An Important Analysis by Stratfor and Highly Recommended Reading
via uruknet.info
"Summary
The chief of the Iranian judiciary praised a bilateral U.S.-Iraqi security agreement Nov. 17, the day after the pact was signed, marking a 180-degree turn from Iran’s previous statements about the deal. The change in tone suggests that the agreement has been tweaked to allay Iranian concerns, and it indicates a desire in Tehran to engage in fruitful negotiations with Washington.
Analysis
The head of Iran’s judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, publicly lauded the bilateral security pact between the United States and Iraq on Nov. 17, claiming that the Iraqi government acted "very well" in approving the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that will permit U.S. troops to remain in Iraq until 2011.
Shahroudi’s comments mark the first time an Iranian official, particularly one of his stature, has shown any positive inclination toward the SOFA. It probably is not a coincidence that his statement comes a day after the Iraqi Cabinet approved the SOFA, leaving it up to the Iraqi parliament for final approval.
Prior to Shahroudi’s remarks, Iran had repeatedly denounced the SOFA agreement, and had used proxies in Iraq to coerce Iraqi politicians into either rejecting the deal outright or ensuring that the pact places severe limitations on the future U.S. military presence in Iraq. Iran’s concerns over the pact are warranted. The SOFA essentially guarantees a U.S. military presence in Iraq for at least another three years, thereby denying Iran the opportunity to exert its will on Baghdad, and prolonging Tehran’s deep anxiety over having a large number of U.S. forces just across its western border.
Shahroudi is a high-level figure in the Iranian government. He was appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to head the judiciary in 1999. Of Iraqi origin, he previously led the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (now known as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq — Iraq’s largest Shiite political party, and the one most closely aligned with Iran) when the party was still based in Tehran in the 1980s. Shahroudi also is a mentor to Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in the latter’s quest to reach ayatollah status. Given Shahroudi’s close connection to al-Sadr and the fact that al-Sadr’s faction has been the Shiite party most vocally opposed to the SOFA, it makes sense that Shahroudi was chosen to issue what can be understood as the official Iranian position on the SOFA. Shahroudi is evidently someone with enough clout and influence among the Iraqi Shiite community to be taken seriously, leading us to believe that Iran is implicitly giving its sign-off to the SOFA and is likely signaling to Washington that it will do its part to ensure the agreement survives a vote in the Iraqi parliament.
To have Iran to give a nod to the SOFA at this stage in the game, the United States surely must have offered Tehran something in return. It is unclear exactly what that something was, but it most likely concerned placing more stringent conditions on the U.S. military presence in Iraq over the next three years, with a guarantee of withdrawal in 2011. In the original text, the United States sought to make the language on the withdrawal dates much more conditional, dependent on the security situation on the ground and the preferences of the Iraqi government. While the Iraqi government can still ask the United States to stay in Iraq after 2011, U.S. military power in the country is still undoubtedly circumscribed in the agreement: U.S. soldiers must withdraw from Iraq’s population centers to bases by mid-2009, must hand over detainees to Iraqi authorities and must seek warrants from Iraqi courts to execute any arrests.
This might be a draft the Iranians can live with, but the backchannel communications between Tehran and Washington likely produced additional security guarantees in order to convince the Iranian regime to sanction the deal. The fact that this is taking place at the tail end of the Bush presidency signals an Iranian willingness to set the stage for fruitful negotiations with the Obama presidency over Iraq, sooner rather than later."
via uruknet.info
"Summary
The chief of the Iranian judiciary praised a bilateral U.S.-Iraqi security agreement Nov. 17, the day after the pact was signed, marking a 180-degree turn from Iran’s previous statements about the deal. The change in tone suggests that the agreement has been tweaked to allay Iranian concerns, and it indicates a desire in Tehran to engage in fruitful negotiations with Washington.
Analysis
The head of Iran’s judiciary, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, publicly lauded the bilateral security pact between the United States and Iraq on Nov. 17, claiming that the Iraqi government acted "very well" in approving the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that will permit U.S. troops to remain in Iraq until 2011.
Shahroudi’s comments mark the first time an Iranian official, particularly one of his stature, has shown any positive inclination toward the SOFA. It probably is not a coincidence that his statement comes a day after the Iraqi Cabinet approved the SOFA, leaving it up to the Iraqi parliament for final approval.
Prior to Shahroudi’s remarks, Iran had repeatedly denounced the SOFA agreement, and had used proxies in Iraq to coerce Iraqi politicians into either rejecting the deal outright or ensuring that the pact places severe limitations on the future U.S. military presence in Iraq. Iran’s concerns over the pact are warranted. The SOFA essentially guarantees a U.S. military presence in Iraq for at least another three years, thereby denying Iran the opportunity to exert its will on Baghdad, and prolonging Tehran’s deep anxiety over having a large number of U.S. forces just across its western border.
Shahroudi is a high-level figure in the Iranian government. He was appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to head the judiciary in 1999. Of Iraqi origin, he previously led the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (now known as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq — Iraq’s largest Shiite political party, and the one most closely aligned with Iran) when the party was still based in Tehran in the 1980s. Shahroudi also is a mentor to Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in the latter’s quest to reach ayatollah status. Given Shahroudi’s close connection to al-Sadr and the fact that al-Sadr’s faction has been the Shiite party most vocally opposed to the SOFA, it makes sense that Shahroudi was chosen to issue what can be understood as the official Iranian position on the SOFA. Shahroudi is evidently someone with enough clout and influence among the Iraqi Shiite community to be taken seriously, leading us to believe that Iran is implicitly giving its sign-off to the SOFA and is likely signaling to Washington that it will do its part to ensure the agreement survives a vote in the Iraqi parliament.
To have Iran to give a nod to the SOFA at this stage in the game, the United States surely must have offered Tehran something in return. It is unclear exactly what that something was, but it most likely concerned placing more stringent conditions on the U.S. military presence in Iraq over the next three years, with a guarantee of withdrawal in 2011. In the original text, the United States sought to make the language on the withdrawal dates much more conditional, dependent on the security situation on the ground and the preferences of the Iraqi government. While the Iraqi government can still ask the United States to stay in Iraq after 2011, U.S. military power in the country is still undoubtedly circumscribed in the agreement: U.S. soldiers must withdraw from Iraq’s population centers to bases by mid-2009, must hand over detainees to Iraqi authorities and must seek warrants from Iraqi courts to execute any arrests.
This might be a draft the Iranians can live with, but the backchannel communications between Tehran and Washington likely produced additional security guarantees in order to convince the Iranian regime to sanction the deal. The fact that this is taking place at the tail end of the Bush presidency signals an Iranian willingness to set the stage for fruitful negotiations with the Obama presidency over Iraq, sooner rather than later."
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