Opportunism and Desperation of Hamas: Hamas and Iran rebuild ties three years after falling out over Syria

• Harriet Sherwood in Gaza City
• theguardian.com, Thursday 9 January 2014 06.19 EST

Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, may visit Tehran in the coming months. Photograph: Mohammed Saber/EPA

"A rapprochement between Hamas and Tehran is under way almost three years after a breach over the Palestinian party's refusal to back the Syrian government in the civil war, and amid its current political isolation following the demise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The rebuilding of the relationship is likely to dismay Israel and the US, which had welcomed the weakened ties between Gaza's rulers and their powerful political, financial and military sponsors.

"Relations between us are now almost back to how they were before [the crisis over Syria]. We believe we will soon be back at that point," said Taher al-Nounou, an aide to Gaza's prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh. Contacts between high-ranking officials from both sides had resumed, he said.

Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas's political bureau, based in Qatar, has met Iranian representatives in Ankara and Doha in recent months, and may visit Tehran in the coming months.

According to Nounou, a delegation of Hamas officials based outside Gaza visited Tehran two months ago. Hamas leaders inside Gaza have been unable to leave the blockaded coastal strip since the military coup in Egypt last July.

Another senior Hamas official, Bassem Naim, confirmed the renewed contacts between his organisation and Tehran. "Ties had never been conclusively severed, but recently there have been a number of meetings that brought new blood back into our relationship with Iran," he said.

"There were several visits and meetings, as there had been previously. But this time the meetings were held at a high level on the part of Hamas and Iran. This led to a marked improvement and progression in the relationship."

The alliance was severely damaged by the stance Hamas took when the uprising against Bashar al-Assad began in Syria almost three years ago. Although the exiled Hamas leadership had been hosted by Assad's regime in Damascus for a decade, it refused to back the government against the rebels, incurring the wrath of Syria's allies, Tehran. Meshaal and other members of the external Hamas leadership left Syria the following year, in 2012.

Iranian leaders cut off funding to Hamas, which had been worth around $23m (£14m) a month, causing a serious financial crisis for Gaza's rulers. This has been severely exacerbated in the past six months by theclosure of the smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt by the new regime in Cairo.

The removal of former the Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi and the bloody crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's ideological parent organisation, has left the Palestinian Islamist party politically and psychologically isolated. "Hamas's big dream of political Islam coming to power has vanished," said the Gaza analyst Omar Shaban.

According to Nounou, who described Hamas-Iran relations as "a very sensitive issue", the ties between the two were weakened by the war in Syria, but not severed. "We kept some channels open," he said. "Recently Iran realised that Hamas was not against Iran or the Syrian regime. They understood that we wanted to be neutral. It was a misunderstanding."

[What an unprincipled position by Hamas. But being starved and besieged works wonders!]

Asked if Tehran had resumed its financial support, Nounou said: "We don't announce these things because there would be efforts to stop it."

Since the closure of the tunnels, Hamas has faced logistical difficulties in bringing financial aid to Gaza. Suitcases filled with cash were transported through the tunnels before the Egyptian crackdown.

Mahmoud al-Zahar, a hardline Hamas leader in Gaza, declined to comment on whether Tehran had resumed its provision of cash or weapons, saying: "It is difficult to discuss secret things. It will only serve the Israelis".

Zahar, who visited Tehran last year, said he was in constant contact with the Iranians, and that any reconciliation between Tehran and the west over the nuclear issue would not affect its support for Hamas.

The rapprochement was not connected to events in Egypt, he insisted. "Hamas is not politically isolated. Do not exaggerate the difficulties with Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is not finished," he said."

Additional reporting by Hazem Balousha

How We Disowned Palestinians in Syria

Starving Refugees

By Ramzy Baroud 
CounterPunch

"A worst case scenario is unfolding in Syria, and Palestinian refugees, particularly in the Yarmouk refugee camp, are paying a heavy price for Syria’s cruelest war. They are starving, although there can be no justification, nor logistical explanation for why they are dying from hunger.

Spokesman for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Chris Gunness, told AFP that “at least five Palestinian refugees in the besieged refugee camp of Yarmouk have died because of malnutrition, bringing the total number of reported cases to 15,” since Sep. 2013. Other estimates, especially those reported by local residents, say the number is significantly higher.

The camp, which is located south of Damascus, had once housed nearly 250,000 Palestinians that included 150,000 officially registered refugees. Three years of a brutal war later, Yarmouk is now nothing but ruins, and houses only around 18,000 residents who couldn’t escape to Lebanon, Jordan or elsewhere.

Reporting for the BBC from Damascus, Lyse Doucet quoted aid officials: “Aid officials in Damascus recently told me ‘the gates of Yarmouk were slammed shut in July’ and almost no aid has been allowed to enter since then.”

A minor Palestinian group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – the General Command, has tried to control Yarmouk on behalf of the Syrian government, an act that the refugees rejected. There has been a semi-consensus among Palestinians that they should not be embroiled in Syria’s war. However, the warring parties – the Syrian government, the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other Islamic groups – desperately tried to use every card in their disposal to weaken the other parties. The result has been devastating and is taking place at the expense of innocent refugees.

Aside from the 1,500 reportedly killed Palestinians and thousands more wounded, the majority of the refugees are once again on the run, although in more perilous circumstances. According to a statement by UNRWA on Dec 17, “of the 540,000 Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Syria, about 270,000 are displaced in the country, and an estimated 80,000 have fled. 51,000 have reached Lebanon, 11,000 have identified themselves in Jordan, 5,000 are in Egypt, and smaller numbers have reached Gaza, Turkey and farther afield.”

Not that other Arab countries have proven kinder than Syria, for the UN agency reports that “those who have reached Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt face risky legal limbo compounded with living conditions so difficult that many decide to return to the dangers inside Syria.”

Yarmouk has been at the heart of that tragedy. The refugee camp was established in 1957 to shelter thousands of refugees who were expelled from Palestine at the hand of Zionist militias in 1947-48. Despite the fact that it was located in Syria, Yarmouk remained close to the pulse of the Palestinian tragedy, as hundreds of men were killed fighting against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Although Palestinians in Syria were generally treated well, if compared to the very poor standards set by other Arab countries, thousands of men found themselves victims of occasional political purges of the Syrian government. An example of this followed the 1983 fallout between late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

But the latest disaster is the worst to strike the refugee camp. In Dec 2012, rebels of the FSA tried to gain control over the camp. Fierce fighting ensued, followed by aerial bombardment of Yarmouk by government airplanes on Dec 16. Dozens were reportedly killed, and thousands fled for their lives.

Despite the obvious signs of danger surrounding Palestinian presence in Syria, only then did the Palestinian leadership attempt to negotiate a special status for Yarmouk so that the stateless Palestinians were kept out of a conflict that was not of their making. Some Palestinian factions were used by other regional powers to declare political stances regarding the conflict in Syria. The refugees should have never been used as fodder for a dirty war and all attempts at sparing the refugees have failed.

The failure has been across the board. Typically, the so-called international community is at the forefront of this shameful episode. “There’s deep frustration in the aid community that a world which came together to deal with Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal cannot do the same when it comes to tackling a deepening humanitarian crisis,” reported Doucet, quoting an aid official: “I have never seen a humanitarian crisis on this scale which does not have a Security Council resolution.”

The same could be said of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah which is chasing after another ‘peace process’ mirage that is surely doomed to fail. Why hasn’t PA president Mahmoud Abbas put all of his frivolous talks and appointments on hold and lobby the international community to save Yarmouk?

The disgrace hardly ends here, for some in the Palestine solidarity movement had ceased to think of the Palestinian refugees’ right of return as an issue that is at the heart of the Palestinian struggle for freedom. They only mobilize around the same issues which are located within the territorial and political parameters imposed by the Oslo accords. According to that logic, Palestinians in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and so on, are hardly a top priority for action and mobilization, even if they are killed by the hundreds or starve to death.

By paying greater attention to Palestinian refugees in Syria, one is hardly calling for ignoring the horrible reality under which the Syrian people continue to suffer. But Palestinian refugees have no legal status, no political representation, no serious international support, no leadership truly concerned by their plight, no place to go to nor place to return to. They have nothing, and now they are starving.

There can be no rationale to explain why the Syrian government and the rebels insist on embroiling the Palestinians into their war which is accumulating into an assortment of many war crimes that refuse to end.

The international community and Palestine solidarity groups everywhere must place Palestinian refugees on the top of their agenda. Food should never be a weapon in this dirty war, and Palestinians should never be starving to death, no matter the motive or the logic."

Palestine’s Quislings

A Hand in the Till Not on the Tiller

by Philip Giraldi, January 09, 2014

"A picture is indeed sometimes worth a thousand words. A photo of Secretary of State John Kerry disembarking from his plane in Tel Aviv showed chief US negotiator Martin Indyk walking along at his side with a grin on his face as if he had just heard a new Palestinian joke in the plane on the way over. It looked like Israel’s American legal team had arrived and just couldn’t wait for the first photo op with a glowering Benjamin Netanyahu. They may even have been chuckling over what might be the funniest line ever uttered by an Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu greeting their arrival by claiming that "There’s growing doubt in Israel that the Palestinians are committed to peace. In the six months since the start of peace negotiations, the Palestinian authority continues its unabated incitement against the State of Israel."

Netanyahu, who insists that the Palestinians declare Israel to be a Jewish State as a precondition for further talks and that Israel be able to maintain a permanent military occupation of the Jordan River valley, certainly knows all about "unabated incitement." And he has plenty of friends hanging on his every pronouncement. US Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were already in Israel when Kerry arrived, consulting with the Israeli government and coming to the conclusion that there are serious concerns about any possible peace agreement with the Palestinians, nearly all relating to "Israel’s security." More fool I to think that Graham and McCain were elected to represent the people of South Carolina and Arizona, but as some have observed politics is the art of the impossible.

As usual official Washington is lining up on the side of the Israelis while pretending to be an "honest broker," a deception that fools no one but the editorial staffs on theWashington Post and New York Times. There are, of course, a number of different ways to look at the current round of the Middle East Peace talks, possibly the longest continuous entertainment spectacular on the planet since Johnny Carson retired after 30 seasons on The Tonight Show. One might well wonder why it has been so difficult to create a Palestinian State of some kind, a development that would seem to be in nearly everyone’s interest and which would also impact on many related issues, to include international terrorism, instability in Lebanon and Syria, Iran, and even Arab democracy. The reason is, of course, simple, involving Israeli unwillingness to permit such a state to come into existence coupled with the United States role as an enabler of Israel. So the peace process spins on and on.

Scott McConnell has hit the nail on the head, recently describing in some detail how Israel has never wanted a sovereign Palestinian state in the neighborhood even though it persists in claiming that it does. The United States, which has always known that the Israelis are liars, nevertheless goes along with the deception for fear of offending the powerful Israel Lobby. McConnell observes that "Since there is no reason to think that Bibi Netanyahu is more inclined to allow the Palestinians a viable state than Barak was, there really is little chance that Kerry’s mission will succeed—unless of course the Palestinian leadership has been sufficiently corrupted and bribed to sell out legitimate Palestinian aspirations."

The point he is making is that the Palestinians have to a large extent been sold out by their own corrupt leadership, which has repeatedly failed to take steps that would assert their national rights. Israeli politician Abba Eban once said that the Palestinians never "miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity" but it is much more than that. Mahmoud Abbas is the perfect Palestinian leader from the point of view of Israel and the United States – corrupt , malleable, and, at the end of the day, always ready to do what Tel Aviv and Washington want while Benjamin Netanyahu proceeds with his settlement building and acquisition of what is left of the West Bank.

The 2006 Palestinian elections illustrate what has gone wrong. The US supported free elections but then changed its mind when Hamas won, embracing the Israeli position that Hamas was a terrorist organization. All of which required a reset on the relationship with the PLO, somehow turning it into the acceptable Palestinian government vis-à-vis Hamas. To do so, of course, ignored the massive corruption of the PLO, which was well known to the Palestinian people and also to just about anyone else who cared to inquire, a major reason why the voters turned against it and voted for Hamas.

Yassir Arafat may have succeeded in placing Palestinian identity and statehood on the international agenda but he also stole billions of dollars that were being given by donors to help the Palestinian people. It has been frequently claimed that Mahmoud Abbas, currently president of Palestine and chairman of the PLO, has continued that tradition, possibly helping himself to many millions more. Many of Abbas’s critics, including members of congress and convicted felon Elliot Abrams, are politically motivated, attempting to demonstrate that Israel has no legitimate negotiating partner among the Palestinians. They undeniably conveniently ignore the considerable level of corruption in Tel Aviv but their own lack of credibility does not in any way make the Palestinian corruption problem go away.

And the corruption has consequences. The price Abbas has paid for being able to help himself and his two sons from the government coffers has been continued acquiescence in the charade being played out by a succession of American Secretaries of State and Benjamin Netanyahu, negotiations that are intended to go nowhere except in a direction desired by Israel. In the latest version featuring Israel as a Jewish State with all that implies, coupled with a continued military occupation and theft of both land and water, the Palestinians are little more than patsies, a player who is so powerless that he can safely be ignored.

As part of that game, Abbas has been careful not to push too hard and he has basically ceded to John Kerry his right to behave independently. He has backed down due to Washington’s threats and failed to energetically assert the Palestinian case for full recognition of statehood in the United Nations, has proven unwilling to utilize the mechanism of the International Criminal Court to condemn Israeli war crimes and other violations, and has avoided even following through on his own threats to dissolve his own government to end the pretense that he actually is a head of a sovereign state. Dissolving the Palestinian government, such as it is, would force the Israelis to resort to a return to a total occupation, which would be expensive, bad public relations, and a turn of events that is not in their interest. Under US pressure, Abbas has generally cooperated with even the most extreme Israeli security demands, including tolerating the arrest and incarceration of his own people without trial.

So when Netanyahu and his shills in the US Congress complain that Israel really cannot deal with the Palestinians because there is no legitimate negotiating partner, for once the Israelis and their friends from AIPAC are actually speaking the truth. Of course there is no one home in Ramallah precisely because that is the way Tel Aviv and Washington want it to be."

Avoid false choices in the Middle East

Western apathy towards the suffering in the Middle East is immoral and politically short-sighted.

By Marwan Bishara

Al-Jazeera

"The West is increasingly uninterested in the Middle East as the region becomes polarised and paralysed by old and new forces. Contrasted binary labels such as rulers and Islamists, war and terrorism, secularism and sectarianism, while seem self-evident, they,nonetheless, conceal a far more complicated and dangerous reality, one that requires an alternative approach to Western interventionism or negligent pragmatism.

If it all looks chaotic and senseless from Washington, New York and Brussels and you think it's dizzying to watch the region unravel, try living in Egypt or dying in Syria. Apathy towards this suffering is immoral and politically short-sighted.

The record shows that rulers can be terribly violent, Islamist groups largely peaceful, seculars deeply religious, liberals undemocratic and wildly sectarian, and generals unabashedly dictatorial. It has also demonstrated that the opposites are no less true. Labels are meaningless in the modern Middle East.

This is why the West's approach cannot be based on knee-jerk reactions to labels. It must ask some fundamental questions like: Is Assad fighting or fermenting terrorism? Is General Sisi a reformer or a deformer of the democratic process? Is Iran an "oasis of stability" or an exporter of instability?

Logic of oppression

Behind the terrible violence lies a cynical calculus: punish the people yearning for freedom and dignity and force them to reconsider whether revolting against tyranny is indeed the wise thing to do. From Qaddafi's attempt to crush his detractors in Libya, to the on-going massacre in Syria, through the military coup in Egypt, counter-revolution is in full gear, fighting tooth and nail to regain and maintain power.

Arab dictators have also tried to link ALL Islamists to extremism, violence or ultimately, al-Qaeda. Buying into that is naive, bordering on reckless. When Islamist groups, even the conservatives and ultra-conservatives, in the spirit of the new era, did join in the democratic process the "old regimes" attempted to sabotage their efforts when the results weren't to their liking as was the case in Egypt. 

While Islamist groups have demonstrated a limited understanding of democratic values when in power in Egypt, such shortcomings do not compare with the destabilising efforts of military dictatorship. Ousting and then outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood under the pretext of labelling it a terrorist organisation makes it impossible to arrive at a reconciliation or compromise with the group and its supporters - that make up no less than a quarter of the population - in order to avoid a descent into total chaos.

Western leaders might have expressed their regrets and warned against reversing the Egyptian democratic process and alienating a major segment of the population, but they fell short on taking meaningful steps to deter the generals from establishing a de facto military rule.

Calculus of war

In Syria, the Assad regime has fought back against the predominantly peaceful revolution, justifying the use of excessive force with the claim that they're fighting extremism. It terrorised an entire population under the pretext of combating 'terrorism'. Intentionally creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, the regime paved the way for "violent Jihadis" to take root and become active amid the death and destruction.

The Syrian regime has shown there is no limit to how far such dictatorships will go to maintain or to regain power. Even manufacturing terrorists to convince the West of its utility in "providing/maintaining stability" in a volatile but strategic region.

Now that the genie is out of the bottle, pandering to violent dictators and their allies promises more instability and violence. The regimes' merciless crackdown will only breed more extremism. Never since their heyday in Afghanistan, has al-Qaeda and other violent Jihadists been as potent as they are today in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Iraq.

Alas, Washington and London seem to buy into to the Russian argument that the Syrian regime is needed for containing al-Qaeda and combating terrorism.

Mounting number of Western pundits from the left and the right are advocating US cooperation with the (Shia) leadership in Iran and Iraq in the war against (Sunni) terrorism. This will prove counterproductive and will no doubt lead to region-wide sectarian conflict.

Indeed the West and the international community at large must look to where leaders and movements stand on the democratic ideals invoked on the streets and public squares of the Arab world three years ago; liberty, prosperity and social justice.

In the absence of developed democracies or democratic majorities, supporting democratic processes is the only way to nurture both. Likewise, a region-wide push for restorative justice and inclusive democracy is the most effective antidote against violent extremists in the Arab world. "

A Great Cartoon by Emad Hajjaj: Palestinian Refugees Are Starved to Death by the Syrian Regime Which Besieges Their Yarmouk Camp

And This is the "resistance" Regime? With a "Supporter" Like This, Who Needs Enemies??

حسابات أطراف الأزمة في اعتصامات الأنبار

وحدة تحليل السياسات في المركز | 07 يناير ،2014

اندلعت في محافظة الأنبار غربي العراق مواجهات عنيفة بين قوات الجيش والأجهزة الأمنية من جهة، ومسلحين من أبناء عشائر المحافظة من جهة أخرى؛ وذلك إثر قيام قوات الأمن العراقية بفضّ اعتصام مدينة الرمادي بعد أن اعتقلت أحد أبرز قياديي الاحتجاجات وهو النائب في البرلمان العراقي أحمد العلواني، ما فتح الباب أمام مواجهات لاحت من خلالها نذر صراع طائفي واسع النطاق.

خلفيات الأزمة المتجددة

تفاقم الموقف في محافظة الأنبار المنتفضة منذ نحو عام مع خمس محافظات عراقية أخرى (ديالى وصلاح الدين والموصل، وقطاع واسع من كركوك، فضلًا عن العاصمة بغداد) للمطالبة بحقوقٍ سياسيةٍ وخدميةٍ ومعيشيةٍ. ويأتي في مقدمة مطالب المنتفضين وقف التمييز الطائفي الذي تتعرّض له المكونات السنية العراقية وإلغاء ما يعرف بالمادة "أربعة إرهاب" في القانون العراقي، التي يطلق عليها المحتجون تهكمًا اسم "أربعة سنّة"؛ للتعبير عن الشعور السائد بأنها تستهدف العرب السنة. كما يطالب المحتجون بإلغاء قانون المساءلة والعدالة الذي حلّ محلّ قانون اجتثاث البعث.

وعلى الرغم من أنّ مطالب المنتفضين كانت تشمل ما يعانيه العراقيون كافة من التهميش والفساد المالي والإداري وغياب الخدمات، فإنّ الحكومة أصرّت على أنها مطالب ذات أهداف طائفية (سنية) من أجل تحييد المكوّن الثاني من مكوّنات عرب العراق وهو المكوّن الشيعي، وذلك بتغذية مخاوفه وتهويلها من خلال الإيحاء بعودة "الهيمنة السنية" على الدولة التي يسعى لها حزب البعث وتنظيم القاعدة (على الرغم من التناقض والتنافر بينهما).

وقد تمكنت الحكومة نتيجة هذا الخطاب - مستفيدة من ممارسات القاعدة وتفجيراتها - من تعميق الهوة بين سنة العراق وشيعته. ولعل أبلغ دليل على ذلك هو عدم تناغم محافظات الجنوب ذات الأغلبية الشيعية مع المطالب الوطنية المشروعة للمحافظات الست المنتفضة^[1]؛ إذ تتخذ معظم تعليقات الشباب و"تغريداتهم" من المكوّنين على وسائل الاتصال الاجتماعي طابعًا طائفيًا على الرغم من وحدة الهموم.

الأبعاد الإستراتيجية للأزمة

جاءت الأحداث الأخيرة في الأنبار في سياق تعود مقدماته إلى بداية الثورة السوريّة، عندما أخذت السلطة الحاكمة في بغداد تتحسّب من تداعيات هذه الثورة على الوضع العراقي الداخلي؛ فأضفت عليها تفسيرًا طائفيًا كإجراء احترازي، وتوقعت أن تمتد تداعياتها إلى محافظات العراق الغربية الثلاث المجاورة لسورية، وهي الأنبار، ونينوى (الموصل)، وصلاح الدين، ثم تنتشر منها باتجاه ديالى وكركوك وبغداد وجوارها. وتوقعت السلطة الحاكمة وأحزابها السياسية أن تنشأ وحدة "سنية" الطابع بين محافظات العراق الغربية والوسطى وبين الثورة السوريّة. وقد صرّح باقر صولاغ، أحد قياديي التحالف الوطني العراقي (الشيعي)، بأنّ القتال سينتقل إلى أسوار بغداد لو أتيح للثورة السوريّة أن تنتصر^[2].

ولذلك، ثمة تحسّب كبير لاحتمال انتصار الثورة السوريّة، وحذر أكبر من احتمال انتقالها إلى العراق، وما يترتب على ذلك من تداعيات إستراتيجية كبيرة على وضع إيران الإقليمي، وإمكانية انقطاع الرابط الجيوبولتيكي الحيوي الذي يربط "الرأس" الإيراني بامتدادات مصالحه الأمنية وغيرها في سورية ولبنان. وفي هذا الإطار، تشكّل الأنبار الحلقة الأضعف في هذا الرابط الطبيعي الذي أنشأته إيران مستفيدة من ظروف الاحتلال الأميركي، وسيطرة الأحزاب التي تدين لها بالولاء على مقاليد الأمور في العراق، وتجمع بين تحالفها مع إيران والتحالف مع الولايات المتحدة.

لقد كان خط الاتصال البريّ بين العراق وسورية الذي تمر عبره الإمدادات من إيران لنظام بشار الأسد مهددًا من قبل فصائل المعارضة السوريّة بسبب القتال الدائر في مناطق شرق سورية، لكنّ هذا الطريق لم يعد آمنًا مطلقًا منذ اندلاع انتفاضة الأنبار في كانون الأول/ ديسمبر 2012؛ إذ تصدى الثائرون في الأنبار مرات عديدة لأرتال عسكرية كانت تهدف إلى اختراق طريق المرور السريع الدولي متجهة صوب منطقة الحدود مع سورية، لأنّ تلك الطريق جرى قطعها قبل وصولها الفلوجة، وكذلك في الرمادي .

وفي العموم تعاني سيطرة الحكومة على الطرق الخارجية اختلالات كبيرة نتيجة مرور معظمها في مناطق تقطنها أغلبية معارضة؛ فمحافظة ديالى – مثلًا - الواقعة إلى الشرق من بغداد تسيطر على خط المواصلات الإستراتيجي الذي يربط العراق بإيران. ومن هنا، نجد سعي الحكومة للسيطرة على هذه المحافظة بالوسائل كافة، بما فيها التهجير على أساس طائفي عند المفاصل الحيوية على هذه الطريق، وبخاصة في منطقة المقدادية ذات الأغلبية السنية، والتي تبعد 50 كيلومترًا فقط عن خط الحدود الدولي مع إيران. أطلقت الحكومة في هذه المنطقة يد الميليشيات لتنفيذ التهجير الطائفي في محاولة لإحكام السيطرة على الطريق الدولي التي تربط العراق بإيران فور خروجها من سلسلة جبال حمرين التي تقع إلى الشرق من المقدادية. ويصح الشيء نفسه على الطريق التي تربط بغداد بالموصل؛ إذ إنها تخترق مناطق تقطنها عشائر (سنية)، بالإضافة إلى الطريقين اللتين تربطان بغداد بالبصرة عبر محوري الفرات ودجلة، فهما تخترقان مناطق تقطنها أغلبية سنية على امتداد مسافة 50 كيلومترًا من بغداد.

يمثل احتمال قطع الطرق الخارجية تهديدًا إستراتيجيًا لقدرة الحكومة الحالية على فرض سلطتها في أنحاء العراق. وقد شكلت الأنبار تحدٍ كبيرٍ في هذا السياق خاصة بعد الانتفاضة؛ إذ جرى قطع الطريق الدولية على فترات. كما جرى قطعها مجددًا كرد فعل على التدخل العسكري الأخير لقوات رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي من مداخل الفلوجة الشرقية (60 كيلومترًا إلى الغرب من بغداد).

الأبعاد الداخلية للأزمة

يعاني رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي تراجعًا كبيرًا في التأييد الشعبي الذي يحتاج إليه من أجل ضمان فوزه في الدورة الانتخابية القادمة وحصوله على ولاية ثالثة. وقد بدا ذلك التراجع واضحًا في انتخابات مجالس المحافظات الأخيرة أمام منافسيه من الشيعة، وفي مقدمتهم المجلس الإسلامي الأعلى الذي يضمه مع المالكي التحالف الوطني العراقي، والذي يجمع الأحزاب السياسية الشيعية. كما أنّ خروج التيار الصدري عن قواعد اللعبة السياسية الذي مثّلها هذا التحالف، واستقالة بعض الوجوه القيادية في ائتلاف دولة القانون الذي يرأسه المالكي، فضلًا عن ظهور اعتراضات في أوساط قريبة من رئيس الوزراء بشأن النفوذ الذي بدأ يتمتع به نجله في إدارة شؤون الدولة؛ كل ذلك جعل المالكي يشعر بالتهديد خصوصًا في بغداد التي حاز فيها أعلى الأصوات في الانتخابات البرلمانية الأخيرة. لذلك وجد المالكي في تضخيم التهديد الذي تمثله الأنبار في وعي العامة من مناصريه وسيلة جذبٍ لأغلبية الرأي العام الشيعي في العراق الذي أخذ ينفضّ من حوله مع اقتراب انتخابات مصيرية بالنسبة إليه. وهذا ما يجعل غرضًا انتخابيًا يقف وراء التصعيد في الموقف من ساحات الاعتصام في الأنبار.

ويشكِّل التشظي في الوضع الداخلي السنّي عاملًا آخر مهمًا بنى عليه المالكي قراره في اقتحام ساحة اعتصام الرمادي، لأنّ سنوات من سيطرة التشكيلة السياسية الحالية على السلطة أوجدت شركاء للمالكي من العرب السنة. وعلى الرغم من أنّ هؤلاء كانوا يظهرون معارضة أحيانًا تجاه المالكي، فإنهم أعطوه شرعية الحكم وادعاء المشاركة فيه. وقد أسهم فشل هذه الكتلة السياسية السنية في طلب المالكي للاستجواب أمام البرلمان ونزع الثقة عن حكومته في تكريس الأمر الواقع الذي تمثّل بهيمنة رئيس الحكومة على قدرات البلد وقراراته.

وعلى الرغم من أنّ الحزب الإسلامي العراقي (سني) كان دائمًا الحليف الطبيعي للمالكي في العملية السياسية والمستعد دائمًا لتقديم تغطية له مقابل مكاسب هزيلة، فإنّ هذا الحزب لا يمثل إلا أقلية في المشهد السياسي العراقي؛ إذ لم يحصل في انتخابات عام 2010 إلا على بضعة مقاعد. لذلك يمكن القول إنّ تأثير تيارات الإسلام السياسي في الرأي العام السني في العراق محدود جدًا؛ فسنة العراق هم من كانوا وراء فوز القائمة العراقية العابرة للطوائف في الانتخابات البرلمانية الأخيرة، مع أنها حرمت من حقها في تشكيل الحكومة نتيجة اتفاق أميركي - إيراني انضمت إليه تركيا في حينه وكفل بقاء المالكي رئيسًا للوزراء بعد فشله انتخابيًا أمام القائمة العراقية.

تشكِّل ساحات الاعتصام في عموم محافظات العراق ظاهرةً رمزيةً تشير إلى انتفاضة جزء من المجتمع العربي في العراق ضد محاولات تقزيمه وتهميشه وارتهان إرادته؛ وهي السياسة التي دأبت عليها حكومات ما بعد الاحتلال منذ عهد إبراهيم الجعفري وحتى حكومة المالكي الحالية. لذلك، يثير تحوّلها إلى رمزٍ قلقَ الأحزاب السياسية المسيطرة على السلطة، ليس بسبب رمزيتها فحسب، وإنما أيضًا بسبب كيفية تحوّل هذا الرمز إلى هدفٍ يسعى لتأكيد سيطرة أصحابه على قراراهم وخياراتهم في مناطق تزيد مساحتها على نصف مساحة العراق (تعد مساحة الأنبار وحدها أكثر من ثلث مساحة العراق كله).

من هنا تهدف عملية فض الاعتصامات إلى كسر الإرادة المتنامية لسكان هذه المناطق في ممارسة حقهم في المشاركة الحقيقية في إدارة شؤون بلدهم، ومنع إنتاج قيادة جديدة أقدر في التعبير عن تطلعاتهم، وإحياء دور الوجوه المهادنة من المكون السني أو إعادة إنتاجها والتي ارتضت العملية السياسية الحالية في مقابل مكاسب شخصية هزيلة، وهؤلاء هم من دعاهم رئيس الوزراء للتفاوض باعتبارهم "أهل الأنبار الحقيقيين".

ويجد المالكي في تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام "داعش" ظهيرًا كبيرًا في محاولاته تقسيم الصف العشائري في المنطقة؛ إذ شكّل دخول التنظيم في الأزمة ومحاولة استغلالها ضربةً كبيرةً للانتفاضة الشعبية في الأنبار، فضلًا عن أنّه يتيح للمالكي اتهام المنتفضين من أبناء المنطقة بالتعاطف مع القاعدة. تشكّل داعش مصدر بلبلة وتشويش وإحراج لنخب الانتفاضة وقاعدتها الشعبية على حد سواء؛ فهم يرفضون أن يكونوا في الخندق نفسه مع داعش من جهة، لكنهم - من جهة أخرى - يجدون أنفسهم وكأنهم يقاتلون في صفها بسبب إصرار المالكي على أخذ الامور في اتجاهات قصوى لا تترك مجالًا للتسوية.

نحو مزيد من التعقيد

على الرغم من أنّ رئيس الوزراء تمكّن بالتعاون مع بعض حلفائه في محافظة الأنبار من إخلاء ساحات الاعتصام، فإنّ الأزمة لا تبدو أنها في طريقها إلى الحلّ، بل إلى مزيد من التعقيد؛ إذ إنّ دخول "داعش" في الأزمة، وفي المدن تحديدًا، سيشكِّل مبررًا لحلفاء المالكي وفي مقدمتهم الحزب الإسلامي والصحوات السابقة لطلب النجدة من الحكومة، ما سينقل الأزمة من استقطابها الثنائي الراهن (أهالي الأنبار مقابل حكومة المالكي) إلى أزمة متعددة الأبعاد أطرافها: المالكي وحلفاؤه المحليون، وداعش، والمنتفضون، وعموم أهالي الأنبار الذين يتخوفون من انتقال القتال إلى داخل المدن. إنّ عودة المالكي عن قراره سحب الجيش، وإعادة زجه من جديد داخل المدن، وتدّخل داعش في الصراع الدائر بين الحكومة وأهالي الأنبار، يشكّل مزيجًا متفجرًا تزداد خطورته مع اقتراب موعد الانتخابات البرلمانية. لذلك، من المهم أن يقوم أهالي الأنبار بإخراج داعش من معادلة الصراع، وقطع الطريق على قيام المالكي باستغلال هذا الموضوع وترجمته إلى أصوات انتخابية داخليًا وإلى مزيدٍ من الدعم خارجيًا باعتباره يحارب الإرهاب.

إنّ نجاح انتفاضة الأنبار رهنٌ بتحقيق هذا الهدف من خلال إعادتها إلى مسارها الحقيقي المتمثل في مطالب المنتفضين المحقة في مواجهة عسف الحكومة وسياساتها الطائفية. بهذه السياسة فقط يمكن الحصول على تأييد ليس المحافظات المتعاطفة سلفًا فحسب، بل عموم المحافظات العراقية على اختلاف انتماءاتها المذهبية والعرقية.

وفي هذا السياق، يتعين ألا ينسى المنتفضون أنّ اللغة الطائفية والتقسيم المذهبي السياسي القائم اليوم في العراق هو نتيجة لسياسات الاحتلال، وأنه من الضرورة تجاوز هذه المصطلحات والعودة لإدراك أنّ شيعة العراق هم عرب وعراقيون، وأنه لا يجوز السماح بدفعهم نحو إيران. ويحتاج العراقيون في مسعاهم هذا إلى مساهمة عربية تمد خطوط التواصل مع سنة العراق وشيعته على حدٍ سواء.

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 [1]  خرجت تظاهرات في جنوب العراق ذي الأغلبية الشيعية في تموز/ يوليو 2013 تطالب المالكي بالتنحي عن الحكم، انظر: "حراك شعبي ومظاهرات جنوب العراق لليوم التاسع على التوالي رفعت شعارات تطالب بتنحي المالكي وعزل الشهرستاني"، الشرق الأوسط، 27/7/2013:

http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12660&article=737866#.Uskcbdyno3w

ومع ذلك، لم يحدث تلاق للحركتين الاحتجاجيتين أو انسجام بينهما.

[2] انظر: تفاصيل تصريحات باقر جبر صولاغ على:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=GJSnNwO4J0Y

A post-everything moment in the Mideast

 January 08, 2014 12:31 AM
By Rami G. Khouri

The Daily Star

"With daily car bombs, suicide bombers, assassinations, kidnappings, ethnic warfare and collapsing government control across the Middle East, we are moving into the post-everything moment of our modern history: post-colonial, post-nationalist, post-statehood, post-imperial, post-Islamist, post-revolutionary, post-developmental and post-modern. The immediate focus of most analysts is on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, where Salafist-takfiri militants, some allied with Al-Qaeda, control bits of territory and have clashed with others to expand their footholds. Constantly changing combinations of groups work together, coexist uneasily, coalesce into greater coalitions and “fronts,” or actively fight each other and ruling regimes. Leading examples include the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the Nusra Front, the Tawhid Brigade, the Army of Islam, the Islamic Front, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, the Free Syrian Army, the Mujahedeen Army and many others.

The chaotic situation reflects several different but simultaneous nationalist and state dynamics, as old orders fray (the Sykes-Picot frontiers, post-World War II secular and nationalist states, the post-1970 modern Arab security state) and new organizations and movements emerge that reflect older nonstate identities (religion, tribe, ethnicity).

In some places, such as Syria, Islamists and secular nationalists battle to overthrow the incumbent regime and establish a more pluralistic and democratic governance system, while some also fight each other. In others, such as Iraq, Libya or Yemen, tribal and Islamist forces challenge the government to redress oppressive government policies or try to take over the government. In yet others, militants such as ISIS aim to control territory and establish “emirates” where fundamentalist Islamist rules rule, while also battling everyone else – Arabs, Iranians, Turks, Israelis, Kurds and any available foreigners.

As these hard-line Islamist militants battle for control of towns in western Iraq and northern Syria, such as Fallujah, Aleppo and Raqqa, six major groups of main actors seem to dominate the scene: hard-line Salafists such as ISIS, others such as Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, Arab-backed mainstream Islamists such as the Islamic Front, the Free Syrian Army and its mostly non-Islamist allies, various Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria, and tribal forces across the Syrian-Iraqi desert regions.

Syria and Iraq are the most extreme but not the only examples of chronic conflicts in Arab countries, as we can also see in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and parts of Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Tunisia. The ordinary citizens who pay the price of conflict are mostly helpless to do anything in the face of tens of thousands of armed fighters, most of whom are supported by foreign governments or financiers. The role of regional or foreign powers that have often shaped the political configuration of the modern Middle East is a hotly debated issue today.

An intriguing front page article in the New York Times on Jan. 4, titled “Power Vacuum in Middle East Lifts Militants,” noted: “For all its echoes, the bloodshed that has engulfed Iraq, Lebanon and Syria in the past two weeks exposes something new and destabilizing: the emergence of a post-American Middle East in which no broker has the power, or the will, to contain the region’s sectarian hatreds.”

I was startled by this presumptuous attitude that exploding sectarian hatreds would worsen in a post-American Middle East, because my own impression from living through the last 45 years of American involvement in the region is precisely the opposite: that American foreign policies contributed deeply to the injustices and distortions that led to the destabilizing emergence of regional sectarian tensions, religious extremism and widespread citizen discontent. These sentiments manifest themselves today in different forms, including ISIS and similar militancy, popular revolutions to overthrow dictatorial regimes, and the patient writing of new constitutions and civil codes in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.

The deadly combination of Washington’s decades of strong support for Arab dictators and its profound pro-Israeli bias combined with the criminal and incompetent legacy of Arab autocrats to create a situation from the 1960s to the 1990s that gnawed away at the foundations and integrity of modern Arab statehood. The Anglo-American assault on Iraq and the wiping away of its state structures created an environment that allowed the birth or spread of contemporary Islamist extremists such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and then ISIS. However, Washington is not the only miscreant; for instance Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 helped spark the birth of Al-Qaeda in the first place.

Today’s mayhem and chaos in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon result from many causes, including the impact of criminal American and British policies in Iraq in 2003 and beyond. These policies have persisted in the form of American drone assassinations that have killed Islamist fighters and many civilians, but have simultaneously led to the mobilization of many, many more militants.

It’s bad enough to have chaos, confusion and criminality in Arab political movements. We should try to avoid these things in serious journalistic analyses of the facts of history."

Al-Maliki's divisive leadership has opened a window for al-Qaida in Iraq

Discontent has been building steadily over the past two years among Sunni Arabs who feel excluded and voiceless. The solution is political, not military

• Fawaz Gerges
• theguardian.com, Wednesday 8 January 2014

"After the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Isis), the group once commonly known as al-Qaida in Iraq, seized control of Falluja in Sunni-dominated Anbar province, the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, urged residents of the city to expel the "terrorists" from their midst. He warned that only this could save their neighbourhoods from all-out battles between militants and government forces. Al-Maliki's appeal seems not only to have fallen on deaf ears but some tribal militias reportedly defected and fought alongside Isis, thus frustrating the government's efforts to retake Falluja.

This failure is hardly surprising given that al-Maliki's authoritarian ways, heavy-handed tactics against the opposition and lack of foresight has alienated a significant segment of Sunni opinion. Twice last year, al-Maliki ordered his security forces to storm Sunni sit-in protests in Anbar, which caused the death of scores of activists and angered the local population.

The spark that ignited the current confrontation was the dismantling of a protest camp last week in Ramadi, Anbar's capital (which al-Maliki called the "headquarters for al-Qaida") and the arrest of a prominent Sunni member of parliament, which further exacerbated tensions between tribal leaders and his Shia-dominated government.

Al-Maliki's critics accuse him of monopolising power and using the al-Qaida label and anti-terrorism laws to crush his political opponents. They point to the government's arrest warrant for the Sunni vice-president, Tariq al-Hashimi, on terrorism charges as a case in point.

Instead of practicing inclusive and transparent governance, al-Maliki relies mainly on sectarian support and ignores calls by the Sunni community and socially disadvantaged groups for equitable political representation and power-sharing. Discontent has been building steadily over the past two years among Sunni Arabs who feel excluded and voiceless.

Al-Qaida, a social parasite that feeds on instability and polarisation, has recently found in Anbar what the al-Qaida leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls hadenah shabiyaa, a refuge, complete with willing Sunni recruits. With its new label, Isis, and having learnt from its past blunders, al-Qaida has positioned itself as a vanguard defending the persecuted Sunni community against the Shia-led government in Baghdad.

When US military forces withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011, al-Qaida-linked militants numbered in the low hundreds. Now several thousand Sunnis fight under its banner. There is no mystery about the resurgence of al-Qaida in Iraq, an alarming development that stems from a severe and deepening political crisis, sectarian polarisation and geostrategic rivalries.

Years after they occupied Iraq and faced a mounting insurgency spearheaded by al-Qaida, the Americans learned the hard way that the most effective means of cutting their losses was to co-opt the local population, particularly the tribes, and to turn them against al-Qaida.

From 2007 to 2011 it was the so-called Sunni awakening councils or Sons of Iraq – not George W Bush's "surge" as the received wisdom in the US has it – that made Anbar relatively secure and forced al-Qaida insurgents out of their neighbourhoods.

This important lesson has been lost on al-Maliki, whose short-sighted policies have polarised the country further along sectarian, social and ideological lines, creating an opening, a small space, for al-Qaida. My conversations with Sunnis convince me that the community is not receptive to extremist ideas of the al-Qaida variety and looks towards Baghdad, the centre, for resources and leadership.

Iraq's crisis is essentially political – revolving around power and distribution of resources – and could be resolved if the ruling elite have the will and wisdom to compromise, both of which have been in short supply.

The war in Syria has poured gasoline on a raging fire in Iraq, and conflicts in both countries feed upon one another and further complicate an already complex struggle. Al-Qaida in Iraq founded both the al-Nusra Front and Isis in Syria. Hundreds of Shia Iraqis have travelled to Syria to fight on the side of the Assad regime. Now the reverberations of the Syrian war are being felt on Arab streets, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, and are aggravating Sunni-Shia tensions across the Arab Middle East.

Sectarianism is poisoning the veins of Arab and Muslim societies and threatening to tear apart their social fabric. It is no wonder then that al-Qaida-linked militants have recently gained strength in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon.

However, the sectarian faultline masks a bigger geostrategic struggle between Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, a struggle that is playing out in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon. The two rival powers vie for mastery in the Gulf and the Levant.

Al-Maliki is said to be mobilising the army to retake Falluja, a battle that could have major regional consequences that transcend Iraq. The US fought two fierce and costly battles in Falluja in 2004 and lost almost 200 soldiers without pacifying the rebellious city. It was only when the Americans co-opted civil society and the tribes that al-Qaida's fortunes declined, a lesson that the Obama administration should impress on al-Maliki as the administration rushes Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, reconnaissance drones and other advanced arms to the Baghdad government."

Messing up in Syria

A tale of two foreign policies

By Brian Whitaker

"How should we judge a country's foreign policy?" Stephen Walt asked in an article earlier this week. "How do we decide whether it is smart, foolish, shrewd, lucky, successful, or disastrous?"

Answering these questions is less straightforward than it might seem. Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard university, continued:

"We cannot judge foreign policy performance solely looking by whether specific goals were achieved or not. Good fortune sometimes rescues poor judgment or inept implementation; at other moments, a well-intentioned and well-planned initiative goes badly. Even the wisest and most far-sighted leaders sometimes fail, and fools sometimes get lucky.

"We also have to take the 'degree of difficulty' into account. Leaders facing grave challenges may work very hard, pay a big price and accomplish relatively little, but we might still judge them to have performed well in difficult circumstances."

"Difficult circumstances" is certainly phrase that policymakers could apply to Syria. Among the two chief foreign protagonists, the Obama administration has often been accused of dithering and indecisiveness. Russia, on the other hand, may appear obstinate and obstructive but has also enjoyed some diplomatic success in the wake of the chemical weapons crisis.

The United States is now little more than a bystander in the Syrian conflict. Despite all the military might at its disposal and the political influence that it wields in many parts of the world, it has found itself relatively powerless when it comes to shaping events in this war-torn country.

In an article for Politico last week, Michael Weiss wrote:

"It’s hard to pinpoint just when, exactly, Barack Obama’s Syria policy fell apart. Was it in December, when Islamists humiliated US-backed rebels by seizing what limited supplies America had given them? Was it back in September, when Obama telegraphed his reluctance to enforce his own 'red line' after the Syrian regime used chemical weapons on its own people? Was it in the months beforehand, when the administration quietly and mysteriously failed to make good on its pledge to directly arm the rebels? Or did it collapse in August 2011, when Obama called on Syrian dictator Bashar Assad to go, only to do almost nothing to make it happen?"

The scale of the Syrian tragedy is truly appalling. Since the conflict began an estimated 130,000 people have died and around 40% of the population have been driven from their homes. It's true, in a sense, that Obama has allowed this to happen but he cannot really be held responsible.

When the conflict broke out, as far as US policy was concerned, there were no good options. It was a matter of choosing the least undesirable course, and that is still the situation today. For all the criticisms of Obama's policy on Syria, no one has yet come up with an alternative that would have been indisputably (or even very probably) better.

To some extent, Obama is being blamed for not behaving towards Syria as George Bush behaved towards Iraq – and we all know where that led. There are still too many Americans who find it difficult to accept that the power of the United States has limitations and who view every problem, no matter where it occurs, as one that the US has an obligation to try and solve – even at the risk of making things worse.

While it's inevitable and also healthy that Obama's Syria policy should be dissected and debated in the media, Russia's policy – unfortunately – has not faced a similar degree of public scrutiny.

Syria is the last Arab country where Russia still has significant influence – a throwback to the Soviet era. Russia also has economic interests in Syria through arms sales and investments, and a small naval facility at Tartus on the Mediterranean coast. The latter is the only one outside the former Soviet bloc and its importance is probably more symbolic than military.

Besides that, Russia has its own concerns about jihadists, especially in the Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya, etc), and the possible knock-on effects from conflict in Syria.

But the main impetus behind Russia's Syria policy is a desire to frustrate western efforts, largely as a result of Nato's earlier intervention against the Gadafy regime in Libya. At that level its policy might be considered a succes, at least in the short term, because nothing can happen at the UN regarding Syria without Russia's assent.

As the conflict drags on, though, Russia's policy is looking increasingly problematic. It was based on the assumption that Assad would succeed in clinging to power. He has done so after a fashion but still seems incapable of defeating the rebels.

Although Russia continues to advocate a political solution, on the ground the main effect of its obduracy has been to prolong the conflict, thus increasing the cost of Russian support for the Assad regime and intensifying rather than reducing the jihadist problem. In terms of achieving Russia's goals, this has been counterproductive.

More widely, this has also damaged perceptions of Russia in the Middle East. Mikko Patokallio and Juha Saarinen write:

"By being seen as a defender of autocrats and as a cynical great power, Russia has clearly cast itself on the wrong side of the Arab Spring. Support for Assad and Gaddafi guarantees that new governments in their respective countries will not look to Moscow for assistance. Russia’s unyielding stance on Syria also damages relations with those Arab states that have urged Assad to leave, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia."

Most of the difficulties that Russia now faces could have been avoided had it not tied itself so closely to Assad's presidency. This has severely limited its room for manoeuvre and hampered efforts towards the political solution that Russia says it wants.  "