ما أسهل تغيير الرؤوس وما أصعب تغيير النفوس!

د. فيصل القاسم

MARCH 21, 2014

هل تغيرنا فعلاً، نحن العرب، بعد أن ثرنا على الطواغيت؟ هل ثرنا فعلاً كي نتغير؟ هل يمكن أن نتغير بمجرد الإطاحة بمن كانوا يحكموننا؟ أم إننا نسخة طبق الأصل عنهم، وبالتالي سنستنسخهم مرات ومرات بدل انتاج ثقافة جديدة؟ ما هو المدى الزمني الذي نحتاجه كي نتحرر فعلاً من الثقافة القديمة، التي زرعها في عقولنا وقلوبنا الطغاة الساقطون والمتساقطون؟ 
لا أحد يستطيع أن ينكر أن كل شرائحنا الاجتماعية والثقافية والدينية والسياسية هي عبارة عن نتاج الأنظمة، التي فرضوها علينا منذ عقود وعقود. إننا بلا أدنى شك نتاج الأنظمة التربوية والدينية والاجتماعية والثقافية التي حكمت بها الأنظمة الساقطة والآيلة للسقوط. وبالتالي: هل نحن قادرون على التحرر من تلك الأنظمة، ومتى؟ ألا يخشى أن نعيد استنساخها جيلاً بعد جيل؟ تقول إحدى الكاتبات: ‘نسمع صوت طبول الحريّة من بعيد. نعتقد أنّنا سنعيش بعد أيام لحظاتٍ لا تنسى، نعوّض فيها عقود القهر والاستبداد. لكن كلّ هذا مجرّد أحلام يقظة ليس إلا، فالمستبدّ مختبئ فينا ريثما تحين له الفرصة، ليخرج المارد من قمقمه ليصول ويجول، مكفّراً هذا بالدّين، وذاك بخيانة القضايا’.
لا شك أن الكثيرين ينتابهم مثل هذا الشعور بعد انقشاع غبار الربيع العربي، فقد ظن البعض أن مجتمعاتنا ستتغير مائة وثمانين درجة بمجرد تغيير أنظمتها السياسية، دون أن يعلموا أن أبسط أنواع التغيير هو التغيير السياسي، أما أصعبها فهو التغيير الاجتماعي والثقافي، فالثقافة التي أنتجت الطواغيت والمستبدين السياسيين يمكن أن تعيد انتاجهم طالما لم تتغير العقليات والذهنيات الثقافية السائدة في هذا المجتمع أو ذاك. لهذا لا بد أن تترافق التحولات السياسية مع تحولات اجتماعية وثقافية عميقة حتى لو استغرق ذلك وقتاً طويلاً، خاصة وأن العادات والتقاليد تموت بصعوبة بالغة، كما يقول غوستاف لوبون في كتابه الشهير ‘سيكولوجية الجماهير’.
لقد كان الكثيرون يتصرفون أيام الطغيان على أسس طائفية وعرقية ومذهبية وعشائرية وقبلية مفضوحة، وكانوا يبررون ذلك بأن الطغاة هم من قسّم المجتمعات إلى ملل ونحل متصارعة عملاً بمقولة: ‘فرق تسد’. ولا شك أن هذا صحيح تماماً. 
لكن هل الأنظمة السياسية الجديدة تريد فعلاً أن تتخلص من ذلك الإرث السياسي والثقافي البغيض؟ بالطبع لا. ربما تحاول أن تغير في الشكل، لا في المضمون، خاصة وأن المجال الثقافي لم يتغير، بل سيبقى على حاله ربما لعقود وعقود. أضف إلى ذلك أن تلك الجماعات السياسية الجديدة التي بدأت تحل محل الأنظمة القديمة ربما تعمل على تكريس الثقافة السياسية القديمة مع تغيير بسيط في أسلوب العمل. ولعلنا لاحظنا كيف أن العراق مثلاً تطور طائفياً، ولم يتطور ديمقراطياً، لأن القيادات الجديدة عملت على تقوية الواقع القديم، لا بل أبرزته إلى السطح بطريقة مقززة من خلال المحاصصة الطائفية البغيضة. 
هل ستقوم الطبقات السياسية الجديدة مثلاً بإجراء تغييرات جذرية على مناهج التعليم، بحيث تقطع تماماً مع العهود القديمة مرة وإلى الأبد؟ هل ستتحدى الثقافة الاجتماعية السائدة، كما تحدت الأنظمة السياسية؟
نستطيع أن نقول ببساطة إن تغيير الرؤوس دون تغيير النفوس بعد الربيع العربي هو أشبه بقطع رأس جبل الجليد الظاهر فوق الماء، والذي لا يشكل عادة سوى خمسة بالمائة من الجبل الذي يقبع جله تحت الماء. 
إن أول ما ينبغي على الأنظمة الجديدة فعله، إذا كانت فعلاً صادقة في التغيير، ولا تريد فقط إعادة انتاج الأنظمة القديمة، هو القيام بثورات ثقافية عارمة تقلب رأساً على عقب أنماط التفكير والعقليات الاجتماعية المترسخة، إذا كانت صادقة في التغيير فعلاً. 
لا بد أن نعلم أن التركيبة الاجتماعية في هذا المجتمع أو ذاك لن تتغير بمجرد سقوط النظام السياسي. ففي كل منطقة من بلادنا العربية نمط ثقافي واجتماعي يعتبره الناس العاديون قبل الوجهاء مقدساً. والسؤال إذاً: ما قيمة التغيير إذا كان إسقاط الرؤوس السياسية مباحاً، بينما إسقاط المقدسات الاجتماعية والثقافية المصطنعة محرماً؟ 
هل يقبل أعيان تلك المنطقة أو تلك في الجمهوريات العربية التي شهدت تحولات سياسية وثورية أن يتخلوا عن وضعياتهم الاجتماعية؟ هل يسمح أتباعهم بذلك أصلاً؟ بالطبع لا.
لقد أكد لوبون في كتابه المذكور أعلاه أن ‘القادة الحقيقيين للشعوب هي تقاليدها الاجتماعية والثقافية الموروثة’ التي لا تتغير بسهولة إلا شكلياً. ويضيف لوبون:’عندما يتيح شعب ما لأعرافه وتقاليده أن تترسخ بقوة زائدة طيلة أجيال عديدة، فإنه لا يعود يستطيع التطور، ويصبح عاجزاً عن التغيير والإصلاح’.
في الكثير من الجمهوريات التي حدث فيها التغيير السياسي هناك هرمية ثقافية واجتماعية لا تخطئها عين. هل يتجرأ أحد على تحطيم تلك الهرمية الاجتماعية والطائفية والعائلية بنفس الطريقة التي تم فيها تحطيم النظام السياسي؟ للأسف لا، فالموروث الثقافي والاجتماعي يحظى بقدسية أكبر بكثير من الموروث السياسي الذي رأينا الجماهير في أكثر من منطقة تحطمه وتدوس رموزه ببراعة عز نظيرها. السؤال المطروح الآن: هل تريد الجماهير الإطاحة بثقافاتها الاجتماعية الوضيعة، أم إن وقتاً طويلاً سيمر قبل أن تتجرأ على الاقتراب منها؟ 
ذات يوم سألت مسؤولاً كبيراً: ‘لقد جئتم إلى السلطة قبل عقود وأنتم تتوعدون الطبقات الاجتماعية والثقافية القديمة بالويل والثبور وعظائم الأمور، لكنكم تحالفتم معها شيئاً فشيئاً، لا بل عززتم مواقعها ووظائفها’، فرد قائلاً:’ هذا صحيح، لكن ليس لأننا نريد تكريس وضع قديم، بل لأننا وجدنا أن هناك قطيعاً كبيراً من الناس يسيرون خلفها بشكل أعمى، ولا يريد أن يمسها بأي تغيير، فقلنا لأنفسنا: بما أن القطيع لا يريد التغيير، لا بل من الصعب تغييره هو نفسه، فلنسر وراء تلك الطبقات القديمة التي تقود القطيع، وتتحكم به طالما أنها تحفظ الاستقرار ولا تهدد النظام السياسي’. 
لا شك أن كلام المسؤول أعلاه فيه الكثير من الخبث، فهو استغل تلك الطبقات القديمة للحفاظ على النظام الجديد. وهذا ما يجب على الأنظمة الجديدة بعد الربيع العربي أن تتجنبه، وأن لا تؤثر الاستقرار على التغيير الحقيقي.
لا شك أن الربيع العربي حدث عظيم في تاريخ المنطقة. وهو المقدمة الصحيحة للبدء بالتغيير الشامل. لكن يجب على من يريد التغيير الجذري فعلاً أن لا يكتفي بتغيير الأنظمة السياسية، ثم يقول لنفسه: سقط الطغاة وانتهت الثورات. لا لم تنته الثورات بسقوط الطغاة، بل بدأت. وإذا لم تستمر النخب الثورية بمتابعة المسيرة الثورية سيكون من حق المتشائمين أن يقولوا بحسرة: إن الطبقات والهياكل والأطر والعقليات والأشخاص الذين صنعوا العهود الساقطة مازالوا موجودين بيننا بعد الثورات، جاهزين لتطبيق قانون التّخلف والاستبداد مرة تلو الأخرى. إنه صراع مرير بين قوى الرجعية بمختلف أشكالها السياسية والثقافية والدينية وقوى التغيير. ولو نظرنا إلى طبيعة الصراع الآن في بلدان الربيع العربي نجد القوى القديمة تشن ثورات مضادة شرسة اعتماداً على الموروث الجاهز لديها. لاحظنا ذلك من قبل في الجزائر، حيث تمخضت الثورة على مدى التسعينات عن عودة كاملة متكاملة للنظام القديم بكل أشكاله. وكذلك الآن فيمصر، حيث يعود النظام القديم بشراسة رهيبة وسط تصفيق نفس الشرائح التي ثارت عليه. ما أحوجنا إلى ثورات ثقافية عارمة قبل أن نحلم بالتغيير المنشود، وهو للأسف ممنوع حتى الآن!

Egypt's spring 2014: is the counter-revolution now complete?

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    Patrick Kingsley
  • The Observer, Saturday 22 March 2014
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Alaa Abd El Fattah argues Egyptians are deceived by the ‘show’ of democratic process. Photograph: Noor Ayman Nour

The joy of the January revolution of 2011 has given way to the return of a form of authoritarian rule. How much power does the country's new strongman, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, intend to wield?

The activist Alaa Abd El Fattah is one of at least 16,000 political dissidents languishing in an Egyptian jail and it was from his cell that he wrote the following last week: "Everyone knows that most of those in jail are young, and that oppression is targeting an entire generation to subjugate it to a regime that understands how separate it is from them and that does not want to, and cannot in any case, accommodate or include them."

It is a bleak assessment of contemporary Egypt, three years and two months after a revolution that was supposed to empower Abd El Fattah and many of those in jail with him. In his letter Abd El Fattah highlights the arbitrary nature of many of their detentions, the torture to which thousands have probably been subjected – and the apathy towards, and often enthusiasm for, such malpractice among the public.

Among Egypt's revolutionaries and rights lawyers, it is no longer remarkable to say the country has returned to the era of Hosni Mubarak– or worse. To Abd El Fattah's portrait of a revolution turned on its head, others might add, among many other criticisms: untrammelled police brutality; journalists jailed; a ban on the kind of protests that drove the 2011 uprising; the exile of Mohamed ElBaradei and Wael Ghonim, two of the politicians and activists most associated with Mubarak's downfall. Plus the likely election to the presidency of the army chief whose presence has come hand in hand with the restoration of Mubarak-style oppression: Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

In cabinet, writes one former minister under Mohamed Morsi, whose year-long presidency was toppled last July, "there is now no one left that has any link to the 25 January revolution". The nuance of Yahia Hamed's point is debatable, not least because Morsi's own government had autocratic leanings, and the extent to which Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood was involved at the start of the 2011 uprising has long been contested. But Hamed's general premise stands: Egypt's recent cabinet reshufflesaw the departure of the most moderate voices in government – the secular liberals who supported Morsi's overthrow last July, not because they craved greater authoritarianism but because they wanted less of it.

But to what extent all this marks a full-circle return to permanent dictatorship – and how similar such a dictatorship would be to Mubarak's – is open to question. It is sometimes assumed that Sisi's grip on power is total. Certainly he enjoys more influence than any other Egyptian and has a large, sycophantic following. But how much power he wields directly – and how much cohesion there is between his army, the secret police, the cabinet, and the judiciary – is unknown.

"For me, the most outstanding feature of this moment is that nobody is in charge," says Michael Hanna, an analyst of Egyptian politics. "The military is not really in charge and it's not making systemic decisions." Even if Sisi is in favour of it, the thinking goes, he might not be directly co-ordinating Egypt's oppression – which may instead be the result of different factions elsewhere in the state using a vacuum in leadership to assert themselves. "So the real test comes post-election," says Hanna.

"Will a President Sisi – with the backing of the military, and with what he would consider a popular mandate – then decide he can make decisions?"

However he acts, it should also not be assumed that Sisi represents quite the same elites as Mubarak did. Sisi may have been head of army intelligence under the ousted dictator, and Egypt's latest prime minister may hail from Mubarak's National Democratic party (NDP). But in Mubarak's last years, senior army officials were at loggerheads with the NDP leadership, whose neo-liberal instincts threatened the military's vast economic empire. When Mubarak fell, leaving senior generals in charge, it was those NDP officials – including Mubarak's son Gamal – who were among the first to experience retribution.

"The NDP neglected society," says one senior officer, who was keen to portray the army as Egypt's salvation. "Their corruption is the reason people are still suffering. They will never come back and the Mubarak era will never come back. A new era is coming."

As Abd El Fattah's prison letter shows, many fear this new era will nevertheless bear many of the oppressive hallmarks of the old one. But others also maintain that the country's dire economic predicament will not allow any new government to use violence to crush dissent indefinitely. As an increasing range of workers' strikes show, officials have nothing to offer the public in exchange for the removal of their political rights. And even if the immediate outlook is dark, this argument continues, the residue of revolutionary gains will remain.

"I don't think you can roll back the gains of liberal principles in the last few years," summarises Samir Radwan, Egypt's first finance minister of the post-Mubarak era, who believes the country's civil society is still in much better shape than it was four years ago.

Hala Shukrallah, who became Egypt's first female leader of a political party earlier this month, is a case in point. Her rise is one scarcely imaginable four years ago – a reflection, she told the Observer, of "real, deep changes in the psyche of the Egyptian people and the Egyptian youth".

Likewise, several activists were arrested for campaigning against Egypt's latest constitution, which passed in January. But the text itself, though flawed, represented a small incremental gain: it is comparatively more liberal than any predecessors.

Detainees enter police custody expecting to be beaten and tortured – but it has not all been one-way traffic. To the surprise of many, the policemen who murdered Khaled Said in 2010 – the attack was one of the rallying points for the 2011 revolution – had their sentences extended last month. A police captain, culpable for the gassing to death of 37 prisoners inside a prison van last August, was jailed for 10 yearslast week. These are extremely rare convictions, and farcically lenient in comparison to the sentences some Morsi supporters have been given simply for protesting. But at a time of seemingly unstoppable police influence, two judges have still been independent enough to convict serving officers.

It was intriguing, too, to see the face of Hisham Geneina peering from an Egyptian broadsheet last week. Geneina, Egypt's chief auditor, had given an interview criticising the police for obstructing his employees' post-audit of their accounts – and he later expanded on his allegations to the Observer. The accountants who did the police's pre-audit, Geneina said, were paid by the police – which, he argued, caused an obvious conflict of interest. Meanwhile, Geneina's team on the post-audit were sometimes not given the paper records they needed. It was not the most rebellious outburst but, given the political climate, it was also not the most compliant.

But for the thousands in prison, or the young Islamists growing frustratedwith the futility of street protests, a few hints of optimism here and there mean little amid a wider environment of wholesale oppression. In his letter from prison, Alaa Abd El Fattah argues that Egyptians have allowed themselves to become deceived by a bogus promise of gradual progress and the "show" of democratic process.

"The show helps to normalise the situation," Abd El Fattah writes, "it [diverts people] on to useless routes: negotiations, advice, legal representations, efforts with the media – until the common understanding becomes that anyone who's accused is guilty, that it's up to the revolutionaries to avoid being imprisoned or killed."

He ends with a rousing call to action: "Everyone knows there is no hope for us who have gone ahead into prison, except through you who will surely follow. So what are you going to do?"

The success of Egypt's next president may depend on the response.

Erdogan and Press Freedom

Erdogan and Press Freedom

Ali Farzat's Cartoon: The Dictator and the Flock

الديكتاتور والرعية March 21, 2014

Let us count the ways Arabs are dying

 March 22, 2014 12:12 AM
By Rami G. Khouri

The Daily Star

How many ways are there to die in the Arab world today, other than through an act of nature or a natural death? Let me count the ways.
Being subjected to deliberate siege and starvation must be the worst way to die, and it is happening before our eyes in the Yarmouk region of Damascus that is mainly inhabited by Palestinian refugees. This is also happening in other parts of Syria where government forces have denied civilians access to food and medicine, inflicting slow death by starvation.
Next on this list of horrors are the growing incidents of Arabs drowning at sea while trying to migrate illegally to southern European countries. Hundreds of North Africans died when their boats capsized near Sicily last year; many others from Syria, Libya, Egypt and African lands risk the possibility of a quick death by drowning rather than the certainty of a slow death in their own crumbling or violent homelands. In just two days this week, the Italian Navy rescued 2,400 Arabs trying to reach its shores. The migrants came in 13 different ships – a veritable armada, unprecedented in its grotesque procession of desperate individuals who fear life at home more than death abroad.
Third on my list is the grotesque practice of beheading, often in public squares. This is mostly done by extremist Salafist-Takfiri religious fanatics who act like barbarians, slitting throats and decapitating other Arabs whom they accuse of being heretics, mostly in lawless lands such as Syria and Iraq. They often display the decapitated bodies and severed heads in public, and distribute videos of their deeds, making their degeneracy a global spectacle.
Death by torture is number four on my grisly list. Hundreds, maybe thousands, of Arab men, women and children are tortured or raped to death every year. This is a double disgrace on the face of Arabism, for torture is practiced by state security authorities as well as rebel militias, gangs and other criminals.
Number five is to be at the receiving end of heavy artillery, missiles and barrel bombs ordered by one’s own government, a death that is all the more criminal because most of the victims are innocent civilians, not armed combatants. Like starvation sieges, these acts are war crimes according to international law, yet many Arab governments and rebel fighters have nonetheless evaded prosecution and punishment for such crimes.
In sixth place are the daily deaths of people killed by car bombs or suicide bombers. Most of these cases involve Arabs killing other Arabs, not attacks against foreign invaders or occupiers such as Israel in Palestine, or the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq, as was previously the case. With the rare exception of targeted political assassinations, civilians are almost always the only victims.
Seventh, sniper fire in urban neighborhoods is an increasingly common cause of death, especially in places such as Tripoli, Lebanon and Fallujah, Iraq, among many others. Heartless and sick Arabs pick off their neighbors in a way akin to shooting plastic ducks at a summer carnival.
Number eight on my list is the death of civilians who are killed during political demonstrations, whether they are targeted deliberately by government troops, accidentally by shooters from all sides, or are trampled by frantic crowds. Even during legitimate and nonviolent political protests, death is never far away today for Arabs expressing their views.
For many years, Arabs have also died by fire from artillery and other weaponry launched from foreign, often neighboring states. This is occurring increasingly these days, with Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians and Palestinians being killed by fire from neighboring Arab states or Israel, or by American drones in countries such as Yemen.
The last entry on my list is the worst, because it involves hundreds of millions of Arabs who are alive biologically, but have died on the inside from the lethal combination of misery, humiliation and agony that come from recognizing what has happened to their societies and many of their leaders. We adjust to these methods of death and go on with our lives, but we walk with our heads bent lower than usual – not to evade a bullet, but to hide our shame.
This is only a passing moment, though, when heartless killers and criminals – some in official positions – trample on the decency, humanity and vibrancy of Arab culture and values. These will regain their footing soon, I am sure, because they are what I encounter every day across the region. The relatively small number of killers and despots will eventually be driven out, and we will raise our heads again, remembering how we once killed and died in so many ways during the lowest point of our culture in the last 9,000 years of settled human life.

Despite the cruelties heaped on them, Palestinian refugees' spirit has not broken

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'Palestinians are raising the flag of return under the banner Return Unifies Us'. Photograph: Oliver Weiken/EPA

From Syria to Turkey to Lebanon, exiled Palestinians haven't surrendered – they are raising the flag for a return to their home

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• • Karma Nabulsi
  • The Guardian, Friday 21 March 2014

The only thing heard nowadays about the majority of the Palestinian people – those made refugees in the Nakba of 1948 – is that they must consider themselves and their fate entirely forfeited. Surrendering their right to return to the place they were expelled from – the most basic right every refugee has under international law – is apparently a given. It is on every leader's lips, the key component of "the compromise" required in the leaked details of John Kerry's "framework" for peace; a commonplace at every western diplomatic closed-door roundtable, which includes the quiet complicity of every Arab regime.

Forfeited if you consider what is now happening to the half a million Palestinian refugees in Syria without respite: entire refugee camps, established more than 65 years ago, utterly flattened; the people in them killed or having fled to safely elsewhere; other refugee camps under military siege for so many months that the people suffering in them are literally starving to death. Hundreds of thousands made refugees for the third or fourth time in their lives, spending the hard months of this past winter in the snow and rain, many without a tent or food, the children without a school or medical care, on the slopes of a Turkish hillside, crowded into already bursting camps in Lebanon, cordoned off under military jurisdiction in Jordan.

It is not all that different to the extreme pressures Palestinians are facing in Palestine, where everyone is more or less a refugee too. In what is now Israel, people internally displaced from their homes in 1947 and 1948 are living in villages that still have no electricity; in Jerusalem more Palestinian refugees are created every day by the Israeli military, as people are illegally thrown out of their ancestral homes. In the occupied West Bank, people's homes are demolished each week. And, of course, in Gaza, where the density and length of the siege, the despair of any change by the people there (the majority of whom are refugees from 1948), and the silence on their collective predicament, is legendary.

You could think, under these extreme cruelties specifically designed to break Palestinians and their cause, that the people as a whole have surrendered – or, if not surrendered, then at least are resigned to their fate. You would be wrong. Today, right across the world – and leading from besieged Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus – Palestinians are raising the flag of return under the banner Return Unifies Us. As a result of a remarkable call issued by a number of large national civic coalitions, which has spread like wildfire across the Palestinian body politic scattered to the four winds, it is now signed by more than 150 popular and grassroots organisations in Palestine and in exile.

Palestinians in dozens of locations are coming together to promote the popular demand for unity and the right of return: the Yarmouk youth band are holding a concert by candlelight; on the windy Turkish border the survivors of the razed, and now regrouped, Handarat camp near Aleppo Syria are giving oral testimonies; and in the 300,000-strong Palestinian community in Chile, Lebanon, Jerusalem, France and Australia, at a concert in London, right across Gaza, in Balata camp in Nablus, Der'aa camp in Syria and Al Am'ari camp in Ramallah, poster exhibitions, lectures, rallies and marching scout troupes are all celebrating the unity of the Palestinian people and their rights.

By this grand gesture, in the face of the continuing disaster of ethnic cleansing, they are making the invisible spirit of an entire people, their humanity and their dignity, visible. On the anniversary of the legendary battle of Karameh in 1968 – a landmark of Palestinian resistance to their nation's destruction and a rallying call for the cause of liberation and return – Palestinians everywhere still have the power to fashion their fate. And they have taken it.

Ali Farzat's Cartoon: Another Arab "Summit"

القمة العربية March 20, 2014

Video: المؤتمر السنوي الثالث -المحاضرة الافتتاحية -عزمي بشارة وابراهيم العيسوي

EXCELLENT VIDEO!

Egypt Gets Muscular Over Nile Dam

By Cam McGrath

Houseboats line the Nile bank in Cairo. Some 85 million Egyptians depend on the Nile for water. Credit: Cam McGrath/IPS.

CAIRO, Mar 21 2014 (IPS) - When Egypt’s then-president Mohamed Morsi said in June 2013 that “all options” including military intervention, were on the table if Ethiopia continued to develop dams on the Nile River, many dismissed it as posturing. But experts claim Cairo is deadly serious about defending its historic water allotment, and if Ethiopia proceeds with construction of what is set to become Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, a military strike is not out of the question.

Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have soured since Ethiopia began construction on the 4.2 billion dollar Grand Renaissance Dam in 2011.

Egypt fears the new dam, slated to begin operation in 2017, will reduce the downstream flow of the Nile, which 85 million Egyptians rely on for almost all of their water needs. Officials in the Ministry of Irrigation claim Egypt will lose 20 to 30 percent of its share of Nile water and nearly a third of the electricity generated by its Aswan High Dam.

"Hydroelectric dams don’t work unless you let the water through.” -- Richard Tutwiler, a specialist in water resource management at the American University in Cairo

Ethiopia insists the Grand Renaissance Dam and its 74 billion cubic metre reservoir at the headwaters of the Blue Nile will have no adverse effect on Egypt’s water share. It hopes the 6,000 megawatt hydroelectric project will lead to energy self-sufficiency and catapult the country out of grinding poverty.

“Egypt sees its Nile water share as a matter of national security,” strategic analyst Ahmed Abdel Halim tells IPS. “To Ethiopia, the new dam is a source of national pride, and essential to its economic future.”

The dispute has heated up since Ethiopia began diverting a stretch of the Nile last May, with some Egyptian parliamentarians calling for sending commandos or arming local insurgents to sabotage the dam project unless Ethiopia halts construction.

Ethiopia’s state-run television responded last month with a report on a visit to the site by army commanders, who voiced their readiness to “pay the price” to defend the partially-built hydro project.

Citing a pair of colonial-era treaties, Egypt argues that it is entitled to no less than two-thirds of the Nile’s water and has veto power over any upstream water projects such as dams or irrigation networks.

Accords drawn up by the British in 1929 and amended in 1959 divvied up the Nile’s waters between Egypt and Sudan without ever consulting the upstream states that were the source of those waters.

The 1959 agreement awarded Egypt 55.5 billion cubic metres of the Nile’s 84 billion cubic metre average annual flow, while Sudan received 18.5 billion cubic metres. Another 10 billion cubic metres is lost to evaporation in Lake Nasser, which was created by Egypt’s Aswan High Dam in the 1970s, leaving barely a drop for the nine other states that share the Nile’s waters.

While the treaty’s water allocations appear gravely unfair to upstream Nile states, analysts point out that unlike the mountainous equatorial nations, which have alternative sources of water, the desert countries of Egypt and Sudan rely almost entirely on the Nile for their water needs.

“One reason for the high level of anxiety is that nobody really knows how this dam is going to affect Egypt’s water share,” Richard Tutwiler, a specialist in water resource management at the American University in Cairo (AUC), tells IPS. “Egypt is totally dependent on the Nile. Without it, there is no Egypt.”

Egypt’s concerns appear warranted as its per capita water share is just 660 cubic metres, among the world’s lowest. The country’s population is forecast to double in the next 50 years, putting even further strain on scarce water resources.

But upstream African nations have their own growing populations to feed, and the thought of tapping the Nile for their agriculture or drinking water needs is all too tempting.

The desire for a more equitable distribution of Nile water rights resulted in the 2010 Entebbe Agreement, which replaces water quotas with a clause that permits all activities provided they do not “significantly” impact the water security of other Nile Basin states. Five upstream countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda – signed the accord. Burundi signed a year later.

Egypt rejected the new treaty outright. But after decades of wielding its political clout to quash the water projects of its impoverished upstream neighbours, Cairo now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of watching its mastery over the Nile’s waters slip through its fingers.

“Ethiopia’s move was unprecedented. Never before has an upstream state unilaterally built a dam without downstream approval,” Ayman Shabaana of the Cairo-based Institute for Africa Studies had told IPS last June. “If other upstream countries follow suit, Egypt will have a serious water emergency on its hands.”

Ethiopia has sought to assure its downstream neighbours that the Grand Renaissance Dam is a hydroelectric project, not an irrigation scheme. But the dam is part of a broader scheme that would see at least three more dams on the Nile.

Cairo has dubbed the proposal “provocative”.

Egypt has appealed to international bodies to force Ethiopia to halt construction of the dam until its downstream impact can be determined. And while officials here hope for a diplomatic solution to diffuse the crisis, security sources say Egypt’s military leadership is prepared to use force to protect its stake in the river.

Related IPS Articles

• Nile Delta Disappearing Beneath the Sea
• Egypt’s Generals Face a Watery Battle
• Inhospitable Flows the Nile

Former president Hosni Mubarak floated plans for an air strike on any dam that Ethiopia built on the Nile, and in 2010 established an airbase in southeastern Sudan as a staging point for just such an operation, according to leaked emails from the global intelligence company Stratfor posted on Wikileaks.

Egypt’s position was weakened in 2012 when Sudan, its traditional ally on Nile water issues, rescinded its opposition to the Grand Renaissance Dam and instead threw its weight behind the project. Analysts attribute Khartoum’s change of heart to the country’s revised domestic priorities following the secession of South Sudan a year earlier.

According to AUC’s Tutwiler, once Sudan felt assured that the dam would have minimal impact on its water allotment, the mega-project’s other benefits became clear. The dam is expected to improve flood control, expand downstream irrigation capacity and, crucially, allow Ethiopia to export surplus electricity to power-hungry Sudan via a cross-border link.

Some studies indicate that properly managed hydroelectric dams in Ethiopia could mitigate damaging floods and increase Egypt’s overall water share. Storing water in the cooler climes of Ethiopia would ensure far less water is lost to evaporation than in the desert behind the Aswan High Dam.

Egypt, however, is particularly concerned about the loss of water share during the five to ten years it will take to fill the dam’s reservoir. Tutwiler says it is unlikely that Ethiopia will severely choke or stop the flow of water.

“Ethiopia needs the electricity…and hydroelectric dams don’t work unless you let the water through.”

Egypt's 'shallow state' and Hamas

Two million Palestinians have been suffering because of Egypt's destruction of tunnels at the Rafah Crossing, writes Hroub [EPA]

Egypt's banning of Hamas is unique throughout the history of Arab relationships, and it's likely to backfire. By Khaled Hroub Egypt's current "deep state" seems to be "deep" only in security and bureaucracy, while its performance in politics and strategy continues to be "shallow". The latest episode showcasing such shallowness - including the military's "discovery" of a cure for AIDS and kidney diseases - is the regime's ban on Hamas, declaring the movement's activities and presence in Egypt illegal. If Egypt's generals have resurrected the tactics of Hosni Mubarak's regime, including the recent appointment a former protege as prime minister, these generals seem to lack some of the sophistication of Mubarak's politics. Over the years, the tense relationship and mutual hatred between Mubarak and Hamas was more than obvious. But even then, Egypt showed more calculated domestic and regional politics and kept Hamas on board. Political miscalculations Even at its lowest point, when Hamas was accused of killing Egyptian soldiers across the Gaza/Egypt borders, Mubarak's regime believed that sustaining links with the group was vital for Egypt's regional role and politics, as well as for security considerations along Gaza borders and in the Sinai desert. It is a basic tenet in politics that severing links with political actors is an extreme step that many countries should avoid. When these actors function in neighbouring countries, ignoring this tenet becomes an act of stupidity and comes at a high cost. By comparison, Iran has maintained its links with Hamas despite the latter's outrageous position, from Tehran's perspective, regarding the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad, Iran's vital ally in the region. A hasty and emotional decision to cut off ties with Hamas could satisfy momentary anger and sate politicians' thirst for revenge, but it weighs little in political calculations. Since they took power in July 2013, Egypt's army generals have displayed all forms of enmity against the Palestinian group, and the Gaza Strip. By extension, two million Palestinians have been suffering because ofEgypt's destruction of tunnels at the Rafah Crossing. In their frantic search for scapegoats, the generals found a convenient case in Hamas and the "threat" it poses to Egyptian national security. Egypt's state-run media took the cue from the military and has launched a damning campaign against Hamas that eludes both sense and sensibility. This media discovered that Hamas is planning to occupy the Sinai desert and annex it to Gaza, conspiring to destroy Egypt's army, inviting all sorts of militant and Jihadist groups and training them in Sinai, killing and kidnapping Egyptian soldiers and smuggling the killers into the Gaza Strip via tunnels and hiding Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Gaza and helping them to come back to power. In a nutshell, Hamas has been projected in the political and media discourse of the ruling military elite in Cairo as nothing short of a regional superpower. To be sure, Hamas itself is not entirely innocent of committing grave mistakes, with a catalogue of bad politics and hasty actions. And Hamas' Brotherhood affiliation is no new discovery; rather it is well-known to everyone including governments that have had long and bloody conflicts with the Brotherhood. Nevertheless, they have nurtured links with Hamas (such as the regimes of Bashar al-Assad and his father before him). It is no new discovery that Hamas used part of the tunnels to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip. And it is no new discovery that some grey areas do exist where elements of extremist violent groups in Sinai may establish links with elements close to Hamas.  Egypt can't afford to boycott a party that rules the Gaza Strip, and enjoys large support among Palestinians. Until then, the amateurish politics of Egypt's rulers may surprise us with more decisions of the sort, which are both laughable and tragic. The wrong battle Nevertheless, the best way to clear many grey areas with Hamas is to engage with them. In doing so, Hamas is wooed to moderate its politics and discourse. It can help safeguard the borders, instead of being part of the problem, with some members of the movement cooperating with radical groups such as the Organisation of the Supporters of Ansar al-Maqdis. By banning Hamas and launching a "war on terror" against a group that is widely supported by considerable segments of Arabs and Muslims, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's Egypt is picking the wrong fight with the wrong party at the wrong time. In fact, this ban and its broader "war" is an open invitation for extremist groups in Gaza and Sinai to further demonise the regime in Egypt, and continue their activities against Egyptian targets. Lack of rational calculus have all led the military and judiciary to a decision that is not only contradictory in nature but also harmful to Egypt itself. The contradiction amplifies the confusion that already exists in the "legal case" against the ousted president Mohammad Morsi who is accused of "collaborating" with Hamas. If contacting Hamas is a crime then a long list of officials, ministers and heads intelligence, prior to Morsi, should be brought to court as well. Along with Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders, there were a number of Hamas members accused of helping the Brothers in breaking into prisons, and conduct illegal activities in Egypt. Some of the accused turned out to be either dead or already spending many years in Israeli jails. Because of the absurdities surrounding the case against Morsi and charges of collaboration with Hamas there were some expectations that over the repeated postponement of his trial, the authorities may find a way to drop it out, or tone it down. Instead, the military regime digs the hole even deeper. The political short-sightedness of this most recent move could also be seen because of the limitations that it imposes on Egyptian diplomacy. The role of Egypt within Palestinian politics, particularly on the reconciliation track between Fatah and Hamas has now become reduced. Any future involvement by Egypt in reaching a Hamas-Israel military truce will also be limited, depriving Egypt from manifesting its diplomacy and expanding regional leverage. The same applies to the current peace talks between the Palestinians and Israel, which have entered a very critical phase. By proscribing Hamas, Egypt needlessly limits its potential capacity to assume regional roles. Egypt's decision to impose a ban on the activities of  a Palestinian resistance group in the country is unique throughout the history of Arab relationships with Palestine. Eventually, any government in Cairo will revoke this decision, either formally or they'll just ignore it. Egypt can't afford to boycott a party that rules the Gaza Strip, and enjoys large support among Palestinians. Until then, the amateurish politics of Egypt's rulers may surprise us with more decisions of the sort, which are both laughable and tragic.