ثلاث سنوات من ثورة سوريا.. نحو سياسة جديدة

بعد ثلاث سنوات من الثورة لا بد من أن تكون قد تراكمت خبرات مهمة، وظهرت المشكلات التي تضعف الثورة، لهذا لا بد من إعادة بناء الرؤية التي تحكمها.

هذا ما فرض إعادة صياغة البرنامج الذي يحدد أهداف الثورة، ويفرض إعادة بناء السياسات التي تستطيع تجاوز الاستعصاء القائم وتحقيق الانتصار.

بدأت الثورة "سلمية"، أي عبر كل أشكال التظاهر التي حشدت في مدن عديدة وفي أوقات مختلفة مئات الآلاف.

استمرت كذلك رغم أن السلطة استخدمت السلاح منذ 18 مارس/آذار في درعا، واستمرت في استخدامه بعدئذ، وحتى بعد توسيع الصراع من قبل السلطة عبر إدخال الجيش في الصراع ضد الشعب.

"إذا كانت بعض أطراف المعارضة تحرّض على استخدام السلاح منذ الأشهر الأولى للثورة، فإن ما فرض انتقال الثورة إلى العمل المسلح هو الوحشية التي كانت تمارسها السلطة"

وإذا كانت السلطة تمارس الوحشية والإذلال من أجل دفع الشعب لحمل السلاح، انطلاقا من أن هذه الخطوة هي التي سوف تعطيها التفوق نتيجة ضخامة القوى العسكرية لديها، وإذا كانت بعض أطراف المعارضة (الإخوان المسلمون) تحرّض على استخدام السلاح منذ الأشهر الأولى، فإن ما فرض انتقال الثورة إلى العمل المسلح هو الوحشية التي كانت تمارسها السلطة.

ولأن الشباب الذي كان يتظاهر هو الذي حمل السلاح، فقد تراجعت المظاهرات، خصوصا مع زيادة عنف السلطة، ومن ثم ميلها للقتل الوحشي والتدمير، وأصبح التسلح هو "المبرر" لكي تزيد وحشية السلطة، وتسمح بالتدمير وتهجير الشعب. بالتالي مالت الثورة لأن تكون مسلحة دون نشاط شعبي مقابل أو رديف، وهذا بات يرتهن لقلة خبرة المسلحين العسكرية، وقلة قدرتهم التنظيمية بعد أن قتل أو اعتقل أو هرب الصف الأول من المنظمين في التنسيقيات، الأمر الذي فُتح على فوضى عسكرية، وتشكل مناطقي للكتائب المسلحة، وفشل في إدارة المناطق التي باتت تحت سيطرتهم.

لقد تسربت فكرة "التحرير" من بعض أحزاب المعارضة كسياسة عسكرية، وفرضت هذه الأحزاب تسمية المنشقين عن الجيش، الذين انخرطوا في الثورة عبر "الجيش الحر".

بالتالي باتت الإستراتيجية العسكرية التي تمارس هي إستراتيجية تصارع "جيشين"، تكون مهمة "الجيش الحر" هي تحرير المدن والمناطق السورية من سيطرة السلطة. وفي ظل الاختلال الكبير في ميزان القوى، حيث تمتلك السلطة قوات مدربة على القمع والقتل، وأسلحة لا يمكن مجاراتها من حيث قوة النيران، وتتحكم في الأرض، ووجود الطيران الحربي والصواريخ البعيدة المدى، لم تكن إستراتيجية الثورة العسكرية صائبة، لأنها همشت الحراك الشعبي، واعتمدت كتائب مسلحة ضعيفة التدريب والتسليح، وتميل للدفاع عن مناطقها، وإذا تقدمت تتقدم في محيطها، لهذا وقعت تحت ضغط التفوق الكبير في الأسلحة التي تمتلكها السلطة.

وإذا كانت سيطرت على مناطق انسحبت قوات السلطة منها، في الشمال والشرق خصوصا، فقد دخلت في عملية "تقدم بطيء" بعدئذ، وفشل أحيانا، ولم تستطع الإفادة من ضعف السلطة لكي تحسم الصراع، إضافة إلى أنها لم تمنع دخول قوى أصولية، زرعتها السلطة، وكان واضحا أن وجودها سوف يؤدي موضوعيا إلى "تخريب" الثورة، أو عرقلة نشاطها. كما لاحظنا متأخرين.

كل ذلك يفرض أن يعاد النظر في الوضع كله، بحيث لا بد من إعادة تنشيط الحراك الشعبي، وتنظيم القوى الشعبية بحيث يكون لها دور فاعل، واعتبار أن الثورة هي ثورة شعبية يكون للعمل المسلح فيها دور داعم لتطوير النشاط الشعبي الذي هو وحده سيحسم الصراع وليس الحرب، في وضع يعاني من اختلال كبير في ميزان القوى.

فالسلطة تُدعّم بالسلاح و"المرتزقة" من إيران والعراق ولبنان، وتدعّم بالسلاح من إيران وروسيا، وبالخبرات من هؤلاء جميعا، بينما لا أحد يريد دعم الثورة عسكريا، على العكس من ذلك جرى دعم القوى الأصولية من أجل تخريب الثورة خدمة للسلطة، وبهدف تحويلها إلى مجزرة تكون عبرة للشعوب كافة، وبالتالي لا يمكن تحقيق تغيير في طبيعة التسليح القائم، يمكن أن يؤدي إلى تحقيق اختلال ميزان القوى.

وهذا يفرض التالي:

"لم تقم الثورة من أجل "دولة الإسلام"، بل كانت من أجل الحرية والعدالة. ولم تقم ضد شخص أو عائلة، بل ضد نمط اقتصادي وفئات تدافع عنه، ومن أجل اقتصاد يحقق الرفاه"

أ- أن تتشكل مجالس شعبية تدير كل المناطق الواقعة خارج سيطرة السلطة، والمحررة، وأن تكون مهمتها تشكيل إدارة كاملة فيما يخص القضاء و"الشرطة" والخدمات.

ب - تنشيط الحراك الشعبي (أو المدني كما يتكرر)، وتفعيله في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها السلطة بكل الأشكال الممكنة، وأظن أن الشعب بعد ثورة السنوات الثلاث قد اكتسب خبرة تجعله قادرا على ذلك.

ج - تنظيم الكتائب المسلحة وتوحيدها في مظلة واحدة، تتشكل من قيادات عسكرية خبيرة، حيث إن الأمر يتعلق بإعادة بناء الإستراتيجية العسكرية، وتحديد الأولويات التي تتعلق بضرب مفاصل السلطة الأساسية، وليس الانخراط في "تحرير المدن" بحيث تصبح هذه المدن عرضة للقصف العنيف، وللبراميل المتفجرة والصواريخ. والانطلاق من ضرورة تدمير ما تبقى من "البنية الصلبة" للسلطة (الفرقة الرابعة والحرس الجمهوري)، وتدمير كل القوى التي تستجلب من لبنان والعراق وإيران، والسيطرة على السلطة ليس عبر "تحرير دمشق"، بل عبر السيطرة على المواقع التي تتحكم السلطة من خلالها في دمشق، وفي السلطة كلها.

د- إنهاء مهزلة التسميات "الإسلامية" للكتائب المسلحة، ومعرفة أن هذه التسميات لن تجلب المال أو السلاح، أو أنها تجلب المال للقوى التي تقبل الخضوع لأجندات خارجية، لا تريدها أن تُسقِط السلطة، بل تريدها أداة مساومة مع السلطة.

لقد أضرت هذه التسميات أكثر مما أفادت، وفتحت الأفق لتقوية قوى طائفية أصولية لا تقتل السلطة، بل تريد فرض "دولة الإسلام" على الشعب في المناطق التي تتراجع السلطة عنها.

ه - لا بد من فهم أن ليس كل الجيش يقاتل مع السلطة، بل الجزء الأكبر منه بات محيّدا ومهمشا، وهذا ما يفرض التفكير في كيفية التأثير فيه من أجل أن يلعب دورا في التغيير.

ويقتضي هذا أولا عدم التعامل معه كعدو، ومن ثم كيف يمكن الاستفادة من دوره، فهو يتشكل من أبناء المناطق التي تعرضت للقتل والتدمير، وهو من أبناء الشعب الذي ثار، ويمتلك الميول ذاتها.

في مستوى آخر لا بد من تهميش كل المجموعات الأصولية، التي يعمل بعضها لمصلحة السلطة وبعضها لمصلحة دول إقليمية، ومواجهة منطقها الوهابي الذي يؤسس على مخيال "قروسطي"، ويسترجع ماضيا وهميا، ويتشكل من خليط من فئات مأزومة (وربما لديها هوس جنسي) واختراق مخابراتي متعدد.

فالثورة لم تكن من أجل "دولة الإسلام" التي يدعو هؤلاء لها، بل كانت من أجل الحرية والعدالة كما أوضحنا سابقا، ولم تكن ضد شخص أو عائلة، بل كانت ضد نمط اقتصادي وفئات تدافع عنه، من أجل اقتصاد يحقق الرفاه.

ولا شك أن إدخال هذه الأفكار الأصولية كان من أجل تشويش الثورة وتشويهها، لأن ما يمارسه هؤلاء يخرّب مجتمعيا ويستفاد منه من قبل السلطة وعالميا للقول إن ما يجري ليس ثورة بل "إرهابا جهاديا".

لا بد أن يحل الخطاب "الوطني" الطبقي الديمقراطي محل أي خطاب آخر، ولا بد بالتالي من مواجهة الخطاب الأصولي الوهابي، وتهميش قواه.

في مستوى ثالث لا بد من تجاوز الأوهام حول "الدور الخارجي"، فليس هناك قوة دولية تريد انتصار الثورة، بل إنها تريد المجزرة لأن كلا منها تتحسس وضعها في ظل الأزمة العميقة التي تعيشها الرأسمالية، والتي تؤسس لثورات كبيرة في العالم.

"لا بد من تجاوز الأوهام حول "الدور الخارجي"، فليس هناك قوة دولية تريد انتصار الثورة، لأن كلا منها تتحسس وضعها في ظل أزمة عميقة تعيشها الرأسمالية، وتؤسس لثورات كبيرة في العالم"

ولأن من يتدخل يُخضع الملتحقين به لسياساته التي لا تهدف إلى انتصار الثورة قطعا، وكل يتسابق من أجل الحصول على مصالح اقتصادية وعقود إعادة الإعمار، لنهب البلد بديلا عن نهب آل الأسد ومخلوف وشاليش وكل الحاشية.

بالتالي لا بد من الانطلاق من القوى المحلية، ومن القدرات المحلية، وتنظيمها بما يجعلها قوة.

ولهذا لا بد من فضح كل الذين يراهنون على القوى الإمبريالية، أو يتعاملون معها، أو يعتقدون بأن سوريا المستقبل يجب أن تكون "في حضن الغرب". هذا خطاب مسيء ويضر الثورة، ولقد أضرها كثيرا في الماضي دون جدوى، لأن القوى الإمبريالية (وأميركا خصوصا) لا تريد التدخل، ولم تعد قادرة على ذلك.

في الأخير، ما هو مهم هو كيف يمكن أن يتحرك الساحل السوري؟ أي كيف يمكن أن تفقد السلطة "بنيتها الصلبة"، وتواجه البيئة الاجتماعية التي استغلتها طيلة السنوات الثلاث، وأفقدتها خيرة شبابها؟

فالصراع مع السلطة لن يحسم إلا من خلال الإفادة من كتلة الجيش المهمشة أولا، ومن تحرك الساحل ثانيا.

بغير ذلك ربما يستمر الصراع فترة أطول إذا لم تسارع القوى الدولية التي تريد تحقيق مصالحها في سوريا إلى فرض حل وفق جنيف2، أو بشكل آخر.

الثورة ليست في أحسن حالاتها، والسلطة كذلك في أسوأ حالاتها، لهذا لا بد من أن يعاد بناء الثورة بما يسمح لها بأن تحسم الصراع، 

وهذا يفترض انخراط كل الشعب، وتنظيم العمل العسكري، وإعادة بناء الأهداف والسياسات.

Seymour Hersh's Volcano Problem

By Brown Moses

Update Seymour Hersh has now let the world know what he knows about Volcano Rockets, which I've detailed in my latest piece, What Does Seymour Hersh Knows About Volcano Rockets?

This article is now available in Turkish here.

Yesterday, the London Review of Books published a second piece by Seymour Hersh on the August 21st Sarin attack.  In an earlier piece published in December 2013, Hersh had approached the attacks from two angles, that the White House had used dodgy intelligence in the build up to intervention in Syria, and that the evidence suggested the munition used were improvised, and therefore it was likely the opposition was responsible.  While the first point is certainly worth exploring, especially in light of information gathered about the attacks since August 21st, the second point was extremely flawed, with there being clear evidence of the government using the type of munitions linked to August 21st going back to late 2012, which I detailed in my piece Sy Hersh's Chemical Misfire.

In his latest piece on August 21st, Seymour Hersh presents a narrative where the Turkish intelligence services aided the Syrian opposition in carrying out a false flag attack on August 21st, using one "former intelligence" source in particular.  EA Worldview has already put together an excellent response highlighting some of the major flaws in Hersh's piece, in particular the use of one source for most of his accusations, and I'd like to focus on one particular aspect of the attacks that Hersh appears to be ignorant of, or has chosen to ignore.

In the aftermath of the Sarin attack on Eastern Ghouta on August 21st, the remains of munitions that were practically unknown where recorded at several impact sites (shown below)

After months of research it has been possible to gather a significant amount of information about these rockets.  August 21st was not the first time these types of rockets, known as "Volcano" rockets, were used in the conflict.  On August 5th 2013, three examples of the same type of rocket were filmed at the scene of an alleged chemical attack in the town of Adra, Damascus

Another example, described as a "chemical rocket" was filmed in June 2013, again in Adra, Damascus, with the remains of another type of the same rocket filmed in January 2013, in Daraya, Damascus, this time without it being described as a chemical rocket.

In all incidents, the rockets have exactly the same design, down to the small nut and bolt, and in three of the four incidents they are described as being chemical weapons. 

It's also been possible to establish there's multiple types of Volcano rockets, and that there are explosives types that have been used widely since at least late 2012.  They all follow the same basic principle, a conventional artillery rocket with the warhead removed and replaced with a much larger warhead, with a much reduced range, but much greater destructive capability.

Videos posted on pro-government YouTube channels and Facebook pages, in particular the official pages of the Syrian National Defence Force, shows Volcano rockets in action, and confirms government forces have been using them for over a year.  The three main types of explosive Volcano rockets are shown below

What's of particular interest is the 122mm motor based Volcano fired from the two barrelled launcher, shown in the above picture.  Multiple videos from the government controlled Mezzeh airbase, in southwest Damascus, show these launchers being used in late 2012, and later images and videos show the same type of Volcano rockets and their launchers being used by government forces.  It seems undeniable that the Syrian government has been using these types of Volcano rockets for over the year, and there's been no evidence of Syrian opposition forces capturing or using this type of Volcano rocket. 

The unexploded remains of the explosive type of 122mm Volcano rockets have also been recovered, and it's possible to compare these videos with the images of the remains of the chemical type of 122mm Volcano rocket.  The rocket sections of the explosive and chemical 122mm Volcano rockets appears to be identical, apart from markings, which on the chemical type are red numbers, and on the explosive types of black numbers.  This type of numbering can be seen on chemical and explosive versions from examples from different dates, and seems to strongly suggest the colour of the number denotes the type of munition, explosive or chemical.

The warheads have similar dimensions, but are obviously different designs due to their differing payloads.  For example, both types have a port at the base of the warhead, but the chemical type has an additional port that appears to be used to fill the munition (shown on the left of the below image)

So, what does this have to do with Seymour Hersh's piece?  Well, it seems Hersh thinks nothing at all, as he fails to even acknowledge their existence in either of his pieces.  As I mentioned before, their use by the Syrian military totally destroys his argument in his earlier piece that their design suggests they are improvised munitions created by the Syrian opposition.  The fact the appear totally unique to the Syrian government's inventory would then suggest two things if the Turkish government had helped with a false flag attack on August 21st as per Hersh's narrative

1. The Syrian opposition captured some chemical Volcano rockets, without Sarin, which was then provided to the opposition by Turkey, or
2. Perfect replicas of chemical Volcano rockets used by the Syrian government were recreated by the Syrian opposition or Turkish government.

As for point one; the Syrian government has never claimed any of their chemical weapons have been captured by the Syrian opposition, even when required to do so by the OPCW.  As Hersh (nor, one assumes, his source) never refers to these munitions it's difficult to know how Hersh and his source thinks these munitions fits into the Turkish false flag narrative Hersh and his source has put together. 

It should also be kept in mind that the OPCW/UN team took samples from these rockets that points towards a binary type of Sarin being used, that would have been premixed before being poured into the warheads.  This is not something you can do in a bathtub, the combination of the two precursors would have produced not only Sarin, but dangerous by-products, including a powerful acid, and specialised equipment and safety procedures would have been required (more details on that here).  There's also a question of quantity; so far I've collected images of at least 8 Volcano rockets used on August 21st, and there are reports that over 12 Volcano rockets were used.  It's been calculated the warheads would have a capacity of 50-60 litres, making for at least 400 to 720 litres of the Sarin mixture.

Seymour Hersh fails to address how eight to twelve 2 meter long perfect copies of Volcano rockets were produced and transported from Turkey to Damascus, along with hundreds of litres of Sarin precursors, and the required equipment to mix it and pour it into the warheads.  When accusing the Turkish government of participating in a horrific chemical attack as the pretext to invading Syria, these sort of details aren't something that can just be hand-waved with "well, they could do anything if they put their mind to it", as some commentators have attempted.  The chemical Volcano rockets used on August 21st are a key piece of evidence, especially in the case of Seymour Hersh's latest accusations, so by not even acknowledging their existence, it seems Hersh is either ignorant of, or chooses to ignore, key information that is extremely significant to the narrative he's trying to construct. 

Considering the seriousness of the charges he's making against the Turkish government, such an oversight seems highly irresponsible for a journalist of Hersh's reputation.

Why Free Jonathan Pollard Now?

Forget the Israeli-Palestinian talks – it’s all about American politics

By Justin Raimondo

The reported deal to release Jonathan Pollard in exchange for the release of an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners, suspension of settlement building, and an extension of the "peace process" beyond the April 30 deadline is a complete fraud. It has nothing to do with resolving the Palestinian question, and – if it becomes a fact – represents nothing but Washington’s capitulation before Tel Aviv’s ceaseless demands.

Indeed, I rather doubt the Pollard matter is primarily related to the negotiations with the Palestinians. After all, what would the US be getting in this exchange but the mere hope that a comprehensive deal can be reached before the end of the month – with no assurances that such an agreement will actually be forthcoming. That this hope is a slender one goes without saying: like the quest for the Holy Grail, the search for the key to unlocking the "peace process" in Palestine has become emblematic of the impossible. So who will be surprised when April 30 comes and we wind up with nada?

What, then, is this all about? If the prospect of peace in the Holy Land is as elusive as it’s ever been, then why is John Kerry dangling Pollard in front of the Israelis? One has to conclude there is more at stake in these negotiations than the status of the occupied territories, the question of settlements, and one traitor’s freedom. We have, of course, no way of knowing exactly what this entails: is the US using Pollard to forestall an Israeli attack on Iran?

That there is more to this deal than meets the eye is underscored, in my view, by the extraordinary efforts successive Israeli governments have made to secure Pollard’s release: every Israel Prime Minister since Pollard’s arrest and imprisonment has tried to get him out. The man Americans revile as a traitor has streets named after him in Israel and is routinely honored as a martyr who gave his all for the Jewish state: the Israeli Knesset regularly votes to demand his release.

In the context of the "special relationship" we are told exists between Israel and the US, this valorization of a spy is somewhat odd, to say the least. Although we are supposed to have no better friend in this world, doesn’t it strike anyone as strange that someone who so damaged our national security is held up as a hero without peer by our peerless "ally"?

And it isn’t just the Israelis who have been rallying to Pollard’s side all these years: averitable army of Israel Firsters has been mobilized in defense of the "hero" Pollard right here in the US. This kind of thing is rare in American politics: a significant mobilization on behalf of an accused spy in the pay of a foreign power. Benedict Arnold had no defense committee, and few believe he deserved one. The only other example of the traitor-as-hero I can think of is the Rosenbergs, on whose behalf American Communists and their fellow travelers campaigned for a pardon. Indeed, the two cases are alike in some of their specifics, as well as in the more general sense of the anti-hero valorized for ideological reasons.

To begin with, what the Rosenbergs stole and what Pollard made off with were similar in terms of their centrality to American national security. The Rosenbergs stole nuclear secrets at the moment when the fate of the postwar world could’ve gone one way or the other. The war was still going but the end was in sight, and the race to develop nuclear weapons – in which the Soviets were lagging, but the Germans stillhoped to win – was proceeding under the radar of most Americans. Without the Rosenbergs, the Soviets might never have created a nuclear arsenal in time to build a credible deterrent. The cold war might never have happened – or else it would’ve been far shorter.

While the scale of Pollard’s theft is not precisely known, what we do know is that he stole much information that would’ve only been useful to the Soviets. Seymour Hershnailed it:

"A number of officials strongly suspect that the Israelis repackaged much of Pollard’s material and provided it to the Soviet Union in exchange for continued Soviet permission for Jews to emigrate to Israel. Other officials go further, and say there was reason to believe that secret information was exchanged for Jews working in highly sensitive positions in the Soviet Union. A significant percentage of Pollard’s documents, including some that described the techniques the American Navy used to track Soviet submarines around the world, was of practical importance only to the Soviet Union. One longtime C.I.A. officer who worked as a station chief in the Middle East said he understood that ‘certain elements in the Israeli military had used it’ – Pollard’s material – ‘to trade for people they wanted to get out,’ including Jewish scientists working in missile technology and on nuclear issues."

Pollard gave away what many consider the "crown jewels" of American intelligence-gathering: "sources and methods," i.e. how our intelligence systems work. Whoever had this key could unlock our deepest secrets – and take out our agents all over the world.

The other parallel with the Rosenberg case is in the talking points used by the traitors’ respective defenders. The red-pinko popular front that turned out at "Free the Rosenbergs" rallies believed these spies for the Soviet Union were victims of anti-Semitism. The inevitable comparisons to the Dreyfuss case were made. As a good pieceon MyJewishLearning puts it:

"The fear that the Rosenberg case would exacerbate anti-Semitism was heightened by the emphasis of European and American Communists on the couple’s Jewish background once it became clear that they were not going to talk. Anti-Semitism, their supporters charged, was behind the government’s prosecution and execution of the Rosenbergs. The Rosenbergs’ defenders wondered why the New York City jury that convicted the Rosenbergs did not contain one Jew, even though the city’s population was 30 percent Jewish. They also noted that, even if the Rosenbergs were guilty as charged, their crime had been committed during World War II, when the Soviet Union was not an enemy of the United States. At the worst, the Rosenbergs had provided information to an ally, and this did not warrant the death penalty."

Pollard’s defenders use almost identical arguments: Israel is an ally of the United States, they aver, the best friend we ever had – he shouldn’t be in jail because he was only defending that ally. This is usually followed by the claim that the "persecution" of Pollard is an example of anti-Semitism-run-amok. Pardoning him, they say, will correct a grave injustice.

Given the sheer scope of Pollard’s thievery, it’s hard to see how any American could defend his actions – but all too easy to see why he’s a hero in Israel.

After all, the "special relationship" is, in many ways, a love-hate relationship. We love them – and we give them billions, and unconditional diplomatic support that isolates us internationally. Yet we also resent them for being so unreasonable – a long-simmering feeling that has boiled over during the Obama administration and is now being openly voiced by both sides.

For years dependent on Western support and financial assistance, the Israelis have long harbored an undercurrent of anti-Americanism that hasn’t bothered to disguise itself of late. Dependence breeds resentment, and this is doubly true for the sort of ultra-nationalists who are now in the ascendant in Israeli politics: tweaking America pays off politically in Israel as well as in Russia, Iran, and China. This tendency in Israeli politics finds its fullest expression in Pollard’s elevation to hero status – a figure so popular that Netanyahu finds himself obliged to demand his freedom.

The last time Netanyahu tried to pull this, back in 1998 when the Clinton administration was trying to do what Kerry is currently attempting, CIA director George Tenet threatened to resign if Pollard were freed. I doubt Brennan has the balls to follow suit, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see lower level resignations, and a chorus of criticism from the ever-dwindling pro-American faction of the national security bureaucracy.

The Israel lobby needs this victory badly, and it looks like the Obama administration has decided to give it to them. They’ve been in retreat ever since the confirmation of Chuck Hagel. The popular outcry that stopped the Syria strike was also a big blow to their prestige, adding to the growing perception that their vaunted influence is on the wane. The freeing of Pollard – and in exchange for suspiciously little – would reassure the true believers that the Lobby still has what it takes – a key to their continued survival as a force to be reckoned with in Washington.

This, I think, is the key to understanding how Pollard got pulled into John Kerry’s road show. After handing the Lobby a number of notable defeats, the freeing of Pollard is a consolation prize – entirely unrelated to the Israeli-Palestinian talks, which are only a cover for an old-fashioned under-the-table political pay off.

The Deterioration of Egypt

By Ramsey Clark and Abdeen Jabara

April 10, 2014 "ICH" - "CP" -  We recently visited Egypt leading a delegation of lawyers to observe the situation of human rights in that country. We were troubled by what we saw and heard. We are also troubled by the United States’ support for a government installed by a military coup.
The United States and more than 160 States have agreed to respect and ensure the right to participate in one’s government, for example, by agreeing to article 25 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless, as this right came under serious attack in Egypt, the United States continues to support the Egyptian military as it imposes its will on the Egyptian people. This support should stop until and unless the freely and fairly elected government is restored.
The military coup that took place in Egypt on 3 July 2013 is a serious violation of the right to participate in one’s democracy. It is a violation of the rights of the majority voters in the Egypt’s presidential and parliamentary elections in 2011 and 2012.
The serious deterioration of human rights in Egypt in the aftermath of the military coup is largely due to the military coup leaders’ unwillingness to allow any significant expressions of dissent and the military coup leaders’ failure to respect the will of the Egyptian people.
During our visit to Cairo we heard reliably allegations of massive, widespread and serious violations of the right to fair trial, to an independent judiciary, to security of person, to the prohibition of torture, and about a policy of violent assaults on women. The level of these abuses is unprecedented in Egypt, a country with which we are familiar for almost half a century.
Grave concerns were expressed by lawyers about the integrity of the courts. The trial of Egypt’s first elected President Mohamed Morsi by the military is a case in point. The procedures that exist in the Egyptian Constitution for trying their President have been ignored. This has resulted in President Morsi being tried by an illegal court that appears to have been created merely to justify removing him from office.
The military coup leaders have been unrelenting in their attack on the peaceful supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In December 2013 the military coup leaders declared the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal entity. They did this despite the fact that the Freedom and Justice Party with which it is associated, won more support than any other party in Egypt’s free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. This action violates the right to free speech, assembly and association.
Recently, an Egyptian court, functioning under the military coup, sentenced more than 400 supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood to death for the killing of a single policeman. At the same time, thousands of Egyptians remain arbitrarily detained and without fair trial.

The dismal state of human rights in Egypt, which we witnessed first hand, should be a concern for us all. The United States should stand with the Egyptian people and not with the leaders of a military coup.

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Egypt must end 'vindictive' detention of Al Jazeera journalists

Egypt’s continued detention of three Al Jazeera journalists charged with falsifying news and involvement with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood movement is “vindictive”, Amnesty International said ahead of the trio’s latest trial hearing.

Al Jazeera English staff Mohamed Fahmy, Peter Greste and Baher Mohamed, along with five Egyptian students, stand accused of belonging to or assisting a banned terrorist organization -, in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood. Their trial resumes on 10 April.

“What the Egyptian authorities are doing is vindictive persecution of journalists for merely doing their jobs,” said Amnesty International’s Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Middle East and North Africa Programme Deputy Director. 

“So far, the Prosecution has failed to produce any convincing evidence and the journalists appear to be pawns in the hands of the authorities in their ongoing dispute with Qatar. The truth is that Mohamed Fahmy, Peter Greste and Baher Mohamed are prisoners of conscience who must be released immediately and unconditionally.”

The men have been detained since 29 December 2013, when security forces arrested Mohamed Fahmy and Peter Greste at the Marriott Hotel in Cairo and Baher Mohamed at his home. 

The five Egyptian students were arrested two days later. 

At their last hearing on 31 March, the judge ordered forensic experts to examine three of the students, after they alleged security forces had beaten them during their arrest.

The authorities are also denying Mohamed Fahmy adequate medical treatment for a shoulder injury sustained in the days before his arrest. 

The journalist has a fractured bone in his arm and his condition has worsened considerably due to lack of adequate medical care and the poor prison conditions he has endured, including over a month spent in the maximum-security Scorpion Prison after his arrest.

“This trial is nothing more than posturing by the authorities to gain public support,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui.

“This farce must end and the charges against the three men must be dropped.”

Media crackdown

The trial has come amid a crackdown by the Egyptian authorities on the Al Jazeera network, as well as other media seen as supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and ousted president Mohamed Morsi.

It has also played out against the backdrop of worsening relations between Egypt and Qatar, where Al Jazeera is based.

Security forces filmed the arrest of Mohamed Fahmy and Peter Greste and the video was later screened on Egyptian television, apparently in an attempt to smear the men. 

The arrests sparked an international outcry from media organizations, as well as a statement by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on 31 January, which expressed concern over what it called “the systematic targeting of Al Jazeera staff” and the wider situation facing journalists and other media workers in Egypt.

In March 2014, Egypt’s president wrote to the families of Mohamed Fahmy and Peter Greste, stating he will spare no effort to quickly resolve the situation.   

“Interim President Adly Mansour is presiding over a campaign of intimidation against journalists and activists, who are being targeted just for challenging the authorities’ narrative on their reporting. These arbitrary restrictions on expression violate Egypt’s obligations under international human rights law,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui.

However, there is little sign of an end to the men’s ordeal. The judge hearing the case has denied the men bail. 

In the nine months since Mohamed Morsi’s ousting, Al Jazeera has reported a number of incidents where security forces have arrested its staff or raided its offices. 

The authorities are continuing to detain Al Jazeera Arabic journalist Abdullah al-Shami, arrested on 14 August 2013. He has been on hunger strike since mid-January 2014. The journalist has faced harassment by the security forces, both during his arrest for his work and in detention.  

An administrative court banned Al Jazeera’s Egyptian channel, Mubasher Misr, on 3 September 2013, along with three other channels seen as supporting Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The authorities are also continuing a wider crackdown on dissent, targeting both the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters as well as other opposition activists critical of the authorities.

Battling perceptions: Minorities in the Arab world

We must move away from the overriding narrative that 'sectarianism' is the natural state of the Arab world.

A VERY GOOD PIECE

Rachel Shabi

A church among residential buildings in the Armenian Christian town of Kasab in Syria [Reuters]

Everywhere you turn in the Middle East, sectarianism is on the rampage - or at least, that is a prevailing media storyline. Incalculable suffering and loss in the Middle East is narrated as the product of religious loathing: between Sunni and Shia; between Muslim and Christian. As countries such as Syria and Iraq are overwhelmed with blood and death and anguish, we are constantly told, by way of explanation, aboutsectarian divisions, long-simmering tensions and ancient hatreds. Outlining why the US would not carry out airstrikes in Syria without Congressional approval, US President Barack Obama last year rolled the phrases into one, referring to "ancient sectarian differences". Zaid al-Ali, author of The Struggle for Iraq's Future - How corruption, incompetence and sectarianism have undermined democracy, says that "ancient hatred" was similarly invoked by Western analysts and media as the only plausible explanation for the deadly unravelling in Iraq following the 2003 US-led invasion. "They would describe a society where everyone hates each other and can't get over it - that's just the way we are," he says. This constant messaging has consequences - not just that the post-invasion plans drawn up by US occupiers in Iraq were catastrophically premised on this supposedly innate hatred, hobbling the country, gutting political life and sowing the seeds of perpetual instability. "US media has a very powerful impact, articles are translated across the region," says al-Ali. "This idea, that it is just a given that people in this region despise each other - it percolates and people start picking up on it." One worry is that, in the face of constant, terrible bloodshed along ethnic or religious lines, and given the prevailing "sectarianism" narrative, a generation on the ground may come to believe this to be the natural state of things. But it requires a serious case of political amnesia to view the Middle East through a historically sectarian lens. The sectarianism narrative Rather than being somehow innate, false divisions have, across the Middle East, been gouged out by colonisers and dictators - European occupiers were especially good at this - to breed weakness and social disunity within populations, all the better to control them with. As historian Ussama Makdisi, author of a book on the culture of sectarianism, has written: "Sectarianism is an expression of modernity. Its origins lay at the intersection of 19th century European colonialism and Ottoman modernisation." This is still at play today as modern-day tyrants prey on ethnic and religious differences, privileging one section of the population and setting it against the other. This sectarian style and rhetoric is of course invoked by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad - but also put to use by US-backed Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose government is routinely accused of using anti-terror laws to target the Sunni population. "It is not the case that sectarian relations are fixed or predetermined as being hostile," says al-Ali. "Fault lines aren't spilling over [into violence] - they are being manipulated; there is no question." Now it goes much wider as the region is being used to fight a proxy war - foreign fighters, munitions and other forms of toxic meddling have flooded nations that might otherwise be more able or necessarily more willing to put weapons aside. My father, and many Iraqis like him, often spoke of a pluralism in his home country that was so unselfconscious and everyday as to be remarkable only in hindsight. He defined himself as an Arab-Jew, a hyphenated identity that seemed both obvious and lacking in contradiction. Identities such as his, forged in a different time, are history lessons gifted to us in human form - yet when people reference tolerant eras in the Middle East, it tends to be viewed as rose-tinted nostalgia, a whimsical preoccupation with the past. That is to entirely miss the point about the region's multicultural history: It presents a path to what is possible; to an ebb and flow that has always been and can still be a way of life. When people reference tolerant eras in the Middle East, it tends to be viewed as rose-tinted nostalgia, a whimsical preoccupation with the past. That is to entirely miss the point about the region's multicultural history: It presents a path to what is possible; to an ebb and flow that has always been and can still be a way of life. Fadi Daou, chairman of Adyan, the Beirut-based foundation for interreligious studies, says the very label we use - "minority" - is inherently problematic. "The connotation is of an identity and culture that is different to others in the community," he says. When you consider the "minority" label applied to Palestinians in Israel - natives of the land and a fifth of the country's population - the politicised and marginalising of this appellation becomes immediately clear. The minority label One of the effects of such singling out of small communities, Daou says, is "to make a very rich heritage a private one for that particular community" - as opposed to being part of a nation's diverse collective heritage, identity and cultural capital. Talking with him reminds me of Jacob Lellouche, a Tunisian who last year opened the country's first Jewish museum, showcasing the culture of this Tunisian population that once numbered 100,000. Tunisian visitors of all faiths told him: "They felt like Tunisia was a chair with only three legs, and that after seeing this museum, the picture was complete." When I wrote a book about Jewish populations of the Middle East, one consequence was a spate of letters from Arab countries now emptied of Jewish populations, all saying the same thing: "We always wondered what happened to the Jews who once lived in our neighbourhood." Defining minorities instead as "citizens" brings many benefits to that community itself, but also to the wider society - because people bearing hyphenated identities often, by definition, have a capacity to deal with differences. Cultures, ethnicities, religious factions or even just languages that may be clashing on the streets are, for minorities of the Middle East, often residing in the same soul. Armenians in Syria, Coptic Christians in Egypt, Arab-Jews in Tunisia - all can be bearers of this same trait: A capacity to intuitively comprehend the "other", because the external is, in some constantly reaffirming way, also an intrinsic part of the internal. Such populations, in other words, aren't an afterthought to reconciliation, but a crucial component to the process itself. The last battle Some minority communities in the Middle East have necessarily sought the protection of a majority group in power - it makes sense that a community fearful for its own future would seek to do so. But Daou and other analysts argue that such a pursuit is counterproductive. "This is the last battle for the minorities in the Middle East, the last chance," he says. "Either they continue looking for protection and it will be useless and they end up leaving the region, or they take up the battle for citizenship and recognition for diversity in societies. This is the battle that is worth fighting." It seems clear that the first steps, the concrete signs must come from Muslim majorities. All over the world, majority communities are typically blind - through lack of experience - to the fraught everyday realities that are inherent to not being a member of the dominant culture. Reassurances that conflicts aren't religious or ethnic-based - such as those issued by some Syrian rebels - simply aren't enough to banish fears, when Christians, including Armenians, are killed or forced to flee, and when extremists leaders make chilling threats against them. It doesn't work, when minorities are caught up in bloody strife, to just put it down to politics, without pausing to understand why sections of a minority community might feel that its best chances for survival would be to support - or at least, to not overtly oppose - a brutal dictator. And it is also dangerously erroneous to label an entire community - Shia, Allawite, Armenian - as being loyal to, or the beneficiaries of, any particular regime. It is also dangerously erroneous to label an entire community - Shia, Allawite, Armenian - as being loyal to, or the beneficiaries of, any particular regime. But here is the thing that analysts always come back to: Populations across the Middle East recoil at sectarianism and, given the slightest opportunity to escape this devastating dynamic, will grab it. As al-Ali says: "If the political class wanted a society where this [sectarianism] matters a lot less, they would find very sympathetic ears in the wider community. Society wants to quell ethnic sectarian tensions, but the politics isn't willing." Despite all the bloodshed, poll after poll in Iraq since 2003 shows that people want a unified country under a centralised political system. Hyphenated identities and multi-stranded societies may rip and unravel when the threads binding them together are so deliberately prised apart. But, even while ethnic and religious differences are inflamed and used to stoke the most nightmarish suffering and cruelty in now blood-torn Arab countries, majorities on the ground seek freedom and justice and equality. In seeking any signs of possible hope, possible solutions, Daou says: "I count on that majority." To adopt the "ancient hatreds" line of explanation is effectively to do the opposite - and to thereby condemn the region to hopeless and perpetual misery.

The false promise of Arab regime-led reform

A VERY GOOD COMMENT
By Rami G. Khouri

"The humiliations and scorn that many Arab leaders heap on their populations seem to have no end. While a few Arab dictators having been toppled or challenged by their disgruntled citizens in the last three years, the remaining ones appear not to have learned any lessons and persist in their cruel ways.

They seize power through military coups, control all government power through a web of security agencies and the armed forces, drive the economy into the ground, wreak havoc with the environment, drain cultural and educational life of their vitality, shut down all credible politics, siphon off massive amounts of money for themselves and their cronies, cause the smartest youth to emigrate to a better life in other countries and ultimately send the majority of their citizens into a downward cycle of pauperization, marginalization, vulnerability and existential fear.

And this goes on for decades, until the country implodes like Somalia, acts so brutally that it is invaded and shattered such as Iraq or Libya, sinks into internal warfare such as Yemen or Syria, or sees its own citizens rise up in revolt in search of rights and dignity, such as Tunisia, Egypt and others to smaller degrees.

I mentioned recently the pitiful aged and ailing Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who insists on claiming a fourth consecutive term in office, which of course he will obtain because the “elections” for the post will be configured to produce his victory. The latest sad example is the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, who assumed power through a military coup, has been president for a quarter of a century and has committed just about every mistake and crime that a national leader can commit against his own people.

His misrule and cruelty was capped by his indictment a few years ago by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the war in Darfur that has killed and displaced millions of Sudanese – and continues today. He is such a disliked leader that some of his own nationals seceded and created their own country of South Sudan in 2011.

He added insult to injury by announcing this week that he sought to implement some political reforms and said that to start this process he would release political prisoners and ease restrictions on political parties. The aim of this, he says, was to “encourage success in a national dialogue.”

It is impossible to take seriously the idea that a man with Bashir’s track record of grinding autocracy and decades of sustained warfare against his own people can suddenly change and begin implementing a political reform process leading to a more pluralistic or democratic system in Sudan.

“The aim behind the decisions is to prepare the stage for dialogue between the political parties for reaching a comprehensive peace in Sudan,” Bashir was quoted as saying by Sudanese television. But here comes the reality that gives this away as a hollow process: Bashir added that he had “directed the authorities concerned in all the states and local governments across Sudan to allow the Sudanese parties to exercise their political activities inside and outside their headquarters without restrictions, within the parameters of the law.”

The “within the parameters of the law” clause is the technique that every Arab autocrat has used for the past half-century to maintain unfettered power and prohibit any credible political activity by opposition parties or civil society groups. This is because Bashir controls all the mechanisms that make, interpret and enforce the law and define its parameters. Which means that Sudanese political parties will not have any serious leeway for action that opposes his ruling circle’s wishes or its hold on power.

This approach of feigned reforms from the top has been used by most Arab autocrats during the past decades of rule, and never, ever has it resulted in real change. Talk of reform or political pluralism is what Arab dictators do when they feel they are being pressured by their own people, as Bashir is these days. It was not surprising, therefore, that just as Bashir was announcing his move to increase political activity and liberties in the country, the leading opposition Reform Now Party charged that government security agents had detained a leader of its student wing and prevented the holding of a party meeting at a university.

Many opposition groups have refused to join the “dialogue” until all their conditions are met, including moves to free prisoners, end internal conflicts and create a transitional government. Among those refusing the dialogue proposal is the Sudanese opposition alliance, a coalition of 17 parties led by the Communist Party."

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Egypt ‘tightens the vice’ on dissent by upholding conviction of three activists

“

This appeals court ruling tightens the vice on freedom of expression and assembly and is yet another sign of Egypt’s growing climate of intolerance towards any legitimate criticism of the authorities

”

Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Deputy Middle East and North Africa Director at Amnesty International

Mon, 07/04/2014

A Cairo appeals court today upheld the conviction of three government critics for taking part in an “unauthorized” protest, a further sign that the Egyptian authorities are tightening the vice on freedom of expression and assembly, Amnesty International said. 

The defendants, Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel, both activists with the 6 April Youth Movement, and well-known blogger Ahmed Douma, are to serve three years in prison with labour and a 50,000 Egyptian pound (US$7,185) fine. The court also ruled they should serve three years’ probation following their release.

“This appeals court ruling tightens the vice on freedom of expression and assembly and is yet another sign of Egypt’s growing climate of intolerance towards any legitimate criticism of the authorities,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Deputy Middle East and North Africa Director at Amnesty International. 

“Repression goes unabated in Egypt. Those who were at the forefront of the 2011 uprising are now jailed for a mere peaceful protest.  

“The three men are prisoners of conscience, who should never have been put on trial. They must be released immediately and unconditionally, with their convictions quashed. 

The three men are the first Egyptians to be sentenced to prison for defying the country’s repressive protest law, adopted in November last year.

Amnesty International has also expressed concern over reports that security forces beat the men during their appeal hearing, with Mohamed Adel and Ahmed Douma showing marks of beatings on their hands, legs and stomach. Mohamed Adel also told his lawyers security forces beat him during his arrest and subsequent detention. 

Defence lawyers told Amnesty International they will now try to challenge the judgement before the Court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest court of law.