Link
It is clear that the relationship between Hamas and Iran has experienced a significant shift over the past few months, but the shift occurred within a limited scope. Since the Iranian officials have not viewed Khaled Meshaal's personal trip to Tehran as reason enough to restore relations, this has not occurred yet and we do not know whether it will happen.
The rapprochement steps quickly proceeded, beginning with Abu Obaidah's "Thank you Iran" during the victory celebration in Gaza last month to successive statements and phone calls over the past few weeks, especially after the Quneitra raid during which the Israeli enemy killed a number of Hezbollah officials and an Iranian general. The most interesting was the strange statement made by one of the leaders regarding Syria's right to defend its people and sovereignty (as quoted by Iranian-funded media outlets, which of course cannot be trusted).
This statement can be interpreted in various ways, especially since the Hamas leaders continue to insist that they will not back down from their position on Syria, which is supportive of the people. Hamas paid a high price for this position, not only by having to leave Syria, but also by suffering from the complete cut of Iranian support for three years.
I would also like to refer to the elements of the axis of resistance and opposition that some have been talking about, and how Hamas would like to return to it. However, we find no one else in this axis except for Bashar Al-Assad, who is begging for cooperation with America and the Zionists in the fight against what he calls "terrorism". However, what he calls terrorism is actually the popular revolution, and this revolution was the original movement, before there were factions, bullets and killing.
While the lady of the axis, Iran, is begging for a nuclear agreement with the United States, the weapons of one of its pillars, Hezbollah, has been aimed at resolving internal disputes since July 2006, and consequently has been aimed against the Syrian people's revolution, with the exception of the last operation (which was precisely calculated). There was also another less significant operation that was a response to a large number of Zionist targets.
On the other hand, the remaining affiliates of the axis of resistance, i.e. the Houthis, are waging a war against the revolutionary Yemeni people. Others went to Iraq on the back of an American occupation tank, invading it once more under the pretext of fighting terrorism, while they actually shed the blood of Sunni Arabs who they labelled members of the Islamic State (ISIS). This has caused a doctrinal war unprecedented in Iraq or in the entire region.
Of course, we must not forget that there are Palestinians who also belong to this axis, such as the Islamic Jihad, which is considered to be part of the resistance but who is funded by Iran. Therefore, they cannot rebel against Iran's options, like other marginal groups, such as the Ahmed Jibril faction, which was used by Bashar to cover up his crimes in the Yarmouk refugee camp, in exchange for which he would receive bags of money from Iran. He was also able to visit Iran and meet with all the Iranian officials, including Khamenei himself.
As for Hamas, it belongs to the resistance axis, whether or not it exists (although the past three years Iranian-funded media outlets have confirmed that Hamas has left the axis and joined the "access of resignation", until it was slapped with the latest war). Hamas fought the latest war waged against it excellently while the axis stood by and watched, not even verbally supporting Hamas until the seventeenth day of fighting and after phone calls from the movement's icons. It had also built up its strength and capabilities after the precious war in 2012, despite the complete blockade of Iran and the absence of any support whatsoever.
Hamas only resorted to Iran out of desperation in light of the blockade imposed on it from Al-Sisi and the heated persecution from Mahmoud Abbas in the context of disarming the resistance. Who said that the wrong positions were taken during a state of relaxation? And who said that those who conceded throughout the history of the Palestinian cause, or any other struggle causes, did so for the sake of certain parties?
Despite this, it seems useful to talk about the benefit that Hamas may gain from this rapprochement compared to the damage and losses it would sustain, because ultimately, politics is a game of interests and losses, even if we disregard the aspect of morals and principles. Hamas has not actually disregarded this aspect, as its position on the Syrian popular revolution has not changed, despite the fact that some of the Syrian people have reproached and cursed Hamas or its reconciliation with their greatest enemy, Iran (who has become an enemy in the minds of the majority of the nation due to its actions.)
If we want to talk about the losses that Hamas would sustain, they are well-known. They include the loss of the Arab and Muslim nation's confidence and trust in Hamas, which they view as a movement that has made the finest sacrifices in the history of its nation and who is fighting on the front of the nation's central cause. This is not a simple or small loss because what the nations gave the movement since its establishment is not something marginal, and it may even be more significant to what Iran and others have provided to Hamas.
It is worth noting that the greatest loss that movements calling for change can suffer is a loss of their masses, not the loss of their authority, if there is one. In Hamas's case, its authority over Gaza is the authority aspect, and the fate of the movement's authority has dictated Hamas's behaviour since 2007. However, their vision must be more comprehensive and include the whole course of the cause.
In Gaza, Hamas has accumulated weapons and an army that have been an example of heroism and sacrifice, but politically, this has become a burden in terms of maintaining it. This reminds us of Fatah's similar experience when its burden became too heavy to bear and it resorted to signing the Oslo Accords. After Oslo, it increased its mobilisation and recruitment, and therefore, its situation became worse in terms of politics, as authority and maintaining it became a goal in itself.
All of this highlights the absurdity of the idea of combining authority and resistance, despite the heroic battles fought by Gaza which were a response to the aggression aimed at forcing the resistance to submit to the status quo. However, the besieged Gaza Strip would be unable to wage a war against the enemy without Palestine's resistance.
I would also like to address what Iran wants out of its relationship with the resistance. We can simply say that its goal is very clear, as it wants a "Sunni" cover for its crimes against the majority of the nation, including Syria, Iraq and Yemen. If you listen to the Iranian writer Mohammed Sadiq Al-Husseini (a mouthpiece for the conservatives) you would know exactly what the people want.
Although Iran wants this cover, neither Hamas nor anyone else can fix its image in the minds of the nation, but Iran is trying anyway. But what will Hamas get in return?
We are certain that financial support will be one of the things provided to Hamas, but it is limited and perhaps even temporary support. This is because Iran is experiencing the worst economic situation in its history due to the decline in oil prices, and therefore it is difficult to rely on financial support.
Will there be arms support? Perhaps, but the ability to deliver it into Gaza will be very difficult due to the tight Egyptian blockade on Gaza. Hamas will therefore continue to rely on its own capabilities, as it did for the last four years.
Is there a political benefit from this rapprochement? Honestly, it does not seem so, as Iran did not succeed in pressuring some of the Gulf states, nor will it put pressure on Al-Sisi, who benefits more from defeating Iran than Hamas. This has driven Tehran to rehabilitate Bashar, which is a very important point.
What about Turkey and Qatar, two of the most supportive states of Hamas? Will they be able to accept a stronger relationship with Iran? They might stay quiet, but they will not be happy about it, especially in light of Iran's recent arrogance manifested in Yemen. It has also become increasingly obvious that Iran is directly interfering militarily in Iraq, not to mention Syria, which is being run by Qassem Soleimani.
Now, in light of the changes in Saudi foreign policy, some are hoping for the restoration of relations between Hamas and the kingdom, even if at a minimal level. However, this will not be possible if the movement strengthens its relationship with Iran.
No one asked Hamas to antagonise Iran; what is required is to calculate benefits and losses without overlooking the most important aspect here represented by the loss of the masses and their support, especially if they doubt that Hamas will achieve the most important goal, i.e. the lifting of the blockade imposed on Gaza. This requires a different vision that re-arranges Palestine's entire internal structure and affairs, not only saving Gaza's weapons or its old interests.
This goal is certainly very important, but its success alone will be very difficult if the surrounding circumstances do not change. The situation may change, as it usually does due to political shifts, but this requires some patience and steadfastness.
In this case, the only option we have is to pray to God that the movement's leaders are able to escape this predicament without losing the masses or losing the achievements they have made. However, we are certain that Iran's predicament is serious and it has been terribly depleted due to its aggression against the majority of the nation. Anyone taking shelter in Iran will remain cold, if not riddled with worse viruses, unless we wise up and deal with the Arab and Muslim surroundings to find a suitable solution for the pending issues.
Only then will everyone be able to come together and help Hamas and the resistance forces in Palestine fight the Zionist enemy instead of engaging in a bloody battle. Iran played an important role in aggravating this battle due to its position on the Syrian popular revolution, and now the Yemeni revolution, and we don't even know whether or not Iran has more in store.
Translated from Al-Jazeera on 1 February 2015.
No comments:
Post a Comment