Tuesday, September 2, 2008

Why Iraqi 'Client' Blocked US Long-Term Presence


By Gareth Porter

".....Instead, Maliki launched his own operation in Basra that was planned to last only a few days. Then, in a move that appears to have been prearranged with Suleimani, Iraqi officials were dispatched to Iran to get Suleimani's help in mediating a peace agreement with Sadr.

The result was a Sadrist retreat from Basra, even though Iraqi security forces had not been able to cope with the Mahdi Army resistance. That headed off a major U.S. troop presence in the Shi'ite south and strengthened Maliki's position in negotiations with Washington.

The Basra agreement set the stage for the subsequent accord between Maliki and Sadr, again reached with Iranian mediation, for a cease-fire in Sadr City on May 12. The agreement prevented the U.S. command from getting the large-scale U.S. campaign in Sadr City for which it had been pushing for more than a year.

The carefully calculating Sadr had been convinced to trade short-term military success for the prospect of a U.S. military retreat. [Comment: Sadr did not make that choice; he was ordered by Iran to support Maliki. Iran continues to play a complex game that primarily benefits Iran (by strengthening its leverage) and not Iraq.]

Maliki began pushing for "significant changes" in the SOFA only after the May agreement, but he was only returning to the position he had embraced two years earlier......."

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