Saturday, July 6, 2013
Video: Morsi Supporters Throw Teens Off Building in Alexandria
"Two teens atop a two-story building in Alexandria, Egypt Friday were hurled off of it by apparently pro- Mohomed Morsi supporters. After failed attempts by the group of men, one of whom is carrying an al-qaeada flag, to try and remove the kids from elevated the roof top by throwing stones at the young boys, one man begins to scale his way towards the boys. He and his other cohorts grab both teens and throw them off the roof. Alexandria is a known hotbed of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. An American was shot dead among protesters in late June when demonsrations against the Morsi led government began to breakout."
What Led to Morsi's Fall—and What Comes Next?
That a popular revolt facilitated Morsi’s ouster is undeniable. But it has also solidified the military’s role as the final arbiter of power in Egypt.
"....The army was warmly embraced by many anti-Morsi protesters who openly called for them to step in and resolve the crisis. Crowds cheered wildly as helicopters flew overhead. The military did plenty to woo the masses, dropping flags on protesters and releasing footage of the anti-Morsi demonstrations on June 30 to sympathetic television stations, which aired them repeatedly, accompanied by nationalist music. The mutual flirtation peaked the day after Morsi’s ouster with air force jets drawing a heart in the sky over Tahrir.
But not everyone was enamored with the army’s return as a savior. Critics recalled its violent crushing of protests and the hauling of 12,000 civilians before military courts, warning that the SCAF’s mismanagement of the post-Mubarak transition helped precipitate the current crisis. Yet much like the early months following Mubarak’s ouster, dissident voices were largely drowned out in the euphoria over the removal of Morsi from office.
With few voices in opposition, the military may try to expand its powers and guarantee itself a role as custodian of the constitutional order, a move that would severely set back the drive for revolutionary change......
With the largest political group in Egypt thrust outside of the political scene, and fears of a violent backlash from more militant Islamist groups, many fear a return to an entrenched authoritarianism. “They’re clamping down on Islamists, and once they are firmly in power they will go after anyone else who speaks out,” said the leading Brotherhood member. “They took advantage of the people’s opposition to Morsi to return Mubarak’s regime.”
If recent history is any indication, continued authoritarianism in Egypt will only be met with more mass mobilizations and revolutionary calls for change."
Three questions: Egypt's 'Zero-sum' politics
With the country and its revolution in turmoil, how can Egyptians transcend the nation's divisions?
By Marwan Bishara
".....
The military has no particular interest in democracy. It falls upon secular and civic political forces - not the military - to help define a democratic and pluralistic Egypt. This requires unifying around one leadership and one programme as to how to direct the transitional period and implement the agreed-upon roadmap. At the end of the day, it is they who must define the limits of the military's role in a new constitution, a step that will be resisted strongly by the generals.
To fulfill their goals and those of the revolution, they need to guarantee that the transitional period towards a restoration of the civic order is as short as possible, and must not be enticed by ministerial portfolios or any other gestures from the military to prolong it. Likewise, they need to steer away from the forces of the old regime and refrain from entering into any alliances with them.
For decades, Egypt had one living president and one president only, never even a former president - only dead ones. Today, Egypt has a deposed president, an ousted president and a temporary president. And soon it will have another elected president.
To fulfill their goals and those of the revolution, they need to guarantee that the transitional period towards a restoration of the civic order is as short as possible, and must not be enticed by ministerial portfolios or any other gestures from the military to prolong it. Likewise, they need to steer away from the forces of the old regime and refrain from entering into any alliances with them.
For decades, Egypt had one living president and one president only, never even a former president - only dead ones. Today, Egypt has a deposed president, an ousted president and a temporary president. And soon it will have another elected president.
However, the ongoing political upheaval has transcended Morsi and the presidency as a whole. It's now an open struggle over the soul, identity and unity of the country."
FREEDOM ACCORDING TO THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Wall Street Journal says Egypt needs a Pinochet – can it get away with that?
The Chilean dictator presided over the torture and murder of thousands, yet still the free-market right reveres his name
guardian.co.uk,
"On Friday, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial entitled "After the Coup in Cairo". Its final paragraph contained these words:
Egyptians would be lucky if their new ruling generals turn out to be in the mold of Chile's Augusto Pinochet, who took over power amid chaos but hired free-market reformers and midwifed a transition to democracy.Presumably, this means that those who speak for the Wall Street Journal – the editorial was unsigned – think Egypt should think itself lucky if its ruling generals now preside over a 17-year reign of terror. I also take it the WSJ means us to associate two governments removed by generals – the one led by Salvador Allende in Chile and the one led by Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. Islamist, socialist … elected, legitimate … who cares?
Presumably, the WSJ thinks the Egyptians now have 17 years in which to think themselves lucky when any who dissent are tortured with electricity, raped, thrown from planes or – if they're really lucky – just shot. That's what happened in Chile after 1973, causing the deaths of between 1,000 and 3,000 people. Around 30,000 were tortured......."
Coptic priest shot dead in Egypt attack: sources
"(Reuters) - Gunmen shot dead a Coptic Christian priest in Egypt's lawless Northern Sinai on Saturday in what could be the first sectarian attack since the military overthrow of Islamist President Mohamed Mursi, security sources said.
The priest, Mina Aboud Sharween, was attacked in the early afternoon while walking in the Masaeed area in El Arish.
The shooting in the coastal city was one of several attacks believed to be by Islamist insurgents that included firing at four military checkpoints in the region, the sources said.
Saturday's attacks on checkpoints took place in al-Mahajer and al-Safaa in Rafah, as well as Sheikh Zuwaid and al-Kharouba.
The violence follows attacks in which five police offers were killed in El Arish on Friday.
Mursi's Muslim Brotherhood has fiercely criticized Coptic Pope Tawadros, spiritual leader of Egypt's 8 million Christians, for giving his blessing to the removal of the president and attending the announcement by armed forces commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi suspending the constitution."
The priest, Mina Aboud Sharween, was attacked in the early afternoon while walking in the Masaeed area in El Arish.
The shooting in the coastal city was one of several attacks believed to be by Islamist insurgents that included firing at four military checkpoints in the region, the sources said.
Saturday's attacks on checkpoints took place in al-Mahajer and al-Safaa in Rafah, as well as Sheikh Zuwaid and al-Kharouba.
The violence follows attacks in which five police offers were killed in El Arish on Friday.
Mursi's Muslim Brotherhood has fiercely criticized Coptic Pope Tawadros, spiritual leader of Egypt's 8 million Christians, for giving his blessing to the removal of the president and attending the announcement by armed forces commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi suspending the constitution."
Al-Jazeera Video: Torture rising in Gaza and West Bank prisons
"Cases of torture the West Bank and Gaza prisons have increased by a third in a year, according to a human rights group. The Independent Commission for Human Rights says both the Israeli army and Palestinian security forces are responsible. The group blames - in part - the enduring tensions between rival Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah. Al Jazeera's Sue Turton reports from Hebron."
Friday, July 5, 2013
Egypt left leader backs military role, sees short transition
Leftist leader Hamdeen Sabahi speaks during an interview with Reuters in Cairo, April 29, 2013.
Credit: Reuters/Asmaa Waguih
CAIRO |
"CAIRO (Reuters) - Egypt's leading left-wing politician endorsed military intervention to oust elected Islamist President Mohamed Mursi and said he expected a short transition to a new democratic president and parliament.
Hamdeen Sabahi, leader of the Popular Current movement, who came third in last year's presidential election, said the army had implemented the will of the people and was not seeking power for itself.
"This action has led to a reconciliation between the people and the army after a long time of estrangement," he told Reuters in an interview on Friday as pro- and anti-Mursi demonstrators clashed in central Cairo.
Those who called Mursi's removal this week a military coup were insulting the Egyptian people, who had turned out in their millions to demand his ouster, Sabahi said.
He called for former U.N. nuclear watchdog Mohamed ElBaradei, a prominent liberal politician, to be appointed prime minister for an interim period he hoped would not last longer than six months until an amended constitution was in place.
The armed forces suspended the constitution, placed Mursi in detention and appointed the head of the supreme constitutional court, Adli Mansour, as interim head of state.
Sabahi, a firebrand orator who models himself on former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, spelled out the sequence of steps he said had been agreed for the transition.
"We have agreed on a roadmap that has a new constitution that will be drafted by a committee to amend the suspended constitution and change the disputed articles, after which people will vote on it in a referendum. Then, there will be a presidential election, then a parliamentary election," he said.
Sabahi accused Mursi of having pursued the same wrong foreign policy of following the West as ex-president Hosni Mubarak, toppled in a 2011 popular uprising. He blamed the United States for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood long after Egyptians had turned against the Islamist president.
"The Egyptian people hold the United States responsible for supporting a rule that was rejected by the people who took legitimacy away from it, and the American administration has to realize that," he said.
He defended the action of armed forces chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, saying he had sided with the people and sought no position for himself.
"Where is General Sisi's position now? He's not the president or prime minister. He is protecting the will of the people and we should salute him for that," Sabahi said.
"This is what a national army is for, not to make coups."
Mohamed Morsi's downfall determined by coffee shop rebels rather than army
A born-again opposition and a president who consistently failed to see his errors were key elements of the 3 July coup d'etat
Martin Chulov and Patrick Kingsley in Cairo
The Guardian,
"On Wednesday morning, as Mohamed Morsi sat discussing his plight with a small coterie of aides at a base in the east of Cairo, a senior adviser reassured him that the presidential guard would protect him no matter what.
But, as the Egyptian troops moved in on the base following the orders of army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sissi, even this elite unit slipped away, so Morsi could be easily detained. As with so many of the political errors that dogged his presidency, Morsi hadn't seen it coming.
The 3 July coup may have been executed by the military, but its roots lie in a civilian movement.......
Last Saturday, with his political legacy crumbling, Morsi cut a serene figure when the Guardian met him in his office in Quba Palace, Cairo.
The streets of the capital were tense, but Morsi appeared cocooned, even oblivious to what had begun to take shape.
"How confident are you in the army?" the Guardian asked him. "Very," he replied. How wrong he was."
Martin Chulov and Patrick Kingsley in Cairo
The Guardian,
"On Wednesday morning, as Mohamed Morsi sat discussing his plight with a small coterie of aides at a base in the east of Cairo, a senior adviser reassured him that the presidential guard would protect him no matter what.
But, as the Egyptian troops moved in on the base following the orders of army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sissi, even this elite unit slipped away, so Morsi could be easily detained. As with so many of the political errors that dogged his presidency, Morsi hadn't seen it coming.
The 3 July coup may have been executed by the military, but its roots lie in a civilian movement.......
Last Saturday, with his political legacy crumbling, Morsi cut a serene figure when the Guardian met him in his office in Quba Palace, Cairo.
The streets of the capital were tense, but Morsi appeared cocooned, even oblivious to what had begun to take shape.
"How confident are you in the army?" the Guardian asked him. "Very," he replied. How wrong he was."
Guardian Video: Egypt: Morsi supporters clash with security forces
"Supporters of former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi clash with security forces in Cairo following Friday prayers. Supporters of the ousted president began to gather at rallies after a series of raids and arrests targeting senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood. At least three people have reportedly been shot dead during protests outside the Republican Guards' headquarters, although the army has denied its troops fired at the protesters."
UPDATED: Violence at pro-Morsi protests in Cairo
Gunfire reported at Republican Guards headquarters in Heliopolis, Cairo, where supporters of ousted president Morsi are demonstrating
Ahram Online
"The Muslim Brotherhood’s Gehad El-Haddad said via Twitter that shootings at the Republican Guards headquarters were not by the guards but by neighboring military police. He said that it "is not known if [the shooting was] under panic or by order."
News agency AFP reported three dead at clashes outside the Cairo headquarters of the Republican Guard on Friday where supporters of ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi are demonstrating.
AFP reports that the pro-Morsi protesters were carrying weapons. Reuters has also quoted a figure of three dead, according to "security sources."
A military spokesman has denied using live fire against protesters in Cairo. Only blank round and tear gas have been used, he claimed in comments reported by Reuters.
The Muslim Brotherhood and their allies called for protests today against the ousting of president Mohamed Morsi, labelling the day 'the Friday of Rejection.'
Pro-Morsi marches are also taking place in Alexandria and Beheira, both in the north, and in Minya in Upper Egypt, among other cities.
Ahram Online
"The Muslim Brotherhood’s Gehad El-Haddad said via Twitter that shootings at the Republican Guards headquarters were not by the guards but by neighboring military police. He said that it "is not known if [the shooting was] under panic or by order."
News agency AFP reported three dead at clashes outside the Cairo headquarters of the Republican Guard on Friday where supporters of ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi are demonstrating.
AFP reports that the pro-Morsi protesters were carrying weapons. Reuters has also quoted a figure of three dead, according to "security sources."
A military spokesman has denied using live fire against protesters in Cairo. Only blank round and tear gas have been used, he claimed in comments reported by Reuters.
The Muslim Brotherhood and their allies called for protests today against the ousting of president Mohamed Morsi, labelling the day 'the Friday of Rejection.'
Pro-Morsi marches are also taking place in Alexandria and Beheira, both in the north, and in Minya in Upper Egypt, among other cities.
In Cairo, there are a number of demonstrations in Giza, on the eastern side of the river.
The Republican Guards headquarters is a short distance from Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square where thousands of Morsi supporters have been holding a sit-in for a week now."
The Republican Guards headquarters is a short distance from Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square where thousands of Morsi supporters have been holding a sit-in for a week now."
Egypt’s second revolution: Questions of legitimacy
Democracy is constituted by the express and active will of real, living people, not by a box; this is especially true when these people are engaged in an on-going revolution, charting their and their nation’s future
AS USUAL, SIMPLY GREAT!
Hani Shukrallah , Thursday 4 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
"The US government, a substantial section of mainstream Western media and the ousted Muslim Brotherhood all seem to agree: what took place in Egypt over the past few days was a military coup, a setback for the country's alleged "transition" to democracy.
Irrespective of the variety of vested interests involved, what the three detractors of one of the most potent popular revolutionary upsurges in modern history share is contempt. Twenty-two million signatures (at nearly 50 percent of the nation’s adult population) are collected demanding the ousting of the president; the same demand is made by some 17 million people (at nearly 30 percent of the adult population) as they hit the streets throughout the country, in what has been described as the biggest demonstration in the history of mankind, and they do so against a barrage of threats and predictions warning of 30 June’s "rivers of blood," and stay there.
Unprecedented it may be, yet not really worth seeing (the Washington Post persisted in speaking of "rival demonstrations" between Morsi supporters and the "opposition"), it is not democracy; it is the army and the "deep state." Nothing short of the most profound sense of contempt for these very people could explain such utter blindness.
For the Muslim Brotherhood the contempt is deep-seated within a doctrine that constructs the leaders of the Gama’a as the ultimate interpreters of God’s will on earth, and as such owed blind obedience, and a lot of hand-kissing, by their "flock" – little wonder then that a rebellious Egyptian people have come to call them "sheep."
From the Western side of the above equation – and I am still dealing here with ideological perspective rather than crass interest – it is the equally deep-seated conviction that such people as Arabs and Muslims are incapable of insisting on the sort of "liberties" that "Western Man" takes for granted.
Certainly, race has become passé, now replaced by "culture," but what with our ostensibly inherent and immutable "Muslim" culture all we presumably can hope for is the kind of stunted and deformed "democracy" that Morsi and his tribe were offering us, never mind freedom of expression, speech, belief, assembly and protest, never mind also the frenzied power grab of Mubarak’s oligarchic and deeply authoritarian state machinery, kept fully intact but for the change of its bosses.
(In June of this year, the deposed Brotherhood president appointed in one sweep 17 new governors from among his group and its allies, a mere three months ahead of planned parliamentary elections, the better to rig them more effectively).
None of it, however, seemed to really matter, minor snags along the "transition," since all we Arabs and Muslims could hope for and deserve is a 2 percent margin in the ballot box – that is democracy enough in terms of our "culture."
Yet, there is another aspect to the blindness. Throughout history, popular revolutions by one people have had a tendency to inspire revolutionary upsurges by other peoples, just as Egypt’s was inspired by Tunisia’s, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria by both. For such a revolution to lead to a bungling, grimly oppressive Islamist regime, whose single claim to "democracy" is ostensibly "free and fair" elections is to drastically undercut such inspirational value. Would the Greeks find inspiration in such an outcome, or the Brazilians?
It was only on the fourth day of Egypt’s second revolution, and following intense American pressure to keep Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in power, that US President Barak Obama seemed to discover – all of a sudden – that democracy is not reducible to the ballot box.
Well, hey hurray! In fact, the history of democracy the world over is one where democratic liberties are won on the street, not the ballot box. Even if we set aside the founding democratic revolutions of the modern world, from Cromwell to Robespierre, via America’s founding fathers (beside which Egypt’s twin revolutions appear sparkling clean – "legitimacy" – wise), the extension of the franchise was won on the street, and so was the right of women to vote; trade unions, which were crucial in defining the very meaning of democracy and democratic liberties in today’s world, did not come out of the ballot box, but were born and evolved on shop-floors and on the street, and so has been the redefining of democracy in terms of women’s rights and liberation, well beyond the right to vote.
And last but not least Mr. Obama, need we remind you that the mere thought of running for office would not have occurred to you had it not been for the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Greensborro Sit-Ins, the March on Washington and the hundreds of other battles, big and small, waged with tremendous sacrifice, on the streets of the self-proclaimed "greatest democracy on earth," by a great many people, including such "legitimacy"‐unsavory characters as Malcolm X, Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael and Angela Davis?
A very long and heroic march, full of blood and tears, put you in office Mr. Obama, and it was on the street that the heroes of these battles marched. And throughout the ballot box merely translated, almost always partially, and in stunted form, the gains won, yes, on the street.
Which seems to bring us straight back to our own erstwhile president, Dr. Morsi himself.
In his final, customarily incoherent, address to the nation, the former president (and don’t you just love the prefix "former" attached to the title of two presidents in a little over as many years) repeated the word "legitimacy" literally dozens of times. But here is a little reminder Mr. former-president, you were actually in prison when your predecessor, the "legitimate" president of the country, voted into his fourth term in what your American and other Western allies then hailed as Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential elections, was illegitimately unseated. (There was nothing in the Egyptian Constitution then in force that allowed the president to cede his powers to something called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – SCAF).
We do not know the real story behind your escape from prison, whether it was the people in charge who broke you out of it, or a Hamas contingent imported especially for that purpose, as has been suggested in recent months. And frankly, I do not care. Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were political prisoners, and in a revolution, setting political prisoners free is right and proper, even if "illegitimate."
The thing is, of course, that since the revolution the powers that be in Egypt, hijackers all, have been juggling "revolutionary legitimacy" and formal, legal legitimacy as stipulated by the Constitution and the law of the land, willy-nilly, arbitrarily – and always in ways best tailored to suite their immediate ends. The SCAF did so, over and over again, and so did the Muslim Brotherhood.
The starkest and most flagrant example of this was the "elected" president’s flaunting of constitution, law and democratic norms, by issuing, in November 2012, a Constitutional Declaration immunising his decisions against judicial review, immunising as well that mockery of a legislative body, the consultative Shura Council (the third of which members are appointed by the president, the other two-thirds scornfully voted in by a measly 7 percent of the electorate), and vesting it meanwhile with full legislative authority, and immunising furthermore, a Constituent Assembly, which had been transformed into a closed club of the Muslim Brotherhood an its Salafi and Jihadi allies. Both these institutions had been facing imminent rulings of unconstitutionality by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court.
And what was Morsi's justification of such draconian measures which clearly aimed at perpetuating the Muslim Brotherhood’s sway over the country until such a time as humanity meets its maker? "Revolutionary legitimacy!" Well, Mr. former-president, this is exactly what is called being "hoist by your own petard," with the added qualification that yours’ was that of a hijacker, while the people who unseated you derived their revolutionary legitimacy from a real, living revolution, historically unprecedented by virtue of 22 million signatures, by virtue of millions on the streets."
AS USUAL, SIMPLY GREAT!
Hani Shukrallah , Thursday 4 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
"The US government, a substantial section of mainstream Western media and the ousted Muslim Brotherhood all seem to agree: what took place in Egypt over the past few days was a military coup, a setback for the country's alleged "transition" to democracy.
Irrespective of the variety of vested interests involved, what the three detractors of one of the most potent popular revolutionary upsurges in modern history share is contempt. Twenty-two million signatures (at nearly 50 percent of the nation’s adult population) are collected demanding the ousting of the president; the same demand is made by some 17 million people (at nearly 30 percent of the adult population) as they hit the streets throughout the country, in what has been described as the biggest demonstration in the history of mankind, and they do so against a barrage of threats and predictions warning of 30 June’s "rivers of blood," and stay there.
Unprecedented it may be, yet not really worth seeing (the Washington Post persisted in speaking of "rival demonstrations" between Morsi supporters and the "opposition"), it is not democracy; it is the army and the "deep state." Nothing short of the most profound sense of contempt for these very people could explain such utter blindness.
For the Muslim Brotherhood the contempt is deep-seated within a doctrine that constructs the leaders of the Gama’a as the ultimate interpreters of God’s will on earth, and as such owed blind obedience, and a lot of hand-kissing, by their "flock" – little wonder then that a rebellious Egyptian people have come to call them "sheep."
From the Western side of the above equation – and I am still dealing here with ideological perspective rather than crass interest – it is the equally deep-seated conviction that such people as Arabs and Muslims are incapable of insisting on the sort of "liberties" that "Western Man" takes for granted.
Certainly, race has become passé, now replaced by "culture," but what with our ostensibly inherent and immutable "Muslim" culture all we presumably can hope for is the kind of stunted and deformed "democracy" that Morsi and his tribe were offering us, never mind freedom of expression, speech, belief, assembly and protest, never mind also the frenzied power grab of Mubarak’s oligarchic and deeply authoritarian state machinery, kept fully intact but for the change of its bosses.
(In June of this year, the deposed Brotherhood president appointed in one sweep 17 new governors from among his group and its allies, a mere three months ahead of planned parliamentary elections, the better to rig them more effectively).
None of it, however, seemed to really matter, minor snags along the "transition," since all we Arabs and Muslims could hope for and deserve is a 2 percent margin in the ballot box – that is democracy enough in terms of our "culture."
Yet, there is another aspect to the blindness. Throughout history, popular revolutions by one people have had a tendency to inspire revolutionary upsurges by other peoples, just as Egypt’s was inspired by Tunisia’s, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria by both. For such a revolution to lead to a bungling, grimly oppressive Islamist regime, whose single claim to "democracy" is ostensibly "free and fair" elections is to drastically undercut such inspirational value. Would the Greeks find inspiration in such an outcome, or the Brazilians?
It was only on the fourth day of Egypt’s second revolution, and following intense American pressure to keep Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in power, that US President Barak Obama seemed to discover – all of a sudden – that democracy is not reducible to the ballot box.
Well, hey hurray! In fact, the history of democracy the world over is one where democratic liberties are won on the street, not the ballot box. Even if we set aside the founding democratic revolutions of the modern world, from Cromwell to Robespierre, via America’s founding fathers (beside which Egypt’s twin revolutions appear sparkling clean – "legitimacy" – wise), the extension of the franchise was won on the street, and so was the right of women to vote; trade unions, which were crucial in defining the very meaning of democracy and democratic liberties in today’s world, did not come out of the ballot box, but were born and evolved on shop-floors and on the street, and so has been the redefining of democracy in terms of women’s rights and liberation, well beyond the right to vote.
And last but not least Mr. Obama, need we remind you that the mere thought of running for office would not have occurred to you had it not been for the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Greensborro Sit-Ins, the March on Washington and the hundreds of other battles, big and small, waged with tremendous sacrifice, on the streets of the self-proclaimed "greatest democracy on earth," by a great many people, including such "legitimacy"‐unsavory characters as Malcolm X, Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael and Angela Davis?
A very long and heroic march, full of blood and tears, put you in office Mr. Obama, and it was on the street that the heroes of these battles marched. And throughout the ballot box merely translated, almost always partially, and in stunted form, the gains won, yes, on the street.
Which seems to bring us straight back to our own erstwhile president, Dr. Morsi himself.
In his final, customarily incoherent, address to the nation, the former president (and don’t you just love the prefix "former" attached to the title of two presidents in a little over as many years) repeated the word "legitimacy" literally dozens of times. But here is a little reminder Mr. former-president, you were actually in prison when your predecessor, the "legitimate" president of the country, voted into his fourth term in what your American and other Western allies then hailed as Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential elections, was illegitimately unseated. (There was nothing in the Egyptian Constitution then in force that allowed the president to cede his powers to something called the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – SCAF).
We do not know the real story behind your escape from prison, whether it was the people in charge who broke you out of it, or a Hamas contingent imported especially for that purpose, as has been suggested in recent months. And frankly, I do not care. Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were political prisoners, and in a revolution, setting political prisoners free is right and proper, even if "illegitimate."
The thing is, of course, that since the revolution the powers that be in Egypt, hijackers all, have been juggling "revolutionary legitimacy" and formal, legal legitimacy as stipulated by the Constitution and the law of the land, willy-nilly, arbitrarily – and always in ways best tailored to suite their immediate ends. The SCAF did so, over and over again, and so did the Muslim Brotherhood.
The starkest and most flagrant example of this was the "elected" president’s flaunting of constitution, law and democratic norms, by issuing, in November 2012, a Constitutional Declaration immunising his decisions against judicial review, immunising as well that mockery of a legislative body, the consultative Shura Council (the third of which members are appointed by the president, the other two-thirds scornfully voted in by a measly 7 percent of the electorate), and vesting it meanwhile with full legislative authority, and immunising furthermore, a Constituent Assembly, which had been transformed into a closed club of the Muslim Brotherhood an its Salafi and Jihadi allies. Both these institutions had been facing imminent rulings of unconstitutionality by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court.
And what was Morsi's justification of such draconian measures which clearly aimed at perpetuating the Muslim Brotherhood’s sway over the country until such a time as humanity meets its maker? "Revolutionary legitimacy!" Well, Mr. former-president, this is exactly what is called being "hoist by your own petard," with the added qualification that yours’ was that of a hijacker, while the people who unseated you derived their revolutionary legitimacy from a real, living revolution, historically unprecedented by virtue of 22 million signatures, by virtue of millions on the streets."
الابتعاد عن السيناريو المفضل... والثورة مستمرة
AN EXCELLENT COMMENT BY HANEEN ZOA'BI
حنين زعبي
"وعد الشعب المصري القيادة التي ستنتخب بمرجعية ثورة 25 يناير، أنها ستبقى تحت الاختبار، وأعلنها بشكل واضح، لا لبس فيه، أن البرلمان سيحكم بمرجعية الميدان، أي أن "مرجعية الثورة" ستبقى مفعلة، ما دام الميدان يقظا، وما دام النظام المنتخب لم يحول "مرجعية الثورة" إلى قواعد ثابتة في الحكم. لكن الذي فعله النظام المنتخب وفق أول انتخابات نزيهة تشهدها مصر في تاريخها، أنه قام بنسف القواعد الثابتة لثورة ما زالت متحركة، غافلا أن الحراك الثوري هذا يؤسس لأغلبية متغيرة، لا يشير لها صندوق الانتخابات.
ما دامت الثورة مستمرة، وما دام الميدان يقظا، فالحكم على الأمور يتم بمرجعية الثورة، وليس بمرجعية صندوق الانتخابات، وسيكون المطلوب ممن استلم الحكم، بغض النظر عن أيديولوجيته وعن مشروعه السياسي، أن يؤسس هو لقواعد حكم ديمقراطية، تعكس قيم الثورة وأهدافها، وأهمها تشكيل دستور يضمن العدل والمساواة، وسيادة القانون، وبناء مؤسسات تعتمد على الكفاءات، وإطلاق الحريات العامة والفردية، وضمان استقلال القضاء والإعلام، وقبل ذلك مطلب الثورة الأول وهو محاكمة رموز النظام السابق الضالعين بالفساد والقمع.
هذه مطالب الثورة، وهي لا تسقط بالاحتكام لصندوق الانتخابات، وهي قائمة بغض النظر عن نتائجه، كما أنها تعتبر شروطا ضرورية، لئلا يحسب النظام خارجا عن أهداف الثورة وقيمها. إلى جانب ضمان تلك المطالب، التي تؤمّن بناء الديمقراطية، كان على النظام أن يعمل على نهضة مصر اقتصاديا وصناعيا وعلميا، وأن يقدم حلولا اقتصادية واجتماعية لمشاكل الفقر والتلوث والبطالة وغيرها.
سقط نظام مرسي لأنه فشل في بناء الديمقراطية من جهة، ولأنه فشل في تقديم حلول لمشاكل مصر المستعصية. ولم يسقط لأنه ينتمي لحركة الأخوان المسلمين، بل إن العكس هو الصحيح، لقد قررت الحركة أن تفشل نفسها قبل أن يقرر شعبها إسقاطها من السلطة، وذلك بأن وضعت نفسها ومؤسساتها ومصالحها فوق مصالح الدولة، ولم تحسن قراءة الواقع الثوري الجديد وتعاملت معه كواقع ما قبل الثورة، وبأدوات إدارة قديمة. باختصار لم يستوعب نظام مرسي المرحلة.
وفي الوقت الذي ضمن فيه الميدان ثورة شهد لها العالم، لم يضمن صندوق الانتخابات حكما ثوريا، ولا استطاعت يقظة الميدان التأثير على ثورية النظام، الذي لم يرغب هو الآخر في إدارة واستيعاب الفئات الثورية العديدة التي بقيت مشتعلة وفاعلة بعد الانتخابات، بل وخسر – وهو الفائز بفارق صغير جدا- جزءا كبيرا من مصوتيه، كما يشهد بذلك ميدان التحرير، وكما تشهد "جبهة الإنقاذ" المكونة من فئات سبق وانتخبت مرسي.
إلى جانب ذلك، فشل النظام في خطوات بناء الديمقراطية، ففشل في تشكيل الجمعية التأسيسية للدستور داخل البرلمان، وضمن بذلك دستورا وسع من صلاحيات الرئيس دون إمكانية الاحتكام للقضاء، ودخل في صدام أفقي مع المجتمع، وحاول الاستحواذ على مؤسسات الدولة، مخاطرا أولا بشرعيته هو التي لا معنى لها خارج تمثيل وحدة مصالح الدولة.
ولم يدخل نظام مرسي في صدام جدّي مع الفلول، ومع رموز وبقايا حكم مبارك، وكان يستطيع ذلك، إلا عندما هدد هؤلاء سلطته بشكل مباشر، فمثلا، لم يطلب مجلس الشعب، صاحب الأغلبية الاخوانية، عزل أحمد شفيق، رمز نظام مبارك، إلا بعدما قررت الحركة خوض المعركة الرئاسية، ورأت في شفيق منافسا لها.
كان الفشل في تطهير بقايا نظام مبارك، وفي بناء ديمقراطية ما بعد الثورة، فشلا في تأسيس شرعية مرسي نفسه، فكان هو أول من أخرج نفسه عن كونه ممثلا لشرعية عامة، وعامل الدولة ومؤسساتها كممثل لفصيل سياسي. لقد تراجعت حركة الأخوان المسلمين أولا عن موقفها بعد ثورة ٢٥ يناير، بعدم ترشيح رئيس للجمهورية منها، ثم أكدت أنها لن تسعى إلى أكثر من ثلث مجلس الشعب، حتى لو استطاعت، ثم تراجعت، ثم رشحت "مستقلين" قريبين من الحركة، ثم ألحقت ذلك بتعيينات حزبية كثيرة.
مع ذلك، لم يكن ما حصل هو السيناريو المفضل...
كان من الأجدى بكثير، لو استوعب نظام مرسي قواعد المرحلة الجديدة، وقرر إما الانسحاب من السلطة والاستقالة، والدعوة لانتخابات مبكرة، وإما الانسحاب من قرارات سياسية تتعلق بالدستور وغيره والتراجع عنها. دخول الجيش كمنقذ، في صراع سياسي من الدرجة الأولى، فيه الدولة بعيدة عن الانهيار أو عن الحرب الأهلية، دليل على توسع صلاحيات الجيش وتدخله في اللعبة السياسية.
كان من الأجدى للمعارضة، لو حرصت على الفصل ما بينها وما بين معارضة الفلول، لأن دون ذلك الفصل تضيع قيم الثورة وأهدافها مرة أخرى، ويتحول الصراع من صراع ثوري صرف، إلى صراع ضد حركة سياسية بعينها هي حركة الأخوان المسلمين. وفي هذا السياق، يتحمل مرسي نفسه مسؤولية عدم حصار الفلول سياسيا، وعدم فرزها عن المعارضة الوطنية.
وبما أن الثورة مستمرة، وما حصل حصل بمرجعيتها، فعلى شعب الميدان أن يحرص على عدم حصار حركة الإخوان المسلمين، وعلى التعامل معها كحركة سياسية شرعية، دون إقصاء أو معاقبة، فهذا هو أحد امتحانات المرحلة المقبلة، ومؤشر هام على أن ما حصل حصل بمرجعية ثورية وليس لأهداف سياسية انتقامية. المهمة الثانية للميدان، هي تمايز المعارضة، ما بين معارضة ثورية، وما بين الفلول، الموجودين هم أيضا داخل الميدان، فاستكمال الثورة، لا يتم دون عزل مؤيدي نظام مبارك، وإقصائهم هم من اللعبة السياسية، وهذا ما لم نشهده في تصريحات قيادات المعارضة نفسها التي بدأ وكأنها تحرص على عدم التمايز مع نظام مبارك.
كما يجب على المعارضة الثورية أن تراجع نفسها، وأن تقدم نفسها كبديل حقيقي، حيث تبقى هي العاجزة الأساسية منذ الثورة، عن تحمل وحمل نتائجها. و يجب أن تجري حركة الإخوان المسلمين، في كل مكان، مراجعة شاملة لأدائها، وأن تعي حجمها الحقيقي والتراجع الحاصل والمستمر في شعبيتها، وأن تدرك قواعد المرحلة الجديدة في العالم العربي، ومركزية مفهوم الحرية في الثورات العربية.
الثورة مستمرة... وهي ليست إسلامية وليست لا إسلامية.. وهي ثورة في النفوس وفي المفاهيم، وليس فقط في المطالب.. وهي مستمرة حتى ضمان قيمها وأهدافها في النظام السياسي الذي يتم بناؤه.
"
حنين زعبي
"وعد الشعب المصري القيادة التي ستنتخب بمرجعية ثورة 25 يناير، أنها ستبقى تحت الاختبار، وأعلنها بشكل واضح، لا لبس فيه، أن البرلمان سيحكم بمرجعية الميدان، أي أن "مرجعية الثورة" ستبقى مفعلة، ما دام الميدان يقظا، وما دام النظام المنتخب لم يحول "مرجعية الثورة" إلى قواعد ثابتة في الحكم. لكن الذي فعله النظام المنتخب وفق أول انتخابات نزيهة تشهدها مصر في تاريخها، أنه قام بنسف القواعد الثابتة لثورة ما زالت متحركة، غافلا أن الحراك الثوري هذا يؤسس لأغلبية متغيرة، لا يشير لها صندوق الانتخابات.
ما دامت الثورة مستمرة، وما دام الميدان يقظا، فالحكم على الأمور يتم بمرجعية الثورة، وليس بمرجعية صندوق الانتخابات، وسيكون المطلوب ممن استلم الحكم، بغض النظر عن أيديولوجيته وعن مشروعه السياسي، أن يؤسس هو لقواعد حكم ديمقراطية، تعكس قيم الثورة وأهدافها، وأهمها تشكيل دستور يضمن العدل والمساواة، وسيادة القانون، وبناء مؤسسات تعتمد على الكفاءات، وإطلاق الحريات العامة والفردية، وضمان استقلال القضاء والإعلام، وقبل ذلك مطلب الثورة الأول وهو محاكمة رموز النظام السابق الضالعين بالفساد والقمع.
هذه مطالب الثورة، وهي لا تسقط بالاحتكام لصندوق الانتخابات، وهي قائمة بغض النظر عن نتائجه، كما أنها تعتبر شروطا ضرورية، لئلا يحسب النظام خارجا عن أهداف الثورة وقيمها. إلى جانب ضمان تلك المطالب، التي تؤمّن بناء الديمقراطية، كان على النظام أن يعمل على نهضة مصر اقتصاديا وصناعيا وعلميا، وأن يقدم حلولا اقتصادية واجتماعية لمشاكل الفقر والتلوث والبطالة وغيرها.
سقط نظام مرسي لأنه فشل في بناء الديمقراطية من جهة، ولأنه فشل في تقديم حلول لمشاكل مصر المستعصية. ولم يسقط لأنه ينتمي لحركة الأخوان المسلمين، بل إن العكس هو الصحيح، لقد قررت الحركة أن تفشل نفسها قبل أن يقرر شعبها إسقاطها من السلطة، وذلك بأن وضعت نفسها ومؤسساتها ومصالحها فوق مصالح الدولة، ولم تحسن قراءة الواقع الثوري الجديد وتعاملت معه كواقع ما قبل الثورة، وبأدوات إدارة قديمة. باختصار لم يستوعب نظام مرسي المرحلة.
وفي الوقت الذي ضمن فيه الميدان ثورة شهد لها العالم، لم يضمن صندوق الانتخابات حكما ثوريا، ولا استطاعت يقظة الميدان التأثير على ثورية النظام، الذي لم يرغب هو الآخر في إدارة واستيعاب الفئات الثورية العديدة التي بقيت مشتعلة وفاعلة بعد الانتخابات، بل وخسر – وهو الفائز بفارق صغير جدا- جزءا كبيرا من مصوتيه، كما يشهد بذلك ميدان التحرير، وكما تشهد "جبهة الإنقاذ" المكونة من فئات سبق وانتخبت مرسي.
إلى جانب ذلك، فشل النظام في خطوات بناء الديمقراطية، ففشل في تشكيل الجمعية التأسيسية للدستور داخل البرلمان، وضمن بذلك دستورا وسع من صلاحيات الرئيس دون إمكانية الاحتكام للقضاء، ودخل في صدام أفقي مع المجتمع، وحاول الاستحواذ على مؤسسات الدولة، مخاطرا أولا بشرعيته هو التي لا معنى لها خارج تمثيل وحدة مصالح الدولة.
ولم يدخل نظام مرسي في صدام جدّي مع الفلول، ومع رموز وبقايا حكم مبارك، وكان يستطيع ذلك، إلا عندما هدد هؤلاء سلطته بشكل مباشر، فمثلا، لم يطلب مجلس الشعب، صاحب الأغلبية الاخوانية، عزل أحمد شفيق، رمز نظام مبارك، إلا بعدما قررت الحركة خوض المعركة الرئاسية، ورأت في شفيق منافسا لها.
كان الفشل في تطهير بقايا نظام مبارك، وفي بناء ديمقراطية ما بعد الثورة، فشلا في تأسيس شرعية مرسي نفسه، فكان هو أول من أخرج نفسه عن كونه ممثلا لشرعية عامة، وعامل الدولة ومؤسساتها كممثل لفصيل سياسي. لقد تراجعت حركة الأخوان المسلمين أولا عن موقفها بعد ثورة ٢٥ يناير، بعدم ترشيح رئيس للجمهورية منها، ثم أكدت أنها لن تسعى إلى أكثر من ثلث مجلس الشعب، حتى لو استطاعت، ثم تراجعت، ثم رشحت "مستقلين" قريبين من الحركة، ثم ألحقت ذلك بتعيينات حزبية كثيرة.
مع ذلك، لم يكن ما حصل هو السيناريو المفضل...
كان من الأجدى بكثير، لو استوعب نظام مرسي قواعد المرحلة الجديدة، وقرر إما الانسحاب من السلطة والاستقالة، والدعوة لانتخابات مبكرة، وإما الانسحاب من قرارات سياسية تتعلق بالدستور وغيره والتراجع عنها. دخول الجيش كمنقذ، في صراع سياسي من الدرجة الأولى، فيه الدولة بعيدة عن الانهيار أو عن الحرب الأهلية، دليل على توسع صلاحيات الجيش وتدخله في اللعبة السياسية.
كان من الأجدى للمعارضة، لو حرصت على الفصل ما بينها وما بين معارضة الفلول، لأن دون ذلك الفصل تضيع قيم الثورة وأهدافها مرة أخرى، ويتحول الصراع من صراع ثوري صرف، إلى صراع ضد حركة سياسية بعينها هي حركة الأخوان المسلمين. وفي هذا السياق، يتحمل مرسي نفسه مسؤولية عدم حصار الفلول سياسيا، وعدم فرزها عن المعارضة الوطنية.
وبما أن الثورة مستمرة، وما حصل حصل بمرجعيتها، فعلى شعب الميدان أن يحرص على عدم حصار حركة الإخوان المسلمين، وعلى التعامل معها كحركة سياسية شرعية، دون إقصاء أو معاقبة، فهذا هو أحد امتحانات المرحلة المقبلة، ومؤشر هام على أن ما حصل حصل بمرجعية ثورية وليس لأهداف سياسية انتقامية. المهمة الثانية للميدان، هي تمايز المعارضة، ما بين معارضة ثورية، وما بين الفلول، الموجودين هم أيضا داخل الميدان، فاستكمال الثورة، لا يتم دون عزل مؤيدي نظام مبارك، وإقصائهم هم من اللعبة السياسية، وهذا ما لم نشهده في تصريحات قيادات المعارضة نفسها التي بدأ وكأنها تحرص على عدم التمايز مع نظام مبارك.
كما يجب على المعارضة الثورية أن تراجع نفسها، وأن تقدم نفسها كبديل حقيقي، حيث تبقى هي العاجزة الأساسية منذ الثورة، عن تحمل وحمل نتائجها. و يجب أن تجري حركة الإخوان المسلمين، في كل مكان، مراجعة شاملة لأدائها، وأن تعي حجمها الحقيقي والتراجع الحاصل والمستمر في شعبيتها، وأن تدرك قواعد المرحلة الجديدة في العالم العربي، ومركزية مفهوم الحرية في الثورات العربية.
الثورة مستمرة... وهي ليست إسلامية وليست لا إسلامية.. وهي ثورة في النفوس وفي المفاهيم، وليس فقط في المطالب.. وهي مستمرة حتى ضمان قيمها وأهدافها في النظام السياسي الذي يتم بناؤه.
"
"الغرفة السرية".. كيف تعمل حركة تمرّد المصرية؟
عــ48ـرب
"من أين ينشط أعضاء حركة تمرّد التي استطاعت أن تجمع أكثر من 22 مليون توقيع على عريضة تطالب بانتخابات مبكرة في مصر، وكانت الوقود الأساسي للمظاهرات الأكبر التي شهدها تاريخ مصر وربما العالم في 30 حزيران؟ من أين يُدار تحرك الجماهير؟ ومن أين تُصدر البيانات وتُنفى الشائعات؟
الغرفة السرية أو كما يحب أعضاؤها أن يطلقوا عليها اسم «بطن الزير» كاسم «حركي» ينشط فيها الجنود المجهولين كغرفة مركزية لإدارة مظاهرات ٣٠ يونيو، التى شكلتها حملة «تمرد»، داخل شقة فخمة، فى مصر الجديدة، تبرع أحد الأشخاص بمنحها للحملة، وآخر بإخلاء شقته ليستطيع أعضاء الحملة الذين يديرون الأمور بعيدا عن الميدان وعن الواجهة الإعلامية، ممارسة عملهم.
تقول الناشطة منى سليم في لقاء أجرته معها صحيفة "المصري اليوم": «الغرفة المركزية تنقسم إلى عدد من اللجان ويشرف على جميع اللجان بشكل إداري شيرين الجيزاوي، عضو اللجنة المركزية للحملة، شقيقة المحامى أحمد الجيزاوي، المعتقل بالسعودية، ووليد المصري، عضو اللجنة المركزية، وهما مسؤولان عن التنسيق بين لجان الغرفة المختلفة».
وهذه اللجان، وفقا، لـ«منى»، هى اللجنة الإعلامية ويتولى مسؤوليتها أعضاء الموقع الإلكتروني للحملة، وعدد من أعضاء اللجنة التنسيقية بقيادة عمرو بدر، رئيس تحرير الموقع، بالإضافة إلى لجنة العمل الجماهيري، والتى تشارك فيها آية حسني وريهام المصري وإسلام نور الدين وإسلام همام ومحمد نبوي وشيماء التوني، بالإضافة إلى محمد هيكل، الذي يشرف على تحركات المسيرات والتفاعل داخل الاعتصام ومهمة اللجنة المنصة وخيام المعتصمين بأماكن الاعتصام.
وأضافت: «هناك أيضا لجنة الإعاشة ومهمتها توزيع الطعام والمياه على المعتصمين، من أعضاء الحملة، ويتولى كل من سلامة فكري ونانسي مليجي، الإشراف عليهم، إلى جانب منسقين فى المناطق بالقاهرة والقليوبية، وهم الأبطال الحقيقيون داخل الحملة وعددهم كبير جدا».
- أعضاء "تمرّد" يحتفلون بغرفتهم السرية بعد عزل مُرسي -
وأشارت إلى أن «لجنة التأمين واللجان الشعبية، يشرف عليها كل من أحمد بديع وأحمد
المصرى والسيد حسني، وتتولى اللجنة بالتنسيق مع مئات المتطوعين مهمة الإشراف على
عدم دخول أي شخص بأسلحة وتأمين أماكن الاعتصام ليلا، من خلال اللجان الشعبية وهناك
أيضا اللجنة الطبية ويتولى الإشراف عليها الدكتور محمد عوض، والدكتورة رشا سليم،
وتقوم اللجنة بالتنسيق مع الكيانات الطبية والمستشفى الميدانى
لتمرد».
وقالت: «هناك أيضا لجنة التواصل مع المحافظات، مسؤول عنها معي، سيد غريب، ومن الإسكندربة خالد القاضى، ومن السويس مصطفى السويسي وتتولى إيمان المهدي، لجنة الموارد، وهى لجنة لجمع التبرعات من أعضاء الحملة، وتوزيعها على اللجان المختلفة فيما تشرف مها أبوبكر وحسن سليمان وكريم المصري على اللجنه القانونية وتقوم بالتنسيق مع المحامين فى عدد من المحافظات ولجان الحريات المختلفة». وتضيف «منى» أن التواصل مع القوى السياسية والمتحدثين الرسميين والمؤسسين من خلال لجنة مشكلة من محمود بدر ومحمد عبد العزيز وحسن شاهين.
وأضافت «منى»: «الجنود المجهولون فى الحملة ليسوا هؤلاء فقط، لكن هناك ملايين وقعوا وجمعوا التوقيعات وقاموا بالفرز والذى تولى الإشراف عليه فى الحملة بالقاهرة، الدكتور أمير زين، وشارك معه إسلام وائل، أصغر عضو فى الحملة، وهو في الثانوية العامة».وقالت شيرين الجيزاوى: «أكثر الأزمات التى تواجه الغرف، أنها سرية ولابد أن تظل سرية كأماكن، حتى لا يحدث أى هجوم عليها من مؤيدى الرئيس محمد مرسي، الذين نتوقع هجومهم علينا فى كل وقت».وأضافت: «نحن لا نخشى إلا الله سبحانه وتعالى، ولا نعرف الخوف، وسرية الأماكن لضمان عدم حرقها أو الاعتداء عليها نظرا لوجود أجهزة لاب توب كثيرة مع أعضاء اللجنة الإعلامية، ووجود فتيات لا يمكن المخاطرة بوضعهن فى خطر».وقال السيد حسنى، مسؤول تأمين الغرف القريبة من القصر،إن «التأمين لا يتم بأي سلاح على الإطلاق، لكنه بوجود عدد من المتطوعين على بدايات الشوارع، وفى حالة حدوث أي أمر مريب نقوم بإخلاء الغرفة وتأمين انصراف الموجودين، إلى أماكن أخرى وحتى الآن المنطقة الموجودة بها الغرفة لم يحدث أي محاوله لاقتحامها لقربها من الاتحادية، والأهالي الذين يعرفون بوجودها وهم ثقة يشاركون معنا فى التأمين، وحياتنا هنا عادية وبسيطة جدا وعلاقاتنا أسرية، والوجبة الرئيسية للغداء هى الفول والطعمية».
"من أين ينشط أعضاء حركة تمرّد التي استطاعت أن تجمع أكثر من 22 مليون توقيع على عريضة تطالب بانتخابات مبكرة في مصر، وكانت الوقود الأساسي للمظاهرات الأكبر التي شهدها تاريخ مصر وربما العالم في 30 حزيران؟ من أين يُدار تحرك الجماهير؟ ومن أين تُصدر البيانات وتُنفى الشائعات؟
الغرفة السرية أو كما يحب أعضاؤها أن يطلقوا عليها اسم «بطن الزير» كاسم «حركي» ينشط فيها الجنود المجهولين كغرفة مركزية لإدارة مظاهرات ٣٠ يونيو، التى شكلتها حملة «تمرد»، داخل شقة فخمة، فى مصر الجديدة، تبرع أحد الأشخاص بمنحها للحملة، وآخر بإخلاء شقته ليستطيع أعضاء الحملة الذين يديرون الأمور بعيدا عن الميدان وعن الواجهة الإعلامية، ممارسة عملهم.
تقول الناشطة منى سليم في لقاء أجرته معها صحيفة "المصري اليوم": «الغرفة المركزية تنقسم إلى عدد من اللجان ويشرف على جميع اللجان بشكل إداري شيرين الجيزاوي، عضو اللجنة المركزية للحملة، شقيقة المحامى أحمد الجيزاوي، المعتقل بالسعودية، ووليد المصري، عضو اللجنة المركزية، وهما مسؤولان عن التنسيق بين لجان الغرفة المختلفة».
وهذه اللجان، وفقا، لـ«منى»، هى اللجنة الإعلامية ويتولى مسؤوليتها أعضاء الموقع الإلكتروني للحملة، وعدد من أعضاء اللجنة التنسيقية بقيادة عمرو بدر، رئيس تحرير الموقع، بالإضافة إلى لجنة العمل الجماهيري، والتى تشارك فيها آية حسني وريهام المصري وإسلام نور الدين وإسلام همام ومحمد نبوي وشيماء التوني، بالإضافة إلى محمد هيكل، الذي يشرف على تحركات المسيرات والتفاعل داخل الاعتصام ومهمة اللجنة المنصة وخيام المعتصمين بأماكن الاعتصام.
وأضافت: «هناك أيضا لجنة الإعاشة ومهمتها توزيع الطعام والمياه على المعتصمين، من أعضاء الحملة، ويتولى كل من سلامة فكري ونانسي مليجي، الإشراف عليهم، إلى جانب منسقين فى المناطق بالقاهرة والقليوبية، وهم الأبطال الحقيقيون داخل الحملة وعددهم كبير جدا».
- أعضاء "تمرّد" يحتفلون بغرفتهم السرية بعد عزل مُرسي -
وقالت: «هناك أيضا لجنة التواصل مع المحافظات، مسؤول عنها معي، سيد غريب، ومن الإسكندربة خالد القاضى، ومن السويس مصطفى السويسي وتتولى إيمان المهدي، لجنة الموارد، وهى لجنة لجمع التبرعات من أعضاء الحملة، وتوزيعها على اللجان المختلفة فيما تشرف مها أبوبكر وحسن سليمان وكريم المصري على اللجنه القانونية وتقوم بالتنسيق مع المحامين فى عدد من المحافظات ولجان الحريات المختلفة». وتضيف «منى» أن التواصل مع القوى السياسية والمتحدثين الرسميين والمؤسسين من خلال لجنة مشكلة من محمود بدر ومحمد عبد العزيز وحسن شاهين.
وأضافت «منى»: «الجنود المجهولون فى الحملة ليسوا هؤلاء فقط، لكن هناك ملايين وقعوا وجمعوا التوقيعات وقاموا بالفرز والذى تولى الإشراف عليه فى الحملة بالقاهرة، الدكتور أمير زين، وشارك معه إسلام وائل، أصغر عضو فى الحملة، وهو في الثانوية العامة».وقالت شيرين الجيزاوى: «أكثر الأزمات التى تواجه الغرف، أنها سرية ولابد أن تظل سرية كأماكن، حتى لا يحدث أى هجوم عليها من مؤيدى الرئيس محمد مرسي، الذين نتوقع هجومهم علينا فى كل وقت».وأضافت: «نحن لا نخشى إلا الله سبحانه وتعالى، ولا نعرف الخوف، وسرية الأماكن لضمان عدم حرقها أو الاعتداء عليها نظرا لوجود أجهزة لاب توب كثيرة مع أعضاء اللجنة الإعلامية، ووجود فتيات لا يمكن المخاطرة بوضعهن فى خطر».وقال السيد حسنى، مسؤول تأمين الغرف القريبة من القصر،إن «التأمين لا يتم بأي سلاح على الإطلاق، لكنه بوجود عدد من المتطوعين على بدايات الشوارع، وفى حالة حدوث أي أمر مريب نقوم بإخلاء الغرفة وتأمين انصراف الموجودين، إلى أماكن أخرى وحتى الآن المنطقة الموجودة بها الغرفة لم يحدث أي محاوله لاقتحامها لقربها من الاتحادية، والأهالي الذين يعرفون بوجودها وهم ثقة يشاركون معنا فى التأمين، وحياتنا هنا عادية وبسيطة جدا وعلاقاتنا أسرية، والوجبة الرئيسية للغداء هى الفول والطعمية».
Mohamed Morsi's final days – the inside story
Egypt's first freely elected president found himself isolated and abandoned by allies as even his guards simply stepped away
guardian.co.uk,
In the end, Egypt's first freely elected president found himself isolated, abandoned by allies and no one in the army or police willing to support him.
Even his Republican Guards simply stepped away as army commandos came to take him to an undisclosed defence ministry facility, according to army, security and Muslim Brotherhood officials who gave the Associated Press an account of Morsi's final hours in office.
The Muslim Brotherhood officials said they saw the end coming for Morsi as early as 23 June – a week before the opposition planned its first big protest. The military gave the president seven days to work out his differences with the opposition......
There was such distrust between Morsi and the security agencies that they began withholding information from him – deploying troops and armour in cities without his knowledge.
Police also refused to protect Muslim Brotherhood offices that came under attack in the latest wave of protests.
Therefore, when Morsi was fighting for his survival, there was no one to turn to, except calling for outside help through western ambassadors and a small coterie of aides from the Brotherhood who could do little more than help him record two last-minute speeches......
Brotherhood officials said they saw the end coming.
"We knew it was over on 23 June. Western ambassadors told us that," said another Brotherhood spokesman. US ambassador Anne Patterson was one of the envoys, he added......
According to the usually authoritative newspaper Al-Ahram, Morsi was offered safe passage to Turkey, Libya or elsewhere, but he declined. He also was offered immunity from prosecution if he voluntarily stepped down....."
guardian.co.uk,
The army chief came to President Mohammed Morsi with a simple demand: Step down on your own.
"Over my dead body!" Morsi replied to General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi on Monday, two days before the army eventually ousted him after a year in office.In the end, Egypt's first freely elected president found himself isolated, abandoned by allies and no one in the army or police willing to support him.
Even his Republican Guards simply stepped away as army commandos came to take him to an undisclosed defence ministry facility, according to army, security and Muslim Brotherhood officials who gave the Associated Press an account of Morsi's final hours in office.
The Muslim Brotherhood officials said they saw the end coming for Morsi as early as 23 June – a week before the opposition planned its first big protest. The military gave the president seven days to work out his differences with the opposition......
There was such distrust between Morsi and the security agencies that they began withholding information from him – deploying troops and armour in cities without his knowledge.
Police also refused to protect Muslim Brotherhood offices that came under attack in the latest wave of protests.
Therefore, when Morsi was fighting for his survival, there was no one to turn to, except calling for outside help through western ambassadors and a small coterie of aides from the Brotherhood who could do little more than help him record two last-minute speeches......
Brotherhood officials said they saw the end coming.
"We knew it was over on 23 June. Western ambassadors told us that," said another Brotherhood spokesman. US ambassador Anne Patterson was one of the envoys, he added......
According to the usually authoritative newspaper Al-Ahram, Morsi was offered safe passage to Turkey, Libya or elsewhere, but he declined. He also was offered immunity from prosecution if he voluntarily stepped down....."
Egypt Q and A: What does this mean for Arab Democratisation?
Where next for a fledging Egyptian democracy?
"As the situation unfolds in Egypt, attention turns to the wider implications of military intervention. Jacob Powell speaks to Dr. Larbi Sadiki, a leading scholar in the field of Arab democratisation and a regular contributor to these pages. He has authored two critically acclaimed books on the issue: Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2009) and The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses (Columbia University Press, 2004).
Jacob Powell: Do you think Egypt is ready for democracy?......
JP: In an op-ed you published in Al Jazeera immediately preceding the coup, you wrote “The age of grand leaders has passed…leaderless-ness is what captures the imagination of the masses more so than the presence of fallible mortals at the apex of power.” But during the 48 hour ultimatum, Mohamed El-Baradei was nominated as the opposition spokesman, appeared with General Sisi on TV, and seems to be the leader of the opposition movement. Do these developments conflict with your statements?
LS: Definitely. Neither El-Baradei nor Sabbahi will be iconic leaders. One year in politics was too long for Morsi, and this could prove the same for succeeding politicians in Egypt and the Arab World at large. It is no longer about Who rules; rather, it is How people are ruled that matters in this midst of this most revolutionary moment. This is an age where people are perpetually dissatisfied with the status quo. The public mood, especially in Egypt, is too volatile. I’m definitely sticking to my guns – the age of iconic leaders has passed.The public square ethos is today the only force that drives change – in whatever direction – that has the last word, even I ephemerally, in the Arab Middle East…I guess, it is a question of ‘stay tuned for more’."
Thursday, July 4, 2013
Legitimacy in Egypt
We can welcome Morsi's departure without welcoming the
means by which it was achieved
By Brian Whitaker
"It is a sad testament to the failure of Mohamed Morsi's
presidency that his claim to remain in office has been based on right rather
than merit.
Almost everyone accepts that he was legitimately elected, and
that is certainly a strong point in his favour. But once a leader has been
elected, continuing legitimacy is in the eye of beholders and unless nurtured it
may be lost.
During his 12 months in power, Morsi's performance was
lacklustre and at times incompetent. That, however, was not the main reason why
Egyptians took to the streets last weekend to protest in unprecedented numbers.
Morsi put himself beyond the pale by promising inclusiveness and then spreading
divisiveness, and by adopting a style of government that increasingly resembled
that of the ousted Mubarak regime.
So why not wait a few years till the next election, then vote
him out of office? This is a question I have heard a few people asking –
especially American TV presenters. One answer is that there are numerous
problems (above all, the economy) which need urgent attention but the question
might also be framed another way: Why should a president be expected to complete
his term if he has clearly lost the confidence of the public?
In the US, presidents – good and bad alike – are expected to
serve their full term unless they happen to get caught in skulduggery like
Richard Nixon, but that is not the only system. In Britain, only two of the last
four prime ministers have been removed by the public at the ballot box and,
worldwide, similar examples can be found in other democracies.
Margaret Thatcher – Britain's most divisive prime minister of
the 20th century – was toppled by her own party when they realised she had
become an electoral liability. The key difference between Thatcher and Morsi is
that the perpetrators of the "coup" against Thatcher were not the military but
her civilian colleagues. Thatcher, unlike Morsi, also agreed to go voluntarily
once it became clear that her position was untenable.
Morsi might have heeded the warnings about his
authoritarianism and divisiveness, but he chose not to. Now that he is gone,
it's perfectly possible – and not inconsistent – to welcome his departure
without welcoming the means by which it was achieved.
The need now, though, is to get the military back in their box
as soon as possible. The military insist that they have no desire to rule Egypt,
and that they are only protecting the "will of the people". Evidence so far,
such as the appointment of a civilian (and a Morsi appointee) as interim
president suggests they are sincere about that ... at least for the moment.
The "will of the people" phrase, though, reasonable as it
might sound today, does open the door to further meddling by the military which
could easily turn into a habit.
Meanwhile, there's the task of assembling a new government
which, given the history of Morsi's rule, needs to be inclusive and be seen as
representing a broad swathe of political opinion. We have yet to see who will
agree to join it, and if key elements cannot be persuaded to take part the
military may then start thinking about a Plan B."
L'Etat, C'est Nous: Who will control the Egyptian state?
The Egyptian military stands in the way of revolution, and the revolutionaries will again have to take it on directly.
AN EXCELLENT LONG ARTICLE AND RECOMMENDED READINGBy Mark LeVine
Al-Jazeera
".....The Egyptian military stands in the way of revolution, and sooner or later the revolutionaries will again have to take it on directly.The question is: Who does the Egyptian state belong to, the military and the power elite, or the people? If the revolutionaries who have won two extraordinary victories in less than three years can find a way to keep the tens of millions of Egyptians who took to the streets to oust Morsi in the ring and on their side, they might just win the fight. But to do that they will need to develop and articulate the kind of progressive ideology that economic, political and religious elites around the world have spent decades doing everything in their power to delegitimise. It's a battle whose stakes involve us all."
Why Egypt is not Algeria
A GOOD ANALYSIS
By Khaled Fahmy
"Immediately after the Egyptian army issued its 48-hour ultimatum to political actors to set down their differences or else the army would initiate its own roadmap, in a thinly disguised threat to President Mohamed Morsi to step down, people started making comparisons with the Algerian army which, back in 1991, stepped in and annulled the results of the parliamentary elections thus preventing the Islamists' Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) from reaping the results of their electoral victory. Egypt according to this comparison is about to enter in a cycle of violence due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s feeling that it has been deeply wronged and denied the opportunity to run the country.
I don’t think this comparison holds for the following reasons:
1. Back in 1991, the Algerian government's Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) suspended the elections immediately after the first round had showed a clear Islamist victory. The FIS never had a chance of forming a government. In Egypt, the situation is different. The Muslim Brotherhood did win, occupy the presidency, dominate parliament and form a government. It is their disastrous mismanagement and not a military fiat that caused their downfall. According to reliable opinion polls, Morsi lost half his own die-hard constituency in his first year in office.
2. The Algerian elections were not the result of a revolution the way the Egyptian elections were. This matters a lot since part of the reason of Morsi’s fall from grace is that he and his organization were not attentive enough to the aims of the revolution and in many respects have even betrayed these aims.
3. Egypt’s Islamists have already had their taste of violence. Throughout the 1990s, Egypt’s militant Islamist groups conducted a ferocious military campaign against the Egyptian state (the police, not the army), and ended up failing and their leaders admitted that that was the wrong strategy.
4. Egypt is still in a revolutionary moment (witness June 30’s huge demonstrations), something that was missing in Algeria in 1991. The revolution, especially the youth, is what prompted the army to issue its declaration. In other words, the army is also cornered and is not acting independently despite all appearances to the contrary. Youth still have the momentum, and everyone else is reacting to them.
This does not mean that there won’t be Egyptian Islamists who would like to revenge a wounded psyche. The sense of victimhood runs very deep in the psychology of the Brotherhood, and the latest events will only exacerbate it. And with the political situation very volatile, with the economy in shambles, and with so many weapons lying around, it is not difficult to imagine violence breaking up. It is also not farfetched for Islamists to use the sectarian card and inflame the situation even more. Some may adopt an après moi, le deluge mentality just like the feloul have been trying to do for two and a half years. Still, for the reasons mentioned above, I don’t think this will lead to a full blown civil war."
By Khaled Fahmy
"Immediately after the Egyptian army issued its 48-hour ultimatum to political actors to set down their differences or else the army would initiate its own roadmap, in a thinly disguised threat to President Mohamed Morsi to step down, people started making comparisons with the Algerian army which, back in 1991, stepped in and annulled the results of the parliamentary elections thus preventing the Islamists' Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) from reaping the results of their electoral victory. Egypt according to this comparison is about to enter in a cycle of violence due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s feeling that it has been deeply wronged and denied the opportunity to run the country.
I don’t think this comparison holds for the following reasons:
1. Back in 1991, the Algerian government's Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) suspended the elections immediately after the first round had showed a clear Islamist victory. The FIS never had a chance of forming a government. In Egypt, the situation is different. The Muslim Brotherhood did win, occupy the presidency, dominate parliament and form a government. It is their disastrous mismanagement and not a military fiat that caused their downfall. According to reliable opinion polls, Morsi lost half his own die-hard constituency in his first year in office.
2. The Algerian elections were not the result of a revolution the way the Egyptian elections were. This matters a lot since part of the reason of Morsi’s fall from grace is that he and his organization were not attentive enough to the aims of the revolution and in many respects have even betrayed these aims.
3. Egypt’s Islamists have already had their taste of violence. Throughout the 1990s, Egypt’s militant Islamist groups conducted a ferocious military campaign against the Egyptian state (the police, not the army), and ended up failing and their leaders admitted that that was the wrong strategy.
4. Egypt is still in a revolutionary moment (witness June 30’s huge demonstrations), something that was missing in Algeria in 1991. The revolution, especially the youth, is what prompted the army to issue its declaration. In other words, the army is also cornered and is not acting independently despite all appearances to the contrary. Youth still have the momentum, and everyone else is reacting to them.
This does not mean that there won’t be Egyptian Islamists who would like to revenge a wounded psyche. The sense of victimhood runs very deep in the psychology of the Brotherhood, and the latest events will only exacerbate it. And with the political situation very volatile, with the economy in shambles, and with so many weapons lying around, it is not difficult to imagine violence breaking up. It is also not farfetched for Islamists to use the sectarian card and inflame the situation even more. Some may adopt an après moi, le deluge mentality just like the feloul have been trying to do for two and a half years. Still, for the reasons mentioned above, I don’t think this will lead to a full blown civil war."
Real News Video: Egyptian Army Ousts Pres. Morsi From Power In Face Of Popular Protests
Gilbert Achcar Pt.1: Morsi removed by military coup but Egyptians should not expect improvements in socioeconomic conditions
Egypt’s “Revocouption” and the Future of Democracy on the Nile
By Juan Cole
".....
What Rebellion and al-Sisi have done is extremely dangerous. Not only does it risk undermining the legitimacy of democratic elections, it risks discouraging Muslim religious groups from participating in democratic politics. The danger is real. A similar revocation of the results of a revolution in Algeria late in 1991 threw the country into a decade and a half of civil war that left over 150,000 dead. The ‘debaathification’ program of the post-2003 Iraqi government, which was vindictive toward former members of the Baath Party, probably helped throw that country into a low-grade guerrilla struggle that continues to this day. Egyptians who think their country is immune from such phenomena are fooling themselves.
Egypt’s future stability and prosperity now depends on whether the officer corps and youth are mature enough to return to pluralist principals and cease persecuting the Muslim Brotherhood just because Morsi was high-handed. Their media has be be free and the 300 officials have to be released unless charged with really-existing crimes on the statute books. And it depends on whether the Muslim Brotherhood is wise and mature enough to roll with this punch and to reform itself, giving up its cliquish and cult-like internal solidarity in favor of truly becoming a nation-wide, center-right, democratic opposition party. If they take this course, they have a chance of emulating Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and one day coming back to power (an observant Muslim prime minister was forced out in 1997, but members of his party just regrouped and ultimately came to rule the country). If the Muslim Brotherhood adherents instead turn to terrorism and guerrilla actions, they will tear the country apart and probably blacken the name of political Islam for decades.
At the moment, neither of those two groups is demonstrating the maturity and high-mindedness that would reassure me about the prospects for a genuinely democratic transition."
".....
What Rebellion and al-Sisi have done is extremely dangerous. Not only does it risk undermining the legitimacy of democratic elections, it risks discouraging Muslim religious groups from participating in democratic politics. The danger is real. A similar revocation of the results of a revolution in Algeria late in 1991 threw the country into a decade and a half of civil war that left over 150,000 dead. The ‘debaathification’ program of the post-2003 Iraqi government, which was vindictive toward former members of the Baath Party, probably helped throw that country into a low-grade guerrilla struggle that continues to this day. Egyptians who think their country is immune from such phenomena are fooling themselves.
Egypt’s future stability and prosperity now depends on whether the officer corps and youth are mature enough to return to pluralist principals and cease persecuting the Muslim Brotherhood just because Morsi was high-handed. Their media has be be free and the 300 officials have to be released unless charged with really-existing crimes on the statute books. And it depends on whether the Muslim Brotherhood is wise and mature enough to roll with this punch and to reform itself, giving up its cliquish and cult-like internal solidarity in favor of truly becoming a nation-wide, center-right, democratic opposition party. If they take this course, they have a chance of emulating Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and one day coming back to power (an observant Muslim prime minister was forced out in 1997, but members of his party just regrouped and ultimately came to rule the country). If the Muslim Brotherhood adherents instead turn to terrorism and guerrilla actions, they will tear the country apart and probably blacken the name of political Islam for decades.
At the moment, neither of those two groups is demonstrating the maturity and high-mindedness that would reassure me about the prospects for a genuinely democratic transition."
Real News Video: Egyptian Army Coup Topples President Morsi
Egypt on edge as military removes elected President after popular uprising brings million into the streets
Why it was necessary to remove Morsi
The revolution aimed to change the rules of the game, not just its players. When it was clear that Mohamed Morsi was picking up the mantle of Mubarak, he had to go
By Khaled Fahmy , Thursday 4 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
"I did not vote for Mohamed Morsi in the previous presidential elections. I invalidated my ballot in these elections because I realised that Egypt deserves better than either Morsi or Shafiq. Yet when the results were announced, I was glad because I realised that we had managed to carry out the first free and fair elections, and I considered Mohamed Morsi the legitimate president of the country, and on many occasions I have stated that my disputes with him and my lack of trust in him do not mean I deny his legitimacy.
By Khaled Fahmy , Thursday 4 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
"I did not vote for Mohamed Morsi in the previous presidential elections. I invalidated my ballot in these elections because I realised that Egypt deserves better than either Morsi or Shafiq. Yet when the results were announced, I was glad because I realised that we had managed to carry out the first free and fair elections, and I considered Mohamed Morsi the legitimate president of the country, and on many occasions I have stated that my disputes with him and my lack of trust in him do not mean I deny his legitimacy.
Yet on 18 May I went to Tahrir Square and I signed the "Rebel" petition calling for the immediate departure of Mohamed Morsi, before completing his presidential term. And on 30 June I joined the millions to insist on the same demand.
What happened between June 2012 and May 2013 that prompted me to change my position?.....
Mohamed Morsi continues to speak of legitimacy, and by that he means the legitimacy of the ballot box. Yet the act of going to the ballot box was made possible, in the first place, by our revolution. This revolution did not start merely to hold fair and free elections that bring new faces and players. When I participated in the revolution with other Egyptians, my intention was changing the rules of the game and not to change the players. But when I became sure that it was not Dr Morsi's intention to change these rules but rather that he meant to play according to the same old rules, and when I realised that his priorities were attacking the judiciary and the media not purifying the interior ministry and subjecting the army to societal oversight, that was when Mohamed Morsi no longer became a legitimate president. Rather, for me he became a leader who had forgotten or missed the fact that there is a revolution that brought him to his place. This is the reason why it became necessary to rebel so that the revolution may continue."
أفكار حول المعضلة المصرية
عزمي بشارة
"1. لم يفهم الإخوان طبيعة المرحلة الانتقالية، وأن المسألة ليست مسألة حق الحزب الأقوى في إدارتها بقدر ما هو واجب الجميع على تحمل مسؤوليتها. قضى واجب الحكم أن لا يتركوا حتى قوةً ثورية واحدة تتهرّب من مسؤولية إدارة المرحلة، لا أن يستأثروا بها فيقعوا في منزلقات الاحتكار، ويستأثروا في الواقع بتحمل صعوباتها وإخفاقاتها. وبدلا من أن يرفضوا مشاركة أولئك الذين دعموهم في الجولة الثانية للانتخابات الرئاسية، كان عليهم من البداية أن يضغطوا هم على الآخرين كي يشاركوا. وكانت لحظة القوة يوم إقالة طنطاوي وعنان، وبدل استغلالها لجذب الآخرين للمشاركة صدر الإعلان الدستوري الذي أفقد مرسي رصيد ذلك اليوم. في النهاية أصبح الآخرون يتهربون من المشاركة، فقد أصبح الهدف هو إفشال تجربة الإخوان في الحكم. ولم تنعدم المبررات والأخطاء والذرائع.
2. لم يفهم معارضو الإخوان أن الطرف الرئيس الذي يعرقل عمل الرئيس هو أجهزة الدولة والقضاء والإعلام، وهي أجهزة يسيطر عليها أتباع النظام السابق.3. لم يفهم الإخوان أنه لكي يواجهوا جهاز الدولة القديم لا بد لهم من التحالف مع أطراف في الثورة، أقصيت عن تحمل المسؤولية، واصبحت تدافع حتى عن بقايا النظام القديم مثل النائب العام، بحجة أن الخطوات التي اتخذت بحق هذه الرموز غير قانونية، في حين أن الطريق الوحيد للتخلص من بقايا النظام القديم كان اتخاذ خطوات ثورية "غير قانونية"، أو تغيير القوانين. الإخوان الذي كان عليهم اتخاذ خطوات ثورية تمسكوا بالشكليات حين أراد الآخرون مشاركتهم، وخرقوها حين كان هذا هو الطريق الوحيد لتحقيق الهدف.4. أدرك أنصار النظام السابق أنها فرصتهم، فصعدوا ضد الرئيس المنتخب في ظل "شماتة" قوى الثورة بالإخوان.
5. ثمة دوامة متعلقة بمدى خطورة تهميش رئيس منتحب (بتدخل الجيش) أو إقصائه بدون انتخابات في سياقات مواجهة قد تؤدي الى تعقيد عملية التحول الديمقراطي. وأخرى متعلقة بإنهاء تجربة مهمة للإسلاميين مع العملية الانتخابية بهذا الشكل، واستنتاجاتهم من عملية إفشالهم. هل سوف يستنتجون ما استنتجه حزب العدالة والتنمية التركي (فبعد كل إنهاء عسكري لتجربته كان يخرج أكثر ديمقراطية)، أما ستحصل ردة فعل ضد المشاركة الديمقراطية؟ لا يجوز الاستهانة بهذه الأسئلة! هذه أسئلة أي إنسان مسؤول. فهي متعلقة بمصير التجربة الديمقراطية وموقف قطاعات سياسية اجتماعية واسعة منها.
6. ثمة إشكالية متعلقة بدفاع بعض الثوريين عن قضاء فاسد يصدر قرارات متتالية في صالح النظام السابق بدلا عن المطالبة بتغييره وإصلاحه.
7. ثمة عطب رئيس هو عصبية الإخوان الحزبية (أكثر منها في الدينية)، والتي تمنعهم من إخضاع مصالح للحزب لمصلحة الوطن والمجتمع، ولكن ثمة مشكلة في عدم رؤية من يريد استغلال ذلك للانقلاب على الثورة من أتباع النظام القديم.
8. ثمة إشكالية في الصمت على خطاب النظام السابق الإعلامي التهريجي المشبع بالخرافات والأكاذيب بما في ذلك التحريض على الفلسطينيين بلا مبرر، ما يذكر بإعلام النظام القديم أثناء الحرب الإسرائيلية على غزة.
9. على الثوريين الديمقراطيين الحقيقيين ان يشقوا طريقهم في هذه الأيام عبر هذه الإشكاليات والمعضلات، وأن لا يتعثروا عند التمييز بين استمرار الثورة، أو ما يمكن تسميته بالثورة في الثورة إلى أن تتحقق الديمقراطية، من جهة، وبين الثورة المضادة من جهة أخرى.
10. الموضوع ليس موضوع إطاحة رئيس منتخب، فبالإمكان الاتفاق على تقديم موعد الانتخابات من خلال حكومة وحدة وطنية تتولى شؤون البلاد لفترة يتفق عليها إلى حين انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية. فتقديم موعد الانتخابات بالاتفاق بحذ ذاته هو إجراء ديمقراطي. الموضوع هو فرض إرادة جزء كبير من المجتمع على جزء آخر، وكسره... هذه الرغبة بكسر إرادة جزء آخر من المجتمع بالقوة تؤدي إلى شرخ عميق... يشكل خطرا على عملية التحول الديمقراطي ويستفيد منه أعداء الديمقراطية المعروفون.
11. عملية التحول الديمقراطي طويلة ولن تحسم خلال يومين، ولا حاجة في استعجال التمترس. المهم أن تكون بوصلة جيل شباب ثورة 25 يناير صحيحة، فهم مستقبل مصر العربية الديمقراطية، وليس بقايا الخارطة الحزبية والسياسية القديمة التي تتصارع متطفلة على جهودهم.
"1. لم يفهم الإخوان طبيعة المرحلة الانتقالية، وأن المسألة ليست مسألة حق الحزب الأقوى في إدارتها بقدر ما هو واجب الجميع على تحمل مسؤوليتها. قضى واجب الحكم أن لا يتركوا حتى قوةً ثورية واحدة تتهرّب من مسؤولية إدارة المرحلة، لا أن يستأثروا بها فيقعوا في منزلقات الاحتكار، ويستأثروا في الواقع بتحمل صعوباتها وإخفاقاتها. وبدلا من أن يرفضوا مشاركة أولئك الذين دعموهم في الجولة الثانية للانتخابات الرئاسية، كان عليهم من البداية أن يضغطوا هم على الآخرين كي يشاركوا. وكانت لحظة القوة يوم إقالة طنطاوي وعنان، وبدل استغلالها لجذب الآخرين للمشاركة صدر الإعلان الدستوري الذي أفقد مرسي رصيد ذلك اليوم. في النهاية أصبح الآخرون يتهربون من المشاركة، فقد أصبح الهدف هو إفشال تجربة الإخوان في الحكم. ولم تنعدم المبررات والأخطاء والذرائع.
2. لم يفهم معارضو الإخوان أن الطرف الرئيس الذي يعرقل عمل الرئيس هو أجهزة الدولة والقضاء والإعلام، وهي أجهزة يسيطر عليها أتباع النظام السابق.3. لم يفهم الإخوان أنه لكي يواجهوا جهاز الدولة القديم لا بد لهم من التحالف مع أطراف في الثورة، أقصيت عن تحمل المسؤولية، واصبحت تدافع حتى عن بقايا النظام القديم مثل النائب العام، بحجة أن الخطوات التي اتخذت بحق هذه الرموز غير قانونية، في حين أن الطريق الوحيد للتخلص من بقايا النظام القديم كان اتخاذ خطوات ثورية "غير قانونية"، أو تغيير القوانين. الإخوان الذي كان عليهم اتخاذ خطوات ثورية تمسكوا بالشكليات حين أراد الآخرون مشاركتهم، وخرقوها حين كان هذا هو الطريق الوحيد لتحقيق الهدف.4. أدرك أنصار النظام السابق أنها فرصتهم، فصعدوا ضد الرئيس المنتخب في ظل "شماتة" قوى الثورة بالإخوان.
5. ثمة دوامة متعلقة بمدى خطورة تهميش رئيس منتحب (بتدخل الجيش) أو إقصائه بدون انتخابات في سياقات مواجهة قد تؤدي الى تعقيد عملية التحول الديمقراطي. وأخرى متعلقة بإنهاء تجربة مهمة للإسلاميين مع العملية الانتخابية بهذا الشكل، واستنتاجاتهم من عملية إفشالهم. هل سوف يستنتجون ما استنتجه حزب العدالة والتنمية التركي (فبعد كل إنهاء عسكري لتجربته كان يخرج أكثر ديمقراطية)، أما ستحصل ردة فعل ضد المشاركة الديمقراطية؟ لا يجوز الاستهانة بهذه الأسئلة! هذه أسئلة أي إنسان مسؤول. فهي متعلقة بمصير التجربة الديمقراطية وموقف قطاعات سياسية اجتماعية واسعة منها.
6. ثمة إشكالية متعلقة بدفاع بعض الثوريين عن قضاء فاسد يصدر قرارات متتالية في صالح النظام السابق بدلا عن المطالبة بتغييره وإصلاحه.
7. ثمة عطب رئيس هو عصبية الإخوان الحزبية (أكثر منها في الدينية)، والتي تمنعهم من إخضاع مصالح للحزب لمصلحة الوطن والمجتمع، ولكن ثمة مشكلة في عدم رؤية من يريد استغلال ذلك للانقلاب على الثورة من أتباع النظام القديم.
8. ثمة إشكالية في الصمت على خطاب النظام السابق الإعلامي التهريجي المشبع بالخرافات والأكاذيب بما في ذلك التحريض على الفلسطينيين بلا مبرر، ما يذكر بإعلام النظام القديم أثناء الحرب الإسرائيلية على غزة.
9. على الثوريين الديمقراطيين الحقيقيين ان يشقوا طريقهم في هذه الأيام عبر هذه الإشكاليات والمعضلات، وأن لا يتعثروا عند التمييز بين استمرار الثورة، أو ما يمكن تسميته بالثورة في الثورة إلى أن تتحقق الديمقراطية، من جهة، وبين الثورة المضادة من جهة أخرى.
10. الموضوع ليس موضوع إطاحة رئيس منتخب، فبالإمكان الاتفاق على تقديم موعد الانتخابات من خلال حكومة وحدة وطنية تتولى شؤون البلاد لفترة يتفق عليها إلى حين انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية. فتقديم موعد الانتخابات بالاتفاق بحذ ذاته هو إجراء ديمقراطي. الموضوع هو فرض إرادة جزء كبير من المجتمع على جزء آخر، وكسره... هذه الرغبة بكسر إرادة جزء آخر من المجتمع بالقوة تؤدي إلى شرخ عميق... يشكل خطرا على عملية التحول الديمقراطي ويستفيد منه أعداء الديمقراطية المعروفون.
11. عملية التحول الديمقراطي طويلة ولن تحسم خلال يومين، ولا حاجة في استعجال التمترس. المهم أن تكون بوصلة جيل شباب ثورة 25 يناير صحيحة، فهم مستقبل مصر العربية الديمقراطية، وليس بقايا الخارطة الحزبية والسياسية القديمة التي تتصارع متطفلة على جهودهم.
"
Wednesday, July 3, 2013
ONtv Live
FANTASTIC COVERAGE.....
IT SIMPLY BOGGLES THE MIND: LIKELY THE LARGEST SIMULTANEOUS UPRISING IN HISTORY, ANYWHERE!
I AM EXTREMELY PROUD OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE....
TAH'YA MASR!
Real News Video: Egyptian Pres. Morsi Strikes Down Army's Ultimatum While Deadline Quickly Approaches
Journalists Rania Al Malky & Mohamed ElMeshad discuss the potential for a coup and whether new elections would delay democracy and usher military rule
Real News Video: US & Qatar Play Hidden, Key Role in Possible Morsi Coup
Mohamed ElMeshad: US & Qatar strongly backed Morsi, but with growing protests future of Morsi's presidency looks dim
Sharif Abdel Kouddous: As Morsi-Army Showdown Grips Egypt, Protesters Reject Authoritarian Rule
Democracy Now!
"Egypt is in a state of crisis as President Mohamed Morsi faces possible ouster from the military.
The Egyptian army is threatening to take over unless Morsi responds to a deadline of today to outline a "roadmap" for reconciliation after millions of Egyptians took to the streets to oppose his government. A leaked plan shows the military is prepared to overthrow Morsi, scrap a draft constitution and impose a government headed by an army general. We go to Egypt to speak with Democracy Now! correspondent Sharif Abdel Kouddous, reporting from Cairo’s Tahrir Square. "The more important struggle is the one that is coming from the ground up — and that is a rejection of authoritarianism and a paternalistic form of government," Kouddous says. "We saw a rejection of Hosni Mubarak that threw him out of office, a rejection of the Supreme Council of the armed forces ruling Egypt, and now a rejection and a revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood. [The people] are revolting against these authoritarian elements that deny them political and economic agency."...."
"Egypt is in a state of crisis as President Mohamed Morsi faces possible ouster from the military.
The Egyptian army is threatening to take over unless Morsi responds to a deadline of today to outline a "roadmap" for reconciliation after millions of Egyptians took to the streets to oppose his government. A leaked plan shows the military is prepared to overthrow Morsi, scrap a draft constitution and impose a government headed by an army general. We go to Egypt to speak with Democracy Now! correspondent Sharif Abdel Kouddous, reporting from Cairo’s Tahrir Square. "The more important struggle is the one that is coming from the ground up — and that is a rejection of authoritarianism and a paternalistic form of government," Kouddous says. "We saw a rejection of Hosni Mubarak that threw him out of office, a rejection of the Supreme Council of the armed forces ruling Egypt, and now a rejection and a revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood. [The people] are revolting against these authoritarian elements that deny them political and economic agency."...."
Novelist Ahdaf Soueif: By Ignoring Egypt’s Majority, Morsi Begat the Uprising Against His Rule
Democracy Now!
"Joining us from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Egyptian writer and activist Ahdaf Soueif says the refusal by Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to run an inclusive government has sparked the massive uprising now seen in the streets. "[Morsi] was not governing Egypt in the interests of Egypt," Soueif says. "He was not even seeing the Egyptian people or their demands and he lost an amazing opportunity to actually have a government that actually worked for the majority of the people." Soueif is the author of a number of books including "The Map of Love" and most recently, "Cairo: My City, Our Revolution."....."
"Joining us from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Egyptian writer and activist Ahdaf Soueif says the refusal by Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to run an inclusive government has sparked the massive uprising now seen in the streets. "[Morsi] was not governing Egypt in the interests of Egypt," Soueif says. "He was not even seeing the Egyptian people or their demands and he lost an amazing opportunity to actually have a government that actually worked for the majority of the people." Soueif is the author of a number of books including "The Map of Love" and most recently, "Cairo: My City, Our Revolution."....."
In Egypt, all eyes are on the army
It looks like the end for Morsi. But the military council must not repeat the disastrous mistakes that got us here in the first place
Magdi Abdelhadi
guardian.co.uk,
Ikhwan Militias!
"There was no way this could end well. Mohamed Morsi and his supporters thought God was on their side, and their opponents concluded that they were up against religious fascists who would turn Egypt into another Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The hyperbole reflects an intensely polarised society and highly charged political atmosphere, where the voice of reason and moderation has been drowned out by the clamour for jihad on one side and for the military to rescue the country on the other.
Morsi clearly thought his speech last night (most probably his last) would be perceived as a heroic stand for democracy. Instead, it was seen by the people he most needed to persuade of his sincerity as a coded message to his most militant followers to unleash war on their fellow Egyptians, viewed as "enemies of the true faith"......
Some predict the end for the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation; others call for its complete annihilation; some warn against a witch-hunt that could exacerbate rather than avert the risk of civil war.
Morsi's biggest political mistake was managing to alienate real and potential allies, thus uniting all his enemies against him....."
Magdi Abdelhadi
guardian.co.uk,
Ikhwan Militias!
"There was no way this could end well. Mohamed Morsi and his supporters thought God was on their side, and their opponents concluded that they were up against religious fascists who would turn Egypt into another Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The hyperbole reflects an intensely polarised society and highly charged political atmosphere, where the voice of reason and moderation has been drowned out by the clamour for jihad on one side and for the military to rescue the country on the other.
Morsi clearly thought his speech last night (most probably his last) would be perceived as a heroic stand for democracy. Instead, it was seen by the people he most needed to persuade of his sincerity as a coded message to his most militant followers to unleash war on their fellow Egyptians, viewed as "enemies of the true faith"......
Some predict the end for the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation; others call for its complete annihilation; some warn against a witch-hunt that could exacerbate rather than avert the risk of civil war.
Morsi's biggest political mistake was managing to alienate real and potential allies, thus uniting all his enemies against him....."
Egypt counts down to army deadline - live updates
Matthew Weaver
guardian.co.uk,
There continue to be conflicting reports about who controls state TV.
The source of the confusion appears to be whether the troops guarding the building are loyal to the president or the army.
Al-Jazeera's Rawya Rageh says the the president's troops guard the building, citing a state radio presenter....."
guardian.co.uk,
State TV
There continue to be conflicting reports about who controls state TV.
The source of the confusion appears to be whether the troops guarding the building are loyal to the president or the army.
Al-Jazeera's Rawya Rageh says the the president's troops guard the building, citing a state radio presenter....."
What would the fall of Morsi mean to the Islamists?
The political crisis in Egypt reached gridlock and the army intervened once again to find a resolution. This has triggered much speculation about the fate of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood
Khalil Al-Anani , Wednesday 3 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
".....The key question now is: what will happen if President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are overthrown? What are the repercussions for the Brotherhood and other Islamist forces? Will Egypt replicate the Algerian model when the army carried out a coup with the support of secularists against the Islamists which resulted in bloodbaths in the 1990s?......
Over the past weeks, I spoke to many senior Brotherhood leaders and was shocked by their utter disregard for the opposition and the popular rage building up against their rule. I realised how badly mistaken they are about the crisis when I asked Mahmoud Hussein, the Brotherhood secretary general, about his expectations for 30 June demonstrations. Hussein said: “A normal day and the people will protect us.” It was then that I realised the Brotherhood is living on another planet and is disconnected from what is happening.
After mass demonstrations on 30 June, I spoke to some Brotherhood leaders and I detected their regret. One of them told me: “We misjudged the situation and we will pay the price.”
The last card the Brotherhood holds today is converting the crisis into a religious and sectarian battle in order to win the sympathy of some sectors in society. I found many Brotherhood youth in Rabaa Al-Adawiya who believe they are defending Islam and Egypt’s identity, not only the president. One leader told me: “The Islamic project is under threat”, which is similar to what Brotherhood leader Mohamed El-Beltagi said: “We will protect President Morsi with our blood.”
If that were true, the Brotherhood will lose everything – not just the presidency."
Khalil Al-Anani , Wednesday 3 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
".....The key question now is: what will happen if President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are overthrown? What are the repercussions for the Brotherhood and other Islamist forces? Will Egypt replicate the Algerian model when the army carried out a coup with the support of secularists against the Islamists which resulted in bloodbaths in the 1990s?......
Over the past weeks, I spoke to many senior Brotherhood leaders and was shocked by their utter disregard for the opposition and the popular rage building up against their rule. I realised how badly mistaken they are about the crisis when I asked Mahmoud Hussein, the Brotherhood secretary general, about his expectations for 30 June demonstrations. Hussein said: “A normal day and the people will protect us.” It was then that I realised the Brotherhood is living on another planet and is disconnected from what is happening.
After mass demonstrations on 30 June, I spoke to some Brotherhood leaders and I detected their regret. One of them told me: “We misjudged the situation and we will pay the price.”
The last card the Brotherhood holds today is converting the crisis into a religious and sectarian battle in order to win the sympathy of some sectors in society. I found many Brotherhood youth in Rabaa Al-Adawiya who believe they are defending Islam and Egypt’s identity, not only the president. One leader told me: “The Islamic project is under threat”, which is similar to what Brotherhood leader Mohamed El-Beltagi said: “We will protect President Morsi with our blood.”
If that were true, the Brotherhood will lose everything – not just the presidency."
That a revolution, as yet undefeated, may succeed
The forces that called for Egypt's 25 January Revolution and the 30 June revolt are by no means homogenous. But do successful revolutions require homogenous revolutionaries?
By Wael Gamal , Tuesday 2 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
".....The swelling popular momentum and its contingencies have shown that the revolution will continue its programme of abolishing the existing system, a programme that many have courted now for nearly two and a half years.
The remarkable effectiveness of youth initiatives, a myriad of which have hiccupped to a halt before fruition, have sprung on a stifled political climate that is full of resentment. The January revolution has not yet realised a single success, with the exception of the ouster of Mubarak and a few of his men, and the dissolution of his ruling party.
In the meantime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and, following on their heels, the Brotherhood, took care to reproduce the old regime, politically, economically and in the security services.
These reproductions were carefully tailored to prevent the translation of changes in the balance of social and political forces (at the hands of millions of ordinary people breaking into the world of politics) into actual authority. Not even one basic reform of the wage system, the redistribution of wealth, or corruption has been realised. The police have undergone no reforms whatsoever, and the security apparatus' grip on society is as tight as ever.
And the poor continue, above all others, to shoulder the deterioration of economic conditions resulting from the insistence of the new rulers on making policy in accordance with the seasoned monopolistic interests that control them. .....
The alternative scenario is of the variety that does not accommodate rulers, or their epigones who provoke political battles through jasmine tea sessions or missions knocking on the doors of Washington. Its calculus resides in practice: a mass and massive ascent that does not content itself with mobilisation in the squares, but rather struggles against the rulers in their economic authority through the general strike.
It is a blitz made possible only through open, clear and visible confrontation against the alliances that work on reproducing the old regime in power, in any and all of its components, in competition or cooperation, from the Brotherhood, to the military, to the older remnants of the regime itself.
This blitz would be a blow. Its victory would open the door to a new politics and a new order whose institutions, ruling parties and prevailing democratic and organisational structures are created in the battle, and not before it, for the struggle conditions these structures, and not the opposite.
Short of this assault, the June offering remains a pressure point whose importance lies in the size and significance of popular and broad-based mobilisation, and whose growth increasingly circumscribes the policies of the counter-revolution in both its wings.
It would be a pressure point that paves the way for another, forthcoming and inevitable battle, under a single banner representing our revolution: the people demand the downfall of the system."
By Wael Gamal , Tuesday 2 Jul 2013
Ahram Online
".....The swelling popular momentum and its contingencies have shown that the revolution will continue its programme of abolishing the existing system, a programme that many have courted now for nearly two and a half years.
The remarkable effectiveness of youth initiatives, a myriad of which have hiccupped to a halt before fruition, have sprung on a stifled political climate that is full of resentment. The January revolution has not yet realised a single success, with the exception of the ouster of Mubarak and a few of his men, and the dissolution of his ruling party.
In the meantime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and, following on their heels, the Brotherhood, took care to reproduce the old regime, politically, economically and in the security services.
These reproductions were carefully tailored to prevent the translation of changes in the balance of social and political forces (at the hands of millions of ordinary people breaking into the world of politics) into actual authority. Not even one basic reform of the wage system, the redistribution of wealth, or corruption has been realised. The police have undergone no reforms whatsoever, and the security apparatus' grip on society is as tight as ever.
And the poor continue, above all others, to shoulder the deterioration of economic conditions resulting from the insistence of the new rulers on making policy in accordance with the seasoned monopolistic interests that control them. .....
The alternative scenario is of the variety that does not accommodate rulers, or their epigones who provoke political battles through jasmine tea sessions or missions knocking on the doors of Washington. Its calculus resides in practice: a mass and massive ascent that does not content itself with mobilisation in the squares, but rather struggles against the rulers in their economic authority through the general strike.
It is a blitz made possible only through open, clear and visible confrontation against the alliances that work on reproducing the old regime in power, in any and all of its components, in competition or cooperation, from the Brotherhood, to the military, to the older remnants of the regime itself.
This blitz would be a blow. Its victory would open the door to a new politics and a new order whose institutions, ruling parties and prevailing democratic and organisational structures are created in the battle, and not before it, for the struggle conditions these structures, and not the opposite.
Short of this assault, the June offering remains a pressure point whose importance lies in the size and significance of popular and broad-based mobilisation, and whose growth increasingly circumscribes the policies of the counter-revolution in both its wings.
It would be a pressure point that paves the way for another, forthcoming and inevitable battle, under a single banner representing our revolution: the people demand the downfall of the system."
General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi: top brass ready to defend the people
Egyptian military chief who issued ultimatum to Mohamed Morsi has history of Islamist sympathy, so motives are questioned
Ian Black, Middle East editor
guardian.co.uk,
Ian Black, Middle East editor
guardian.co.uk,
Tuesday, July 2, 2013
Egypt's revolution hones its skills
Tamarod demonstrates the ability to converge technological innovations and maintain the public's trust and attention.
Al-Jazeera
A protester holds a poster that says, "Tamarod, the end of the Muslim Brotherhood's regime," in Cairo, June 30 [AP]
|
"Since Mubarak's dramatic toppling on February 11, 2011, Egypt has been centre stage in most discussions, theoretical and methodological, on the role of social media in political communication and dissent. There is no shortage of treatments on the topic from the popular press to scholarly writings. In just two years, notable manuscripts have been published that tackle every aspect of these online activities.[1] And while most of these address this question from complimentary perspectives, they are nevertheless confined to actions in the past rather than developments in the present or what might be anticipated in the future. With Egypt on the eve of another dramatic showdown between the pro-Morsi groups and swelling numbers of dissenting demonstrators, it would be valuable to examine how this movement, known as "Tamarod" (Rebellion), adopted and innovated previously employed communication strategies....." |
Lessons of the Egyptian revolution
Have
the military learned what Morsi failed to learn?
By Brian Whitaker
"....
By Brian Whitaker
"....
At the same time, though, I’m not sure that it’s wise to dump
Morsi – at least, not yet. If he’s forced out of office now, the Brotherhood
will claim to have been robbed by anti-democratic forces – and that will create
more problems for the future. But there’s still no sign, even after the Sunday
protests, that he’s ready to make the necessary compromises – and for that
reason he may have to go.
The great unknown quantity in all this is of course the
Egyptian military. Are the generals merely trying – as their statements suggest
– to nudge the politicians towards a solution, or is the country on the brink of
an old-style coup?
Many Egyptians are fearful, and with good reason. But – and
it’s a very important “but” – the revolution has changed the game for the
military as much as it has for the Brotherhood. If the military fail to
recognise that, they can expect to pay the price eventually, just as Morsi is
doing now."
Egypt, Brazil, Turkey: without politics, protest is at the mercy of the elites
From Egypt to Brazil, street action is driving change, but organisation is essential if it's not to be hijacked or disarmed
Seumas Milne
The Guardian,
".....
In the era of neoliberalism, when the ruling elite has hollowed out democracy and ensured that whoever you vote for you get the same, politically inchoate protest movements are bound to flourish. They have crucial strengths: they can change moods, ditch policies and topple governments. But without socially rooted organisation and clear political agendas, they can flare and fizzle, or be vulnerable to hijacking or diversion by more entrenched and powerful forces.
That also goes for revolutions – and is what appears to be happening in Egypt. Many activists regard traditional political parties and movements as redundant in the internet age. But that's an argument for new forms of political and social organisation. Without it, the elites will keep control – however spectacular the protests."
Seumas Milne
The Guardian,
".....
In the era of neoliberalism, when the ruling elite has hollowed out democracy and ensured that whoever you vote for you get the same, politically inchoate protest movements are bound to flourish. They have crucial strengths: they can change moods, ditch policies and topple governments. But without socially rooted organisation and clear political agendas, they can flare and fizzle, or be vulnerable to hijacking or diversion by more entrenched and powerful forces.
That also goes for revolutions – and is what appears to be happening in Egypt. Many activists regard traditional political parties and movements as redundant in the internet age. But that's an argument for new forms of political and social organisation. Without it, the elites will keep control – however spectacular the protests."
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