US should put Russian offer to the test
By Brian Whitaker
"As regular readers of this blog will know, I have recently been advocating two
things in connection with Syria:
First, to address the issue of chemical weapons separately
from the wider conflict.
That's because it IS a separate issue. Although the
chemical crisis has arisen out of the wider conflict, maintaining the
international ban is a matter of global importance. Whatever people may think
about the principle of intervening in another country's internal struggle, the
use of banned weapons – wherever it happens – requires a strong international
response.
Secondly, to explore diplomatic/political ways of dealing
with chemical weapons in Syria.
On the first of these two points, things have got worse rather
than better. In the US especially, the level of confusion – among the public and
in the media – is now extraordinary. Much of the debate relates to internal
politicking around Obama's "leadership" (or supposed lack of) rather than the
matter in hand. As for chemical weapons, they have become little more than a peg
for discussing more familiar but only marginally related topics like jihadists
and Iran, as well as for expressions of isolationist sentiment.
On the second point, though, there are signs of progress. When
I
first
suggested placing Syria's chemical stockpile in the hands of the UN, it was
greeted with a mixture of silence and scepticism. But
now it seems the idea may
have legs after all.
Earlier today, John Kerry, the US secretary of state,
suggested the Assad regime could avoid being attacked if it
handed
over its entire stock of chemical weapons. In the form delivered by Kerry it
sounded like an ultimatum – hand them over within a week, or else – and Kerry
added that he did not expect Assad to comply.
But then
something very interesting happened. The Russian
foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, chipped in, unexpectedly
agreed
with Kerry about handing over the weapons (though without the threatening
tone) and
even went a bit further. He said:
"We are calling on the Syrian authorities not only [to] agree
on putting chemical weapons storages under international control, but also for
its further destruction and then joining the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons.
"We have passed our offer to Walid al-Muallem [the Syrian
foreign minister] and hope to receive a fast and positive
answer."
The best way the US can respond to this is not to add further
demands, such as an admission of guilt from Assad, but to say to the Russians:
"That's an interesting idea. Let's see what can be done."
There are two steps involved in dealing with the use of banned
weapons:
1. Preventing any further use.
2. Holding accountable whoever was
responsible.
As far as achieving these objectives is concerned, airstrikes
are not a precise tool. They could hold the regime accountable to some extent by
destroying some of its assets – in other words, punishment. Airstrikes would not
directly prevent further use of chemical weapons, however. Bombing toxic
stockpiles themselves could be dangerous, so the aim would be partly to reduce
the military's ability to use them but mainly to serve as a deterrent – a
message that further use of such weapons would result in increasingly severe
airstrikes.
Apart from saving lives, the diplomatic route could prove more
effective. Persuading Assad to hand over his chemicals to the UN, together with
agreeing to inspections, etc, would – if done properly – ensure there could be
no further use of these weapons. It would not address the issue of
accountability, but that is less urgent and could be set aside till later.
In theory, it ought to be possible to secure Russian
co-operation in a diplomatic initiative since President Putin has already said
he regards use of chemical weapons as a crime. (As a side-note, Iran – another
important ally of Assad – also takes a dim view of chemical weapons, having been
on the receiving end during the Iran-Iraq war.)
It's necessary to recognise, though, that on other issues
relating to the Syrian conflict Russia has been thoroughly obstructive, as
Samantha Power, the US ambassador at the UN,
explained
recently. If the Americans want to test Russia's willingness to co-operate on
chemical weapons, therefore, they will have to treat it as a self-contained
issue in any discussions.
Another potential obstacle is that in the absence of any
startling new evidence Russia will probably stick to its insistence that the
Assad regime was not responsible for the attacks on August 21. If the Americans
persist in trying to change the Russian view on point, talks will inevitably
founder.
But, surprising as it may seem, disagreements over culpability
need not necessarily be a problem. There are perfectly good arguments for urging
Assad to give up his chemical weapons without blaming him for the events of
August 21.
One is that surrendering the chemicals will protect him from
further accusations (either true of false) of their use. Another is that it will
prevent any of the weapons being captured – and even used – by rebel
fighters.
The biggest unknown quantity in this, of course, is how Assad
himself will react to the proposal. Currently, he seems to be neither confirming
nor denying that he has chemical weapons (which is what Israel also does in
connection with its nuclear weapons). But there's no real doubt that he has both
actual weapons and a research programme which was originally developed as the
"poor man's defence" against Israel's nuclear capability.
Assad might remain defiant, claiming that the weapons (if he
admits to their existence at all) are purely for national defence. Or he could
offer to give them up on condition that Israel does the same with its nuclear
weapons.
That's the kind of bravado that made Saddam Hussein a hero
among his supporters but ultimately led to his downfall. If Assad has any sense,
though, he will weigh up the costs and benefits of keeping his weapons versus
giving them up. If he's prepared to swallow his pride (and values his
relationship with Russia) it shouldn't be a difficult choice to make."
