Friday, April 17, 2015

حديث الثورة-دور عاصفة الحزم في دعم تقدم المقاومة باليمن

DNA 17/04/2015: التحالف السعودي الاسرائيلي




SUPER......SUPER!!

Once again, what's the solution in Syria?

By: Salameh Kaileh

Link

Comment: Any solution that does not start with the removal of Assad and his power in Syria will most certainly fail, writes Salameh Kaileh.
Discussions surrounding Syria seem to suggest that an opposition is being "tailored" that will be willing to accept the continuation of Bashar al-Assad's power.

Russia is working to arrange an opposition from "within the regime" - meaning they never were and never will be part of the opposition. Nevertheless, it is forging ahead with its plan.

This is based on the formation of a transitional government that paves way for a presidential election, in which Assad can take part in.

However, it has become obvious that all regional and international actors are now dealing with specific opposition figures, and not opposition groups or bodies.

Every regional and international player now invites a group of opposition figures to hold a meeting or conference about their vision for the solution, which in most part, does not involve the overthrow of Assad and his group.

This in return means groups such as the Syrian National Coalition and the National Coordination Committee are facing disintegration, for the sake of a solution that regional and international figures can agree upon.

Every one of these actors is selecting an opposition figure that it favours, or one that would agree to the regime remaining in power - more specifically, for Assad to remain in power.
    How can the transitional committee carry out its role while the group that launched a war against its people remains in power?

To achieve this goal, the principles of the Geneva conference would need to be disregarded, or at least altered.

The Geneva conference specified the establishment of a transitional committee that enjoys full executive powers.

This would mean an end to the current regime, and stripping the president and the prime minister off their authority.

However, in an attempt to keep Assad’s position intact, there has been a lot of talk about the need for the president to be part of any negotiations tied to any final solution.

If the same president, the same apparatuses and the same people remain in power, who can guarantee any change?

How can the transitional committee carry out its role while the group that launched a war against its people remains in power?

This project aims to block the path to a solution because not removing Assad and his regime from power will keep the conflict raging.

The mass amount of civilians who have lost family members and loved ones, those whose homes have been destroyed and have had to flee their own country, will not agree to any solution that will ensure Assad and his group stays in power.

A solution cannot be achieved without the Syrian people, who have fought for change and have sacrificed their life and their limbs, being able to feel that they have achieved a 'small' victory by removing Assad and his regime.

The opposition must refuse its disintegration and must hold on to the basis of a successful solution, which is the removal of the group that controls the state, has fought against its population, destroyed the country and plundered it for decades with its authoritarian rule.

Any solution that does not start with that point in mind will most certainly fail.
Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of al-Araby al-Jadeed, its editorial board or staff.
This is an edited translation of the original Arabic.

Syrian regime reaps rewards of IS advances

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Analysis: Regime is benefiting from IS attacks on other rebel forces - attacks which also deflect attention from its own atrocities. But how long will that last?
The Islamic State group is making a clear bid to expand its control around the Syrian capital Damascus. But it is the regime that is gaining the most from the IS advance.

Only a few months after advancing to the area of Beir al-Qassab in the Damascus countryside, IS tried to seize control of the Yarmouk refugee camp, less than 10km away from the capital's city centre.

They also advanced into the nearby area of Qaboun, where Syrian opposition forces put up a fight, leading IS to retreat into the northern area of Teshrin. Opposition forces attacked them there on Wednesday night.

Small but growing presence

IS does not have a strong presence there. Activist Omar Abdul Salam told al-Araby al-Jadeed that two months ago, there were barely 50 IS fighters in the area, before new fighters started joining them, taking the number up to around 200.

Abdul Salam said IS lures young recruits into their training camp by offering a monthly salary of $200-300 and food rations.

But it was regime forces who achieved major military gains after fighting started in Yarmouk, especially when they pushed through the frontlines in Tadamon and the camp.

The regime seems to be benefitting long-term as IS drains the resources of opposition forces. In PR terms, media reports of the IS advance on Damascus have also played into the regime's hands.

These reports overshadow the regime's defeat in Idlib as well as its daily air raids on the city’s residential areas, and on northern, eastern and southern areas of Aleppo.

Most strikingly, all the areas into which IS has advanced by attacking opposition forces are, in fact, besieged by the regime.
    This raises many questions on how IS has received logistical, financial and military support.

Opposition forces even agreed on a truce with the regime following its blockades in most of the areas IS is attempting to expand to, such as Yalda, Babila and Bayt Sahem, south of Damascus, as well as Qaboun, Barza and Teshrin, north of Damascus.

This raises many questions on how IS has received logistical, financial and military support.

IS had provoked Qaboun's opposition forces by posting videos on the Twitter account an affiliated group showing masked young men in training. The video was called "Mujahideen training camp in Qaboun".

The fight between opposition forces and IS in Qaboun may be compared to the battle in Damascus' southern suburbs, where Army of Islam (Jaish al-Islam) forces continue attempts to advance from the area of al-Zayn - which they took over in the past two days - towards al-Hajar al-Aswad, while Ajnad al-Sham forces continue to fight the IS outside the town of Yalda.

Yarmouk


At the same time, the Palestinian Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis brigades are continuing to fight IS in the northern parts of Yarmouk, supported by the opposition-affiliated brigades of Sham al-Rasoul and Ababil.

Members of the executive committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) told al-Araby al-Jadeed that the issue of Yarmouk would be at the top of the agenda in their meeting next Saturday, adding that the meeting would confirm the PLO’s decision not to intervene militarily in the camp in any way.

"The PLO's position has not changed. We will not intervene in armed conflicts on foreign territories anywhere", committee member Hanan Ashrawy said.

This comes as part of recent conflicting statements about Yarmouk, as PLO representative Ahmed al-Majdalani said there would be no political solution with the IS, referring to the need for a military solution to end the IS’s presence in the camp.

This article is an edited translation from our Arabic edition
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Al-Jazeera Cartoon

كاريكاتير: جسر عبور

Current Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Online Poll


Do you support giving Ali Saleh (of Yemen) amnesty in return for surrendering?

So far, 89% have voted no.

Stakes for Saudis are high in Yemen

By David Hearst

Link
20150416_2
Saudi Arabia faces a critical juncture in its air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. There have been gains. The Houthis have been pushed back in Marib by tribal forces in the North and from areas of central Aden in the south. Their coalition with army units loyal to the ousted autocrat Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son Ahmed is also showing sign of wear and tear.
In an attempt to forestall a UN Security Council resolution which placed an arms embargo, among others, on Ahmed Ali Saleh, the former head of the Republican Guard, Saleh Senior called for a ceasefire, denying any ambition either he or his family had to return to power. This was a rare display of softness from someone who had so actively undermined the presidency of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, his former deputy. Or it was realism?
That said, three weeks in, none of the main political goals of the air campaign have been accomplished -- yet. The Houthis have not left the cities they have captured; Hadi has not been re-installed as president in Sanaa and a national dialogue on finding a government of national unity has yet to start. Militarily, the Saudis have yet to find a national figure to lead the fight back on the ground in Yemen, let alone unify the forces fighting the Houthis under one command.
Attempts to secure a ceasefire have so far foundered on the demand for a Houthi withdrawal from the main cities they have captured. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan failed to convince his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani, in his latest visit, of the need for a Houthi withdrawal from Sanaa and Aden before a ceasefire is declared. The Iranians insist on a ceasefire based on the militias in their current position. The haggling is not over and and the search for a ceasefire under the auspices of the UN is still on-going. The fact that Russia did not veto the UN resolution could be significant.
The current impasse leaves the Saudis with two options: either fight the Houthis with local forces or assemble a foreign fighting force and go in through Aden. Both options pose big challenges.
Support for the tribal forces would necessarily entail arming Islah, which is a combination of Yemeni clans and the Muslim Brotherhood. The royal household is cautious about this, because it would amount to U turn in policy, which was to fight the Brotherhood in every Arab country where it emerged as a major political force.
This was why the leading faction of advisers in the court of King Abdullah first opened secret contacts with the Houthis, although this is now emerging as more of an Emirati run conspiracy rather than a Saudi one. A senior political representative of Islah recently visited Riyadh, so the Saudi taboo on direct contacts with a Brotherhood affiliated group has been breached. But it would require more than this to install an Islah-backed government in Sanaa and it is an open question whether Riyadh wants this.
Saudi Arabia is committed to re-install Hadi in Sanaa, and start a national dialogue on forming a unity government. But the president in exile has not emerged from this episode with his credentials as a national leader enhanced. Anything but. He is seen by Yemenis as a weak war time leader , who dithered under pressure and ultimately fled. Hadi is no Winston Churchill. This week he was forced to make his prime minister Khaled Bahah, his vice-president. Bahah is seen as having stronger cross-party links than Hadi. Bahah's appointment as vice president is a sign of Saudi's recognition of Hadi's political weakness in Yemen.
The leader of choice, the man with the qualities to fight a war, would be Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar , the military commander in exile whose house was ransacked by the Houthis. But Hadi resists the general on two counts -- that he is a northerner and that he is too close to Islah.
The second option is a ground invasion, most likely through Aden. Here Saudi Arabia feels its dependence on its allies, because it knows it does not have the troops who can do the job on their own. The coalition supporting Saudi Arabia is soon whittled down when the criterion is countries with combat capability. Two of them are non-Arab : Turkey and Pakistan. Turkey will not deploy troops before an election and Pakistan has its own reasons to delay.
According to my sources, the Saudi request for Pakistan was not for troops in Yemen , but to guard the long and vulnerable borders of the Kingdom itself. The Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif has dodged and weaved, using a carefully constructed parliamentary resolution, as cover for delay.
The Pakistan Army is a stronger institution than both parliament and a civilian prime minister. Like the Egyptian army, it decides where it will agree to be deployed and there are rational arguments against deploying in Yemen. Pakistan has its own border conflict with Iran and its own Shia minority. Importing a conflict from the Gulf, when it has two other insurgencies on its hands -- the Taliban and the Baluchs -- could be far down the army's agenda.
That leaves Jordan and Egypt, the only other two Arab countries with functioning ground forces. Jordanian relations with Saudi Arabia are strained, because Amman has been eager to open a new diplomatic chapter with Iran.The foreign minister and deputy prime minister Nasser Judeh has just visited Iran. A leading Iraqi Shia, the president of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Ammar al-Hakim, a figure with close Iranian ties, visited Amman. King Abdullah attended the Arab League summit in Sharm el-Sheikh for one hour only and did not give the Jordanian speech. It was another sign of Hashemite unease.
For Egypt, Yemen is a lose-lose situation. If Egyptian troops go in, it will mean casualties and could reawaken painful memories. The last time its troops fought in Yemen, it lost at least 22,000 men. It will not be a popular war in Egypt, and the army is already overstretched in the Sinai and guarding strategic targets at home. Relations with Russia and Iran will also be damaged. But if Egypt refuses a Saudi request, it would be the last straw for the main funder of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's regime.
Further, the new Saudi King stole Sisi's thunder by launching the air attack three days before the Sharm el- Sheikh summit. Salman walked out after giving his speech, leaving his foreign minister to engage in a furious spat with his Egyptian hosts, after a supportive letter from the Russian president Vladimir Putin was read out. The pro-Sisi media launched a wave of attacks against Saudi Arabia on the campaign in Yemen. A media that is clearly controlled by the state is passing on calculated messages. Sisi wanted the summit to crown him as the leader of an Arab military stabilisation force. In reality, the summit did no such thing.
A compromise could be the joint manoeuvres that were announced on Wednesday on Saudi territory. But that does not solve the problem of Yemen.
Relations between the Saudis and the Emiratis, who provide the second largest contingent of planes in the air campaign, are also souring. And neither side even bothers to hide it. Neither bin Zayed nor his prime minister turned up to the Arab League Summit.
The warmth and royal attention lavished on the Emir of Qatar who visited Riyadh recently contrasted to the coolness afforded to the Emirati crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed, who waited for ten days for permission to visit.
The anxiety of the UAE goes further than this. When a serving minister in the ministry of foreign affairs Dr Anwar Gargash, tweeted recently, his target was Saudi's non arab partners - Turkey and Pakistan:
The Turkish Foreign Minister sees eye to eye with Iran over Yemen and believes that the political solution is a Turkish Iranian Saudi responsibility. Letting down positions of neutrality are ongoing.Pakistan is requested to have a clear stance for the sake of its strategic relations with the Arab Gulf States. Inconsistent and dubious stances on this extremely important issue have a very high costThe Arabian Gulf is engaged in serious and critical confrontation and its strategic security is on the line. This moment of truth distinguishes a real ally from a mere media and statements ally.The dubious and inconsistent stances of Pakistan and Turkey are best proof that Arab security from Libya to Yemen has an Arab address (title). The test of the neighbouring countries is best witness to this.
Salman is in no mood to accommodate the Emiratis, because he knows first hand of their links to the Salehs, father and son. But the Emiratis sense that the Yemen operation is more than a reaction to a plan gone wrong. The Emiratis are alarmed at what they feel could be the product of Saudi success in Yemen, a changing strategic alliance which would see Saudi Arabia in coalition with the Turks.
If the Saudis are searching for a key strategic partner in containing the Iranian influence in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, it is to Ankara that they are looking. The Turks for their part would need Saudi backing in their long stalled project to establish an exclusion zone in Northern Syria, a project which Barack Obama has in the past opposed but may not do so for much longer.
The Saudi analyst Jamal Khashoggi called it the Salman doctrine, a pact formed in the absence of US leadership , but with its tacit approval.
The Turks, who are the upcoming partner of Saudi Arabia in the process of "resolving crises" without U.S., think so too. The president's consultant Ibrahim Kalin, who I met in Ankara last Thursday, told me: "Yes, there are similarities and differences between Syria and Yemen. However the problems, circumstances and rivals are the same. The Saudi operation may repeat there and we must think about that.Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has several times voiced his desire to impose a no-fly zone -- and later -- a buffer zone in north Syria. He even suggested this latter idea to King Salman during their last summit and his idea was supported by the king. However what's common is that achieving such a desire cannot be without U.S. approval. If the Decisive Storm campaign succeeds, this rule may change and the American condition may no longer be a condition and Erdogan might say: "If the Saudis did it, why don't I do like them?
Iran stands to benefit from a protracted war in Yemen. While it was as surprised as anyone by the decision to launch air strikes, Tehran might still calculate that it can profit from tying the Saudis up in knots in Yemen. Saudi Arabia would be in a weaker position to stop them advancing in Iraq and Syria. Iran's interest is in securing Iraq as its defensive hinterland.
By the same token, a swift Saudi success in Yemen, even it was as limited as getting the Houthis out of Sanaa and Aden, could strengthen its relationship with Turkey and lead to a second phase in Syria. These regional powers would emerge as a counterbalance to two countries torn apart by war. If the Islamic State flourished in the vacuum created by an absent Sunni leadership, the Saudis and Turks can profit by reclaiming it. There is much at stake in Yemen.
This article was first published by huffingtonpost.

Thursday, April 16, 2015

حديث الثورة- تطورات الشأن اليمني

DNA 16/04/2015: عاصفة الحزم..وتخبّط إعلام الممانعة

ما وراء الخبر-ما مصلحة حفتر في تعويق الحوار الليبي؟

Lawfare, the continuation of war by other means

By Jonathan Cook

Link

Analysis: Israeli organisations are using legal means to impose a high cost on the Palestinian Authority before it can bring war crimes charges against Israel at the ICC, Jonathan Cook.
Right-wing Israeli organisations have been quietly escalating "legal warfare" against the Palestinian leadership in an attempt to dissuade it from bringing war crimes charges against Israel at the International Criminal Court.

The latest case against the Palestinians, filed in the US, threatens lengthy jail sentences and heavy fines against Hamas leaders, including Khaled Mashal, for briefly closing Israel's only international airport during Israel's attack on Gaza last summer.

It follows a decision by a New York jury in February to impose $218m damages on the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian government-in-waiting in the occupied territories. The compensation relates to six attacks more than a decade ago, at the start of the second intifada, in which US citizens were killed or injured.

The legal campaign, which exploits loosely defined anti-terrorism laws in the US, appears designed to exhaust the Palestinian authority's existing financial reserves and isolate it from funding sources in the region.

Comments from Shurat HaDin, a legal group that initiated the action against the PA, indicate that the intention is to push Palestinian institutions toward collapse, both as a way to weaken efforts to resist Israel's occupation and to destroy any possibility of Palestinian statehood.

Punishing Palestinians financially
Last December, as the PA case opened, Shurat HaDin's director, Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, warned that the goal was to create "financial instability" for the Palestinians. She added that harsh financial penalties would be a test of the PA's readiness for statehood: "If they want to become a state, they have to show that they can meet their obligations."
The latest case against the Palestinians in the US threatens lengthy jail sentences and heavy fines against Hamas leaders.
The $218m award and similar ones that may be approved by US juries in the future could potentially bankrupt the PA.

Palestinian officials have already warned that the PA is in dire financial trouble after Israel recently withheld millions in tax revenues it collects on the Authority's behalf.

Palestinian institutions also risk finding themselves financially marooned after Israeli legal groups scored a success in the US last week against a leading Middle East bank.

In a precedent-setting case last September, a US jury found the Jordan-based Arab Bank liable for 24 attacks, blamed on Hamas, in which US citizens were hurt or killed. The bank was shown to have made transactions to accounts belonging to Hamas members.

A federal judge in Brooklyn upheld that verdict last week, even though the bank had demonstrated it followed standard industry practices. The door is now open to some 300 victims and their relatives to claim damages, likely to run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

The ruling's wider significance is that it is likely to make most banks wary of operating in the occupied Palestinian territories for fear of handling accounts that may later be shown to belong to Palestinians involved in attacks against Israel.

Similar cases are pending against other banks, including the Bank of China, Credit Lyonnais and a unit of the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Palestinians start their own 'lawfare'…
The raft of recent cases in the US launched by Israeli organisations has been largely overlooked as world attention has focused instead on Palestinian efforts to use legal action against Israel.

This month the Palestinian Authority became an official member of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Palestinians are expected to request that the Hague court investigate Israeli officials for war crimes, both those committed last summer during Israel's attack on Gaza and those associated with decades of settlement-building in the occupied territories.

Israeli leaders, led by Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, have accused the PA of pursuing what they call "lawfare" instead of peace negotiations.

In January Netanyahu convened legal advisers to help devise a strategy to discredit the ICC, saying war crimes investigations against Israel were "absurd" and a "perversion of justice".

He is fearful that such investigations will "delegitimise" Israel and make it increasingly difficult for Israeli officials to travel overseas, where they might be arrested.

Gilead Sher, a lawyer and former government adviser, recently observed that "the emerging legal front [by the Palestinians] is nothing less than an extension of the battlefield... The Palestinian approach is based on a theory of total warfare that includes legal efforts combined with mass media manipulation, active diplomacy, incitement, boycotts and sanctions."

… but Israeli 'lawfare' is more effective
The advantage for Israel in turning to US courts is they can make their case according to the lower standards of proof required in civil cases.
But in truth, Israeli organisations have so far proved much more effective at lawfare than the Palestinians.

The message of Sher and others that Israel cannot afford to be passive has been taken especially to heart by Shurat HaDin, which has close ties to the Israeli right.

In 2012 its director, Darshan-Leitner, won the Moskowitz Prize for Zionism, an award funded by US casino magnate Irving Moskowitz, who has invested millions of dollars in helping illegal Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

As well as its recent civil actions against the PA and Hamas in the US, Shurat HaDin has also turned directly to the ICC.

Last September its lawyers filed a war crimes suit against Mashal, implicating him in Hamas executions of suspected collaborators with Israel during its attack last year.

Two months later the Israeli group brought a second suit, this time against Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, for attacks allegedly carried out by Fatah loyalists from Gaza.

In January it filed further suits: against the Palestinian prime minister, Rami Hamdallah; Jibril Rajoub, former head of the Palestinian security services; and the PA's intelligence chief, Majed Faraj.

In an interview in December Darshan-Leitner said Shurat HaDin's actions at the ICC were intended as a warning to the Palestinian leadership to "tell them they're playing with fire… The moment they join [the ICC], it's game over. It will be like sniper fire."

Civil suits in US courts trump international justice
However, the wheels of the ICC are expected to move slowly. Most observers believe that both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are years away from facing a serious investigation.

Shurat HaDin has therefore forged ahead with simpler and faster civil actions in the US, exploiting the fact that a proportion of Israeli Jews also hold US citizenship and can claim redress in US courts.

There, it has taken advantage of the growing body of US anti-terror laws, especially since 9/11, to target Palestinian officials.

In the case over Ben Gurion airport's closure for a little more than 24 hours last July, Shurat HaDin has made use of a law that provides for 20-year jail terms and heavy fines for anyone endangering American citizens at an international airport.

The complaint, filed with the Justice Department, claims that 26 US citizens were forced to flee to bomb shelters after a rocket from Gaza landed near the airport. As a result, US federal aviation authorities barred US carriers from taking off at Ben Gurion and several US flights heading to Israel had to be diverted to other countries.
The ruling will make banks wary of operating in Palestine for fear of handling accounts later shown to be associated with attacks against Israel.
The advantage for Israeli legal groups in turning to US courts is that they can make their case according to the relatively low standards of proof required in civil cases, avoiding the stringent standards at the Hague in international law.

Their lawyers can also rely on the easy sympathies of US juries and judges that have come to equate Arabs and Islam with terror, backed by a media and political culture that highlights suffering by Israeli Jews while downplaying the experiences of Palestinians at the hands of Israeli soldiers and settlers.

Targeting finance
In the case against the Arab Bank, Judge Brian Cogan of Brooklyn district court ignored the bank's defence that it had screened customer accounts according to the relevant watch lists, including that of the US Treasury Department.

Only one customer, Ahmed Yassin, had been designated a terrorist, and the bank's lawyers argued that his account had slipped through because of a spelling error.

Cogan has warned that other banks are in the crosshairs: "We have not finished our work by a long shot."

In May 2011 Shurat HaDin, working with the Israeli government, foiled an international aid flotilla to Gaza by sending letters to insurance and satellite companies threatening them with lawsuits under US law for offering services to the ships.

Shurat HaDin has also pursued cases in the US against Middle East states that are seen as close allies of Palestinian organisations.

In 2012, a US court awarded a Florida family $332 million in damages after it was alleged Syria and Iran assisted the Palestinian movement Islamic Jihad in organising a suicide attack in Tel Aviv.

Darshan-Leitner has observed that her organisation's work is related to Netanyahu's concerns about battering Israel's image is taking in the international community. "Really, we're fighting back against the delegitimization of Israel," she said.

تكراراً، ما الحل في سورية؟

سلامة كيلة
تكراراً، ما الحل في سورية؟
Link

كل ما يجري يُظهر أن هناك من يعمل على "تزبيط" معارضةٍ، تقبل باستمرار بشار الأسد. ما زالت روسيا تعمل على ترتيب معارضة "من صلب السلطة"، ربما تسعى إلى الحصول على مناصب. لهذا، دعت شخصياتٍ، بصفتها تمثل المعارضة وهي ليست معارضة، لم تكن ولم تصبح ولن تكون. وعلى الرغم من ذلك، أتت بوفد سلطوي ينفّر أيّاً كان، فيُفشل أي "تزبيط" روسي. بعدها، تحاول موسكو أن توجد مخرجاً يسمح باستمرار الأسد. ولهذا، تحاول إيجاد معارضة توافق على ذلك. وما تطرحه يقوم على تشكيل حكومة انتقاليةٍ، تهيئ لانتخابات رئاسيةٍ، يشارك فيها بشار الأسد، وبإشراف الأجهزة السلطوية نفسها، لينجح بنسبة 92%. 
لكن، ما يبدو واضحاً أن كل الأطراف الإقليمية والدولية باتت تتعامل مع أفراد معارضين، وليس مع هيئات معارضة، ويبدو أن أطراف المعارضة توافق، لأن مشاركين كثيرين يريدون أن يحصلوا على مناصب في أي حلّ قد يتحقق، فلا يتوقفون أمام وجود هيئات المعارضة. لهذا، لم يعد أحد ينظر إلى "الائتلاف" أو "هيئة التنسيق"، أو المجموعات الأخرى، تكويناتٍ تمثل معارضة، بل أصبح كل طرف إقليمي، أو دولي، يستنسب بعض المعارضين لعقد لقاء أو مؤتمر يطرح تصوراً للحل، بات يتراجع عن التمسك بإبعاد بشار الأسد ومجموعته. 


يحدث الأمر نفسه في القاهرة. لكن، مع أفراد آخرين، أو حتى مع الأفراد أنفسهم. لهذا، يظهر ما يسمى حوار المعارضة، وهو حوار معارضين بهذا المستوى أو ذاك، عليهم أن يشكلوا "هيئة" متابعة. ويجري الحديث، الآن، عن دعوة سعودية مماثلة، أي لمعارضين، لتشكيل هيئة تشارك في الحل السياسي. وذلك كله يعني أن المعارضة المتبلورة أساساً في هيئة التنسيق لقوى التغيير الوطني الديمقراطي والائتلاف الوطني لقوى الثورة والمعارضة السورية، وتحالفات أخرى أقل أهمية، باتت في مرحلة التفكيك، من أجل اختيار ما يناسب حلاً تتوافق عليه الدول الإقليمية والدولية. وفي هذا السياق، يسعى كل طرف إلى اختيار المقربين منه، والموافقين ربما على استمرار النظام، لكن، بالتحديد استمرار بشار الأسد. 


بات هذا الأمر يفرض لَيّ عنق مبادئ جنيف1 عن تأسيس هيئة انتقالية كاملة الصلاحيات التنفيذية، ما يعني، بالضرورة، إنهاء بنية السلطة القائمة بكل مستوياتها، بما في ذلك سلطة الرئيس ومنصبه، ومنصب رئيس الوزراء. لَيّ عنقها لمصلحة ضمان استمرار الأسد وبنيته، حيث بات يتكرر الكلام عن ضرورة عدم طرح وضع الرئيس في المفاوضات، وربط ذلك في المآل الأخير. فمن سيضمن تحقيق التغيير، إذا بقي الرئيس، وبقيت الأجهزة نفسها؟ والأفراد أنفسهم؟ بالتالي، كيف ستمارس الهيئة الانتقالية مهماتها، في ظل سيطرة المجموعة التي خاضت الحرب ضد الشعب؟ 
يهدف هذا الممر إلى عدم الوصول إلى حل، لأن عدم إزاحة بشار الأسد ومجموعته التي خاضت الحرب ضد الشعب سوف يبقي الصراع قائماً، فليس من إمكانية للوصول إلى حل يوقف الصراع، ويسمح بقبول الكتائب المسلحة والشعب الذي تدمرت بيوته وتشرد وقتل أبناؤه وما زال يقاتل ويخوض الصراع ضد السلطة، سوى (كحد أدنى)، إبعاد الأسد ومجموعته المهيمنة على الأمن والجيش والاقتصاد. ليس من حل ممكن، من دون أن يشعر الشعب الذي قاتل من أجل التغيير، وتدمرت بيوته وقتل أبناؤه وتشرد، بأنه حقق انتصاراً "صغيراً"، يتمثل في إبعاد الرئيس ومجموعته. من دون ذلك، ليس ممكناً أن تقبل الكتائب المسلحة والشعب. وبالتالي، سيفشل أي حل لا يبدأ من إبعاد هذه المجموعة التي خاضت الحرب ضد الشعب ودمرت سورية، بعد أن نهبتها عقوداً طويلة، في ظل سلطة استبدادية. 


الأوهام حول اللعب على الكلمات لن تفيد شيئاً. لهذا، يجب أن ترفض المعارضة تفكيكها، وأن تتمسك بأساس نجاح أي حل، وهو إبعاد الفئة المسيطرة على الدولة. 


HIZBOLLAH OR HIZB IRAN, THAT IS THE QUESTION

الحريري: عاصفة الحزم لن تقف عند حدود اليمن

HIZBOLLAH OR HIZB IRAN, THAT IS THE QUESTION.