond anything imaginable, the country will remain in depression if voters there commit to the troika’s target in the snap referendum to be held this weekend.
In terms of transforming a large primary deficit into a surplus, few countries have accomplished anything like what the Greeks have achieved in the last five years. And, though the cost in terms of human suffering has been extremely high, the Greek government’s recent proposals went a long way toward meeting its creditors’ demands.
We should be clear: almost none of the huge amount of money loaned to Greece has actually gone there. It has gone to pay out private-sector creditors — including German and French banks. Greece has gotten but a pittance, but it has paid a high price to preserve these countries’ banking systems. The IMF and the other “official” creditors do not need the money that is being demanded. Under a business-as-usual scenario, the money received would most likely just be lent out again to Greece.
But, again, it’s not about the money. It’s about using “deadlines” to force Greece to knuckle under, and to accept the unacceptable — not only austerity measures, but other regressive and punitive policies.
But why would Europe do this? Why are European Union leaders resisting the referendum and refusing even to extend by a few days the June 30 deadline for Greece’s next payment to the IMF? Isn’t Europe all about democracy?
In January, Greece’s citizens voted for a government committed to ending austerity. If the government were simply fulfilling its campaign promises, it would already have rejected the proposal. But it wanted to give Greeks a chance to weigh in on this issue, so critical for their country’s future wellbeing.
That concern for popular legitimacy is incompatible with the politics of the eurozone EURUSD, +0.2239% , which was never a very democratic project. Most of its members’ governments did not seek their people’s approval to turn over their monetary sovereignty to the ECB.
When Sweden’s did, Swedes said no. They understood that unemployment would rise if the country’s monetary policy were set by a central bank that focused single-mindedly on inflation (and also that there would be insufficient attention to financial stability). The economy would suffer, because the economic model underlying the eurozone was predicated on power relationships that disadvantaged workers.
And, sure enough, what we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalized those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy: Many European leaders want to see the end of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s leftist government.
We should be clear: almost none of the huge amount of money loaned to Greece has actually gone there. It has gone to pay out private-sector creditors — including German and French banks.
After all, it is extremely inconvenient to have in Greece a government that is so opposed to the types of policies that have done so much to increase inequality in so many advanced countries, and that is so committed to curbing the unbridled power of wealth. They seem to believe that they can eventually bring down the Greek government by bullying it into accepting an agreement that contravenes its mandate.
It is hard to advise Greeks how to vote on July 5. Neither alternative — approval or rejection of the troika’s terms — will be easy, and both carry huge risks.
A “yes” vote would mean depression almost without end. Perhaps a depleted country — one that has sold off all of its assets, and whose bright young people have emigrated — might finally get debt forgiveness; perhaps, having shriveled into a middle-income economy, Greece might finally be able to get assistance from the World Bank. All of this might happen in the next decade, or perhaps in the decade after that.
By contrast, a “no” vote would at least open the possibility that Greece, with its strong democratic tradition, might grasp its destiny in its own hands. Greeks might gain the opportunity to shape a future that, though perhaps not as prosperous as the past, is far more hopeful than the unconscionable torture of the present.
I know how I would vote.
This article has been published with the permission of Project Syndicate — <Europe’s Attack on Greek Democracy.
Religion, politics and jihad
Blaming the west misses the main culprits
By Brian Whitaker
Link
Posted by Brian Whitaker
Monday, 29 June 2015
By Brian Whitaker
Link
Predictable as clockwork, in the wake of Friday's carnage at a mosque in Kuwait and on a beach in Tunisia, the Guardian came up with an article headed "It’s not the religion that creates terrorists, it’s the politics".
Considering that the article's author, Giles Fraser, is a former canon chancellor of St Paul's cathedral in London it's not altogether surprising that he is eager to minimise religion's role in terrorism and ends up pointing an accusing finger at politics – especially "the long history of disastrous western interventions in the Middle East".
"The language of violent jihad," Fraser writes, "may borrow its vocabulary from Islamic theology – it’s a useful marker of shared identity – but root motivation is as it always is: politics". He adds:
"The IRA weren’t Bible-believing Catholics, they were mostly staunch atheists. Catholicism was simply a marker of who counted as 'one of us'. And the same is true of Islamic terrorism."
Fraser doesn't seem to be suggesting IS fighters are a bunch of atheists but he does say: "Many of the young people who have been persuaded to go off and fight in Syria and Iraq have hardly got past the first chapter of Islam for Dummies."
That may well be true but you don't have to be a Qur'anic scholar in order to believe in Islam or go out and fight for it. It takes only a cursory knowledge of Islamic history (in fact, the more cursory the better) to be persuaded that IS's attempt to re-create the Caliphate is an inspirational event of enormous significance to Islam. And if you have qualms over the sadism of IS, a few carefully selected verses from the Qur'an about divine retribution may even persuade you that its violent behaviour is almost God-like.
Debating whether religion or politics is more to blame for jihadism is actually rather pointless. It's a European – and to some extent Christian – way of looking at the problem. In Europe (fortunately) we are accustomed to a fairly clear-cut division between the two but in the Middle East the line between religion and politics is very blurred and there are plenty of forces at work trying to blur it even more.
Some of these east-west differences may also be traced to the early histories of Islam and Christianity. Jesus in the New Testament appears basically apolitical: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's". His only recorded act of violence was knocking over tables and driving money-changers from the temple in Jerusalem. It was only later that Christianity became institutionalised politically and militarised. Muhammad, however, was a very different character. Besides his role as the last of God's prophets he was also, in modern parlance, a statesman and a general. In Islam, therefore, politics and religion were closely inter-twined from the very beginning.
Today, virtually all Arab regimes – including the supposedly more secular ones like the Sisi regime in Egypt and the Assad regime in Syria – use and manipulate religion unscrupulously for political purposes, fuelling sectarianism whenever they imagine it serves their interests.
In doing so they also reinforce the principle of religious compulsion – the idea that everyone should comply with religious rules, and that both state and society have a duty to enforce them. Imposing religion by force is, of course, a basic principle of the Islamic State and jihadist groups more generally. Until Arab governments dissociate themselves from that, stop legitimising compulsory religion and start to accept that everyone should be allowed to think and believe as they see fit (so long as they don't interfere with anyone else's right to do the same) Islamic terrorism can only get worse.
Fraser's effort to shift the blame away from religion and more towards politics naturally opens the door to blaming the west and its history of interventions in the Middle East – especially the military kind. While it's important to consider the effects of western policies, this shouldn't obscure the fact that the roots of the problem lie primarily in the Middle East and the way it has been governed over many years.
Critical self-examination is desirable and necessary but it needs to be done carefully and judiciously. Arab regimes and their supporters like nothing better than to hear westerners blaming the west because it removes the need for any self-examination of their own.
While asserting that western intervention is "a part of the cause of the horror that continues to unfold" Fraser doesn't provide a supporting argument. He doesn't say how big a part he thinks intervention has played, or in what ways it has contributed.
Although there is probably some truth in Fraser's assertion it is not self-evidently true and, if we look at specific cases, it's often difficult to see a direct causal link between western policies/interventions and events on the ground. The recent suicide bombings at mosques in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are one example.
The chaos in Libya is often blamed on western military intervention but the same cannot be said of Syria, where many people now blame non-intervention instead. Iraq might seem a more persuasive case but even there it's arguable that the current turmoil is due more to Saddam Hussein's removal than the fact that he was removed by Americans.
Saddam, Gaddafi and the Assads all constructed their regimes on the "aprés moi le déluge" principle as a survival strategy: attempt to overthrow them and mayhem would be sure to follow. What we see now in Libya, Syria and Iraq is mainly a result of that. Regardless of who is actually involved in toppling these regimes, the outcome is likely to be the same.
There is, however, a general problem with Fraser's article and others like it. Constantly returning to the perils of military intervention highlights the inadequacy of much leftist thinking about the Middle East and obstructs the development of a more rounded analysis of western policy and the other ways it causes damage in the region.
What needs to be challenged above all else is the idea – much cherished by western governments – that maintaining stability should be their most important policy goal in the Middle East. In practice this actually leads to instability by creating political and social stagnation. Maintaining stability, as conceived by western governments, also means getting into bed with Gulf monarchies which are the region’s main counter-revolutionary forces and, of course, the main purveyors of religious bigotry. In the long run this can only make things worse – both for the west and the Middle East.
Posted by Brian Whitaker
Monday, 29 June 2015
Egypt: Jockeying for position in the emerging regional order
By Alain Gresh
Link
Link
Comment: In part two of this two-part series, Alain Gresh argues the emerging regional order poses serious domestic and regional challenges to Egypt, which it is struggling to address.
"We are witnessing a general shake-up of the region" explains one journalist from al-Ahram, "in both internal and geopolitical terms. In one or two decades, it will look completely different. But Egypt is too weak to influence the course of events, and contents itself with concentrating its efforts on its immediate environment, with mixed results."
Changing the way the waters of the Nile are shared out
Mohamed Megahed Elzayat, of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, said that "in collaboration with Ethiopia and Sudan, we reached an interim agreement in 2015, which although vague, encouraged more relaxed relations with our neighbours in the south."
This text was celebrated as a victory for President Sisi. Less diplomatic in his reading, an official close to the dossier pointed out the subtlety: "The President managed to sell an agreement to public opinion which, in concrete terms, ratifies a new way of dividing up the waters of the Nile and calls into question a treaty dating from 1929.
Ethiopia, backed by the US, is asserting itself as a regional power and the construction of the Renaissance dam on the Nile is establishing the regime's legitimacy. We demanded that construction stop immediately, as it is contrary to the agreements that govern the sharing of the waters of the Nile, but we had to back down."
Changing the way the waters of the Nile are shared out
Mohamed Megahed Elzayat, of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies and a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, said that "in collaboration with Ethiopia and Sudan, we reached an interim agreement in 2015, which although vague, encouraged more relaxed relations with our neighbours in the south."
This text was celebrated as a victory for President Sisi. Less diplomatic in his reading, an official close to the dossier pointed out the subtlety: "The President managed to sell an agreement to public opinion which, in concrete terms, ratifies a new way of dividing up the waters of the Nile and calls into question a treaty dating from 1929.
Ethiopia, backed by the US, is asserting itself as a regional power and the construction of the Renaissance dam on the Nile is establishing the regime's legitimacy. We demanded that construction stop immediately, as it is contrary to the agreements that govern the sharing of the waters of the Nile, but we had to back down."
 | On repeated occasions since taking power, the army has declared it had ended the insurrection in the Sinai. |
Sisi's speech to the Ethiopian parliament, followed by his visit in May to Sudan for the inauguration of Omar al-Bashir after his re-election as president gave the impression that relations between the three countries had been re-established, despite the fact that the dam will store 12 billion cubic metres of water each year to the detriment of Egypt. "Though the water shortages will not take effect for ten years," the source conceded.
The Libya problem
Libya is another crucial factor. "We support the legitimate government, explained one diplomat. The West says a balanced approach is needed, but on one hand we have the legitimate government, in Tobruk, and on the other, the west of the country is occupied, particularly Tripoli, by militias some of which are linked to international terrorism and have won the support of foreign States."
Qatar is of course one of those states in question, but its name is not mentioned. Of course, any illusions about General Khalifa Haftar, who triggered a military rebellion and was selected by the Tobruk government (recognized by the international community) have long since evaporated.
His army, recounts Aclimandos "has more officers than soldiers". But Cairo remains reluctant to deal with the Tripoli government, which includes the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the fact that all the other governments, from Europe and the Gulf, have done so. The diplomat insists his country "supports the efforts of Bernardino Leon, the UN mediator, but he should not make too many concessions to the so-called government in Tripoli."
On 25 May, there was a meeting of representatives of Libyan tribesmen. It met with little success, as only those who were favourable to the Tobruk government accepted the invitation. Unsurprisingly, the meeting ended in the complete refusal to engage in discussion with the Islamists and the Brotherhood, which was likened to a terrorist organization.
Ten thousand rebels in the Sinai
The last of the priorities in the region for Cairo is Gaza, and above all the Sinai. On repeated occasions since taking power, the army has declared it had ended the insurrection of the group Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which has become a subsidiary of the Islamic State Group (IS) under the name Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province).
However, the Egyptian press agency Mena admitted on 27 May that over the first five months of the year, 643 people had been killed, including 177 civilians and members of the security forces. The media reports "terrorist attacks" in the region on a daily basis.
Appalled at the recent news passed on to him by officials, one journalist who knows the Sinai well said Wilayat Sinai had about 10,000 to 12,000 guerrilla soldiers, and though they are brought together by range of motivations - ideology, but also the desire to avenge the abuses of the armed forces or the lure of the profit from the various types of trafficking that has always existed in this remote region, neglected by the central government - they are determined and know the terrain well.
For the Egyptian media, which sometimes borders on anti-Palestinian racism, the instability in the Sinai is mainly due to the support Hamas provides to the IS. Despite this, few journalists or researchers share this Manichaean reading of the situation.
Furthermore, the government has not cut ties completely, as demonstrated by the court ruling at the end of May going back on the decision to declare Hamas a terrorist organisation.
A siege on two fronts
The Libya problem
Libya is another crucial factor. "We support the legitimate government, explained one diplomat. The West says a balanced approach is needed, but on one hand we have the legitimate government, in Tobruk, and on the other, the west of the country is occupied, particularly Tripoli, by militias some of which are linked to international terrorism and have won the support of foreign States."
Qatar is of course one of those states in question, but its name is not mentioned. Of course, any illusions about General Khalifa Haftar, who triggered a military rebellion and was selected by the Tobruk government (recognized by the international community) have long since evaporated.
His army, recounts Aclimandos "has more officers than soldiers". But Cairo remains reluctant to deal with the Tripoli government, which includes the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the fact that all the other governments, from Europe and the Gulf, have done so. The diplomat insists his country "supports the efforts of Bernardino Leon, the UN mediator, but he should not make too many concessions to the so-called government in Tripoli."
On 25 May, there was a meeting of representatives of Libyan tribesmen. It met with little success, as only those who were favourable to the Tobruk government accepted the invitation. Unsurprisingly, the meeting ended in the complete refusal to engage in discussion with the Islamists and the Brotherhood, which was likened to a terrorist organization.
Ten thousand rebels in the Sinai
The last of the priorities in the region for Cairo is Gaza, and above all the Sinai. On repeated occasions since taking power, the army has declared it had ended the insurrection of the group Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which has become a subsidiary of the Islamic State Group (IS) under the name Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province).
However, the Egyptian press agency Mena admitted on 27 May that over the first five months of the year, 643 people had been killed, including 177 civilians and members of the security forces. The media reports "terrorist attacks" in the region on a daily basis.
Appalled at the recent news passed on to him by officials, one journalist who knows the Sinai well said Wilayat Sinai had about 10,000 to 12,000 guerrilla soldiers, and though they are brought together by range of motivations - ideology, but also the desire to avenge the abuses of the armed forces or the lure of the profit from the various types of trafficking that has always existed in this remote region, neglected by the central government - they are determined and know the terrain well.
For the Egyptian media, which sometimes borders on anti-Palestinian racism, the instability in the Sinai is mainly due to the support Hamas provides to the IS. Despite this, few journalists or researchers share this Manichaean reading of the situation.
Furthermore, the government has not cut ties completely, as demonstrated by the court ruling at the end of May going back on the decision to declare Hamas a terrorist organisation.
A siege on two fronts
| Foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy. If we are domestically unstable, we cannot have any kind of foreign policy. -Former Egyptian diplomat. |
One journalist and expert on the region sums up the general feeling. "Of course jihadist groups have fall back positions in Gaza, and officials in al-Qassam Brigades are undoubtedly aware of this; but these militias are autonomous, and are not necessarily accountable for the political orientation. Another complicating factor, is that Hamas is facing a Salafist jihadist challenge, encouraged by the non-reconstruction of Gaza since the Israeli attacks in the summer of 2014 and the impossibility of putting in place a government of national unity."
Though the Rafah crossing (the only one that allows people to circulate between Gaza and Egypt) was open for a few days in June, it has remained essentially closed for a year. Some officials are even worried about the possibility of Hamas itself breaking up and jihadist groups take control in this territory, under the pressure of an Israeli-Egyptian siege.
While one Egyptian diplomatic source claims that there is no longer any contact at all with Hamas, it may be that the army and the intelligence services, which have directly managed the Palestinian issue for more than twenty years, maintain some channels of communication, especially as in the eyes of the Gulf monarchies, Hamas has reinforced its standing in supporting the Saudi operation in Yemen.
In the newly-built 6 October city, about 30km from the centre of Cairo, Maasoum Marzouk, a retired ambassador, welcomes us in the cafe of a sprawling shopping centre. His agenda is that of a generation whose hopes were dashed time and time again, but who want to pursue the battle for the ideals of his youth.
In 1968, he participated in the student protests demanding the sentencing of officers responsible for the June 1967 defeat. He joined the army and participated in the commando raids to reconquer the Sinai in October 1973.
Entering the world of diplomacy, he never hid his criticism of Anwar el-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak's foreign policy, and advises Hamdeen Sabbahi, the Nasserite leader.
"Between 1991 and 2011, we were in the shadow of Saudi Arabia. Today, we still cannot lead an independent policy. It would be in Egypt's interests to open dialogue with Tehran, but Riyadh won't allow this."
He concludes: "Foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy. If we are domestically on unstable territory, which is the case, we cannot have any kind of foreign policy."
It is not just the political terrain that is unstable. In the shopping centre's park, water and light games attract a swarm of children. This year, two million more Egyptians will be born into a country which doesn't have a government capable of guaranteeing their future.
For part one in this series, click here.
Though the Rafah crossing (the only one that allows people to circulate between Gaza and Egypt) was open for a few days in June, it has remained essentially closed for a year. Some officials are even worried about the possibility of Hamas itself breaking up and jihadist groups take control in this territory, under the pressure of an Israeli-Egyptian siege.
While one Egyptian diplomatic source claims that there is no longer any contact at all with Hamas, it may be that the army and the intelligence services, which have directly managed the Palestinian issue for more than twenty years, maintain some channels of communication, especially as in the eyes of the Gulf monarchies, Hamas has reinforced its standing in supporting the Saudi operation in Yemen.
In the newly-built 6 October city, about 30km from the centre of Cairo, Maasoum Marzouk, a retired ambassador, welcomes us in the cafe of a sprawling shopping centre. His agenda is that of a generation whose hopes were dashed time and time again, but who want to pursue the battle for the ideals of his youth.
In 1968, he participated in the student protests demanding the sentencing of officers responsible for the June 1967 defeat. He joined the army and participated in the commando raids to reconquer the Sinai in October 1973.
Entering the world of diplomacy, he never hid his criticism of Anwar el-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak's foreign policy, and advises Hamdeen Sabbahi, the Nasserite leader.
"Between 1991 and 2011, we were in the shadow of Saudi Arabia. Today, we still cannot lead an independent policy. It would be in Egypt's interests to open dialogue with Tehran, but Riyadh won't allow this."
He concludes: "Foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy. If we are domestically on unstable territory, which is the case, we cannot have any kind of foreign policy."
It is not just the political terrain that is unstable. In the shopping centre's park, water and light games attract a swarm of children. This year, two million more Egyptians will be born into a country which doesn't have a government capable of guaranteeing their future.
For part one in this series, click here.
Turkey 'preparing' for military intervention in Syria
Link
Erdogan is chairing a regular National Security Council meeting on Monday, days after he vowed to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Syria following advances by Kurdish fighters battling Islamic State group militants.
A source told al-Araby al-Jadeed Monday that President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu were pushing for Turkish military intervention in Aleppo province, mainly in Jarablus, to stop Kurdish forces under the excuse of fighting IS.
The aim of such intervention, the source added, is to establish a buffer zone on the borders, set a no-fly zone to support the rebels, and stop the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey. However, the plan faced heavy opposition from army commanders.
Turkish Buffer Zone
As Kurdish forces secure more territory on the border with Turkey against IS, Erdogan's interventionist plan are becoming more viable.
On Monday, Turkish media reported that after several meetings, the Turkish General Staff, National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Prime Ministry decided to establish a buffer zone in Syrian territory. The army and MIT will have completed the scheme of the maneuver by Friday, July 3.
According to pro-government Turkish news daily Yeni Safak, Ankara plans to establish a 110-km long and 28-km wide buffer zone stretching from Karkamis to Oncupinar. The Turkish Armed Forces are expected to conduct a synchronous operation on both sides.
Turkey will first attempt to secure diplomatic support of its NATO allies and US-led coalition forces. If this plan works, Turkish soldiers are expected to be stationed in the buffer zone for two years, the daily added.
If Turkey does not get diplomatic backing from its allies, then the "Southern Lebanon Model" will be considered as "plan B". Israel once used the model to secure itself in a region in southern Lebanon dominated by Hizballah fighters.
If "plan B" is applied, the Turkey daily adds, Turkish soldiers will stay for a shorter time in the zone but will train and equip the Free Syrian Army to ensure the security of the region.
Turkish media reported on Sunday that top Turkish officials have begun preparations for a possible military intervention into northern Syria to prevent possible Kurdish threat.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stepped up for a military operation into Syrian territory. Reports published in Turkish media claim that the Turkish General Staff is on the verge of a possible military intervention with some 18,000 soldiers ready to be deployed into Syria.Erdogan is chairing a regular National Security Council meeting on Monday, days after he vowed to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Syria following advances by Kurdish fighters battling Islamic State group militants.
A source told al-Araby al-Jadeed Monday that President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu were pushing for Turkish military intervention in Aleppo province, mainly in Jarablus, to stop Kurdish forces under the excuse of fighting IS.
The aim of such intervention, the source added, is to establish a buffer zone on the borders, set a no-fly zone to support the rebels, and stop the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey. However, the plan faced heavy opposition from army commanders.
Turkish Buffer Zone
As Kurdish forces secure more territory on the border with Turkey against IS, Erdogan's interventionist plan are becoming more viable.
On Monday, Turkish media reported that after several meetings, the Turkish General Staff, National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Prime Ministry decided to establish a buffer zone in Syrian territory. The army and MIT will have completed the scheme of the maneuver by Friday, July 3.
According to pro-government Turkish news daily Yeni Safak, Ankara plans to establish a 110-km long and 28-km wide buffer zone stretching from Karkamis to Oncupinar. The Turkish Armed Forces are expected to conduct a synchronous operation on both sides.
Turkey will first attempt to secure diplomatic support of its NATO allies and US-led coalition forces. If this plan works, Turkish soldiers are expected to be stationed in the buffer zone for two years, the daily added.
If Turkey does not get diplomatic backing from its allies, then the "Southern Lebanon Model" will be considered as "plan B". Israel once used the model to secure itself in a region in southern Lebanon dominated by Hizballah fighters.
If "plan B" is applied, the Turkey daily adds, Turkish soldiers will stay for a shorter time in the zone but will train and equip the Free Syrian Army to ensure the security of the region.
Current Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Online Poll
Another is-the-Pope-Catholic poll:
On the second anniversary of the coup, have conditions in Egypt improved?
So far, 90% have voted no.
An alternative project for Muslim youth could finish ISIS off
Jamal Khashogji
Link
Link
When "Operation Decisive Storm" began a few months ago, the supporters of ISIS launched a campaign to question its credibility. They were joined in this by their traditional enemies, the Houthis, those loyal to Yemen's deposed President Saleh and whoever is allied with them, such as the Iranians and Lebanon's Hezbollah.
A couple of days ago, the "Storm of the South" was launched in order to liberate the city of Daraa, wherefrom the spark of the Syrian revolution emerged. Once again, the supporters of ISIS led those who questioned its credibility and sought to suppress it. No one rivalled them in this apart from the supporters of the regime. It is natural for the Houthis or for the supporters of the Syrian regime to be upset but why are ISIS and its electronic brigades upset about such victories?
This question is answered by Hassan Hassan (that's what he calls himself anyway), who is an independent researcher collaborating with London's Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House. He entered Syria several times and met with revolutionaries and supporters of ISIS before co-writing a book called "ISIS: inside the army of terror".
In an article published in the UAE's National newspaper in April, he said that "two significant developments have been going on in the region that have damaged ISIS popularity more than has been caused by nine months of aerial bombardment and battles waged against it in both Syria and Iraq."
The first were the successive victories achieved by the Syrian revolutions in the north of Syria and their seizure of the city of Idlib and then Jisr Al-Shughour. These successes were soon followed by others in the central area as well as in the south of Syria. According to Hassan, the outcome has been "stealing the impetus from ISIS". The group consequently lost some of its attractiveness and therefore some of its recruiting appeal. "Many people inside Syria," he continued, "have told me that ISIS lost some of their own sympathisers after the revolutionaries exhibited their capabilities and conquered towns and fortified military positions belonging to the regime during the past few months."
The explanation given by Hassan is accurate. Not all ISIS supporters, and particularly those who are local, are ideological believers in the organisation. Or at least they weren't until they joined and were subjected to intensive training and brainwashing procedures. Victory begets victory and might attracts the oppressed who detest the regime. As such, they found hope in ISIS, especially during a time when the Syrian revolution was in retreat. They hoped that ISIS would avenge them and fulfil their desire to exact revenge against an oppressive and tyrannical regime that persecuted them and their loved ones. Consequently, the emergence of an alternative that combines might with capability and moderation is sufficient to pull the rug from underneath the feet of ISIS, if not by drawing away the majority of its supporters then at least by rescuing some of those among them who are still on the periphery and by frustrating its recruitment campaigns.
The second development that has cost ISIS some of its appeal and ability to recruit and keep supporters, according to Hassan, is the reaction of the public in the region regarding "Decisive Storm" that was launched in March by Saudi Arabia as part of an Arab and international coalition against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. "There has been a marked decline in the positive remarks made toward the group amongst its own sympathisers," said Hassan. "They have, instead, been attracted by Operation Decisive Storm, which they see as a war against the followers of Iran in the region."
He added that this has been accompanied by the spreading conviction that Saudi Arabia no longer sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat. "Consequently, there has been a boost in optimism and a growth in positive feelings in favour of the campaign against the Houthis."
In other words, the angry have seen in Decisive Storm an alternative project as a result of which they no longer feel the need to support an extremist organisation.
The theory advanced by Hassan Hassan seems logical. Not all of the followers of ISIS happen to be takfiris (those who declare other Muslims to be disbelievers), or let us say that not all of them were when they first knocked on the group's door. The sense of defeat, frustration and the lack of "an alternative project" that is capable of standing in the face of oppression, despotism and tyranny is what gave ISIS its appeal among young men and women who were overwhelmed with anger and with the desire to do something in support of Islam. Such young people are found in Riyadh, Tunis and places as far away as Copenhagen and Brussels. They believe that the Sunnis in Iraq and the Levant are being subjected to the most brutal campaign of persecution and murder while the world does nothing to help them. Of course they are right, and that is why they pack and hit the road to travel far from home where life is safe and opulent. They leave for what they believe to be the "land of jihad, glory and dignity". Such an incentive for their migration turns, once they arrive in the ISIS lands, into violence, blind hatred, takfirism and terrorism.
The theory advanced by Hassan is lent credence by the opinion of Saudi preacher Salman Al-Awdah, which he threw in for discussion a few days ago on "To the Point", the most popular Saudi TV talk show during the month of Ramadan. He believes that one of the tools to confront violence could be an alternative Arab-Islamic renaissance project that caters for the needs of young Muslims and harnesses their considerable energy. "Man has kinetic energy within him," said Al-Awdah. "You cannot just tell him to sit down and keep quiet. You need to preoccupy him with something. You need to fulfil for him some of his dreams in order to ensure that that energy is channelled in the right direction."
Regrettably, the "energy" of young Muslims is now suspect. Normally, it is a moderate energy. Yet, the absence of the right project has driven them into the embrace of the wrong one. The experience of "Decisive Storm" and the victories achieved by the Syrian revolutionaries point to the right direction into which this energy can be channelled and even employed in the service of its strategic goals of rebuilding the region and liberating it from sectarianism and despotism altogether.
It is unfair that it is apparently acceptable for an Irishman or a Frenchman to join the ranks of the Kurdish protection forces, which have recently achieved noticeable victories in the north of Syria (although they have been accused of the "ethnic cleansing" of Arabs and the Turkoman from the territories under their control, a clear war crime). Yet, we see such mercenaries posing with Kurdish fighters for a picture to post on Facebook. When they return home they give press interviews boosting their claims to be heroes. In contrast, any Arab young man who does the same is an immediate suspect as a terrorist. It is a huge moral paradox. Resolving this problem might just help to finish ISIS off.
Translated from Al Hayat newspaper, 27 June, 2015
Sunday, June 28, 2015
الصحافة التركية تتحدث عن تدخل عسكري محتمل في سورية
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كشفت صحيفة "يني شفق" التركية (القريبة من حزب العدالة والتنمية والتي تعتبر الناطقة باسمه)، اليوم الأحد، أن "الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان ضغط على زر التدخل العسكري في سورية مع رئيس الوزراء أحمد داود أوغلو"، مضيفةً أن "رئاسة الأركان التركية تتحضر للعملية بـ 18 ألف جندي".
وأوضحت الصحيفة أن قرار التدخل يأتي "في وقت تهجّر فيه القوات الكردية المعارضين التركمان والعرب في الشمال السوري، إضافة إلى محاولة إنشاء كيان كردي مستقل وفي ظل التعاون بين نظام بشار الأسد وتنظيم (الدولة الإسلامية)".
وأشارت الصحيفة إلى أنه "بعد سلسلة من الاجتماعات الأمنية التي عقدها أردوغان مع قيادة الأركان والاستخبارات ورئاسة الوزراء، وفي ضوء استهداف قوات المعارضة والمدنيين، اتخذ القرار على إنشاء درع واقٍ في المنطقة (شمال سورية)"، ولفتت الصحيفة إلى أن "يوم الجمعة المقبل سيكون الجيش وأجهزة الاستخبارات قد أكملوا عملية الانتشار والتجهيز".
وكشفت الصحيفة أن "قرار أردوغان بالتدخل العسكري جاء بعد ستة اجتماعات أمنية متتالية في أنقرة، إذ طلب أردوغان من داود أوغلو البدء بالاستعدادات العسكرية، كما تم إخطار رئيس الأركان الجنرال نجدت أوزال بهذا الأمر بشكل رسمي".
ووفقاً للمعلومات المسربة التي نشرتها "يني شفق" فإن "الوضع الأمني على طول الخط الحدودي سيبحث على الطاولة بالتفصيل بدءاً من خط جرابلس وحتى البوابة الحدودية عند منطقة إعزاز بطول 110 كيلومترات، حيث ستدخل القوات التركية في هذه المناطق بعمق يتراوح بين 28 – 33 كيلومتراً، ومن المتوقع أن تدخل هذه القوات من نقطتي جرابلس وإعزاز".
وفي الحديث عن جرابلس التي يسيطر عليها تنظيم "داعش"، فإنه في حال توغل الجيش التركي بعمق 33 كيلومتراً فإن هناك احتمالاً كبيراً بأن تصطدم القوات التركية مع قوات الأسد المتواجدة في المنطقة.
وبحسب "يني شفق" فإن هذا التوغل الهدف منه إنشاء منطقة عازلة أو آمنة، حيث من المقرر أن يشارك بعملية التوغل 18 ألف جندي، لكن الصحيفة نوهت إلى أنه لن تتوغل جميع القوات داخل الأراضي السورية، بل سيبقى قسم منها في حالة استعداد للتدخل.
سيناريوهات متوقعة:
وحول السيناريوهات المتوقعة للتجاوب الدولي مع التدخل التركي، ذكرت "يني شفق" أن السيناريو الأول هو حصول تركيا على الدعم.
أما السيناريو الثاني: غياب الدعم الدولي وفي هذه الحالة سوف تلجأ تركيا لتطبيق نموذج جنوب لبنان في التدخل العسكري، إذ أن "المنطقة العازلة التي شكلتها إسرائيل في جنوب لبنان بعد القضاء على معسكرات وقواعد (حزب الله) في الجنوب لم تتطلب قراراً أممياً لأنها أقيمت بحجة حماية الأمن القومي لإسرائيل".
Egypt: Struggling to assert itself in the Middle East
By Alain Gresh
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Comment: In part one of this two-part series, Alain Gresh argues Egypt is struggling to follow an independent foreign policy and move out of the long shadow of Saudi Arabia.
"President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's visit to Germany demonstrated the problems you come up against in defining foreign policy. The president wants first and foremost to be seen as legitimate, something that Hosni Mubarak did not have to worry about", explains one influential journalist from a government newspaper, who asked to remain anonymous.
Sisi's recent visit to Germany surprised, amused and even astonished Egyptian opinion, which has been largely indifferent to the media coverage attempting to erase frequent criticism of German journalists and politicians.
Along with many Egyptians, they were shocked to see the leader accompanied by artists literally singing his praises and journalists doing a standing ovation at everything "their" president said at his press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Unsurprisingly, the Chancellor's statements condemning the death sentence against former President Mohamed Morsi were not translated on Egyptian television.
Sisi's recent visit to Germany surprised, amused and even astonished Egyptian opinion, which has been largely indifferent to the media coverage attempting to erase frequent criticism of German journalists and politicians.
Along with many Egyptians, they were shocked to see the leader accompanied by artists literally singing his praises and journalists doing a standing ovation at everything "their" president said at his press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Unsurprisingly, the Chancellor's statements condemning the death sentence against former President Mohamed Morsi were not translated on Egyptian television.
| God made me a doctor to diagnose the problem, so I could prescribe the remedy. -President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi |
Many were appalled to hear Sisi declare: "God made me a doctor to diagnose the problem, so I could prescribe the remedy" appalled Egyptian officials in the corridors of the very cautious Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This desperate search for legitimacy surrounding his rule that was born of a coup d'état on 3 July 2013 (the President had to cancel his participation at the African Union summit in South Africa in June after local organisations filed a complaint against him and requested his arrest) is accompanied by an obsession with the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, which antagonises even Egypt's allies.
The honeymoon with Riyadh comes to an end
"We hope to enshrine" the speaker continues, "our vision of a global confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood across the whole region. Now, our ally, Saudi Arabia, has lifted its veto on an operation with the Brotherhood, notably in Yemen and in Syria. With King Salman's accession to the throne, Riyadh's priority changed and Iran became the main enemy. The Saudis are aiming to bring order to the ‘Sunni house', they have resumed talks with Turkey - a regime which constantly denounces Sisi's illegitimacy, supports al-Islah in Yemen and the Brotherhood in Syria."
The honeymoon period for Cairo and Riyadh has come to an end, and the Egyptian media is not shy in making digs at the Saudis, whilst being careful to not overstep the mark: the regime is too dependent on the financial boon of the Gulf to be able to break from or even a develop an overly autonomous regional policy.
If we are to believe rumours, on his death bed, King Abdelaziz, the founder of the Saudi regime, is said to have confided in his children that: "The happiness of the Kingdom lies in the misfortune of Yemen."
Mustafa el-Labbad is the director of the Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies in al-Sharq. Like all centres that are indirectly dependent on the authorities, it is on autopilot, and the organization of any sort of conference has become impossible. He recounts another anecdote: "On his deathbed, Abdelaziz is said that have explained that: "Egypt should be immersed up to its nose; not so much that it drowns, not so little that it can no longer swim."
"Saudi Arabia" he continues, "doesn't want Egypt as a partner, even as a second-rate one. It doesn't want an Arab front, and even less so the military force advocated by Egypt. The Saudi decision to attack Yemen was taken two days before the Arab Summit, and Egypt was informed of it a few hours before it was launched."
Indeed, the first reaction of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs was to publish a statement asserting Cairo would not be involved. A few hours later, Sisi confirmed his country would be cooperating fully with the Riyadh-led coalition.
The dangers of Yemen
This desperate search for legitimacy surrounding his rule that was born of a coup d'état on 3 July 2013 (the President had to cancel his participation at the African Union summit in South Africa in June after local organisations filed a complaint against him and requested his arrest) is accompanied by an obsession with the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, which antagonises even Egypt's allies.
The honeymoon with Riyadh comes to an end
"We hope to enshrine" the speaker continues, "our vision of a global confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood across the whole region. Now, our ally, Saudi Arabia, has lifted its veto on an operation with the Brotherhood, notably in Yemen and in Syria. With King Salman's accession to the throne, Riyadh's priority changed and Iran became the main enemy. The Saudis are aiming to bring order to the ‘Sunni house', they have resumed talks with Turkey - a regime which constantly denounces Sisi's illegitimacy, supports al-Islah in Yemen and the Brotherhood in Syria."
The honeymoon period for Cairo and Riyadh has come to an end, and the Egyptian media is not shy in making digs at the Saudis, whilst being careful to not overstep the mark: the regime is too dependent on the financial boon of the Gulf to be able to break from or even a develop an overly autonomous regional policy.
If we are to believe rumours, on his death bed, King Abdelaziz, the founder of the Saudi regime, is said to have confided in his children that: "The happiness of the Kingdom lies in the misfortune of Yemen."
Mustafa el-Labbad is the director of the Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies in al-Sharq. Like all centres that are indirectly dependent on the authorities, it is on autopilot, and the organization of any sort of conference has become impossible. He recounts another anecdote: "On his deathbed, Abdelaziz is said that have explained that: "Egypt should be immersed up to its nose; not so much that it drowns, not so little that it can no longer swim."
"Saudi Arabia" he continues, "doesn't want Egypt as a partner, even as a second-rate one. It doesn't want an Arab front, and even less so the military force advocated by Egypt. The Saudi decision to attack Yemen was taken two days before the Arab Summit, and Egypt was informed of it a few hours before it was launched."
Indeed, the first reaction of the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs was to publish a statement asserting Cairo would not be involved. A few hours later, Sisi confirmed his country would be cooperating fully with the Riyadh-led coalition.
The dangers of Yemen
| On his deathbed, the Saudi King reportedly said Egypt should be immersed up to its nose; not so much that it drowns, not so little that it can no longer swim. |
The Yemeni question embodies the contradictions in Cairo's foreign policy. Not a single official, journalist or citizen wishes to see Egyptian involvement, all of them fear the kind of downward spiral that would lead their country to being involved against its will.
The memory of the war led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in support of the young republican regime (1962-1970), which cost the lives of 26,000 Egyptian soldiers still haunts peoples' memories, and first and foremost those of the army. "We have coordinated our efforts with Pakistan, the Emirates and Oman so that the Saudis do not go too far," explained the researcher Tewfik Aclimandos.
Egypt comes down in favour or negotiations, especially as the result of the coalition's military operations is limited - prevent the destruction of the little infrastructure Yemen possesses, and alleviate an alarming humanitarian situation denounced by the International Red Cross set against a backdrop of bizarre international indifference.
Egypt refused to send out its troops and contented itself with the deployment of a few battleships on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which is already closely watched over by American and French marines.
"If Pakistan was able to take refuge behind its parliament's decision, in order to justify its refusal to send troops, Sisi doesn't even have that pretext as there's no longer a parliament in Egypt. And the Saudi's won't forget it," concludes Labbad.
Are they looking for an alternative solution to the "doctor sent by God"?
Whatever the reason, even the United Arab Emirates, a country that is considered the most sympathetic to Egypt's vision of a global struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood, appears to be hesitating.
As reported by the very well-informed journalist Dina Ezzat, "a high-ranking Egyptian official went to Abu Dhabi in order to complain that Ahmed Shafik, Morsi's unfortunate opponent in the second round of the 2012 presidential election, was continuing to pursue political activities in the capital."
On 14 June, he announced he was stepping down from the presidency of his party, but it was unlikely this would put the lie to the notion he is waiting in the wings, should Sisi fail.
For part two in this series, click here.
This is an edited translation of an article originally published by our partners at Orient XXI.
The memory of the war led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in support of the young republican regime (1962-1970), which cost the lives of 26,000 Egyptian soldiers still haunts peoples' memories, and first and foremost those of the army. "We have coordinated our efforts with Pakistan, the Emirates and Oman so that the Saudis do not go too far," explained the researcher Tewfik Aclimandos.
Egypt comes down in favour or negotiations, especially as the result of the coalition's military operations is limited - prevent the destruction of the little infrastructure Yemen possesses, and alleviate an alarming humanitarian situation denounced by the International Red Cross set against a backdrop of bizarre international indifference.
Egypt refused to send out its troops and contented itself with the deployment of a few battleships on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which is already closely watched over by American and French marines.
"If Pakistan was able to take refuge behind its parliament's decision, in order to justify its refusal to send troops, Sisi doesn't even have that pretext as there's no longer a parliament in Egypt. And the Saudi's won't forget it," concludes Labbad.
Are they looking for an alternative solution to the "doctor sent by God"?
Whatever the reason, even the United Arab Emirates, a country that is considered the most sympathetic to Egypt's vision of a global struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood, appears to be hesitating.
As reported by the very well-informed journalist Dina Ezzat, "a high-ranking Egyptian official went to Abu Dhabi in order to complain that Ahmed Shafik, Morsi's unfortunate opponent in the second round of the 2012 presidential election, was continuing to pursue political activities in the capital."
On 14 June, he announced he was stepping down from the presidency of his party, but it was unlikely this would put the lie to the notion he is waiting in the wings, should Sisi fail.
For part two in this series, click here.
This is an edited translation of an article originally published by our partners at Orient XXI.
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