Do you support a multi-year truce between Hamas and Israel (irrespective of the accuracy of the news about negotiations for a truce of this kind) in return for ending the Gaza siege and opening a sea port?
So far, 80% have voted yes.
Saturday, June 20, 2015
Current Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Online Poll
Do you support a multi-year truce between Hamas and Israel (irrespective of the accuracy of the news about negotiations for a truce of this kind) in return for ending the Gaza siege and opening a sea port?
So far, 80% have voted yes.
From Azmi Bishara's Facebook Page
Link
ثمة مراحل تاريخية تُمتَحن فيها القيادة السياسية بموحب قدرتها على المساومة وإيجاد حلول وسط، والتوصل إلى التسويات التي تحفظ البلاد والعباد والأوطان، وتهيّء سبل التغيير التدريجي السلمي.
منذ وردت أخبار تعثر المفاوضات بين اللبييين، وتلك الدائرة بين اليمنيين في جنيف وأنا أحاول أن أتذكر متى اتفق مندوبون عن أطراف متصارعة في دولة عربية على حل وسط، متى نجحوا في التفاوض وفي المساومة لحقن الدماء وحفظ الأوطان، ولكي يتمكنوا من إجراء التغيير بالطرف السلمية بحيث تقبل نخبة سياسية نخبة اخرى تختلف معها، ويحددون سوية شكل السلطة، ويشاركون فيها أو يتداولونها سلميا.
متى حصل ذلك آخر مرة؟ لا أذكر للأسف. آه...ربما في تونس. ولكن لا أذكر مثالا آخر.
متى حصل ذلك آخر مرة؟ لا أذكر للأسف. آه...ربما في تونس. ولكن لا أذكر مثالا آخر.
ثمة مراحل تاريخية تُمتَحن فيها القيادة السياسية بموحب قدرتها على المساومة وإيجاد حلول وسط، والتوصل إلى التسويات التي تحفظ البلاد والعباد والأوطان، وتهيّء سبل التغيير التدريجي السلمي.
عزمي بشارة
Friday, June 19, 2015
Sisi to Lebanese: Prepare for fall of Assad
BEIRUT: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi reportedly advised a visiting Lebanese delegation to brace themselves for the imminent fall of Syrian President Bashar Assad, Al-Mustaqbal newspaper reported Friday.
“Be ready for the fall of Assad,” an anonymous member of the delegation quoted Sisi as saying.
The Egyptian president warned “of dramatic developments that could suddenly hit Syria,” saying that the regime is in “bad shape” as evidenced by the latest military developments on the ground, the Lebanese daily reported.
Sisi acknowledged that any dramatic shift in Syria resulting from Assad’s removal from power could lead to further pressure on Lebanon, especially with regards to a potential increase in the number of Syrian refugees fleeing the neighboring conflict.
“Therefore, Lebanon should endeavor to fortify itself and start anticipating how it would deal with such a possibility,” the source quoted Sisi as saying.
Prime Minister Tammam Salam launched a series of meetings with top officials in Cairo Wednesday, including his Egyptian counterpart Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab and Sisi, as part of his one day visit to the country.
Salam’s talks with Sisi covered developments in the region, including the war in Syria and helping Lebanon cope with its repercussions, particularly the presence of more than a million Syrian refugees, the state-run National News Agency reported.
During the meeting with Salam, which was also attended by Mahlab, Sisi stressed Egypt’s position, which advocates a political solution to the Syrian crisis with the priority of preserving the Syrian state, the NNA said.
The report added that the talks also touched on the Lebanese presidential election crisis, with Sisi again calling for the election of a president as soon as possible in order to achieve stability in Lebanon.
خفايا الحياة الأسطورية لخامنئي: يسيطر على النفط والغاز ويمتلك أكثر الأسهم في شركات الأرز والسكر وفريق حمايته من 700 حارس المرشد الأعلى للثورة الإيرانية لديه ملجأ نووي ويستخدم قصور الشاه
خفايا الحياة الأسطورية لخامنئي: يسيطر على النفط والغاز ويمتلك أكثر الأسهم في شركات الأرز والسكر وفريق حمايته من 700 حارس
المرشد الأعلى للثورة الإيرانية لديه ملجأ نووي ويستخدم قصور الشاه
لندن ـ «القدس العربي»: في الجزء الثاني من الفيلم الوثائقي للمخرج الإيراني المنفي، محسن مخملباف، عن الحياة المترفة التي يعيشها المرشد الأعلى للثورة الإيرانية علي خامنئي، أظهر معلومات حول حراسة خامنئي من مئات العسكريين المختارين بعناية، وتخصيص عدد من الطائرات التجارية لنقلهم معه في أسفاره الداخلية، وكذلك عن تجاراته وسيطرته على الأسواق في بلاده من النفط وحتى تجارة الأرز.
وجاء في الفيلم الذي نشره موقع «جنوبية» اللبناني المعارض لحزب الله، أن تعداد فريق حماية خامنئي يبلغ عشرة آلاف شخص، من بينهم اثنان فقط (دين شعاري وحسين جباري) يعملان في خدمته منذ حوالى ثلاثين سنة، وهذان الحارسان الشخصيان (شعاري وجباري)، يحق لهما الدخول إلى غرفته الخاصة، وحراستها ليلا نهارا، والاقتراب منه، وهما مسلحان، أما الباقون فلا، وفق ما عرضه الفيلم.
وعدا الحارسين الآنفي الذكر، هناك 700 حارس وهم «حراس الحلقة الضيقة» أو الأولى، وينقسمون إلى فئتين: الحراس المقربون أو الفدائيون ويبلغ عددهم 200 شخص، يرافقون خامنئي في رحلاته وسفراته ويعيشون في محيط قصره في بيوت وقصور فخمة. يخضع الحراس المقربون لنظام حياة صارم، يتحكم بمشاعرهم وعلاقاتهم مع محيطهم وحتى ارتباطاتهم العاطفية، ومن غير المسموح لأحدهم ان يتزوج من بنات موظفين عاديين في الدولة، بل يجب أن يختاروا زوجاتهم من الأسر السياسية العريقة أو من الأسر الروحية المعروفة.
يبلغ عدد الحراس في هذه الفئة 500 شخص، وهم مولجون بحماية 40 شخصا من عائلة خامنئي، بدءا من زوجته وعائلتها، وبناته وأزواجهم وأبنائه وزوجاتهم، وصولا إلى الأحفاد وأخوالهم وأعمامهم. ويتم اختيار هذه الفئة من الحراس، بعد مرورهم على ثلاثة أجهزة أمنية، وقد يستغرق حصول أحدهم على الموافقة على هذه المكرمة سنوات طويلة.
طبيب خامنئي الخاص هو الدكتور مرندي وزير الصحة السابق، وهو منسقه الصحي إذا جاز التعبير، أي هو الذي يختار له الأطباء لمعاينته وفق ما تقتضيه حالته المرضية.
یوجد أسفل القصر الذي يسكنه خامنئي في شمال طهران، مستشفى كامل التجهيز، يشرف عليه أربعة أطباء مختصين على مدار 24 ساعة، وترافقه في رحلاته البرية سيارة إسعاف ضخمة عبارة عن مستشفى صغير نقال، مجهز بأحدث الأجهزة للحالات الطارئة، وتحوي غرفة عمليات للرحلات الجوية، وجهز خامنئي طائرته الخاصة بما لا يقل أهمية وتطورا عن المستشفى البري عدا أنها تحوي غرفتي عمليات حديثة.
يمضي خامنئي عطلته الشتوية في القصر الذي شيده في منطقة وكيل آباد في مدينة مشهد، أما في عطلة عيد النوروز (آذار) فيتوجه إلى محافظة خوزستان، حيث يمضي عطلته في قصر يقع في محيط قاعدة مدينة دزفول الجوية. ودزفول هي إحدى المدن التي تعرضت للتدمير الكامل إبان الحرب العراقية الإيرانية، وما زالت تعيش حتى الآن على وعود إعادة الإعمار، كما أنها أحد مواطن القومية البختيارية المعارضة، أما في الصيف فيمضي خامنئي شهرا كاملا متنقلا ما بين مدن زيبا كنار، ساري، رامسر وبيشه كنارو في شمال إيران، وفي عطل نهاية الأسبوع التي تصادف يومي الخميس والجمعة في الجمهورية الإسلامية، يختار لتمضيتها وعائلته أحد قصور الشاه في طهران، فإما أن يقصد قصر نياواران أو قصر جمشيدية أو قصر لواسانات. مع العلم أن هذه القصور قد صودرت في بداية الثورة، وتحولت إلى متاحف يؤمها السائحون من كل أصقاع العالم، إلا أن الثورة عادت وأغلقت عددا من أجنحتها بوجه الزوار، وذلك للاستعمال الثوري.
عندما يكون خامنئي على سفر، يظل على تماس مع مساعديه، وقد خصص طائرة تقل إليه يوميا من يرسل في طلبه أينما كان، كما يرتفع عدد حراسه، فينقل معه حوالى 1200 حارس، من بينهم فئة الحراس المقربين كلهم، حيث ينتشرون في المنطقة التي يقيم فيها، ويتوزعون على نقاط وأبراج مراقبة طيلة مدة إقامته وعلى مدى 24 ساعة. كما خصص خامنئي للرحلات البرية (كارافان) ضد الرصاص بالطبع، مجهزا بغرفتي نوم، وحمامين، ومطبخ صغير.
يستخدم خامنئي كل قصور الشاه التي حولتها الثورة إلى متاحف، لا بل أضاف إليها أجنحة خاصة لا تقل بذخا عما بناه الشاه. وهو يستعمل كل الأدوات الموجودة فيها خصوصا ملاعق الذهب والأواني الفضية وأكواب الكريستال.
يقع منزل خامنئي الرسمي في شارع باستور في قلب طهران، وقد بنى أسفله ملجأ بعمق 60 مترا، زوده بسقف وجدران عازلة للسلاح النووي، وقد بلغت كلفة مصاعده فقط 5 ملايين دولار، وكذلك الحال في قصر وكيل آباد في مدينة مشهد.
يملك خامنئي طائرة ايرباص خصوصية يسافر على متنها وحده، أما عائلته فقد خصص لها طائرة بوينغ 707 ومثلها للحراس، ويملك أيضا خمس طائرات هليكوبتر من نوع فالكون، يبلغ ثمن كل واحدة منها 400 ألف دولار، وحين تحلق إحدى طائراته الخاصة في سماء طهران تتوقف حركة الطيران في مطاراتها. إضافة إلى أسطول الطائرات، يملك خامنئي أسطولا من السيارات، ولديه 17 سيارة ضد الرصاص، و1200 سيارة حديثة.
يسيطر خامنئي بشكل كامل على قطاعي النفط والغاز في إيران، ويحتكر قطاع التسليح العسكري من روسيا والصين حصرا، ويمتلك أكثر الأسهم في شركات تصدير الأرز وشركات استيراد السكر، وشركة «بي أم دبليو»، وشركات انتاج القند على الصعيد المحلي، ويملك عقود استثمار تجارية باسم العتبة الرضوية المقدسة في كل من: دبي، ألمانيا، العراق، أفريقيا الجنوبية، فنزويلا، لبنان والصين.
والمعروف عن خامنئي أنه قليلا ما يغير معاونيه التجاريين، ويبخل في ضخ دماء جديدة في عروق شركاته منعا من توسع دائرة المطلعين على ثروته وأرباحه. في الثلاثين سنة الماضية وصلت مبيعات إيران من النفط إلى ما يناهز 700 مليار دولار، كان لخامنئي منها حصة الأسد من أرباحها، علما أن شقيقه حسن خامنئي يعمل في وزارة النفط كمراقب أرباح.
New Barrage of Barrel Bombs on Health Facilities in Syria
Link
Busra Hospital was the only health facility providing neonatal and dialysis services in Dara’a and will now be closed indefinitely because of the severity of the bombing damage.
“They targeted the building at about 11:00 p.m. with four barrels that broke doors and windows,” said one of the doctors at the hospital. “When we arrived we heard the helicopters still flying around and we evacuated the medical team and the patients. After an hour, they dropped six more bombs that destroyed half the medical equipment and seriously damaged the building.”
The aggression followed another attack on June 10 on a hospital supported by MSF in Aleppo Governorate in northern Syria. A barrel bomb exploded just outside the medical center, damaging medical equipment, the pharmacy, and all the windows and doors. The hospital's post-operative room is out of service.
“Once again, we call on the warring parties to respect civilians, health facilities, and medical staff, according to international humanitarian law,” said Carlos Francisco, MSF head of mission for Syria. “These new attacks on medical infrastructures are unacceptable.”
The intensity and frequency of attacks against medical facilities in Aleppo is increasing. MSF has received reports of attacks on nine health structures since May 2015. Among them, six hospitals were hit, representing 40 percent of the hospitals currently operating in East Aleppo.
''Hospitals are the main target, but recently, ambulances have also been attacked with missiles," said one of the doctors working at the MSF-supported hospital in Aleppo.
The attack in Aleppo was the third suffered by the hospital over the past year, and was the heaviest and most damaging, according to hospital staff.
''The medical team was in the hospital and one of the doctors was injured,” said one of the doctors. “The staff keeps working, even after this attack. It is normal to feel fear, but we are committed to continuing our work. As medical staff in Aleppo, we feel disappointed because the world is watching us without intervening to protect us. We need protection from these attacks. The situation is very hard and painful.”
Barrel bomb attacks in Aleppo have damaged and destroyed medical equipment, drug warehouses, and generators, temporarily and permanently closing health facilities and reducing healthcare options. Medical personnel are fleeing and many drugs are not available.
''There is a lack of medical human resources because the majority of doctors are going to the countryside or to Turkey, said Francisco. “If attacks continue, I expect most medical staff will leave.”
MSF operates seven medical facilities inside Syria and directly supports more than 100 clinics, health posts, and field hospitals. MSF is also working with patients from Syria who have fled to Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
EU: Rights Abuses at Home Drive Mediterranean Crisis
Migrants Detail Horrors That Caused Them to Flee
Link
(Brussels) – Human rights abuses in their home countries are the driving force behind the surge in boat migration in the Mediterranean to reach Europe, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.EU leaders should put human rights at the heart of its response. EU leaders will meet on June 25 and 26, 2015, to discuss European Commission proposals toward a “European Migration Agenda.”
The 33-page report, “The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do,” documents the human rights abuses driving people to make the dangerous sea crossing and the shortcomings of EU migration and asylum policies. The report is based on over 150 interviews in May with recently-arrived migrants and asylum seekers in Italy – Lampedusa, Catania, and Milan – and Greece – the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos. The conclusions are also based on extensive Human Rights Watch research in Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, andSomalia – the home countries of many of those arriving by sea.
“The majority of those crossing the Mediterranean are taking terrible risks because they have to, not because they want to,” said Judith Sunderland, senior Western Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch and author of the report. “Saving lives and increasing safe pathways into Europe should be the EU’s priorities, while ensuring that all cooperation with countries of origin and transit countries respects international human rights standards.”
Interactive Map (Click to Launch): Migration journeys to the European Union
Over 100,000 migrants and asylum seekers have crossed the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2015. According to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, over 60 percent of those taking the journey come from Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan, countries torn apart by war and generalized political violence, or from Eritrea, which is ruled by a highly repressive government. Asylum seekers, including children, from these four countries who arrived in Italy and Greece in May described to Human Rights Watch the indiscriminate fighting, threats from insurgent groups such as the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and ISIS, forced conscription and recruitment by armed groups, attacks on schools, and other abuses that forced them to flee.
Mubarek, from Parwan, in northern Afghanistan, left the country with his wife and three young sons in March to escape the Taliban. “Every day the Taliban would take people and children for suicide bombings,” he said. “I was worried about my children, my sons, that they would be forced to become suicide bombers.”
While many of those coming from other countries – Nigeria, The Gambia, Senegal, Mali – want to improve their economic opportunities or to live in more open and safe societies, some among them may be fleeing persecution or other serious harm. Some migrants who have lived in Libya since before the current hostilities broke out in May 2014, are fleeing insecurity and violence there.
Every year thousands of unaccompanied children make the journey across the Mediterranean without parents or other caregivers. In 2014, over 10,500 children traveled alone to Italy by sea. In Greece, over 1,100 unaccompanied children were registered in 2014.
The International Organization for Migration has identified the Mediterranean as the world’s deadliest migration route. The EU has recently taken some positive steps to save lives in the Mediterranean, but it remains focused primarily on ways to limit arrivals to European shores. But the severe human rights situations that people are fleeing shows why the EU’s priorities need to change, Human Rights Watch said.
The EU should maintain robust search and rescue operations as long as they are necessary, Human Rights Watch said. It should significantly increase the number of people resettled in the EU under UNHCR programs from the 20,000 proposed by the European Commission. EU countries should endorse and fully carry out the commission’s proposal to relocate 40,000 asylum seekers within the EU to share responsibility for asylum seekers more equitably across the EU.
UNCHR has asked the international community to resettle at least 130,000 Syrian refugees. The EU has pledged to resettle 45,000 but can respond more generously to the Syrian crisis as well as to other protracted refugee crises, Human Rights Watch said.
The deaths of over 1,000 migrants at sea within a week in April spurred positive, if belated, EU action to step up search and rescue efforts in the central Mediterranean. The EU should sustain this collective effort in the long term to minimize deaths at sea, and ensure that those rescued are brought to safe EU ports where those seeking asylum will have the opportunity for fair consideration of their claims, Human Rights Watch said.
In May the European Commission issued proposals for a “European Agenda on Migration.” The agenda includes some positive steps that if implemented fully – and more generously – could help save lives, ensure safer access to international protection in the EU, and correct distortions in the EU’s asylum system that affect the rights of asylum seekers, Human Rights Watch said. However, most of the commission’s agenda involves reinforcing measures to limit arrivals to the EU.
EU respect for international law and human rights norms should inform and shape its current and future deliberations on migration and asylum policies as well as its approach to boat migration in the Mediterranean, Human Rights Watch said. The right to life and protection against refoulement – the return to persecution, torture, or ill-treatment – are cornerstone rights of international human rights architecture. In addition to these rights, the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the rights to liberty and security, the right to an effective remedy, and the right to privacy and family life. Enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to leave any country, including one’s own, is key to ensuring the right to seek asylum. This is also guaranteed in the EU’s binding Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In advance of the EU Council on June 25-26, Human Rights Watch said, EU leaders should support farther-reaching proposals to increase safe and legal channels into the EU. These measures should include significantly expanding resettlement for refugees identified by the UNHCR, facilitated family reunification to enable people already in the EU to bring family members there, and the increased use of humanitarian visas to enable people in need of international protection to travel lawfully to the EU to apply for asylum.
Over the long term, the EU should ensure that cooperation with sending and transit countries does not effectively trap people in abusive situations, prevent them from accessing fair asylum procedures, or lead to refoulement. And the EU should use its influence and resources more effectively to address the major drivers of migration, including systematic human rights violations, poverty, inequitable development, weak governance, and violent conflict and lawlessness.
“There are no easy solutions to the terrible abuse and hardship that force people to leave their countries or the cruelty they face on the journeys,” Sunderland said. “This is a difficult challenge for the EU but one where human rights must take center stage.”
Link
(Brussels) – Human rights abuses in their home countries are the driving force behind the surge in boat migration in the Mediterranean to reach Europe, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.EU leaders should put human rights at the heart of its response. EU leaders will meet on June 25 and 26, 2015, to discuss European Commission proposals toward a “European Migration Agenda.”
The 33-page report, “The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do,” documents the human rights abuses driving people to make the dangerous sea crossing and the shortcomings of EU migration and asylum policies. The report is based on over 150 interviews in May with recently-arrived migrants and asylum seekers in Italy – Lampedusa, Catania, and Milan – and Greece – the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos. The conclusions are also based on extensive Human Rights Watch research in Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, andSomalia – the home countries of many of those arriving by sea.
“The majority of those crossing the Mediterranean are taking terrible risks because they have to, not because they want to,” said Judith Sunderland, senior Western Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch and author of the report. “Saving lives and increasing safe pathways into Europe should be the EU’s priorities, while ensuring that all cooperation with countries of origin and transit countries respects international human rights standards.”
Interactive Map (Click to Launch): Migration journeys to the European Union
Over 100,000 migrants and asylum seekers have crossed the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2015. According to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, over 60 percent of those taking the journey come from Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan, countries torn apart by war and generalized political violence, or from Eritrea, which is ruled by a highly repressive government. Asylum seekers, including children, from these four countries who arrived in Italy and Greece in May described to Human Rights Watch the indiscriminate fighting, threats from insurgent groups such as the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and ISIS, forced conscription and recruitment by armed groups, attacks on schools, and other abuses that forced them to flee.
Mubarek, from Parwan, in northern Afghanistan, left the country with his wife and three young sons in March to escape the Taliban. “Every day the Taliban would take people and children for suicide bombings,” he said. “I was worried about my children, my sons, that they would be forced to become suicide bombers.”
While many of those coming from other countries – Nigeria, The Gambia, Senegal, Mali – want to improve their economic opportunities or to live in more open and safe societies, some among them may be fleeing persecution or other serious harm. Some migrants who have lived in Libya since before the current hostilities broke out in May 2014, are fleeing insecurity and violence there.
Every year thousands of unaccompanied children make the journey across the Mediterranean without parents or other caregivers. In 2014, over 10,500 children traveled alone to Italy by sea. In Greece, over 1,100 unaccompanied children were registered in 2014.
The International Organization for Migration has identified the Mediterranean as the world’s deadliest migration route. The EU has recently taken some positive steps to save lives in the Mediterranean, but it remains focused primarily on ways to limit arrivals to European shores. But the severe human rights situations that people are fleeing shows why the EU’s priorities need to change, Human Rights Watch said.
The EU should maintain robust search and rescue operations as long as they are necessary, Human Rights Watch said. It should significantly increase the number of people resettled in the EU under UNHCR programs from the 20,000 proposed by the European Commission. EU countries should endorse and fully carry out the commission’s proposal to relocate 40,000 asylum seekers within the EU to share responsibility for asylum seekers more equitably across the EU.
UNCHR has asked the international community to resettle at least 130,000 Syrian refugees. The EU has pledged to resettle 45,000 but can respond more generously to the Syrian crisis as well as to other protracted refugee crises, Human Rights Watch said.
The deaths of over 1,000 migrants at sea within a week in April spurred positive, if belated, EU action to step up search and rescue efforts in the central Mediterranean. The EU should sustain this collective effort in the long term to minimize deaths at sea, and ensure that those rescued are brought to safe EU ports where those seeking asylum will have the opportunity for fair consideration of their claims, Human Rights Watch said.
In May the European Commission issued proposals for a “European Agenda on Migration.” The agenda includes some positive steps that if implemented fully – and more generously – could help save lives, ensure safer access to international protection in the EU, and correct distortions in the EU’s asylum system that affect the rights of asylum seekers, Human Rights Watch said. However, most of the commission’s agenda involves reinforcing measures to limit arrivals to the EU.
EU respect for international law and human rights norms should inform and shape its current and future deliberations on migration and asylum policies as well as its approach to boat migration in the Mediterranean, Human Rights Watch said. The right to life and protection against refoulement – the return to persecution, torture, or ill-treatment – are cornerstone rights of international human rights architecture. In addition to these rights, the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees the rights to liberty and security, the right to an effective remedy, and the right to privacy and family life. Enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to leave any country, including one’s own, is key to ensuring the right to seek asylum. This is also guaranteed in the EU’s binding Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In advance of the EU Council on June 25-26, Human Rights Watch said, EU leaders should support farther-reaching proposals to increase safe and legal channels into the EU. These measures should include significantly expanding resettlement for refugees identified by the UNHCR, facilitated family reunification to enable people already in the EU to bring family members there, and the increased use of humanitarian visas to enable people in need of international protection to travel lawfully to the EU to apply for asylum.
Over the long term, the EU should ensure that cooperation with sending and transit countries does not effectively trap people in abusive situations, prevent them from accessing fair asylum procedures, or lead to refoulement. And the EU should use its influence and resources more effectively to address the major drivers of migration, including systematic human rights violations, poverty, inequitable development, weak governance, and violent conflict and lawlessness.
“There are no easy solutions to the terrible abuse and hardship that force people to leave their countries or the cruelty they face on the journeys,” Sunderland said. “This is a difficult challenge for the EU but one where human rights must take center stage.”
Egypt’s Destiny Between Four Political Forces and Four Dates
The Dialectics Between Revolution and Counterrevolution
by ESAM AL-AMIN
CounterPunch
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by ESAM AL-AMIN
CounterPunch
Link
Husam Al Sane’i, Tayseer Abu Sneima, and Ahmed Al Jaa’bari were three Palestinians from Gaza killed or assassinated by Israel between 2008 and 2012. The first was killed during Israel’s war on Gaza in late 2008, while the second was assassinated in 2009 after being accused of taking part in the abduction of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier who was held by Hamas for over five years until Israel agreed to release more than 1000 Palestinian prisoners in October 2011. The third was a senior commander in the military wing of Hamas and his assassination in 2012 ignited the war between the two archenemies in November of that year. Another Palestinian by the name of Hasan Salamah was sentenced in 1996 by Israel to 48 life sentences and has been imprisoned ever since, mostly in solitary confinement.
What these four Palestinians share in common is that they were sentenced to death this week by an Egyptian court on the charge that they helped free hundreds of people, including ousted President Mohammad Morsi, in a prison break outside Cairo on January 29, 2011, in the midst of Egypt’s popular uprising.
But the death sentences of these and seventy other Palestinians were just the sideshow to the main story, in which the same court sentenced 122 people to death, including Morsi, most of the senior leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the most senior cleric in the Sunni world, academics, activists, and even a young female student for being part of Morsi’s presidential team. This and other trialshave been widely condemned around the world. Amnesty International has called the trial a “charade” and “grossly unfair.” Consequently Egypt’s politicized judiciary has become the laughing stock of the world as it manifestly serves as the convenient tool of repression against the regime opponents ever since the July 2013 coup that ousted Morsi and thwarted Egypt’s path towards democracy. It is unlikely that Egypt’s judiciary did not know these facts. The judges just do not care as they try to re-impose the state of fear that engulfed Egyptian society before it was decimated with the toppling of Mubarak in February 2011.
There was none other Gen. Sami Anan who was the Army Chief of Staff at the time who refuted the essence of the fabricated charges when he said that he was unaware of any border breach by Hamas or Hizbollah operatives during these tumultuous days as claimed by government prosecutors in the political trial.
The gross human rights violations by the regime of coup leader Gen. Abdelfattah al-Sisi, have been well documented, including the killing of over five thousand people, injuring over twenty-seven thousand, the systematic use of rape, torture, kidnapping, and forced disappearancesas instruments to subjugate the Egyptian people (similar to the los desaparecidos that took place against dissidents during the rule of the junta in Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s), and the imprisonment of over forty-one thousand of its opponents. Yet despite the harsh sentences and brutal measures employed over the past two years, the military-backed government and its counterrevolutionary supporters have not been able to hold firm control of the streets or enforce stability. The army has been battling militant groups in Sinai and losing soldiers every week. The security forces have aimlessly been lashing out and cracking down on all opposition groups and activists to the point of exhaustion. Economically, Egypt is on the verge of collapsedespite the infusion of over $50 billion in the past two years, primarily by the coup sponsors, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The country’s infrastructure is deteriorating, unemployment exploding, currency collapsing, inflation rising, and the misery index being among the highest in the world. The tourism industry is devastated and the country is virtually bankrupt as its foreign currency reserve is at $20 billion, with a total of only $6B not owned by foreign governments, including $3B in non-convertible gold assets. Sisi’s government was recently forced to borrow $1.5B at the very high interest rate of 6.25 percent, even though the interest rate charged to banks has fluctuated for years between zero and 0.25 percent as set by the Federal Reserve. Every day the country has to borrow internally nearly one billion pounds ($130 million) just to cover its budget deficit, despite the drastic cut of most subsidies. The internal debt has surpassed 2 trillion pounds or $262 billion (96 percent of its GDP), while the external debt has reached $40 billion.
So why is the coup regime intent on following this path of self-destruction? To answer this question one has to understand the make-up of the current political landscape in the country.
Four Political Factions
The recent history of modern Egypt that started with the 1952 bloodless coup was marked by the rise of a state controlled by the army. The first four presidents were military officers (Naguib, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak.) Between the mid-1950s and 1970, Nasser dominated the scene and embarked on a neo-socialist discourse in order to redraw the political power structure in the country. Old political parties were banned and political life choked, as new political elites were born within an authoritarian state dominated by military officers. The 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel shook this new reality leading eventually to Sadat’s controlled opening that gave rise to plutocracy, a new class of political and economic elites dominated by unrestrained capitalism, corrupt businessmen, and retired military officers and their cronies. When Mubarak took over after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, he allowed the army to build its own economic empire and business enterprises in order to finance the lavish styles of its senior officers, ultimately becoming a direct competitor and threat to many businesses and conglomerates dominated by the country’s new economic elites. Meanwhile, Mubarak consolidated his power with the latter group especially when his son Gamal started in the late 1990s taking direct control of the state apparatus as he began to prepare himself to become Egypt’s next president. But these two factions, the military and thefulool (remnants of Mubarak’s regime as they came to be known after the 2011 uprising), were firmly under the grip of Mubarak during his reign, as he knew how to maneuver between them.
Meanwhile, street politics since the 1970s had gradually come under the influence of grassroots movements dominated by Islamist social movements led by the Muslim Brotherhood. But their expanding charitable networks and social work were tolerated by the regime because it supplemented the lack of services the government could not provide to the poor and lower middle class. By the turn of the century, there was a tacit understanding between these three factions. Each was aware of the other two, yet content with its sphere of power and influence: the military with its high social status and economic privileges, the plutocrats with their rising influence and control of state institutions, economy, and carefully managed political life, and the Islamists with their expansion and domination of the social networks, the mosques, and the streets.
With the advent of the satellite television networks and social media anew youth generation emerged that was fed up with the corrupt regime and unsatisfied with the agenda and cautious pragmatism of Islamist groups. These activists started organizing in groups such as the April 6 movement and took initiatives challenging the regime over its economic and social policies. Other independent opposition groups also organized themselves under the umbrella of the Kefaya (Enough) movement. With each challenge the group became bolder as many traditional opposition parties were either supporting them from behind the scenes or cheering them from the sidelines, including many Islamist movements. In fact, many youth members from the MB quietly joined these activities and some even started their own independent groups and became more vocal and daring. It was the collective efforts of these groups that ultimately sparked the January 25, 2011 popular uprising and toppled Mubarak. Even though the MB played a crucial and decisive role during the momentous days that led to Mubarak’s overthrow, its official entry into the revolutionary path against the regime was January 28, three days after the protests began in Tahrir Square.
Four Factions with Four Dates: Jan. 24, July 3, June 29, and Feb. 12
The unity of the revolutionary factions brilliantly displayed during the electrifying days of January and February 2011 gave way to recriminations and tension as soon as Egypt’s military took over from Mubarak. Two opposing positions about the way forward emerged, one favored by the Islamist bloc and the other by the revolutionary youth groups. The youth groups called for a revolutionary path that centered on writing a new constitution that would restructure the social contract between the state and its citizens. The Islamists favored a reformist agenda and endorsed an electoral path under the control of the military that they knew Islamists were destined to win. The former group accused the latter of cynically betraying the revolutionary goals and forming a tacit alliance with the military. During most of the transitional period under the direct rule of the military council, the revolutionary youth movements clashed with the state, while the MB called for calm as it won five electoral victories including the majority of seats in parliament as well as the presidency.
By the time Morsi became president in July 2012, the political maneuvering playbook became clear. Two out of the four factions would momentarily ally themselves and defeat a third, while the fourth would watch from the sidelines. In early 2011, the Islamists and the youth groups were allied against the fulool, while the military watched from the sidelines, since it considered it in its interest to halt the ascendency of Mubarak’s son, who did not come from its ranks. Soon after, the interests of the Islamists and the military were aligned as the former wanted to gain legitimacy through electoral wins while the latter wanted to maintain the status quo until it hatched a strategy to reverse the revolutionary momentum. When the interests of these two forces were aligned, the demands of the revolutionary youth were ignored and their ranks devastated as thousands were subjected to military trials while Islamists looked the other way. During this period, the fulool were watching from the sidelines, still licking their wounds from the fall of their chief benefactor. By the time the Islamists came to power in the summer of 2012, the fulool had regained their footing, emboldened by the 12 million votes Mubarak’s last prime minister, Gen. Ahmad Shafik, garnered in his losing presidential bid against Morsi.
Justifiably or not, by the end of 2012, the revolutionary youth groups felt betrayed by the MB and accused it of consolidating power to advance its political and social agenda. Meanwhile, the MB president bitterly complained that the revolutionary partners were abandoning him and allowing themselves to be manipulated by the counterrevolutionary groups. As the military, which was by then led by Gen. Sisi, and the state’s security apparatus observed closely from the sidelines, the positions were hardened and the mistrust grew between the former revolutionary partners. Because of inexperience, political naiveté, or miscalculation, the MB did not offer sufficient compromises to its former allies thinking that without the support of the army (which the MB erroneously believed was supporting it) the other groups could not impose their will.
Once the dust settled in the aftermath of the coup, it was wellestablished that Morsi was never allowed to govern, and that the revolutionary groups were easily manipulated by the deep state, while the fulool provided all the logistical and media support needed to topple the rule of the Islamists. But this time it was all three factions allied against one with devastating consequences. The country has been deeply polarized as the levels of hatred, mistrust, and anger reached unprecedented levels. All were easily played by the military that again presented itself in the person of Sisi as the country’s savior from instability and civil war. But despite the euphoria that came with the removal of the first democratically elected president, the revolutionary groups soon learned that the military does not share their lofty goals. In their zeal to end Morsi’s reign they betrayed their own long established principle of rejecting military rule. In a matter of months, all the major revolutionary youth leaders were either in prison, exiled, silenced or on the run.
Sisi became president in May 2014 in sham elections where he received over 96 percent of the vote. A year into his term has produced no majoraccomplishments and the tactical alliances have frayed as each faction was not only alienated from its ideological foe, but has also become wary of its own natural ideological ally. The fulool remain nervous because most major investment projects have been subsumed within the army’s mighty economic machine. Since it relies on practically free labor, pays no taxes, uses subsidized energy and skilled engineering workforce, and owns precious real estate, the military is nearly impossible to compete against economically. In less than one year, Sisi has seemingly made it his chief ambition to fulfill the saying that “Egypt is not a state that has an army, but an army that has a state.” Moreover, Sisi continued to demand hefty concessions and large contributions from wealthy businessmen without offering much in return. Politically, Sisi never fully trusted Mubarak’s former cronies and has not built his own political constituency. As a result, he keeps postponing the parliamentary elections fearing that the fulool would dominate it and restrain his autocratic rule.
For their part, the fulool found a new figurehead in Shafik, the losing candidate in the 2012 presidential race. After the election, he fled to the UAE for fear of being arrested on corruption charges. Even after the politicized judiciary acquitted or overturned all the convictions of Mubarak, his sons, and his cronies, including Shafik, he remained in exile knowing that Sisi was keen on not allowing him to play any political role, even though he established a party and vowed to lead it to parliamentary victory. This tension recently came to the fore as Shafik gave an interview in which he questioned Sisi’s legitimacy and vowed to challenge the 2012 elections results. In the interview Shafik allegedly said, “I know more than the intelligence services do. It’s better if everyone keeps his mouth shut so that I do too. No one can dare tell me not to run for parliament.” In turn, Sisi prevented the interview from airing in Egypt even after it was heavily promoted. Sisi furthermore declared during his recent trip to Germany, in a clear rebuff to Shafik, that there was no doubt that Morsi was the actual winner in the 2012 race but that the people had turned against him. Subsequently, Sisi sent his intelligence chief to appeal to the UAE rulers to restrain Shafik. Many political observers now believe that forces within the state allied with Shafik were most likely the source of the frequent audio leaks that exposed Sisi’s corrupt and incompetent rule during the past two years.
Meanwhile, the revolutionary ranks have also suffered from rancor and finger pointing. The revolutionary youth groups accuse the MB of turning its back on the revolution once it attained political power. The MB accuses these groups of facilitating the coup and justifying the restoration of military rule and return of the police state. It further contends that even if it committed mistakes while in government, the alliance with the counterrevolutionaries could never be justified. It points to the fact that since the coup it categorically refused to compromise with the military rule and has consequently suffered the most at the hands of the coup with thousands of its leaders, members, and supporters killed, injured or in exile, while its assets confiscated, and institutions and charities banned.
Each faction ventures to return Egypt to a certain date in the past. The fulool hope to return Egypt to January 24, 2011 and to restore their political and economic dominance. Their strength includes support from a significant segment of the deep state, much of Mubarak’s corrupt yet experienced political machinery, as well as many business oligarchs and tycoons with their media empires that played a crucial role in alienating the public from Morsi and the MB, but is now willing to graduallycriticize Sisi. This group apparently has had the tacit support of the UAE, which was recently beseeched by Sisi to silence Shafik. Within days, Shafik stepped down as head of his newly established party, called the Egyptian Patriotic Movement, but vowed to remain vocal.
The military, led by Sisi and a close circle around him, hail July 3, 2013, the day Morsi was ousted and detained, and the start of their ascendency to power, as the beginning of a new dawn in Egypt. Sisi loves to remind people that he had to remove Morsi in order to prevent a civil war even though there is no evidence that the former president ordered any crackdown on the opposition. Talk of Morsi’s authoritarian rule pales when compared with those who succeeded him. Adly Mansour, who was installed as an interim president by Sisi, had in fact held the executive, legislative, and judicial powers all at once, since he was simultaneously the acting president, the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and ruled by decree when Sisi suspended the constitution. The strength of this group is of course the backing of the army that still enjoys a large degree of reverence and respect from a significant number of Egyptians, as well as the fear of instability by many if the army were to lose its grip on the country. But so far Sisi has failed to articulate any grand vision for the country or unite its deeply polarized citizens. To consolidate his rule he has relied heavily on the tactics of the police state and the exhaustion of the Egyptian people after four years of uncertainty and instability. It is doubtful that he could bring Egypt back from the abyss, or succeed in tackling Egypt’s political unrest, economic challenges, and social polarization.
The MB has seen the fastest rise and fall of any political group in the region’s modern history. To its credit it refused to grant legitimacy to the coup or compromise its principled position of rejecting military rule and has insisted on bringing to justice those who committed atrocities against the Egyptian people. Yet it advocates returning Egyptians to June 29, 2013 by insisting on the return of Morsi as the legitimately elected president, the restoration of the polarizing 2012 constitution, and the elected institutions of parliament dismissed by Sisi. Its immediate goal is to reverse the effects of the coup and delegitimize the effects of the June 30 demonstrations. To the disappointment of its critics from within the revolutionary ranks, it still refuses to acknowledge the deeply polarized politics it practiced against its former revolutionary partners, which paved the way to the June 30 events and the current crisis. Furthermore, its critics contend that its rhetoric of a revolutionary path would directly contradict the constitutional path its supporters are pursuing by insisting on the demand of Morsi’s return to power and the 2012 constitution. A constitutional path, they argue, does not allow for revolutionary purge of the politicized judiciary, corrupt prosecutors, and compromised media outlets. It also shields the military and confers on its senior officers undeserved protections and privileges.
The degree of brutality against the MB by the Sisi regime has surpassed all its past experiences with government repressions since the 1940s. It has shaken its members to the core but the strength of the organization has been demonstrated as it is largely kept intact despite the unprecedented levels of suffering and abuse. After a period of defiance that ended publicly with several massacres in July and August 2013, many members of MB who were able to escape the security apparatus and leave the country launched into a vigorous internal debate. By April 2014, the reevaluation was settled in favor of a new leadership that, according to the most senior MB official outside Egypt, comprises 65-70 percent from the youth generation under 45. The internal dynamics within the group recently became public when one of the old guard leaders issued a statement that rejected violence and dismissed the new leadership. Within hours the new leadership rejected his assertions and renewed its call for an uncompromising revolutionary path that would continue until the fall of Sisi and his repressive regime. The internal youth leadership within Egypt soon followed with another call that endorsed the unbending approach.
Meanwhile, the revolutionary youth groups have been arguing from the very beginning for the return of a purely revolutionary path reminiscent of the heady days of the 2011 revolution. They argue that their revolution has been aborted and must be resumed as if it were February 12, 2011. The biggest mistake, they argue, was that the revolutionaries went home and accepted the rule of the military council. Some of the most prominent among these groups include the April 6 movement, whose leaders such as Ahmed Maher and Mohammad Adel, and activist Ahmed Doma have been imprisoned by the Sisi regime, the Revolutionary Socialists, and other leaders such as Alaa Abdel Fattah who received a 5-year sentence for defying the military regime. Their critics, especially from the Islamist camp, argue that most of these revolutionary groups are big on rhetoric but lack substance, sophistication and widespread support. Furthermore, many of the revolutionary youth that played key roles during the early moments of the revolution but not vigorously pursued by the government have been exiled, given up, or remained silent including Wael Ghoneim, one of the most prominent youth figures that ignited the 2011 revolution. Furthermore, football ultras have also played a significant role in opposing the repressive measures of the current regime. Their future involvement would be crucial, as they have demonstrated courage, determination, and organization, three ingredients needed for real revolutionary change.
The Way Forward
History rarely repeats itself but the wise always learn from its lessons. The 2011 Egyptian uprising was a remarkable event that displayed many positive attributes about the Egyptian youth and their future aspirations. But the moment the revolutionary partners broke ranks within days of toppling Egypt’s former dictator, there was not much chance to advance the march towards genuine change. Their dream was easily hijacked. Those who were advocating gradual change and a reformist agenda have in essence put their trust in, and subjugated their agenda to, the same people who have benefited the most from the corruption and repression of Mubarak’s regime. A revolutionary path does not necessarily mean a resort to violence or chaos. It means in essence a complete break from the former regime and its compromised institutions and personalities, and building a new state from the ground up. Such undertaking is indeed enormous but the Egyptian state is so deeply entrenched in repression and corruption, anything short of its total dismantlement would simply not result in any meaningful change.
Still, the success of a revolutionary path has a dilemma. It cannot succeed without the MB because of their discipline and ability to mobilize large segments of society. But it also cannot succeed with them alone. To recreate that moment of unity that was displayed in Tahrir Square, defeated Mubarak’s regime, and broke its security apparatus is the first step towards ending Sisi’s neo-Mubarakist regime. Yet both sides have to agree on the strategic goals of this renewed partnership and offer real confidence-building measures. Such strategy must be centered on a revolutionary path, which all have advocated, in order to achieve three main goals: (a) the end of the Egyptian military involvement in politics, the forced retirement of its most senior officers, and the restructuring of its institutions to focus solely on the defense of the country against external threats, coupled with the complete dismantlement of its economic empire, (b) the dismantlement of the deep state in all its aspects from the police, security apparatus, and the intelligence agencies, to the compromised judiciary, corrupt business conglomerates, and their media empires, and (c) the future state must be formed on the basis of building genuine democratic institutions with guaranteed rights, freedoms, and protections of minorities, as well as a pledge from all partners not to impose social agendas, nor promote or seek competitive politics until the deep state is dismantled and democratic institutions are in place and functioning.
Once the main strategy is agreed upon, confidence-building measures must be established. The controversial issue of Morsi’s return to power appears to be the sticking point. On the one hand the MB argues that it is important to stand for legitimacy and respect the people’s will, and to reject the usurper of power and all the consequences of the coup regime, especially on the economic front. On the other hand, the revolutionary youth assert that they would not be willing to revolt against Sisi to simply restore Morsi whom a significant number of them had also revolted against in 2013. Both groups have a point and this impasse must be resolved by the latter group acknowledging that Morsi was legitimately and democratically elected as president by the majority of Egyptian citizens. Moreover, as long as the revolution is in progress and Sisi is in control, all revolutionary groups must concede this fact and acknowledge their respect of the will of the electorate, and thus accept Morsi as the elected, yet kidnapped, president of Egypt. If somehow Morsi were to be restored to power by any other means, he would then resume his presidency. However, if Sisi and his regime fall through a revolutionary path, then all parties including the MB must acknowledge the new reality of a successful revolution where a new path, structure, and constitution would emerge without any regards to the past.
Revolutions are so rare in history because several factors and conditions have to dynamically coexist simultaneously. The sooner the revolutionary partners resolve their differences and start working on creating these conditions, the sooner Egypt can throw off the yoke of subjugation and restore honor and dignity to its people as well as to the dead and sentenced Palestinians.
Esam Al-Amin is the author of The Arab Awakening Unveiled: Understanding Transformations and Revolutions in the Middle East. He can be contacted at alamin1919@gmail.com.
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