An uphill battle on Baghdad's mean streets

By Brian M Downing
Asia Times

".....As attuned as anyone to recent announcements, insurgent leaders, who have thus far demonstrated formidable tactical skills and increased cooperation among factions, know precisely where and roughly when the new phase will start. Preparations have almost certainly begun. Arms caches, observation positions, fields of fire and tiers of explosive devices are probably being set up for a defense in depth throughout Sunni Baghdad.

Insurgent leaders probably know they cannot defeat the US and Iraqi troops in the battle of Baghdad, at least not in the usual sense. They will seek to inflict high casualties on US and Iraqi troops, force US firepower to devastate Baghdad at least as much as it did Fallujah, and attempt to cause Iraqi army units to disintegrate or at least balk.

They will create diversionary uprisings elsewhere in the Sunni Triangle, strike into Shi'ite neighborhoods of Baghdad, and attempt to cut off the city from fuel and food supplies.

Insurgents will be bolstered by the expectation that high US casualties and the devastation of large parts of Baghdad will decisively transform US opinion into wide and intense opposition insisting on a rapid withdrawal from Iraq, however graceless that might be.

The battle of Baghdad will be furious, and because of its proximity to the Green Zone it will be televised. It will be watched with keen interest throughout the Arab world, which sees in these events the possibility, perhaps now the likelihood, of a long-standing hope - Arabs strategically defeating Americans......

A further aspect in gauging a counterinsurgency's prospects is the sophistication of insurgent organizations. The Ba'ath Party, through which Saddam Hussein ruled, provides important organizational strengths. It had existed clandestinely for many years since the 1940s and, either out of paranoia or astute assessment of domestic and foreign dangers, retained, even while in power, the ability to flee underground and fight its way back to power. The redoubtable Ba'athist cell network now serves as a basis for clandestine operations.

The old Iraqi army figures too. Former officers bring organizational skills, an extant command structure and expertise in weaponry, especially in infantry tactics, mortars and explosives. Disgraced by the seemingly invincible US military twice and dishonored by unceremonious demobilization after Baghdad fell, they burn for vengeance. Guerrilla forces, more suitable to their society and culture than conventional formations, are making vengeance look attainable. Tribal and religious networks also provide organizational patterns and impart moral energies to guerrillas......"