WITH ITS HESITATION AND INACTION IN BOTH SYRIA AND IRAQ, TURKEY HAS PROVEN TO BE TRULY A PAPER TIGER. THIS HAS NOT SURPRISED ME, AND I PREDICTED THAT A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO. NORMALIZING WITH THE BRUTAL RUSSIAN REGIME WHILE IT IS OBLITERATING ALEPPO AND OTHER SYRIAN CITIES IS UNFORGIVABLE. NORMALIZING WITH THE ZIONIST STATE WHILE IT INCREASES THE FEROCITY OF ITS BLOCKADE ON GAZA IS EQUALLY UNFORGIVABLE. COMPARE THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THAT IRAN GIVES TO ITS SURROGATES AND ALLIES TO THAT GIVEN BY TURKEY TO ITS ALLIES; THERE IS NO COMPARISON!
THOSE ARABS WHO HAVE COUNTED ON TURKEY FOR SUPPORT SHOULD FEEL SORELY DISAPPOINTED. STILL THE PILGRIMAGE OF THE GULF LEADERS TO ANKARA DOES NOT STOP. I GUESS IT IS DESPERATION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO ONE ELSE TO ASK FOR HELP. TURKEY HAS BEEN SUBSERVIENT TO THE US, THE EU, RUSSIA AND ISRAEL. IT IS ALL TALK WITH NO ACTION.
Evidence reveals device dropped in Idlib in March 2015 contained toxic substance later identified as chlorine gas The Guardian
A man receives treatment at the Sarmin field hospital after a chemical attack in Idlib, Syria. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty ImagesLink
The Syrian government is responsible for a third chemical attack against a rebel-held area, an international team has concluded.
In a report released to the UN security council on Friday, and seen by the Associated Press, investigators said there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Syrian forces were behind an attack in Qmenas, in Idlib province, in March 2015.
A device dropped from a high altitude “hit the ground and released the toxic substance that affected the population”, the report said, adding that witnesses and hospital staff identified the smell and symptoms of chlorine gas.
“It is crucial to hold those who use or intend to use chemicals as weapons accountable for their acts, as it is fundamental to deter all those who continue to believe that there is something to be gained in [their] use,” the panel said.
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN joint investigative mechanism, known as the Jim, in August blamed Syrian forces for using chlorine in two other attacks, and Islamic State for using mustard gas in one.
The conclusion reached in the latest report relates to one of three other attacks that the Jim originally said may have been perpetrated by the government. There was not enough evidence to determine who was behind the two other attacks, it said.
The experts said they couldn’t confirm the use of barrel bombs in Kfar Zita in Hama governorate on 18 April 2014, because the remnants of the device allegedly used had been removed and could not be linked with certainty to the location.
They said additional witnesses corroborated that a canister with traces of chlorine was found in Binnish in Idlib governorate on 24 March 2015. But the exact time and location could not be established and the canister could not be linked to any of the incident locations.
Russia, Syria’s closest ally, has blocked attempts by Britain, France and the US to impose UN sanctions on the Syrian government for using chemical weapons, saying that the evidence presented in August was not conclusive.
The security council is expected to discuss the report on Thursday, but Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s UN ambassador, has already indicated that Moscow will oppose any sanctions.
The Jim, established by the security council a year ago, has investigated nine cases in seven towns where an OPCW fact-finding mission found that chemical weapons had probably been used. The panel has found the Syrian government responsible for two chlorine attacks in Idlib governorate: one in Talmenes on 21 April 2014, and one in Sarmin on 16 March 2015.
It also said Isis was “the only entity with the ability, capability, motive and the means” to use sulfur mustard gas in Marea in Aleppo governorate near the Turkish border on 21 August 2015.
خليل العناني Link لا يستطيع المرء، وهو يشاهد عمليات القصف والغزو والتدمير والإنهاك التي تعيشها مدن عربية، كانت يوماً من رموز الحياة العربية، بمعناها الحضاري والثقافي والإنسانوي، إلا أن يصيبه الحزن والأسى على ما وصلت إليه هذه المدن. فمن حلب، قلب الشام، وأقدم مدن الأرض، بحسب الحفريات والدراسات التاريخية، وقد حوّلها الروس ومليشيات بشار الأسد إلى كومةٍ من الركام وهجّروا أهلها، إلى الموصل، ثاني أكبر المدن والحواضر العراقية، ومقر كبرى القبائل العربية، بتنوعها المذهبي والديني والمرجعي، إلى القاهرة، بتاريخها وعمقها الحضاري والبشري، وقد تحولت إلى مدينة أشباح، قُتل فيها معنى الحياة بفعل القهر السياسي والاجتماعي الذي تئن تحت وطأته، ويكاد أن ينفجر في وجوه الجميع، وانتهاءً ببغداد التي باتت مدينةً مرعبة، بسبب التفجيرات والعربات المفخخة التي باتت جزءاً من الطقس اليومي، منذ غزوها وسقوطها في 2003. ويزداد الأسى، حين يقارن المرء هذه المدن العربية بمدن وحواضر أخرى، سواء في المنطقة أو خارجها، نجحت في الاحتفاظ بعراقتها وإرثها التاريخي والحضاري، وأصبحت قِبلة للزائرين والباحثين عن معنى للذات وتكويناتها الهوياتية والتاريخية، كما الحال في إسطنبول، أو مدن غربية كفيينا ولندن وجنيف وفلورنسا وروما وقرطبة، فالسفر إلى هذه المدن والتجول في شوارعها وأزقتها أصبح متعةً بحد ذاتها، وخُلوة يهرب إليها المرء من جحيم القهر والصراع والاستقطاب الذي لم يترك مجتمعاً في منطقتنا لم يترك بصمته عليه. بؤس المدن العربية أصله سياسي، وتمثلاته اجتماعية وإنسانية وهويّاتية، فالصراع الدامي الذي يجري الآن في الموصل، وتشارك فيه فئات وطوائف ومذاهب معينة، يسير عكس التاريخ الطويل لهذه المدنية التي تعايشت فيها هذه الفئات والطوائف والمذاهب قروناً. وما يجري في حلب من قصفٍ وتدمير وتهجير حوّلها إلى ما يشبه "مقبرة" كبيرة، يسير عكس طبيعة المدينة التي كانت رمزاً للحياة الثقافية والفكرية، ونموذجاً للتعايش العابر للهويات الفرعية، سواء المذهبية أو الإيديولوجية. والإفقار والإنهاك والإضعاف الممنهج لمدينةٍ عريقة كالقاهرة يسير تماماً عكس طبعيتها التي يجسّدها اسمها. يتصارع السياسيون على السلطة والنفوذ، وبينما يفعلون، يدّمرون معهم التاريخ والإنسان ومعاني الحياة التي باتت لاتساوي لديهم شيئاً في مقابل بسط سيطرتهم وهيمنتهم علي الأرض، حتى وإنْ خلت من البشر، وإن فقدت المعنى. لذا، ليس غريباً أن تصبح المنطقة أقلّ مناطق العالم جاذبيةً للسياحة، وأكثرها خوفاً وقلقاً بفعل الصراعات العنيفة التي تجري الآن في أكثر من بلد عربي. وفي وقتٍ كانت فيه هذه العواصم مثار إعجاب للكثيرين، بات مجرّد ذكر اسمها مدعاةً للقلق والتوتر والرغبة في الانسحاب. لذا، لم تعد المدينة العربية مركزاً للجذب أو التفاعل الحضاري والثقافي والإنساني، وإنما باتت هامشاً طارداً لكل من فيه، ورافضاً من هو خارجه، وذلك في حالةٍ من النكوص والارتداد لم تشهدها المنطقة، طوال المائة عام الأخيرة، فمنذ أواخر أوائل القرن التاسع عشر وأوائل القرن العشرين، كانت الإقامة في مدينة كالقاهرة حلماً يراود المثقفين والكتاب والمفكرين العرب، واستمرّت هذه الحال لفترة طويلة. وكذلك كانت الحال مع بيروت حتى منتصف السبعينيات، قبل أن تتحوّل إلى كومة من الرماد بفعل الحرب الأهلية الطويلة التي خاضتها طوائفها وجماعاتها ومكوناتها الاجتماعية. لو أن مؤسس علم الاجتماع، ابن خلدون، كان معنا اليوم، لما كتب مقدمته التأسيسية في علم العمران، ولتحسّر على حجم الدمار والتفتت الذي أصاب المدن العربية الكبرى، ولتركها وهاجر مثلما يفعل الآن كثيرون من أهلها، بحثاً عن معنى جديد ومختلف للحياة.
In a country renowned for the commercial prowess of its businessmen and brokers whose activities span the globe, Lebanese leaders Saad al-Hariri and Michel Aoun just struck a political deal to fill the vacant presidency that may well set a record for audacity and about-faces - though its actual gains and losses remain to be calculated for all sides.
As Lebanon now enters into a wild spree of speculation and anticipation about what happens next, the deal reconfirms that in politics there are no principles, only interests; and Lebanese officials have reconfirmed that the self-interest of individual politicians to preserve their power is the greatest interest of them all.
Inside Story - Lebanon's deepening crisis
In return for supporting Aoun as president, Hariri will be appointed prime minister. This would halt for now Hariri's slow decline as a credible political leader in the country.
It would also reinforce the supremacy of Shia political and military movement Hezbollah as the kingmaker in the country, while also maintaining indirect Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanese politics.
Marriage of opposing political camps
Hariri's endorsement of Aoun for the presidency on Thursday is a dramatic and expedient marriage of opposing political camps that have been at each other's throats for years.
The sheer political geometry, reversals, and contradictions of these enemies-turned-allies is staggering, even by Lebanese standards.
Michel Aoun [EPA]
Prominent Christian leader and former armed forces commander Aoun has been backed for the past decade by Hezbollah, the strongest single force in the country.
The Hezbollah-Aoun alliance in parliament has lobbied for a Aoun presidency, but its blockage by Hariri and his allies has caused them effectively to prevent the election of a new Lebanese president in parliament since May 2014.
Hariri even nominated Hezbollah-friendly Sleiman Frangieh for the presidency, which by tradition is held by a Maronite Christian; but Hezbollah and Aoun held out, insisting that Aoun would be president or there would be no president at all. They have now prevailed.
Hezbollah is also locked in a vocal and ugly battle of accusations with Saudi Arabia, once Hariri's solid backers. Yet Saudi Arabia recently withdrew a $3bn grant to upgrade the Lebanese armed forces, which was also a slap in the face for Hariri.
The erratic behaviour of Hariri now is largely explained by the fact that his best days may be behind him, given his long absences from the country for security reasons...
The erratic behaviour of Hariri now is largely explained by the fact that his best days may be behind him, given his long absences from the country for security reasons, his declining Saudi business interests, some local challenges to his tepid leadership in recent municipal elections, and his decline in stature in the eyes of his Saudi backers.
Marginalisation of the Sunnis
He also may have wanted to stop two other trends: the gradual marginalisation of the Sunnis in Lebanon, who shared power with the Christians at Lebanon's birth 75 years ago, and the general deterioration in the public political climate and efficiency of the state, due to the presidential vacuum and the consequent sense of marginalisation of the Christian community.
Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah appears finally to have paid dividends in moving him into the presidential palace, which the 128-member parliament must formally vote on, probably next week.
Yet the process may lead to new fault lines and resentments across the notoriously unstable Lebanese political system whose 18 different confessional groups share all levels of power.
Opponents of Hezbollah resent that its Syrian and Iranian allies may increase their influence in the country, and it ultimately aims to use its power to revise the constitutional system and strengthen its hand in the long run.
Lebanon's former Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri [Reuters]
The Hariri-Aoun agreement has shown that Hezbollah can bring the national political system to a halt. This happened in the past several years, and it worsened conditions in sectors such as foreign debt, electricity output, rubbish collection, water delivery, and other essential services, to the discomfort of the majority of Lebanese who have spoken out intermittently against the oligarchy of sectarian leaders who rule the country.
Given the broad discomfort across most sectors of Lebanese society, especially poor and low-income people, Hariri not surprisingly said he endorsed Aoun "to protect Lebanon, protect the [political] system, protect the state, protect the Lebanese people … relaunch the economy, and distance us from the Syrian crisis".
He also seems to have protected his own political fortunes for now, though many sympathisers say he really had no other option. Some important political figures, including within Hariri's party, refuse to support him on Aoun’s presidency, but it is unlikely they can prevent parliament from bringing this about.
Lebanon has shown once again that it is a land of dazzling deals and mercurial personalities, including in the realm of the national presidency itself.
Yet the average Lebanese citizen has no say in the power-politics and back-room deals of his or her sectarian leader; so most people will go along with this new arrangement if they see their government functioning more efficiently and their daily basic services improving slowly.
Rami G Khouri is a senior public policy fellow at the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut and a non-resident senior fellow at Harvard University Kennedy School.
أعلنت وزارة الدفاع الأميركية (بنتاغون) مقتل جندي أميركي متأثرا بجروح أصيب بها في انفجار عبوة ناسفة شمال العراق. ولم تحدد الوزارة -في بيان أصدرته مساء الخميس- اسم الجندي أو موقع الانفجار، لكن صحيفة واشنطن بوست نقلت عن مسؤول عسكري في الوزارة أن الحادث وقع قرب الموصل.
وفي حال مقتل الجندي في معركة الموصل، فسيكون أول قتيل في الجيش الأميركي يسقط في هذه العملية العسكرية، ورابع قتيل منذ بدء العمليات ضد تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق عام 2014.
وأطلق الجيش العراقي فجر الاثنين الماضي عملية عسكرية لاستعادة مدينة الموصل من قبضة تنظيم الدولة. وتحظى العملية بغطاء جوي من التحالف الدولي التي تقوده الولايات المتحدة. كما يقدم مئات الجنود الأميركيين المشورة للقوات العراقية وقوات البشمركة الكردية التي تشارك في العملية.
Iran is stepping up weapons transfers to Houthi rebels in Yemen via smuggling routes through Oman, despite the current ceasefire in the country's civil war, the Reuters news agency reported on Thursday citing diplomatic sources.
A senior US official told Reuters that Washington had conveyed its concerns to Oman about the suspected flow of weapons into neighbouring Yemen.
Another western diplomat said there had been a "recent increased frequency of weapons shipments supplied by Iran, which are reaching the Houthis via the Omani border".
"What they're bringing in via Oman are anti-ship missiles, explosives..., money and personnel," another US official said.
Oman has denied its territory is being used as a smuggling route by the Houthis with Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin Alwi last week saying there was "no truth" in the claim.
Yemeni and senior regional officials told Reuters the Omanis were turning a blind eye and failing to aggressively crack down on the flow.
Both Saudi Arabia and the US have accused Iran of supplying weapons to the Houthis, but Tehran has denied doing so.
Reuters however quoted a senior Iranian diplomat who said there had been a "sharp surge in Iran's help to the Houthis in Yemen" since May, referring to weapons, training and money.
Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition of Arab states that has been battling the Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh since March 2015 in support of Yemen's exiled President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi.
The US has recently launched retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets following a missle attack targeting a US warship in the Red Sea.
Sporadic fighting was reported on Thursday hours after a United Nations-backed three-day ceasefire plan came into effect.
Both sides have said they will respect the ceasefire providing the other side also does so.
It is the sixth attempt to end the bloodshed since Saudi Arabia and its allies entered the conflict.
The last ceasefire attempt began in April and later collapsed alongside UN-brokered peace talks in Kuwait.
Almost 6,900 people have been killed -- more than half of them civilians -- while another three million are displaced and millions more need food aid.
EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said late on Wednesday that the truce should be a first step towards resuming peace talks.
"The ceasefire must be respected by all sides and its duration extended so as to create the necessary conditions for such negotiations," she said.
The real battle for this key Iraqi city starts when the guns fall silent and it is clearer whether Mosul will remain a predominantly Sunni city
“I was driven to the ‘yellow house’ at night and put in a room of about 4m x 5m with tens of others. There was blood on the walls. Torture started immediately. They hit us with anything they could lay their hands on, metal rods, shovels, pipes, cables. They walked on top of us with their boots. They insulted us, and said that this was payback for Speicher massacre... I saw two people die before my eyes. On the second day, I saw [relative, name and relationship removed upon request] die; he was hit with a shovel on his head several times. Others died from the conditions. They didn’t give us anything to drink for the first day; on the second, they brought a small bottle for 10 people. They took about 300 of us to the truck...They handcuffed us two by two. One man died right there, I think from thirst and suffocation... Others were taken out and then I could hear gunshots. Later I could also smell burning.”
This is one survivor’s account of what it is like to be liberated from the Islamic State (IS) group by men wearing Iraqi army and police uniforms. The testimony was given to Amnesty International last year near Fallujah, at al-Sijir and also at Saqlawiya where 643 men alone went missing.
There is a reason why Amnesty released this testimony in the week in which Iraqi and Kurdish forces launched their offensive to retake Mosul. Based on interviews with 470 former prisoners of Shia militias, Amnesty lays bare the fear of every refugee who, in the next few days and weeks, will be streaming out of Mosul, Iraq’s second biggest city and a predominantly Sunni one. If indeed they do so voluntarily. The UN says that up to a million could flee their homes.
A sectarian tinderbox
Arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance and unlawful killing are nothing new in post-Saddam Iraq. Tikrit, Fallujah and districts such as Muqdadiya in the Diyala Governorate, which has been under government control since January of 2015, have now established a pattern, which could now be repeated on a larger scale in Mosul. Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch reports are not just allegations of war crimes. They are evidence of them.
Arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance and unlawful killing are nothing new in post-Saddam Iraq
The victims of the overwhelmingly Shia Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU)s cite three reasons given by their attackers: revenge for IS sectarian attacks on Shia; the belief that all Sunni men of fighting age are IS fighters, or their families, in disguise; and an overtly religious motive to change the ethnic balance in the major cities of Iraq.
The sectarianism is stoked by the statements of Shia militia leaders themselves. Qais al-Khazaili, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, called the liberation of Mosul revenge for the killing of Imam Hussein and “preparation for a state of divine justice”. He said :"The liberation of Mosul will be the revenge against the killers of Hussein, because these are their grandsons. Allah willing, the liberation of Mosul will be vengeance and retribution against the killers of Hussein.”
This takes the motivation for the current campaign back to 680 AD, when Hussein’s death triggered the schism between the two branches of Islam. Khazaili is not marginal figure. He is in charge of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, or the League of the Righteous, the second largest militia formed by Iran in 2006 to attack US troops in Iraq. Try though they might to portray the government-funded PMUs as opposed to sectarianism - one PMU went to the lengths of producing a cartoon portraying themselves as defenders of the Christians - Khazaili’s words were unambiguously sectarian.
On Tuesday, Khazaili surfaced again in a reconciliation meeting with one of his main rivals powerful cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.
Easy recruiting conditions
The history of attacks by Shia militias during the prime ministership of Nouri al-Maliki, and his systematic efforts to cut Sunni leaders out of power, was the main recruiting sergeant for IS.
But the attacks and the dominance of militias have continued under his successor Haidar al-Abadi who has vowed repeatedly to share power. They allowed IS to take Mosul with a handful of fighters in 2014. It was against the rafidah or rejectors - a derogatory word for Shia - that the IS leader al-Baghdadi offered the Sunni in Anbar province “protection”.
The question is how effective Abadi is, and whether the forces that these PMUs represent are more powerful than Abadi himself
Under pressure, Abadi established a committee on 5 June last year to investigate the crimes of the battle of Fallujah and announced the arrest of an unspecified number of people who had committed “infractions”. The committee’s members included PMUs and Federal Police accused of these crimes, so little surprise that the Iraqi governmentare reticient about providing details to Amnesty about it.
In public, Abadi and his foreign minister have stuck to the rotten apple theory. The Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari, a former resident of Mosul himself, said in London earlier this month: “I do not deny the actions by one person here or there or a small group of people here or there”. Mosul, he said, would be a military operation of the Iraqi forces, would not be driven by a religious or sectarian agenda.
Atheel Nujaifi, former governor of Mosul and now leader of the Sunni militia known as Hashd al-Watani, said that if Hashd al-Shaabi militia were deployed in Mosul and faced with the choice of whom to fight with, many would choose IS.
"Neither the Iraqi government, nor the US, nor parts of the [international] organisations have done anything against the oppression of Sunnis…They even refute us, saying nothing is done against the Sunnis.”
Nujaifi said: “If they do not take these matters into account, there will be a significant amount of violence in Sunni areas after ISIS is gone.”
Abadi, under US pressure, has replied with promises to keep the most notorious of the Shia PMUs away from the frontlines in the battle. It has been enforced by a refusal of the US to provide air cover when these units became bogged down under IS fire. The question is how effective Abadi is, and whether the forces that these PMUs represent are more powerful than Abadi himself.
Mass evictions
Reconquest is only half of the story. The greater fear lies in what happens to these cities after the IS have been kicked out.
Fallujah has not been a good omen for what could yet take place in Mosul. Three months after its liberation, the city is empty. Only a trickle of families have been allowed back, and some of those have left again.
Plainly, a new Iraq is not being built in the rubble of these cities. An ethnically cleansed urban landscape could emerge instead
Again, there could be more than one reason for this. In the villages around Mosul, Kurdish fighters have found a network of mined tunnels, which IS use to mount suicide attacks behind Iraqi government lines. The Iraqi government forces have dug a moat around Fallujah to prevent this from happening. Three months on, the benefit of the doubt is starting to wear thin.
If the Shia militias remain in control of the captured city, how many of 300,000 residents of Fallujah who are now displaced will return?
From the Mediterranean to Baghdad, from Deraa, where theuprisings started in Syria to Mosul, Sunni Arabs are being evicted from their cities. The bulk of the population which inhabit these lands have become refugees, exiled or internally displaced. Either at the hands of the Bashar al-Assad, the Russians and Iranian-backed militias, in the case of Aleppo, or the hands of Iraqi government forces in Tikrit and Ramadi. Since IS took over, 3.3 million Iraqis have been displaced. Until now, the vast majority of residents from these cities have not returned to their homes.
Over the past three weeks, three towns on the outskirts of Damascus - Qudsaya, al-Hamehand now Moadamiyat al-Sham - besieged and bombarded by the regime even while mere kilometres from stocked aid warehouses, have been emptied of rebels and their families after they agreed to what have been called 'kneel or die' truces. They have been shipped to Idlib on buses and are unlikely to ever return. Under the truce in August made in Daraya, another long besieged Damascus suburb, even residents - 4,000 reportedly in total - were to be sent awayfrom their homes to government shelters.
Mosul is home to a plethora of ethnicities and religious minorities. Apart from Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens, there are also Christian, Yazidi, Shabak and Kakai religious minorities. The only way the conflict in Syria and Iraq will stop, and the only way to prevent the IS monster from reproducing itself ad infinitum, is to make sure that a liberated Mosul reflects the same ethnic and confessional balance as pre-IS Mosul. To make sure that all Iraqis of whatever confession or ethnicity have access to power and protection, with leaders and politicians they choose.
Plainly, a new Iraq is not being built in the rubble of these cities. An ethnically cleansed urban landscape could emerge instead.
No one knows how well dug in IS is, how long the fight to regain Mosul will take and how many more innocents have to die before the city is retaken. If the experience of recapturing Tikrit and Fallujah are anything to go by, the real battle for Mosul will only start when the fighting stops. The recapture of Mosul will not determine the outcome of this war. The resettlement of Mosul, however, will.
- David Hearst is editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He was chief foreign leader writer of The Guardian, former associate foreign editor, European editor, Moscow Bureau Chief, European correspondent, and Ireland correspondent. He joined The Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.
بيروت ـ الأناضول ـ شيّع حزب الله اللبناني، اليوم الثلاثاء، جثمان أحد قادته العسكريين البارزين، “حاتم حمادي”، الذي قتل أمس الأول، خلال مشاركته في الحرب السورية إلى جانب قوات نظام “بشار الأسد”.
وأقيمت مراسم التشييع لـ”حمادي” الذي يحمل الاسم الحركي “الحاج علاء” ، في ضاحية بيروت الجنوبية، بمشاركة مئات من أنصار الحزب.
وسارت الجنازة، التي حملت نعش “حمادي” الملفوف بعلم حزب الله، في عدد من شوارع وأحياء الضاحية، على وقع الصيحات والشعارات الدينية والسياسية، قبل أن يدفن في مقبرة “روضة الحوراء زينب”.
ورفع المشاركون في التشييع صور “حمادي” وأعلام الحزب ورايات دينية.
ويقاتل حزب الله إلى جانب النظام السوري، بشكل علني، منذ مطلع العام 2013.
ووفق بيان سابق للحزب، فإن “حمادي”، من بلدة القماطية في جبل لبنان، ولد عام1971، متزوج وله ولدان، حائز على إجازة جامعية تخصص هندسة الكهرباء.
وأوضح البيان أن “حمادي من طلائع المجاهدين الذين ذهبوا إلى سوريا لحماية لبنان من الخطر التكفيري”، بحسب تعبيره.
Paramilitary militias and government forces in Iraq have committed serious human rights violations, including war crimes, by torturing, arbitrarily detaining, forcibly disappearing and extrajudicially executing thousands of civilians who have escaped areas controlled by the armed group calling itself the Islamic State (IS), said Amnesty International in a new report published today.
The report is based on interviews with more than 470 former detainees, witnesses and relatives of those killed, disappeared or detained, as well as officials, activists, humanitarian workers and others.
“After escaping the horrors of war and tyranny of IS, Sunni Arabs in Iraq are facing brutal revenge attacks at the hands of militias and government forces, and are being punished for crimes committed by the group,” said Philip Luther, Research and Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.
“Iraq is currently facing very real and deadly security threats from IS, but there can be no justification for extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture or arbitrary detention.
“As the battle to retake Mosul gets underway, it is crucial that the Iraqi authorities take steps to ensure these appalling abuses do not happen again. States supporting military efforts to combat IS in Iraq must demonstrate they will not continue to turn a blind eye to violations.”
As the battle to retake Mosul gets underway, it is crucial that the Iraqi authorities take steps to ensure these appalling abuses do not happen again
The report highlights widespread revenge attacks and discrimination faced by Sunni Arabs suspected of being complicit in IS crimes or supporting the group. Many were displaced during major military operations in 2016 across the country, including in Falluja and surrounding areas (in the governorate of Anbar), al-Sharqat (Salah al-Din governorate), Hawija (Kirkuk governorate) and around Mosul (Ninewa governorate).
The predominantly Shi’a militias involved in abuses, known as the Popular Mobilization Units, have long been backed by the Iraqi authorities, which have provided them with financial support and weapons. They were officially designated part of the Iraqi forces in February 2016.
The government’s responsibility for these violations cannot be ignored and states supporting or participating in the ongoing military effort to combat IS in Iraq should have rigorous checks in place to ensure that any support or equipment they provide does not contribute to abuses.
Amnesty International’s research reveals that war crimes and other gross human rights violations were committed by predominantly Sh’ia militias, and possibly government forces, during operations to retake Falluja and surrounding areas from IS in May and June 2016.
In one shocking incident at least 12 men and four boys from the Jumaila tribe who fled al-Sijir, north of Falluja, were extrajudicially executed after they handed themselves in to men wearing military and federal police uniforms on 30 May. Men and older boys were separated from the women and younger children before being lined up and shot dead. At least 73 other men and older boys from the same tribe were seized a few days earlier and are still missing.
Militias also abducted, tortured and killed men and boys from the Mehemda tribe who fled Saqlawiya, another town north of Falluja. On 3 June, some 1,300 men and older boys were seized. Three days later, more than 600 of them were transferred to the custody of local Anbar officials bearing marks of torture on their bodies.
Survivors interviewed by Amnesty International said they were held at an abandoned farmhouse, beaten with various objects, including shovels, and denied food and water. One survivor said that 17 of his relatives were still missing, including his 17-year-old nephew. Another of his relatives had died, apparently as a result of torture.
“There was blood on the walls… They hit me and the others with anything they could lay their hands on, metal rods, shovels, pipes, cables… They walked on top of us with their boots. They insulted us, and said that this was payback for the Speicher massacre [in which some 1,700 captured Shi’a cadets were summarily killed by IS]… I saw two people die in front of my eyes,” he told Amnesty International.
There was blood on the walls… I saw two people die in front of my eyes
A local investigative committee set up by the Governor of Anbar concluded that 49 people captured from Saqlawiya were killed – either shot dead or burned or tortured to death – and that 643 others remained missing. The government announced that investigations had been opened into the incident and arrests carried out, but has not disclosed any detailed information about findings or those detained.
The abductions and mass killings near Falluja are far from isolated incidents. Across the country, thousands of Sunni men and boys who fled IS-held territory have been forcibly disappeared by Iraqi security forces and militias. Most went missing either after handing themselves over to pro-government forces or were seized from their homes, camps for internally displaced people or at checkpoints or on the streets According to one local parliamentarian, since late 2014 members of the Hizbullah Brigades have abducted and forcibly disappeared up to 2,000 men and boys at the al-Razzaza checkpoint, which separates Anbar and Karbala governorates.
“The Hashd [militias] took our men away saying this was payback [for IS abuses],” said “Salma” (name changed to protect her identity), whose husband was seized at the al-Razzaza checkpoint with his two cousins in January 2016 as they fled IS rule.
“Iraqi authorities, whose complicity and inaction in the face of widespread abuses have contributed to the current climate of impunity, must rein in militias and make clear that such serious violations will not be tolerated. They must impartially and independently investigate all allegations of torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions,” said Philip Luther.
“Failure to do so will allow a vicious cycle of abuse, repression and injustice to continue and raises serious fears about the safety of civilians still in Mosul.”
Torture and abuses in detention
All males fleeing areas under IS control considered of fighting age (between roughly 15 and 65) are subjected to security screening by Iraqi authorities and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government to determine if they have links to IS. But the process is opaque and often deeply flawed. While some are released within days, others are transferred to security forces and detained for weeks or months in horrific conditions, without access to their families or the outside world, and without being referred to court.
The report reveals how security forces and militia members routinely torture or otherwise ill-treat detainees at screening facilities, unofficial militia detention sites, and facilities controlled by the Ministries of Defence and Interior in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala and Salah al-Din governorates.
Detainees told Amnesty International they were suspended in stress positions for long periods, given electric shocks, beaten brutally or were taunted with threats that their female relatives would be raped. Many said they were tortured to “confess” or to provide information on IS and other armed groups.
Former detainees held by the Kurdish security forces (Asayish) in Dibis, Makhmur and Dohuk in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq also said they faced torture and other ill-treatment.
One man described being tortured at a facility controlled by Iraqi armed forces and intelligence near the village of Hajj Ali in June 2016 where more than 50 people were held in one room and subjected to repeated beatings:
“They beat me with a thick cable on the soles of my feet. I saw another detainee having a cigarette extinguished on his body. A boy of about 15 had hot wax poured on him. They wanted us to confess to being Daesh.”
I saw another detainee having a cigarette extinguished on his body. A boy of about 15 had hot wax poured on him
Iraqi courts have a history of relying on coerced “confessions” to convict defendants of serious charges in flagrantly unfair trials – often sentencing them to death. So far in 2016, at least 88 executions have been carried out mainly on terrorism-related charges. Dozens of death sentences have been handed down and some 3,000 people remain on death row.
Background
The findings of this report were shared with the Iraqi and Kurdish authorities on 21 September. No response has been received from the Iraqi authorities. The Kurdish authorities responded largely denying Amnesty International’s findings.
Tens of thousands of Iraqis have been forcibly displaced by Iraqi government forces and the Peshmerga (Kurdish armed forces), as well as militias, since mid-2014. Many are barred from returning to their homes, purportedly on security grounds or face arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions on their freedom of movement. Often they are confined to camps with little prospect of gaining livelihoods or accessing essential services.
