عبر تسريب فيديو بعدسة جيدة الدقة، تظهر 5 نساء سوريات بلباس عسكري، وثلاثة منهنّ يضع حجاباً، ليتحدثن لحاملة الكاميرا، عن التحرش الذي يتعرضن له من قبل قائد وضباط اللواء 130 المقاتل في حلب، النساء المتطوعات للقتال يُنقلن من كل المحافظات إلى التجمع العسكري في حلب، وذلك للقيام بمهمات قتالية ولوجستية دعماً لقتال جيش النظام.
سريعاً يكتشف المتلقي اختلاف صيغة المخاطب أمام الكاميرا، في السنوات الخمس التي توالت على الثورة السورية، لا تملك النسوة المجندات خطاباً سلطوياً حاداً، ولا يملكن انطواء سرياً على ذُل الذات أمام القادة العسكريين.
على أرض متسخة، وببدلاتهن العسكرية، يجلسن على الأرض، ويكسرن نمطاً مثالياً يحاول النظام تكراره لخمس سنين لمظهر جنوده ومواليه. حتى المحجبات منهن يجلسن بأسلوب عفوي غير مُلقم بهيبية مصطنعة، يتحدثن دون أي ذعر أمام الكاميرا عن معاناتهن، لا يترددن كُلهن بموافقة إحداهن، وهي تضع نفسها بموقع الفتاة البشعة، غير الصالحة للأهواء الجنسية لقائد اللواء وضباطه، والأخرى، تشعر نفسها مهانة على كل حاجز، فلا أحد يعترف بقيمة تطوعها للقتال دفاعاً عن البلد كما تدعي، صيغة الفضيحة ليست واضحة تماماً، النسوة يتحدثن من باب الألم والخوف والقهر، وليس من باب استهلاك الفضيحة، في هذا تبدو النسوة قد فقدن كل شيء، في أثناء المحاولة العنفوانية للدفاع عن النظام، وفي الانتماء إليه.
المقطع المسرب أحد المقاطع القليلة جداً، التي تفضح الجيش السوري والنظام بكل صراحة ومن دون أي ارتباك، هذا الهجوم مبطن بأكثر أنواع القهر انتشاراً، العنف ضد المرأة، والاستهانة بها وبقدراتها، وتحويلها إلى جسدٍ صرف أمام شهوة ذكورية لا تنتهي.
فالقادة الذكوريون لن يتخلوا أبداً عن جعلهن مجرد أجسادٍ لتفريغ للشهوة، ولسن جسداً عسكرياً مقاتلاً للموت والشهادة دفاعاً عن الوطن مثل قادتهم الذكور. ما يميز النسوة، أنهن لا يملكن أي خوف في أثناء حديثهن، فرغم انتشار أخبار فساد الجيش وقادته بين الجنود وغيرهم، إلا أن أحداً ما لن يجرؤ على الحديث جهراً عن هذا الفساد، أمام كاميرا، وبكامل الضعف والاستسلام والصراحة، حيث يعد الفيديو اختراقاً للعالم الخارجي الذي يرسمه النظام لمقاتليه.
وسيتبع هذا الفيديو مئات المقاطع، التي تُخرج خفايا الذات العسكرية وأحوالها إلى العالم الخارجي، في سورية آلاف الضعفاء والمظلومين يخفون عالمهم الداخلي، خوفاً من بطش النظام.
ناهيك عن التحرش الجنسي والظلم اللذين تحدثت عنهما النسوة، يخرج إلى العالم الخارجي أيضاً طريقة تعامل جيش النظام مع الوجود الروسي، كيف يُعامل الجيش السوري جنوده في أثناء الزيارات الروسية للقطع العسكرية، حيث يتم إرضاء الجنود وإطعامهم، ذلك لأن الروسي يشترط أن يكون الجيش وأفراده في أفضل حالة، الإهانة المضاعفة الذي سمعها الجميع جهاراً، هي إهانة يعرفها الجميع ويشعر بها، أن يكون الأجنبي جالباً للحياة الكريمة للجندي المقاتل مع النظام. مادحو الوجود الروسي من الجنود والمتطوعات لا يخرج عن كونه أخرجهم من سلطة الرجل العسكري السوري، إلى إمرة وحماية الجندي الروسي الذي أقله لا يسرق طعام المجندين السوريين، ولا يمنع رواتبهم ليتاجر بها.
الفيديو المسرب ليس إلا إهانة طويلة المدى لأيامنا، هذا ما لم نتحدث عن الوضع المُريب لمتطوعات شابات قد رهنّ حياتهن الصعبة لخدمة آلة الموت التي يفعلها النظام في وجه السوريين، بحث دقيق أكد لنا أن النسوة من الساحل السوري، ومن ريف مدينة حلب، وهن في أوضاع اقتصادية صعبة جداً، أجبرهن ظرف اقتصادي، للتطوع في القتال بعد أن تم تقديم وعد لهن براتب ضخم.
There's lots of talk about Plan B in Washington as the Obama administration looks for alternatives to its failed Syria policy. The same goes for various other parts of the region, where the administration is floating ideas about a potential last-minute change of strategy.
Whether in Syria or Palestine - and even Iraq, Libya and Yemen - the United States has seen its hopes dashed, its advice ignored, its red lines violated, and its warnings and ultimatums ridiculed.
US President Barack Obama says he's haunted by Syria; that he's daunted by a repeat of the Libya intervention (which he sees as his biggest failure); that he's troubled by Israel's settlement activities in occupied Palestine, among others.
But he remains adamant that there isn't much he could have done to produce better results in a region that, in his words, is "going through a transformation that will play out for a generation, rooted in conflicts that date back millennia".
Obama: Syria represents 'a challenge to the world'
This is of course a cop-out, and he knows it. These are mostly contemporary conflicts exacerbated by regional and foreign powers, especially by his predecessors.
Be that as it may, the Obama administration is now looking for ways to save face and perhaps regain the initiative in the Middle East. But what went wrong in the first place?
The problem with Plan A
Obama had distinguished himself from his predecessor by taking the pragmatic path forward in order to chart new relationships in the Middle East.
He favoured working with the Europeans in Libya, with Iran in Iraq, with Russia in Syria and with Benjamin Netanyahu in Palestine.
But Obama's bet on Netanyahu, Vladimir Putin and Hassan Rouhani backfired when they acted in their own - and not Washington's - best interests. The American president was also disappointed by the performance of Francois Hollande and David Cameron in Libya.
US President Barack Obama [Reuters]
The Obama administration invested huge political capital in reaching the Iran nuclear deal, but it lost pretty much everything else. It has come out empty-handed in terms of better alliances, with its credibility compromised and its deterrence weakened.
Obama's aversion to getting involved in Middle East affairs has allowed others to do just that: Iran took advantage of the US withdrawal to enforce its own presence in Iraq; Russia took advantage of the US reluctance to intervene in Syria to deploy its military last year. And Israel expanded its presence in Palestine despite US appeals and objections.
To reason with them, Obama dispatched his chatty Secretary of State John Kerry, knowing all too well he had little or no chance of succeeding without strategic leverage.
Not having a Plan B ready is bad diplomacy. Threatening to use a hypothetical one is plain stupid.
But if Kerry were to succeed, Plan B should have been an integral part of Plan A: an explicit and credible escalatory threat to coerce his adversaries to accept his proposition. In that way, Plan B should be more of an ultimatum than an alternative.
Not having a Plan B ready is bad diplomacy. Threatening to use a hypothetical one is plain stupid. Resorting to Plan B as a mere afterthought to save face is dangerously naive.
Unfortunately, Obama's Plan B seems to be just that: an afterthought.
B for bollocks
A No-Fly-zone in Syria is too late in the game; one or two years too late. With the Russian military well-positioned in Syria, such a plan could trigger a major confrontation or further accelerate the Putin-Assad plans to raze Aleppo.
Likewise, training the Syrian opposition to use advanced weapons, which remains far-fetched, would lead to more bloodshed, certainly not in the absence of a comprehensive strategy to deal with Moscow and Tehran. After hundreds of thousands of deaths, Plan B can't be fighting the Russians until the last Syrian. That seems to be Russia's endgame to humiliate the US.
People inspect a damaged site after air strikes on a rebel-held neighbourhood of Aleppo, Syria [Reuters]
In Iraq, the Obama administration failed to respond early and adequately to the deepening sectarianism of the Iran-backed government that led to the rise of ISIL (also known as ISIS).
Moreover, Washington's appeasement of Tehran to secure the nuclear deal didn't result in better relations, as Iran continued to expand its influence over Iraq and Syria as it leaned closer towards Russia.
Now Washington is trying to regain the initiative by arming various Kurdish forces and deploying more forces against ISIL, all of which is alienating Turkey without curbing Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria.
Likewise in Israel and Palestine.It's too late for the Obama administration to devise a new plan to deal with Israel's continued illegal settlements after the White House agreed to a $38bn aid package for Israel. It simply has no leverage.
There is also talk of the US sponsoring a UN Security Council resolution setting the guidelines for resolving the Israel-Palestine "issue".
But why would the administration that did nothing of substance to advance the cause of peace and freedom in Palestine suddenly want to decide the contours of its final solution?
Could Obama act without Clinton's consent come November? This promises to be a terrible draft resolution. But I'd be more than happy to be proven wrong.
The search for Plan C
It's clear the Obama administration has no time left to take on new plans or strategies. It's just playing on the lost time until January 20, 2017.
Obama might have had better intentions and better reason than his predecessors (and successor), but for a leader who prides himself on thinking things through and asking "why, how and what then?", he sure underestimated his adversaries.
Just as it inherited a chaotic region with diminished US influence in 2008, so the Obama administration will leave behind a violent and unstable region for the next administration to deal with.
And it will do so from an even weaker position than its predecessors because Washington's adversaries are emboldened with no incentive to let go, and its allies are disenchanted with little reason to hang their hopes on the next president.
Plan C anyone?
Marwan Bishara is the senior political analyst at Al Jazeera. Follow him on Facebook.
Not far from Mosul, a large military force is finalising plans for an advance that has been more than three decades in the making. The troops are Shia militiamen who have fought against the Islamic State, but they have not been given a direct role in the coming attack to free Iraq’s second city from its clutches.
Instead, while the Iraqi army attacks Mosul from the south, the militias will take up a blocking position to the west, stopping Isis forces from fleeing towards their last redoubt of Raqqa in Syria. Their absence is aimed at reassuring the Sunni Muslims of Mosul that the imminent recapture of the city is not a sectarian push against them. However, among Iraq’s Shia-dominated army the militia’s decision to remain aloof from the battle of Mosul is being seen as a rebuff.
Yet among the militias’ backers in Iran there is little concern. Since their inception, the Shia irregulars have made their name on the battlefields of Iraq, but they have always been central to Tehran’s ambitions elsewhere. By not helping to retake Mosul, the militias are free to drive one of its most coveted projects – securing an arc of influence across Iraqand Syria that would end at the Mediterranean Sea.
The strip of land to the west of Mosul in which the militias will operate is essential to that goal. After 12 years of conflict in Iraq and an even more savage conflict in Syria, Iran is now closer than ever to securing a land corridor that will anchor it in the region – and potentially transform the Islamic Republic’s presence on Arab lands. “They have been working extremely hard on this,” said a European official who has monitored Iran’s role in both wars for the past five years. “This is a matter of pride for them on one hand and pragmatism on the other. They will be able to move people and supplies between the Mediterranean and Tehran whenever they want, and they will do so along safe routes that are secured by their people, or their proxies.”
Interviews during the past four months with regional officials, influential Iraqis and residents of northern Syria have established that the land corridor has slowly taken shape since 2014. It is a complex route that weaves across Arab Iraq, through the Kurdish north, into Kurdish north-eastern Syria and through the battlefields north of Aleppo, where Iran and its allies are prevailing on the ground. It has been assembled under the noses of friend and foe, the latter of which has begun to sound the alarm in recent weeks. Turkey has been especially opposed, fearful of what such a development means for Iran’s relationship with the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ party), the restive Kurds in its midst, on whom much of the plan hinges.
The plan has been coordinated by senior government and security officials in Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus, all of whom defer to the head of the spearhead of Iran’s foreign policy, the Quds force of the Revolutionary Guards, headed by Major General Qassem Suleimani, who has run Iran’s wars in Syria and Iraq. It involves demographic shifts, which have already taken place in central Iraq and are under way in northern Syria. And it relies heavily on the support of a range of allies, who are not necessarily aware of the entirety of the project but have a developed vested interest in securing separate legs.
Maj Gen Qassem Suleimani, head of Iran’s all-powerful Quds force. Photograph: HO/AFP/Getty Images
The corridor starts at the entry points that Iran has used to send supplies and manpower into Iraq over the past 12 years. They are the same routes that were used by the Quds force to run a guerrilla war against US forces when they occupied the country – a campaign fought by the same Iraqi militias that have since been immersed in the fight against Isis.
The groups, Asa’ib ahl al-Haq, Keta’ib Hezbollah and their offshoots, accounted for close to 25% of all US battlefield casualties, senior US officials have said. They have become even more influential since US forces left the country. And in one of modern warfare’s starkest ironies, in the two years since US troops have returned to Iraq to fight Isis they have at times fought under US air cover.
The route crosses through Baquba, the capital of Diyala province, around 60 miles north of Baghdad. A mixed Sunni/Shia area for hundreds of years, Diyala became one of the main sectarian flashpoint areas during Iraq’s civil war. Along roads that have been secured by militias, which are known locally as “popular mobilisation units”, it then moves northwest into areas that were occupied by Isis as recently as several months ago.
The town of Shirqat in Salaheddin province is one important area. It was taken by militias along with Iraqi forces on 22 September, delivering another blow to the terrorist group and an important boost to Iran’s ambitions.
The militias are now present in large numbers in Shirqat and readying to move towards the western edge of Mosul, to a point around 50 miles southeast of Sinjar, which – at this point – is the next leg in the corridor. Between the militia forces and Sinjar is the town of Tal Afar, an Isis stronghold, which has been a historical home of both Sunni and Shia Turkmen – ancestral kin of Turkey.
A senior intelligence official said the leg between Tel Afar and Sinjar is essential to the plan. Sinjar is an ancestral home to the Yazidi population, which was forced to flee in August 2014 after Isis invaded the city, killing all the men it could find and enslaving women. It was recaptured by Iraqi Kurdish forces last November. And ever since PKK forces from across the Syrian border have taken up residence in the city and across the giant monolith, Mt Sinjar, behind it. The PKK fighters are being paid by the Iraqi government and have been incorporated into the popular mobilisation units. Iraqi and western intelligence officials say the move was approved by Iraq’s national security adviser, Falah Fayadh.
An influential Iraqi tribal sheikh, Abdulrahim al-Shammari, emerges as a central figure further to the north. He has a power base near the Rabia crossing into Syria, receives support from the popular mobilisation units and is close to the Assad regime in Damascus. “I believe that in our area Iran does not have very much influence,” he told the Observer in Baghdad. “There is nobody here, no major power that is helping us with weapons. Ideologically speaking, the PKK is affiliated with the Kurds of this area, so there is no problem having them here.”
From the Rabia crossing, the mooted route goes past the towns of Qamishli and Kobani towards Irfin, which are all controlled by the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia. Throughout the war the YPG (People’s Protection Units) has hedged its bets, at times allying with the US against Isis, and at other times siding with the Syrian regime. “Iran thinks it has them where it wants them now,” said the European source. “I’m not sure it has gauged the Turks correctly, though.”
A fighter sits on a balcony in Sinjar, Iraq after the town was retaken from Isis by Kurdish-led forces. Photograph: Cengiz Yar for the Guardian
Of all the points between Tehran and the Syrian coast, Aleppo has concentrated Iran’s energies more than anywhere else. Up to 6,000 militia members, mostly from Iraq, have congregated there ahead of a move to take the rebel-held east of the city, which could begin around the same time as the assault on Mosul.
Those who have observed Suleimani up close as he inspects the frontlines in Syria and Iraq, or in meetings in Damascus and Baghdad, where he projects his immense power through studied calm, say he has invested everything in Syria – and in ensuring that Iran emerges from a brutal, expensive war with its ambitions enhanced. “If we lose Syria, we lose Tehran,” Suleimani told the late Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi in 2014. Chalabi told the Observer at the time that Suleimani had added: “We will turn all this chaos into an opportunity.”
Securing Aleppo would be an important leg in the corridor, which would run past two villages to the north that have historically been in Shia hands. From there, a senior Syrian official, and Iraqi officials in Baghdad, said it would run towards the outskirts of Syria’s fourth city, Homs, then move north through the Alawite heartland of Syria, which a year of Russian airpower has again made safe for Assad. Iran’s hard-won road ends at the port of Latakia, which has remained firmly in regime hands throughout the war.
Ali Khedery, who advised all US ambassadors to Iraq and four commanders of Centcom in 2003-11 said securing a Mediterranean link would be seen as a strategic triumph in Iran. “It signifies the consolidation of Iran’s control over Iraq and the Levant, which in turn confirms their hegemonic regional ambitions,” he said. “That should trouble every western leader and our regional allies because this will further embolden Iran to continue expanding, likely into the Gulf countries next, a goal they have explicitly and repeatedly articulated. Why should we expect them to stop if they’ve been at the casino, doubling their money over and over again, for a decade?”
تشبه القرارات والتصريحات الروسية الأخيرة ضربات خاطفة تعلن تحديات متصاعدة ضد سياسة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وحلفائها في العالم فأثناء إرسالها المدمرتين سيربوخوف وزيليوني عبر تركيا نحو الساحل السوري وإلحاقها بالسفينة الصاروخية ميراج، ونشرها منظومة صواريخ متطوّرة واستقدامها طائرات مقاتلة جديدة، ألغت موسكو اتفاقيتها مع واشنطن حول التخلص من البلوتونيوم الصالح لصناعة الأسلحة وبعدها ألغت اتفاقية أخرى حول البحث النووي، وحذرت واشنطن من أن أي هجوم على المناطق الخاضعة للنظام السوري سيعتبر هجوما على قواتها وأن طواقمها لن يكون لديها الوقت الكافي لرصد مسارات الصواريخ ومن أي اتجاه تم إطلاقها. في الوقت نفسه كان وزير الدفاع الروسي سيرغي شويغو يتفاخر أن الحملة في سوريا أثبتت فاعلية الأسلحة الروسية وبأن الكرملين ساعد في استقرار الوضع في البلد، من دون أن يذكر، دليلاً على كلامه طبعاً، أن عدد القتلى الذين حصدتهم آلته العسكرية خلال سنة من التدخل الروسي كان أكثر من عشرة آلاف سوري بينهم مئات الأطفال. على جبهة واشنطن التي يفترض أن الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين يتحدّاها شهدنا اتصالا من وزير الخارجية الأمريكي جون كيري بنظيره الروسي سيرغي لافروف أمس (وذلك بعد إعلان واشنطن تعليق المباحثات بشأن سوريا)، كما قرأنا خبرا عن أن الرئيس الأمريكي باراك أوباما يدرس فرض عقوبات جديدة على النظام السوري، وأنه اجتمع مع مجلس الأمن القومي الأمريكي لبحث خياراته، فيما استلم الأوروبيون راية المفاوضات العقيمة فاجتمعت مدراء الخارجية لفرنسا وألمانيا وبريطانيا وإيطاليا مع نظيرهم الأمريكي في برلين للقيام بـ»عصف ذهني لبحث الموضوع السوري»، واجتمع وزير الخارجية الفرنسي جان مارك ايرولت مع نظيره الروسي لافروف وأنّبه قائلا: «لا شيء يبرر حمم النار». الأمم المتحدة انتحت جانباً عملياً وطالبت بانسحاب مقاتلي «جبهة فتح الشام» من شرق حلب وعرض مبعوثها ستافان دي ميستورا مرافقة المقاتلين شخصيّاً، وهو ما عنونته إحدى وكالات الأنباء «مبعوث الأمم المتحدة يجازف بحياته من أجل السلام في حلب»، والحقيقة أن دي ميستورا يجازف بحياته لتحقيق شرط روسيا بإخراج المقاتلين من شرق حلب لتسهيل احتلالها (وهو أمر طالب به النظام في اليوم السابق على العرض «البطوليّ» لمبعوث الأمم المتحدة)! التفسير الحقيقي لما يحصل هو أن روسيا تفهم الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية جيّداً وتعرف أن الخلاف بينهما شكليّ وهي غير معنيّة أبداً بإنقاذ وجه البيت الأبيض الذي لا يفصله عن الكرملينخلاف حقيقي حول الوضع السوريّوالخلاف فقط هو على تفاصيل إخراج المجزرة.
بل إن الرطانة الأمريكية حول الوحشية التي تمارسها موسكو في حلب في قصفها للمستشفيات والمخابز ومحطات المياه والمدنيين لا تتناسب مع قصف واشنطن لمشفى في الموصل قبل أيام وقتلها العشرات من المدنيين في تموز/يوليو الماضي قرب منبج في ريف حلب الشمالي في غارات جوّية واعتبارهم «خسائر جانبية» لحربها على تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» من اعتذار لأهاليهم بينما قامت بالاعتذار عن قتلى جيش النظام واقترحت دفع تعويضات لهم، وبالتالي فإن «الوحشية» و»تجاهل حقوق الإنسان» أمور نسبيّة بالنسبة لواشنطن، واختلافها مع موسكو هوبالدرجة لا بالمبدأ.
وإذا أردنا الحقيقة فإن ما يحصل في سوريا والمنطقة العربيّة يعكس اتفاقاً بين النخب الغربيّة الحاكمة وروسيا على السرديّة التي اشتغل عليها النظام السوري منذ بدء حربه الإجرامية ضد شعبه عام 2011 وهي أن البديل الوحيد لنظام الاستبداد هو الإسلاميون، وأن الإسلاميين هم أكثر خطراً على أوروبا من أنظمة الاستبداد وبالتالي فالأولى إبقاء هذه الأنظمة مع إجراء تحسينات شكلية عليها. … أما موسكو فلا يهمّها هذه الشكليات.
أعلن برنامج الأمم المتحدة لصور الأقمار الصناعية، الأربعاء، في جنيف، أن صور الأقمار الصناعية للهجوم على قافلة تنقل مساعدات إنسانية في 19 أيلول/سبتمبر في سورية، تؤكد تعرض القافلة لغارة جوية.
وفي تصريح صحافي، قال المستشار في برنامج 'يونوسات'، لارس بروملي، 'تأكدنا أن ما حصل هو غارة جوية'، وذلك بالاستناد إلى حجم ونوع الحفر الواضحة في الصور.
وقد أبدت الأمم المتحدة تحفظا شديدا حتى الآن على صعيد تحديد المسؤوليات عن شن تلك الغارة. وعزت واشنطن المسؤولية إلى موسكو التي نفت أي تورط في الغارة.
وأعلن الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة بان كي مون، الأسبوع الماضي، عن تشكيل لجنة تحقيق.
وقال رئيس برنامج يونوسات إينار بيورغو، اليوم الأربعاء 'لم نتسلم بعد طلبا' للحصول على الصور في هذا الإطار.
وقد تعرض أكثر من ثلاثين شاحنة كانت تنقل مساعدة من الأمم المتحدة والهلال الأحمر السوري لهجوم قرب حلب في 19 أيلول/سبتمبر الماضي. وقتل 18 شخصا منهم المسؤول المحلي للهلال الأحمر.
وتبث يونوسات التي نادرا ما تصدر بيانات، صورا مستخرجة من الأقمار الصناعية التجارية، بناء على طلب وكالات الأمم المتحدة أو الدول.
وتستخدم الصور لدى حصول كوارث طبيعية ولتقييم أوضاع المهجرين في النزاعات.
وكان قد طلب عدد كبير من وكالات الأمم المتحدة صورا في الفترة الأخيرة لمنطقة الموصل، لاتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة تمهيدا لاستقبال مئات آلاف المهجرين المنتظرين لدى شن الهجوم لاستعادة المدينة من تنظيم داعش.
‘The British government has no direct contact with the Assad regime due to the atrocities it has committed against the Syrian people,’ says spokesman The Guardian Link
Zaina Erhaim’s passport was taken from her when she arrived in Britain on 22 September. It has since been retained by a Home Office department.
Erhaim, a noted critic of the Syrian regime run by Bashar al-Assad, was told that the confiscation followed a claim by the Syrian government that it had been stolen.
Border agency officials told her they were complying with a request from Syriaand she should take the matter up with Syrian consular officials.
But a Home Office spokesman said: “The British government has no direct contact with the Assad regime due to the atrocities it has committed against the Syrian people.”
He explained that the department’s “first priority is the security of our borders and it would be irresponsible to ignore warnings about lost or stolen passports.”
Erhaim has a second, valid passport with a UK visa, but without sufficient space to enable her to travel outside of the European Union.
She will therefore be permitted to leave and return the UK. But it may make travel to Turkey, where she is based, difficult and, possibly, hazardous.
It is unclear yet whether the Home Office will relent and give her back the confiscated passport.
In a blog item earlier today, I criticised the Home Office’s press office for its tardy response to questions about Erhaim’s passport.
